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The PRESS IMPRINT

September and October 1927

A New Old Testament

As advance accounts in the newspapers some time ago intimated J. M. Powis Smith of the University of Chicago, Theophile J. Meek of the University of Toronto, Alex. R. Gordon of the United Theological College and McGill University, and Leroy Waterman of the University of Michigan, have completed their American Translation of the Old Testament. The excitement that the new version has caused in the daily press recalls that brought forth by the appearance of the Goodspeed translation of the New Testament four years ago.

While controversy rages the translators let the matter rest as stated in their Preface to the translation:

"Why should anyone make a new English version of the Old Testament? With the Authorized Version of King James and the British and American revisions, to say nothing of unofficial renderings, have we not enough? This question may quite fairly be asked. The only possible basis for a satisfactory answer must be either in a better knowledge of Hebrew, or in a fuller appreciation of fundamental textual problems, or in a clearer recognition of poetic structures, or in such a change in our own language as would render the language of the older translations more or less unintelligible to the average man of our day. As a matter of fact, our answer must be found in all of these.

"The most urgent demand for a new translation comes from the field of Hebrew scholarship. The control of Hebrew vocabulary and syntax available to the scholar of today is vastly greater than that at the command of the translators of the Authorized Version, or of its revisers.

"Modern studies of textual problems reinforce the need for a new rendering. . . . . The science of textual criticism has made great progress in recent years, and no translation of the Old Testament can afford to ignore its results. Our guiding principle has been that the official Massoretic text must be adhered to as long as it made satisfactory sense. . . . .

"Much of the text that has long passed as prose is now recognized as really poetic both in form and spirit. This adds to the necessity for a new translation. Poetry should not be printed as prose. The present translation brings into clear light many of the hidden beauties of Hebrew poetry. . . . .

"The English of King James's day is not wholly natural or clear to the average man of the present day. . . . . The use of 'vinegar' in the sense of a wine or liquor for drinking has long since ceased to be recognized. . . . . Facts like these make the reading of the Bible a scholarly rather than a religious exercise, and clearly point to the need for a new translation. . . . .

"The content of the Old Testament is, with little exception, on a high literary plane. The language of the translation, therefore, cannot be allowed to fall to the level of the street. In this translation the foregoing principles have been kept clearly in mind. It tries to be American in the sense that the writings of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Wilson are American . . . . it aims at being easily understood wherever English is spoken. . . . .

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"The translators and the University of Chicago Press have sought to give this translation the appearance of a modern book. This purpose has determined the make-up of the page and has led to the addition of headings for paragraphs, and to the *insertion of half-titles before* individual books. It has also kept verse numbers out of the text and relegated them to the margin. . . . ."

In the best tradition of modern English writing this new version interprets the impressive, eloquent Hebrew of centuries ago.

The following passage from "The Song of Songs, Which Is Solomon's" is illustrative of those sections which the translators have cast into poetic form:

THE MAIDEN TO THE YOUTH

Kiss me with kisses from your mouth,
for your love is better than wine;
the fragrance of your ointments is sweet;
Your very self is a precious ointment;
therefore do the maidens love you.
Take me along with you, let us hasten;
bring me, O king, into your chamber,
That we may exult and rejoice in you,
that we may praise your love more than wine;
rightly are you loved.

And here is a part of the story of Ruth in the new translation:

RUTH'S APPEAL TO BOAZ

Then her mother-in-law Naomi said to her,

"Should I not be seeking a home for you, my daughter, where you may be comfortable? Now then, what about our relative Boaz, with whose women you have been? See, he is going to winnow barley at the threshing-floor tonight. Wash and anoint yourself therefore, put on your best clothes, and go down to the threshing-floor; but do not let your presence be known to the man until he has finished eating and drinking. See to it, however, when he lies down, that you note the place where he lies; then go in, uncover his feet, and lie down yourself; he will let you know what to do."

"I will do just as you say," she responded.

So she went down to the threshing-floor, and did just as her mother-in-law had instructed her. When Boaz had eaten and drunk, and felt content, he went to lie down at the end of the grain-heap. Then she came in stealthily, uncovered his feet, and lay down. At midnight the man started up, and turning over, discovered a woman lying at his feet!

"Who are you?" he said.

"I am Ruth, your maidservant," she said. "Take your maidservant in marriage; for you are a near relative."

"May the Lord bless you, my girl!" he said. "This last kindness of yours is lovelier than the first, in that you have not run after the young men, either poor or rich. And now, my girl, have no fear; I will do all that you ask; for all the counselors of my people know that you are a fine woman. . . . ."

THE OLD TESTAMENT: AN AMERICAN TRANSLATION. Edited by J. M. Powis Smith. *Cloth $7.50, leather $10.00, postage 25 cents extra.*

Silly? Crazy? Damnable Heresy?

Since the appearance of his *Jesus: A New Biography*, Shirley Jackson Case has been heralded from the Atlantic to the Pacific by newspaper reporters as the arch-heretic of the century. Dr. Case, in attempting to show the modern reader "not the Jesus of the stained-glass window, but the Jesus who lived and walked with men," has, it seems, done something exceedingly sensational. The feeling of the publishers about the matter, however, has been expressed by the Nashville *Presbyterian Advance*, a by no means radical magazine, better than they could do it themselves:

"It appears that Professor Shirley Case, who has published several excellent volumes, has written a book on the life of Jesus. It is not yet published. [It has since appeared.] Some newspaper writer, however, learned something about the book and wrote a sensational story affirming that in the new book Dr. Case declares that Jesus did not affirm his own divinity. Whether this is a fact or not remains to be seen, but on the basis of the assertion of the 'exclusive story' (unfortunately the word 'exclusive' in such cases has come to have about the meaning of 'lying' to discriminating readers) other reporters got busy and interviewed some ministers. These ministers, without having seen the book, promptly proceeded to call it 'crazy' and 'silly' and at least two of them are quoted as calling it 'damnable heresy.' If there is

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anything 'crazy' or 'silly' about the whole business, it is to be found in those persons who so violently denounce what they know absolutely nothing about, except on the 'say-so' of some untrained reporter who is probably unable to distinguish between theological dogmas and historical facts."

Hasty and popular as they are, entirely oblivious to the unique methods of scholarship upon which Dr. Case's biography rests, the newspaper accounts have nevertheless shown one significant thing: that the public is intensely interested in new interpretations of Jesus' life and work. The modern reader is eager to look back over the intervening centuries to Jesus as he actually was.

Professor Case has long been known as a scholar who has studied, more fruitfully, perhaps, than any other, the social background of early Christianity. His method has been his most original contribution. It has enabled him to bring the reader of today into direct contact with the environment of beginning Christianity. It enabled him to dispel in his *Historicity of Jesus* the recurring hoaxes that treat Jesus' existence as a myth. And it has now made it possible for him to bring the reader closer than ever before to the real Jesus of history, as he appeared to the men of his own time in Palestine over 1900 years ago.

Within the past few years there have been many unhistorical and sentimental lives of Jesus, but there has not been a biography dealing in so thoroughgoing a fashion with the results of scientific investigation. *JESUS: A NEW BIOGRAPHY*. By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. *$3.00, postpaid $3.15.*

* * *

The Ten Princes

Somewhere beyond the Himalaya Mountains lies Magadha, a land notorious for its unscrupulous delight in sensuous beauty and its ribald worldly wisdom. From this country, at a time when its people were gay, in love with poetry and pleasure, and shamelessly given to lying, fared Rajavahana and nine companion princes to conquer the four quarters of the universe. Dandin told the story of their adventures over a thousand years ago in *The Ten Princes*, his only prose novel. Arthur W. Ryder has retold it in a translation which retains the beauty of the original and adds a modern piquancy.



It seems that Rajavahana disappeared, and the nine companion princes, scattering to find him, met with a series of gay adventures in the course of which each gained a throne and an incredibly beautiful lady. Mr. Ryder's translation is a racy re-telling of Dandin's record, first of Rajavahana's experiences, and, as the other princes rejoin him, of their own exploits, related by them with appropriate flourishes and due exaggeration.

In these adventurers runs a pronounced strain of the picaresque. But rascals as they undoubtedly are, they must nevertheless be accredited with pleasant accomplishments. Handsome as no other mortals, erudite in ethics, astronomy, and metaphysics, they have a gift for the lute, are masters of magic, excel in horsemanship, and possess a scientific skill in thievery, gambling, and the arts of deception in general.

In their travels, they meet many beautiful maidens (versed in the arts of flirtation both major and minor), whom they charm by artifice and natural endowment, and describe in warm detail. And through their stories troop as great a crowd of shady characters, curious villains, and examples of shining virtues, as ever emerged from an oriental fancy: Buddhist nuns, unfaithful wives, sages, rakes, and kings, gay girls and gods, court ladies, merchants, thieves. Each has his appropriate philosophy which the princes remember to the last degree of subtlety, and readily report, whether the subject be the conduct of courtesans or the rules of political science.

Dandin was the master of a beautiful prose

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style which has not lost in the translating. One feature of his art is sententious brevity. He looked upon prose as a more exacting medium than poetry itself. Of his life we know little more than that he flourished in India in the seventh Christian century. *THE TEN PRINCES.* Translated by ARTHUR W. RYDER. *$2.00, postpaid $2.10.*

Arthur W. Ryder has also translated from the Sanskrit *The Panchatantra* and *Gold's Gloom.* Achmed Abdulla says of *The Panchatantra:* "Fairytales. But Fairytales for grown-ups. Fairytales suffused with a wisdom that is ironic, slightly bitter, wire-drawn, perfectly civilized. Mr. Ryder's translation is most excellent. It shows not only a thorough knowledge of the subject but understanding, sympathy, style, and a keen sense of humor."

Gold's Gloom is bound in exceptionally attractive form, with bright-hued covers, and a specially designed title-page and headbands by Preissig. The quintessence of the wisdom and charm of *The Panchatantra,* it is a representative selection of some of the most captivating stories in the world. *THE PANCHATANTRA. $4.00, postpaid $4.15. GOLD'S GLOOM: TALES FROM THE PANCHATANTRA. $2.00, postpaid $2.10.* Translated from the Sanskrit by ARTHUR W. RYDER.

The World and Man

Critics unite in calling *The Nature of the World and of Man,* by Sixteen Ranking Scientists of the University of Chicago, one of the finest and most engrossing popularizations of current science in existence. A handsome new edition, with bright-hued covers, has just appeared. In accordance with its authors' wish that it should always represent the most recent knowledge of science, revisions have been made throughout the book.

Forest Ray Moulton, the astronomer, says of the volume's theme: "The Nature of the World and of Man is not only a great subject—in fact, the greatest one that human beings may investigate—but it is one rich in romance and filled with stirring adventure. It will satisfy, if anything can, the love of youth for heroic things. The giants of mythological days are far surpassed by the huge machines that are the untiring slaves of modern men. The eye of the fabled Cyclops was not even prophetic of the great telescope on Mount Wilson, the pupil of whose eye, so to speak, is 100 inches in diameter. Not all the magic of antiquity can match the marvels of any chemical laboratory. Physicians cast out demons by means of surgery, by the use of extracts of ductless glands, and by prescribing chemical compounds, and if they have not raised the dead even in a single instance, they have at least within a few decades increased the average span of human life by ten or fifteen years. . . . . In fact, reason and the laws of nature (mark well *reason* and the *laws of nature*) have become a sort of intellectual telescope, as it were, with which modern science looks back across the geological ages. . . . ."

THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN. By SIXTEEN RANKING SCIENTISTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. *$5.00, postpaid $5.15.* (*Textbook Edition $4.00, postpaid $4.15.*)

More Contemporary Americans

In his second series of appraisals of American life and letters, Mr. Boynton gives the reader an unusual view of public taste in America, a view marked by absence of ridicule and obloquy, in short, a glimpse of what American culture has to show on the positive side. The design of the book centers around the theme that certain fine inherited traditions are surviving, that the public is not oblivious to them, and that a new public is developing with a taste distinctly its own.

Beginning with Melville, Bierce, and Hearn, men who wrote before their time and who belong in spirit to the present

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day, Mr. Boynton proceeds to Hergesheimer, Anderson, and Lewis. Believing that it is as necessary for the critic to see and declare what the artist is trying to express as for him to discuss the mode of expression, he conducts the reader to the very center of each artist's own particular world.

Various aspects of the American scene from Paul Whiteman and the movies to the college insurgents appear in a lively discussion that ranges freely over the seven arts and over the traditions and innovations of American life. *MORE CONTEMPORARY AMERICANS*. By Percy Holmes Boynton. *$2.50, postpaid $2.60.*

Some Contemporary Americans, Mr. Boynton's previous book, still retains its popularity. In it he interprets the drama, the short story, and the poet's art from his background of American life and tradition, and gives his personal reactions to the new modes, forms, and men.

Sandburg, Dreiser, Mencken, Robinson, Frost, Lowell, Wharton, Tarkington, Cabell, Cather, O'Neill, and Bradford appear in this brilliant and engaging series of estimates of contemporary American literature. *SOME CONTEMPORARY AMERICANS*. By Percy Holmes Boynton. *$2.00, postpaid $2.10.*

Chinese Painting

An extraordinarily beautiful volume with fifty-seven plates in collotype is *Chinese Painting* by John C. Ferguson. Chinese art as it really is and as it is valued by the country that fostered it is written into this book with authority and understanding.

Mr. Ferguson's qualifications for judging the art of China by Chinese standards—as it must be done—are many. For thirty-five years he has lived in China in close association with all the connoisseurs and critics of his day, who have been his guides in the examination of extant specimens of writing and painting.

Beginning with the earliest records of China, Mr. Ferguson has written the history of painting in that country to the eighteenth century. The introductory paragraph is characteristic of the spirit of the book:

"More than three hundred years ago Chang Ch'ou wrote in the Preface to his *Ch'ing-ho Shu Hua Fang* that he would like to be transferred into a bookworm, and promised that he would not injure any of the manuscripts or paintings in which he lived, but would be contented with mere existence in their company. Such was the delight with which one of the ablest critics of Chinese writings and paintings reveled in his enormous task of separating the good from the bad, the genuine from the false, among the accumulated ink-remains of previous generations. If Chang Ch'ou could have had his wish gratified by becoming a bookworm, he would not have been of that variety which Emerson placed in contrast with 'Man Thinking,' for he had a keen mind. His wish was the measure of his appreciation of the worthy writings and paintings that came under his observation. These were the products of man's soul and were quite unlike the work of man's hands in bronze or clay or jade. Through these writings and paintings Chang Ch'ou held communion with the spirits of the great artists and calligraphists who preceded him, and in their unseen world there were no limits of time or space." *CHINESE PAINTING*. By John C. Ferguson. *Boxed, $12.50, postpaid $12.75.*



Roosevelt

Turning aside from the hero-worship which has in the past been an almost unavoidable snare to biographers, however desirous of presenting Roosevelt as he actually was, Howard C. Hill has written a book which even at this late date shows Roosevelt in a new light.

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The Business Life of Ancient Athens

By GEORGE CALHOUN

Many aspects of the life of the ancient Athenian have been made familiar, but we know very little of the busy docks and markets in the Piraeus, of the financial district where capital was mobilized and put to work, or the industrial region around Laurium, almost modern in its dirtiness and desolation. In short, for the first time the general reader may now learn the way in which business and finance were carried on in the fourth century B.C. Mr. Calhoun has chosen to emphasize the personal and ethical aspects of the subject rather than the technical processes or purely economic data. His exposition of the ancient Athenians' aims and ideals, their standards of honesty, is offered as a step toward a better appreciation of what business has contributed to the slow building up of the standards and ideals which serve as a background to the commercial activities of the modern world.

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The source material to which Mr. Hill has had access is more extensive than Roosevelt's biographers and historians have hitherto found available. Of this material, the most important part is the Roosevelt papers of the Library of Congress, to which only two or three others besides Mr. Hill have ever been given access. Although perhaps a quarter of his notes were censored by the official in charge, his book still includes the greatest amount of material that has ever been taken from this source.

Roosevelt the man, the creator of the Roosevelt myth, Mr. Hill would place before Roosevelt the statesman. Representative of Mr. Hill's view of Roosevelt in his official capacity is the following: "Rooseveltian imperialism as manifested in the Caribbean was opportunist in character, not planned or predetermined. Like the conscript fathers of ancient Rome, Roosevelt was led from one action to another by the swift current of events which during his administration seemed to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. . . . . With each problem he dealt in the manner of a practical man of affairs rather than in the fashion of the doctrinaire or the man of predetermined policies."

The Boston Transcript comments, "We have Professor Hill to thank for a most interesting glimpse of our ex-President. . . . . He does not hammer away at his conclusions; he presents them gently. . . . . He invites us to strike a compromise, and therefore proves himself a most gracious gentleman, quite unlike any of his kind in the past or present. In his book we find for the student, an essay; for the interested reader, a narrative; for everyone, a striking portrait penned upon a background of living detail."

Harry Hansen in the *New York World* calls Mr. Hill's book "the sober second thought of the historian . . . . a very able study." And the *Herald-Tribune* says, "Professor Hill has turned the X-ray of historical criticism upon Roosevelt's Caribbean policy." *ROOSEVELT AND THE CARIBBEAN.* By HOWARD C. HILL. *$2.50, postpaid $2.60.*

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The Platonism of Joachim du Bellay

By ROBERT V. MERRILL

This study deals with Platonism in the works of Joachim du Bellay, offering an estimate of its character, its sources, and its position in the poet's spirit. The introductory portion sketches the history of literary Platonism in France, and is followed by an analysis of Platonistic *procédés* used by Du Bellay. There is a conclusion summarizing the results of the whole investigation.

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THE GREEK ORIGINS OF THE IDEA OF COSMOPOLITANISM

HUGH HARRIS

"Patriotism," said Horatio Smith, "is too often the hatred of other countries disguised as love of our own"; and this sentiment was re-echoed by Nurse Cavell in her famous phrase, "Patriotism is not enough." Opposed to the perverted and restricted patriotism which is here condemned is the conception of cosmopolitanism. In the last few years this conception has gained much support. Thus, the First International Congress on Child Welfare held in August, 1925, at Geneva and attended by delegates from over fifty different nations, passed a resolution, "That in every country the education of the child, while based in the first place on patriotic sentiment, should be directed toward a wider love, namely, that of humanity at large." Similarly, Professor H. J. Laski (*A Grammar of Politics*, p. 642) has recently emphasized the necessity for "a liberal education in that cosmopolitan outlook which the needs of humanity have made so essential." Although the circumstance of the great war has certainly given cosmopolitanism its present intellectual currency, yet we should do well to remember that it is no merely ephemeral doctrine, but one that has been transmitted to us through the ages.

The earliest recorded formulation of this idea is supplied by modern archaeological discovery at Tell-el-Amarna, in Egypt. Inscriptions have been found there, written by Akhnaton (pharaoh of Egypt from 1375 to 1358 B.C.), which indi-

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cate that this ruler preached a universalistic monotheism and regarded himself as owing the same duties to all men, irrespective of race or nationality. But this was an isolated phenomenon, without any apparent influence on the subsequent history of human thought. The same idea, however, as it was expounded by the Hebrews and developed in the biblical literature, has had permanent and far-reaching results. And, together with the Hebraic contribution on this subject, modern civilization is particularly indebted to the Hellenic contribution. For, as far as we know from historical records, the ancient Greeks were the first of Europeans to promulgate this idea, and it is from them that Western civilization has directly inherited it.

There is a prevalent opinion—which, as I think, needs correcting—that prior to the Alexandrian age and to the foundation of the Stoic school, Greek thought had not advanced beyond the conceptions of a narrow city-state patriotism and of an irreconcilable barrier between Hellenes and barbarians. It is my object to show that the first beginnings of this idea of cosmopolitanism are to be found in the earlier classical period of Greek thought. I think we may recognize four main lines of approach by which the more enlightened of the Greeks arrived at the idea: the poetic, the scientific, the philosophical, and the religious. And each of these seems to me to have a bearing on the problem as it presents itself to the modern world.

The first approach is what I have designated the poetic. From the time of Homer onward poetry has enabled its followers to look away from their native heath to the horizon beyond. Imaginative fancy is of the very essence of poetry. "Ever let the fancy roam, pleasure never is at home." It is in this spirit that Homer pictures the fabulously happy life of the Phaeacians, and describes the Abii, who live far away in the North, as "the justest of men," and the Ethiopians, who represent the dark-skinned races of Asia and Africa, as "blameless." He makes Menelaus boast in words that are full of romance:

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"I roamed over Cyprus and Phoenicia and Egypt, and came to Ethiopians and Sidonians and Erembians and Libya." The *Odyssey* is concerned with the adventures and travels of the hero who "saw the cities and knew the minds of many men." His nostalgia is certainly shown, but it is in the true Homeric strain that Tennyson represents his wanderlust as incurable.

Homer is a proof that the artistic imagination not only sees the cities of many men, but also comes to know their minds. His poetic insight into human nature enables him to draw the characters of both friend and foe with understanding sympathy. In the scene between Priam and Achilles the spirit of humanism finds most pronounced expression. Priam ventures, as one man to another, to appeal to the good will of his enemy, and Achilles becomes sensible of a human solidarity founded upon a common destiny. Homer's freedom from patriotic prejudices is indeed remarkable. Many readers of the *Iliad* have felt that his sympathy was with Hector quite as much as with Achilles, and an effort has even been made to prove that he was a poet at the court of the Trojan Priam.

The Homeric poems were recited by the rhapsodes—reciters who wandered from city to city and thus helped in the spread of a common culture between the different Greek states. Further, so far from arousing hostility toward the traditional enemies of the Greeks, the effect of their recitation seems rather to have been the enlisting of sympathy. Plato, in his *Ion,* records how when the rhapsode is reciting the sorrows of Andromache, Hecuba, or Priam, his soul in ecstasy appears to be far away in Troy, and his eyes fill with tears; and how he produces a similar effect on the spectators.

It is the true Homeric tradition of a sympathy transcending patriotism which Euripides follows in some of his Trojan themes. In the *Trojan Women,* for example, far from dilating on the glory won by the Greeks, Euripides depicts the cruelties and atrocities which war caused them to commit upon the Trojans. Again, in the *Andromache,* Hermione's remark that

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"Barbarians' laws are not a standard for our city," receives the reply from the captive Andromache: "Alike in Asia and in Hellas infamy attends base actions." The genius of Euripides lay essentially in psychological drama which demanded an impartial interest in the emotions of all human hearts, whether their country was Greece, Troy, Taurica, Egypt, Tyre, Lydia, Mysia, or Ethiopia. He pointed to a human nature beyond the accidents of citizenship and race, and regarded each man's natural endowments as being his true fatherland. Accordingly, he said: "Man finds a native country wherever the earth nourishes him." Even more finely expressed are some other words of his: "The whole expanse of air is open to the eagle's flight, and every land is native soil to the noble man."

Thus did the Greeks show that the human soul cannot be "cabined, cribbed, confined" within its native land, but is free to wander abroad on the wings of poetry. And more than any other branch of literature, poetry has continued to be permeated with the spirit of cosmopolitanism. The long history of the foreign influences in English poetry is one indication of this. It is true that an attempt was made to chain poetry to the state by the institution of the poet-laureateship. But the fact that patriotic poems on state occasions are no longer expected from the holder of that office is a recognition that the attempt has failed.

The second approach I have called the scientific. Here the love of learning is the determining factor. We read in Herodotus how Solon "traveled through many lands from love of knowledge and a desire to see the world." It was this motive which led Anaximander of Miletus to undertake such a great work in the cause of human solidarity as the drawing of the first map of the world. This map was utilized by his fellow-citizen, Hecataeus, who wandered far and wide in order to gather material for his geographical, ethnographical, and historical researches. His contact with foreigners led Hecataeus to declare: "I write as I think true, for the stories of the

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Greeks seem to me manifold and laughable." Thus did he lay down the proposition that scientific truth should come before national traditions.

In this, Hecataeus was followed by Herodotus, who often accepts a Persian or an Egyptian record in preference to a Greek version of events. Herodotus was the first to adopt the comparative method of study and to recognize the unity of history. For example, he notes the resemblances between particular customs of the Babylonians and those prevailing in Egypt, Lycia, Illyria, Arabia, and Cyprus. He shows how Greece is indebted for various inventions of civilization to Egypt, Phoenicia, Lydia, Babylon, Caria, and Libya. So free from chauvinism is the Greek historian that he ascribes the defeat of the Persians at Plataea to their inferiority in arms and discipline, and not to their lack of valor. Many times he takes evident pleasure in recording his admiration of the good qualities in the Persian character. In his opening sentence he states that his aim was "to preserve from oblivion the great and wonderful deeds of both the Greeks and the barbarians" —a statement which evidently annoyed one of his critics, Lucian, who altered it into "Greek victories and barbarian defeats." It is surely a remarkable fact that the father of history should have set for his profession so high a standard of impartiality. Had more historians followed his lead, they might have prevented their records from being used to develop national egotism and to depreciate foreign achievements. Only in very recent years has a reformed method of writing history been adopted, and most modern historians now realize—as did Herodotus—the interdependence of peoples and states and their mutual obligations.

The itinerant Greek thinkers known as the Sophists encountered from their contemporaries a prejudice which has been recorded by Plato in the *Protagoras*. At the beginning of this dialogue Socrates describes how he called upon Protagoras after his arrival in Athens: "A train of listeners followed

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Protagoras; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, attracting them by his voice, and they following." Protagoras himself explains the difficulties under which he labors: "A stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of the youth in them to leave the company of their kinsmen or any other acquaintances old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many enmities and conspiracies."

Later in this dialogue Hippias of Elis gives a most striking enunciation of the cosmopolitan ideal. This speaker had studied the habits and traditions of diverse peoples, and himself employed non-Hellenic sources of history. He says: "All of you who are here present I hold to be kinsmen and relatives and fellow-citizens by nature, though not by law; for like is by nature kin to like, but law, the tyrant of mankind, often constrains by violence in contravention of nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the meanest of mankind."

From recent archaeological discovery in Egypt (see Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri,* Part XI, No. 1364) we know that Antiphon, another of these Sophists, urged that the distinction which current Greek opinion held to exist between the Greeks and the rest of the world was a conventional and false one. He argued, probably under the influence of medical science, that by nature all men had the same physical attributes and like bodily faculties.

Among those who suffered for their disinterested pursuit of truth was Anaxagoras, who let no racial prepossessions or

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civic pride stand in the way. He was not one of those who vainly boasted of the wisdom of the Greeks. He remarked, "The theories of the Greeks are mistaken." Migrating from Ionia to Athens, he devoted himself there to the special study of meteorological problems. This seems to have aroused the ire of the Athenian patriots, who connected such matters with Persian thought, and he was exiled on a charge of Medism. It was to him probably that his friend Euripides addressed the noble words: "Though a wise man dwell far across the earth, and though I never see him with my eyes, yet I count him as a friend."

The philosophical approach is specially interesting, since it was the Greeks who were the founders of philosophy. Their claim to this title rests on the fact that they were the first to place on a scientific basis the idea of the unity of the world. The synoptic attitude which they adopted toward the universe had spiritual and ethical aspects which necessarily led to cosmopolitanism. Many of them, like the Sophists and Anaxagoras, were itinerants. Among others who were noted for their distant travels were Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Democritus. Xenophanes was specially fond of the comparative method of argument, by which he could work in his own observations as a traveler. Parmenides wrote on the way of truth which led him through all the towns in search of knowledge. Democritus complains, "I visited Athens and no one knew me." Yet, as a result of his wanderings further afield, he could say, "To the wise man every country is a dwelling-place, for the whole world is the fatherland of a good soul."

Heracleitus and Empedocles enunciated the doctrine that immanent in the order of the universe is a moral law of reason, in which all men as rational creatures naturally share, and to which human laws everywhere should conform. The idea of the law of nature (or natural law) which they thus promulgated has been of the greatest importance in the history of human thought. "Modern international law," says Sir Frederick

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Pollock (*Essays in the Law,* p. 67), "is a law founded on cosmopolitan principles of reason, a true living offshoot of the Law of Nature"; and the necessity for still maintaining the connection between the two is emphasized by international jurists at the present day (see the essay by Professor A. Pearce Higgins on "The Work of Grotius and of the Modern International Lawyer," in *Cambridge Legal Essays,* 1926). Empedocles further associated with the idea of natural law the conception of an original state of nature which was characterized by universal peace. According to him, war is not a primeval institution, and this belief has recently received support from two prominent anthropologists, Professor G. Elliot Smith and Mr. W. J. Perry.

Entirely in accordance with what we know of the character of Socrates is the tradition that he asserted that he was "a citizen of the world" (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* V. 37, 108: "mundanus"; Plutarch, *De Exil.* V. p. 600: κόσμιος). According to Plato (*Gorgias,* 480 B–C), he urged that the wrongdoings of one's country, so far from being screened or defended, should be exposed and denounced—a teaching which enunciates the very opposite of the doctrine "My country, right or wrong." He spent his lifetime in the practice and teaching of philosophy, associating equally with citizens and aliens. Among his most devoted followers was the semibarbarian Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, which made cosmopolitanism one of its foremost precepts. Thus Diogenes proudly boasted that he was a κοσμοπολίτης (Diog. Laert. vi. 63). A Cynic, Crates, was the teacher of Zeno, the Semitic founder of the Stoic school, which inherited the tradition of cosmopolitanism.

The names of such men as Voltaire, Kant, and Bertrand Russell are a sufficient reminder of the continued connection between philosophy and cosmopolitanism. At its foundation two years ago the British Institute of Philosophical Studies issued a prospectus in which it emphasized the point "that

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philosophy, by enlarging the objects of our thoughts and actions, is able to make us citizens of a larger world."

The fourth approach is the religious. There is evidence that the Greeks felt the insufficiency of the particularistic type of religion and recognized the need for universalism. Plato (*Laws*, 886 A, 887 E), for instance, as a proof of the existence of the gods, finds it desirable to state this as the common belief of all Greeks and all non-Greeks alike. Zeus was generally regarded as the universal father and omnipotent king of gods and men. As a war-god pure and simple he scarcely appears at all, while his appellative of Xenios (the god of strangers) is particularly prominent.

The significance and value of the religious movement known as Orphism, which entered Greece from the East during the sixth century B.C., have only come to be realized by scholars during recent years. Orphism was concerned primarily with the salvation of the individual soul—a conception which was incongruent with the absolute rights of the state. The spread of Orphic brotherhoods and their doctrines divorced religion from its dependence on the state, and provided a spiritual creed which could be shared by men of different political allegiances. Thus individualism in religion had as its complement universalism. A mystical faith such as this, which made each soul capable of working out its own salvation, and postulated a natural union between all living creatures, could have no place for patriotic exclusiveness. In the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries B.C. the influence of the Orphic brotherhoods was immense, and they preached a religion to the whole world, Greek and barbarian, bond and free. "The renown is theirs," says Dr. L. R. Farnell (*The Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, p. 139), "of being the first world-religion bearing a free message."

It is probable that out of some such Orphic association arose the famous school of Pythagoras, which gained adherents in the different Greek states as well as among many of

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the native peoples of Italy. This Society of Pythagoreans showed, just as does the modern Society of Friends, that an individualistic mysticism in religion tends to ally itself with a universalistic humanism. Socrates appears to have been at the head of the Pythagorean group at Athens, and it was probably his association with this international religion which led to his conviction.

This Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine finds its finest expression in Socrates' great disciple. Plato enlarged the sentiment of local patriotism by centering attention on the soul's heavenly home. Man's original and ultimate home was heaven; therefore he should direct his thoughts beyond his temporary habitation here, and realize that he was a member of a wider community than that of his own particular city-state. This Platonic conception has been an inspiration to men ever since. From it has developed that line of thought which finds its noblest modern expression in the words of Romain Rolland: "For the finer spirits of Europe there are two dwelling places: our earthly fatherland and that other, the city of God. Of the one we are the guests, of the other the builders. To the one let us give our lives and our faithful hearts; but neither family, friend, nor fatherland, nor aught we love has power over the spirit which is the light. It is our duty to rise above tempests, and thrust aside the clouds which threaten to obscure it, to build higher and stronger, dominating the injustice and hatred of nations, the walls of that city wherein the souls of the whole world may assemble."

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THE RESURRECTION OF HEDONISM

JOHN WILD

Progress in philosophy is something concerning which it is always possible to wax sceptical. Ever diverging streams of speculation seem constantly to reverify and intensify such pessimism. And yet in one respect the very luxuriance of the successive emergences seems to afford grounds for a somewhat more humble and negative optimism. Surely there *are* positions which it is not possible to reassume: blind alleys which the feeble, philosophic torches have perhaps only faintly and fitfully illumined, but which have, nevertheless, been clearly recognized as quite impossible. So far as ethical thought is concerned, many recent philosophers have perhaps oversanguinely congratulated themselves on the discovery of such a *cul-de-sac*. Hedonism in the most recent literature has undoubtedly been looked upon as something possessing a purely historical interest—something now outgrown. For most of us Butler's criticism of psychological hedonism and egoism, the familiar contradictions of Mill and Spencer, the polemics of idealists such as Green and Bradley, and, last but not least, the keen analysis of Mr. G. E. Moore, have been decisive. It is all the more interesting, therefore, to be confronted with a contemporary attempt on the part of Mr. R. M. Blake to defend this pariah among ethical doctrines.[1] Such protests against largely unconscious intellectual drifts are always salutary and worthy of serious examination.

Mr. Blake, after summarizing what he takes to be the essence of the hedonistic position in seven propositions taken from G. E. Moore, proceeds to answer current objections. In the first place, he disavows psychological hedonism, and dis-

[1] "Why Not Hedonism? A Protest." *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVII (October, 1926), 1–18.

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misses all arguments, such as those of Professor Dewey, against this theory as being "completely beside the mark," so far as his own view, which embodies "the central core of hedonistic doctrine," is concerned. Mr. Blake is quite clear as to his rejection of psychological hedonism. He says that "its falsity . . . . is now generally recognized." But can Mr. Blake consistently do this? Is not psychological hedonism, at least to a certain degree, involved in his own position? Now I must admit that I am in something of a haze as to the precise nature of Mr. Blake's position, since he not only appears to disavow psychological hedonism, but occasionally hedonism itself, as in his discussion of the hedonistic paradox where he seems to maintain that pleasure need not be the basically prescribed object of desire. It is admitted, however, at the beginning of his paper, that the crucial tenet of hedonism is the proposition that "pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good, and nothing else is ever ultimately good." Now the ultimate good is assuredly what we *ought* to desire, or what we ought to devote all our efforts toward realizing. In Mr. Blake's words, "human effort should be so directed as to make this amount [of pleasurable experience] as great as possible." So Mr. Blake's typical position seems to be that basically we *ought* to desire pleasure, although he definitely rejects psychological hedonism. Stated in a bald form, we do not desire pleasure, but nevertheless we *ought* to. This, of course, involves a chasm between the actual and the ideal, a chasm which Mr. Blake, in common with a number of other philosophers, is doubtless glad to accept. Of course the ideal is not identical with the actual. If it were so it would not be ideal. Nevertheless, if the chasm becomes too vast does not our ideal become a mere fantastic dream, and not ideal at all? How far removed from actuality may the ideal be? It is this question I wish first to consider, since it is a question which I believe Mr. Blake is not alone in tending to neglect. Is there not some necessary connection between the ideal and the actual? If so,

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is not Mr. Blake then necessarily a psychological hedonist in a very real sense?

The relationship between the actual and the ideal may take four different forms: In the first place the two may be identical. One may try to show by a factual analysis that anything but the ideal is impossible. This is the usual method of theodicies, and is the method resorted to by J. S. Mill in attempting to prove hedonism. According to Mill, all desire is *necessarily* for pleasure. He says, "to desire anything except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasant is a physical and metaphysical impossibility."[2] The whole field of possible objects of desire is occupied by pleasure. Since the ethical objects of desire, what we *ought* to desire, are necessarily included within the possible, what we *ought* to desire is certainly pleasure. Mill's proof, therefore, holds good on the basis of a rigid and exclusive psychological hedonism which makes the desire for anything but pleasure *impossible*. There is only one loophole. This is to take the position, as I suppose someone might, that the ideal might be altogether impossible. This position is not in harmony with our ethical intuitions, which surely do not allow us to prescribe as moral acts which are utterly beyond the range of possibility for the agent. One could no more ethically condemn a six-year-old child for not possessing the ear of a Beethoven than he could ethically condemn an oyster for not climbing the French Alps. The realm of the ethical is not identical with the realm of the possible, but assuredly the ethical is contained within the possible. The "can" does not imply the "ought," but, as Kant insisted, the "ought" does imply the "can." If a thing is entirely impossible, it cannot be a moral prescription. Such would be a contradiction. So Mill's proof stands on the basis of a strict psychological hedonism. Now, this basis is precisely what Mr. Blake denies. He expressly disavows the theory that "the sole human motive is the desire for pleasure." He is, therefore, deprived of Mill's basis of

[2] Mill, *Utilitarianism* (Everyman edition), p. 36.

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proof. Let us glance for a moment at the other possible positions open to him.

The opposite extreme is, of course, the view we have obliquely considered, that the desire for pleasure is altogether impossible. In denying psychological hedonism, Mr. Blake *might* be assuming this position, which we have seen is contradictory, since the "ought" surely does imply the "can." It would be contradictory, for example, to prescribe arctic life for a banana, or everlasting youth for an octogenarian, because the ability to achieve it is contained in the very idea of a moral prescription. The ethical must be at least possible. The ethical is beyond the actual, to be sure, but it is not beyond the possible. It soars far over the fields of fact, but beyond the thin ethers of potentiality it cannot penetrate in its transmundane flight. Thus, this alternative is closed to Mr. Blake. That all possible desire is for pleasure, he denies. Consequently Mill's route to hedonism is closed. And the idea that no desire can possibly be for pleasure would make hedonism itself a contradiction, and hence impossible. Undoubtedly Mr. Blake has chosen a mediate position. Two, I believe, are open to him.

Since the ethical, as Kant pointed out, is definitely included in the realm of possibility, I propose to subdivide this realm into two minor kingdoms to the end of further localizing the elusive "ought." The word "natural," as Professor Lovejoy has pointed out, is a very dangerous word. Nevertheless, like other dangerous things, it may be exceedingly useful. What is unnatural is still within the limits of possibility. It is what can exist, but only at the cost of violating some fundamental structural or working principle. Now, I submit that, in addition to being limited to the possible, the ethical must further be limited to the natural. An ethical prescription cannot violate the basic, working character of a thing. Someone with a Shavian sense of humor might *say* that men *ought* to give up all present pursuits and spend their time chasing vortices with butterfly

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nets. But thus to literalize a utopian dream is to confuse categories. The utopian dream in itself, by itself, is in no sense ethical. Of course—and in this lies the immense value of the utopian dream—it may suggest or indicate the ethical. But the ethical is not utopian and remote. It grows out of the actual and is sternly limited by it. What we *ought* to do lies before us clean-cut and concrete. It is no vague and transcendent dream. If so, how could it be prescriptive and imperative? Even such a transcendentalist as Bradley clearly recognized the stark mundaneness of morality, sharply separating it from religion: that which deals with the perfect and transcendent.[3] Morality is in and of this world, or rather it is this world growing out of itself. But morality is limited by fact. The prescriptions of the ethicist, though he has not always been aware of the fact, have always been limited by actuality, and the nature of man. The ethical experience is the experience of growth and emergence. Consequently the emphasis is placed on the novel and the transcendent, and the past reality out of which the new emerges is neglected. But the past actuality is always there, limiting the process, and any projected growth which warps or violates the process as it is cannot be ethical. The weird and fantastic, as much as the perfect and transcendent, is non-moral. No one, for instance, would think of prescribing "life in the great open spaces" for a mole. There is a large area of the possible, the unnatural which includes the transcendently perfect and the merely chimerical, from which the ethical is excluded. The human ethicist is limited by the nature of man. What is, from the point of view of man's present nature, abnormal or eccentric cannot be seriously prescribed. Such prescriptions, while not contradictory, are at least absurd.

There is, thus, only one remaining position open to Mr. Blake. That pleasure is the only possible object of desire he himself denies. That pleasure is *impossible* as an object of

[3] Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, pp. 279 ff.

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desire he must reject in order to remain a hedonist. That pleasure is an abnormal or unnatural object of desire he must also deny, since to prescribe any such thing is simply grotesque. It is, therefore, necessary for Mr. Blake to accept the fourth alternative. It is impossible for him to set up "pleasurable consciousness" as the ultimate good without implying that pleasure not only can be desired, but that it can be *naturally* desired without violating any fundamental psychological principle. No ethicist can be completely obvious to psychology. He at least assumes the sort of psychology that will prevent his ideal from being a mere grotesque mirage. If the desire for pleasure is unnatural and unhuman, occurring only in a rare epicurean or neurotic mood, Mr. Blake's hedonic end of ends cannot be taken seriously. In order to make Mr. Blake plausible it is necessary to assume that pleasure is a natural object of desire.

Now this is precisely what anyone who has followed through the implications of Butler's analysis of desire[4] is inclined to deny. After all it is quite abnormal for people to become interested in their own psychic states. Our action is normally directed outward toward specific objects, as Butler shows. Interest in our own feelings and the introverted desire to maintain certain of them is decidedly unhealthy, as the prevalence of hedonic conceptions in the Freudian psychopathology tends to indicate. Now, we have seen that Mr. Blake, in common with his hedonistic predecessors, altogether ignores Butler and his well-known criticism. It is interesting to speculate as to what the history of the hedonistic school would have been if the hedonists, such as Paley, Tucker, or Bentham, had read Butler. Possibly there would have been no hedonistic school, for we have seen that, as Mill realized, ethical hedonism must have a factual basis. Mr. Blake's ideal, to avoid sheer absurdity, must involve the naturalness of pleasure as an object of desire. This may not be psychological hedonism.

[4] See particularly Sermons 11 and 12 (Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, I, 225).

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Mr. Blake evidently does not consider it such. But it is the view, at any rate, which Butler criticized, and to such good purpose that it is very difficult to see how anyone really familiar with his analysis can hold to the doctrine. So, although Mr. Blake denies psychological hedonism in its absurdly extreme Millian form—that "the sole human motive is the desire for pleasure"—he is still a psychological hedonist in believing the desire for pleasure to be consistent with human psychology, and thus natural. Accordingly, I do not believe Mr. Blake is at all successful in his attempt to dodge the strictures of modern, dynamic psychologists, such as Professor Dewey, who tend to view symptoms of hedonism as essentially psychopathic. If man is the sort of being which the Butlerian analysis indicates, then hedonism is a secondary inversion of desire. Man is a center of energy directed toward particular, external goals. It simply would not occur to one holding such psychological views to consider hedonism as an adequate ethical ideal.[5] To set up hedonism as a statement of the adequate end for a dynamic being is as nonsensical as the prescription of high altitudes for a crinoid. I suspect, therefore, that after all Mr. Blake is a psychological hedonist in an objectionable sense, as all hedonists must be, at least to the extent of holding to the plausibility of a Humian or Titchenerian psychology of mental states which may be naturally desired. Criticisms, such as those of Professor Dewey, based as they are on a Butlerian analysis of desire, and directed against such a mental-state psychology are not in the least "beside the mark," so far as hedonism is concerned. They attack the factual foundation of the theory, without which it becomes not a sensible ideal at all, but a mere fantastic dream. Modern

[5] Of course I am aware of the fact that Butler himself followed his age in accepting a hedonic theory of value, and even went so far as to say that "it is manifest that nothing can be of consequence to mankind or any creature but happiness" (Selby-Bigge, *British Moralists*, I, 242). His subtle analysis of desire, however, as we have indicated, makes pleasure derivative and dependent, and thus leads to a quite different conclusion.

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psychology, whether of the instinctive or behavioristic variety, follows Butler in condemning this foundation. With its necessary factual basis, hedonism is untrue. Without it, hedonism is either contradictory or absurd.

Mr. Blake endeavors to free hedonism from another doctrine with which it has been confused by such people as Miss Calkins and Mr. Joad, who have attributed to hedonism the idea that pleasure *ought* to be desired. This idea, in the words of Miss Calkins, that "the proper, though not the invariable, object of the morally willing self is pleasure," Mr. Blake says is "definitely excluded" by his quintessential principles of hedonism. In justification of this rather astounding statement we are referred to the hedonistic paradox that "pleasure to be got must be forgot," and assured that it "may certainly be quite consistently accepted by hedonists." There are two points which must be here interjected.

In the first place, Mr. Blake has not made it at all clear just how the hedonistic paradox is to be reconciled with hedonism. Take, for example, his own statement (p. 10) that "the intrinsic value of any state of affairs is in proportion to the amount of pleasurable experience it contains, and that human effort should be so directed as to make this amount as great as possible." But the hedonistic paradox tells us that the pleasurable experience must be *forgot*. We cannot both direct our efforts toward increasing the amount of pleasure in the world and also forget all about pleasure. This certainly *looks* like a contradiction, and at least deserves serious consideration.

What Mr. Blake probably means to say is that the hedonistic paradox points out merely a *means* for achieving the greatest pleasure in certain cases, namely, by temporarily forgetting about the pleasure. This is the only way of reconciling the paradox with hedonism. If our forgetting assumes such proportions that pleasure ceases to be our ultimate aim, if we really forget about pleasure, and make some other aim ulti-

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mate, then we certainly are no longer hedonists. Mr. Blake cannot both eat his cake and have it. Hedonism is committed to the doctrine that in our rational moments we ought to set up pleasure, or, as Mr. Blake sometimes puts it, "pleasurable consciousness," as our ultimate goal. It may be feasible temporarily to forget this after we have once decided, but the forgetting is a mere matter of policy. This is the only way out of the dilemma. But if Mr. Blake means this, then he is certainly committed to Miss Calkins' proposition that "the proper, though not the invariable, object of the morally willing self is pleasure." The hedonistic paradox cannot be reconciled with hedonism by giving up hedonism. If this word is to be given any ethical significance whatever, it must mean pleasure as the basic end of action. I am afraid that Mr. Blake has either contradicted hedonism or himself.

In the latter case, and if we are to take Mr. Blake seriously when he says "that human effort should be so directed as to make this amount [of pleasurable experience] as great as possible," he is, of course, a genuine hedonist, and his ideal is subject to the traditional criticism of narrowness. When we picture to ourselves a continuous, rhapsodic dream of pleasure, without knowledge, effort, or action, there is certainly an intuitive revulsion in many against the confusion of such a static, passive bliss with the ethical goal. And this is the crucial test. As Mr. G. E. Moore has pointed out, the consideration of a thing in absolute isolation, stripped of all its usual accompaniments, is "the only method that can be safely used when we wish to discover what degree of value a thing has in itself."[6] I think that Mr. Moore, among others, has clearly demonstrated that neither pleasure nor pleasurable consciousness succeed in meeting this test, as the hedonist would anticipate. Pleasure is a value, but not the only value. Other things, such as activity and thought, are not merely necessary evils or means to sensory titillations. They are values in themselves,

[6] Moore, *Principia Ethica*, p. 91.

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and without them life simply would be poorer. It is simply flying in the face of human intuition, which Mr. Blake admits to be final, as revealed in history and language itself, to try to absorb the whole variegated array of values into one single, passive sort of concept such as "pleasure." Mr. Blake gives very little attention to this fundamental criticism, and what he does give issues only in a rather petulant *tu quoque*. Any theory of ethics, he says, must reject some things as evil and select other things as good. But are not some ethical theories much narrower in their range of selection than others? Are not some ethical theories so narrow as to leave out certain values which the ethical consciousness of man has always found good? In excluding activity and all dynamic factors from its ideal, and particularly in making knowledge and morality itself mere extrinsic means to the good, is not hedonism running counter to the intuitions of the race? Mr. Blake leaves the question of narrowness unanswered, although his substitution of "pleasurable consciousness" for mere "pleasure" is a tacit admission, at least, of the point.[1] Pleasure without consciousness (Mr. Blake has perhaps been convinced by the *Philebus*) *is* too narrow. Knowledge or consciousness of the pleasure must also be included. Knowledge thus becomes an intrinsic value. "Pleasurable consciousness" is much more than mere pleasure. That such a position is really quite inconsistent with hedonism and with his own basic thought is shown at the end of his paper, where Mr. Blake, in summing up his own views, subscribes heartily to the statement "that if we *could* get as much pleasure in the world, without needing to have any knowledge, or any moral qualities, or any sense of beauty, as we can get *with* them, then all these things would be entirely superfluous." Such a view, as Mr. Blake tacitly, and a host of critics quite vehemently, have recognized, is certainly open to the charge of narrowness.

Many criticisms have been made of the various attempts

[1] *Principia Ethica*, pp. 87 ff.

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to transform hedonism into a universalistic doctrine. Mr. Blake sees no difficulty here, denying point blank any connection between his view and that of egoism. Nevertheless, I believe that such a connection does exist. Turning to Mr. Blake's credal principles on page 3, we find the last statement to be that "pleasurable consciousness is always ultimately good . . . . and nothing else is ever ultimately good." This is "the characteristic and peculiar thesis of hedonism." Now, pleasurable consciousness, as it concretely occurs—and Mr. Blake is very clear that "it is, of course, only concrete, pleasurable experience which he [the hedonist] values"—is a decidedly private, subjective affair, as everyone knows. Actual pleasure, as distinguished from "mere pleasantness as an abstract universal," in which Mr. Blake is not interested, is distinctly *my* pleasure, part of my own ineffable stream of consciousness, separate from other streams. Now, if concrete, pleasurable consciousness "is always ultimately good . . . . and nothing else is ever ultimately good," and if my efforts with respect to the quantity of this pleasure "should be so directed as to make this amount as great as possible," then egoism is certainly implied, as most of the historic hedonists, and practically all of their critics, have repeatedly recognized. The end of my action must be the *concrete* pleasure that I feel. Each man, of course, has a different pleasure, and the ultimate end (one thing) turns out to be a multitude of things—the egoistic paradox.

The point is that hedonists, as we have seen, must take the position that the desire for pleasure is essentially natural, and thus tend toward a Humian or Titchenerian psychology of mental states which may be naturally desired. But such a psychology is, of course, logically solipsistic. If the desire for a subjective, mental state, such as pleasure, is natural, then the desire for external transcendent things, such as other peoples' mental states, is unnatural. This, I believe, is the basis for the well-known connection between hedonism and egoism. He-

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donists have used two methods in attempting to escape this relationship. The earlier hedonists pointed out that there were external sanctions, primarily legislative, which forced the individual to work for others in order to achieve his own pleasure. This, however, left him as selfish and immoral as before, and was subject to the additional difficulty of leaving the motives of the legislator entirely anomalous. The other way is to take the position of Sidgwick, that reason is able to intuit the abstract pleasure of sensitive beings in general as the good.[8] Much of Mr. Blake's paper seems to harmonize with this position, his proposition 6, for example, where he says "the intrinsic value of a whole is always in proportion to the amount of ultimate value which it contains." Here Mr. Blake seems to be setting up a genuinely abstract and universal goal, not the concrete particular of hedonism at all. As Green, Bradley, and others have pointed out *ad nauseam*, and as Sidgwick himself clearly recognized,[9] a sum or "amount" of pleasures is a very different thing from a concrete, actual pleasure. Here are two extremely different ends of action: on the one hand the actual evanescent pleasure, utterly subjective and unsharable; on the other hand, the sum of the pleasures of all sentient beings, objective and universal. Each requires a different psychology to make it anything more than a fantastic dream. A Humian psychology will make the first possible and plausible, and the second a mere figment of the imagination. A Butlerian psychology will exactly turn the tables. The minute we make it possible for man to desire external, transcendent objects, such as the pleasures of other people, we make him something dynamic, and the good as a passive, internal state will simply appear absurd. The minute we supply a motivation for the universal intuitions of Sidgwick, we made his particularistic, passive goal (pleasurable consciousness) narrow and inadequate for the only sort of being that can ever make them any-

[8] Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, particularly p. 355.

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. 354.

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thing more than hopeless daydreams. We must choose once and for all between a psychology of mental states and a psychology of outwardly directed action—between Hume and Butler. If we choose the first, and Mr. Blake seems often to lean in this direction, altruism and morality are grotesque delusions. If we choose the second, the good for such a dynamic being must be something active, realization rather than subjective bliss. Hedonism becomes a mere pathological fantasm. I do not see how Mr. Blake can avoid one or the other of these alternatives. He must either hold that our motivation is hedonistic, in which case we cannot be unselfish and in any way moral. Or he must hold that our motivation is non-subjective, in which case we cannot be hedonists.

The final issue, as Mr. Blake follows Mr. Moore in maintaining, is an intuitive one. All that an ethical system can do is to attempt to organize and systematize our ethical intuitions, which is a large enough task, since our intuitions are very vague. Nevertheless, if a system contradicts them in any particular respect, we are certainly justified in condemning it. And as a host of writers, including Bradley and Moore, have pointed out, hedonism does just this. As Bradley says, "when moral persons without a theory on the matter are told that the moral end for the individual and the race is the getting a maximum surplusage of pleasurable feeling, and that there is nothing in the whole world which has the smallest moral value except this end and the means to it, there is no gainsaying that they repudiate such a result."[10] And they repudiate it, I think, on two different grounds. The first ground we have already considered, namely, narrowness. The common person undoubtedly feels that there are things we should choose even if no pleasure came from them. The attempt to fuse all values into one he intuitively rejects. Pleasure simply is not the *only* good. In the second place there is no question about the fact that common opinion recognizes certain pleasures as higher

[10] Bradley, *Ethical Studies*, p. 81.

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than others. All sensitive persons recognize qualitative distinctions in pleasure, as did J. S. Mill. The pleasures of the pig simply are not on the same level with the pleasures of Socrates. And yet all competent critics are agreed that such a qualitative standard is entirely inconsistent with hedonism. Both Sidgwick and Mr. Blake are correct in abandoning it. The minute we admit invidious distinctions in our scale of pleasures we are no longer hedonists. That by means of which we judge pleasure cannot itself be pleasure. So for both Sidgwick and Mr. Blake the good is a purely quantitative affair. One whole is better than another only if the quantity or "amount" of pleasure is greater. Thus both Mr. Blake and Sidgwick are logically consistent with their hedonistic premisses. But do they not purchase such consistency only at the price of violating the basic intuitions which assure us so unmistakably that certain pleasures are higher than others? The pleasure of pushpin simply is not at the same level as that of poetry. The standard we use in judging the morality of an action simply is not a mere quantitative summing of pleasures, where all are on the same level. If our intuitions are the final court of appeal, and I quite agree with Mr. Blake that this is the case, then hedonism is certainly wrong, not only in ignoring the many different sorts of intrinsic value, but in refusing to distinguish between the different grades of pleasure.

In short, I think Mr. Blake has been unsuccessful in avoiding the Butlerian criticisms of modern, dynamic psychology. On the contrary, they play on his hedonism with full force, reducing it to a mere chimerical dream with no foundation in human nature. I think that this is the most formidable charge that can be brought against the view. It may be claimed that hedonism is necessary and inevitable, as J. S. Mill asserted, at least in the notorious chapter iv of his *Utilitarianism*. This idea Mr. Blake rightly rejects. Also, we may assume that he rejects the contrary view that the desire for pleasure is impossible. If the desire for pleasure is possible, it must be eith-

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er natural or abnormal and eccentric. In the latter case hedonism as an ethical end is absurd. So Mr. Blake is forced to the position that the desire for pleasure is natural in the sense of not violating any fundamental psychological principle. This view modern psychology seems to agree with Butler in condemning as quite false. Of the three alternatives, then, which remain after the first, which he denies, Mr. Blake may choose between the contradictoriness, the absurdity, or the falsity of his resuscitated hedonism.

The attempt of Mr. Blake's new hedonism to reconcile itself with the hedonistic paradox cannot be regarded as altogether fortunate. His method for achieving the reconciliation seems certainly at some points tantamount to a rejection of hedonism. If hedonism means anything at all, it must mean that "the intrinsic value of any state of affairs is in proportion to the amount of pleasurable experience it contains, and that human effort should be so directed as to make this amount as great as possible," or, in other words, that our *basic* desire must always be for pleasure, which Mr. Blake, in considering Miss Calkins' definition of hedonism, seems actually to deny. Of course, it may be feasible for short intervals to forget this and to lose ourselves in action. If the forgetting, however, is permanent, and we never succeed in coming to our rational selves again, we are no longer hedonists.

Mr. Blake's revived hedonism is open to the ancient charge of narrowness, as he tacitly admits by substituting "pleasurable consciousness" for the orthodox "pleasure" of hedonism in certain portions of his article. An endless, unconscious dream of pleasure without knowledge or consciousness is quite obviously inadequate as *the* ethical goal. But as soon as we admit knowledge as an intrinsic value we are no longer hedonists, and the way is open for the admission of other intrinsic goods, such as morality and action.

Nor can Mr. Blake's hedonism be consistently universalistic. As he says, the hedonist is interested in *concrete* pleas-

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ure, as it actually occurs, something altogether subjective. The psychology that makes such an introverted goal plausible makes the desire for other persons' pleasures quite unplausible. On the other hand, universalism needs a dynamic, Butlerian psychology according to which desire is something directed toward external objects. Such a psychology makes hedonism unplausible. We must choose one or the other. Either we are hedonists, and altruism and morality become ridiculous, or we are Butlerians, and hedonism is ridiculous.

Finally, Mr. Blake's new hedonism is quite at odds with the common moral intuitions of mankind, which quite definitely repudiate the lumping together of all values under one passive, subjective experience called "pleasure," and the attempt to consider all pleasurable experiences as on the same level of goodness. If, as Mr. Blake says, the verdict of our intuitions is final, this repudiation, which has been recognized by a host of writers, would seem to be a most serious difficulty for any ethical system that pays the least attention to everyday morality and its concepts. After all, a moral theory cannot end up by completely explaining away morality.

Hedonism may possibly be resurrectible, and while I for one am grateful to Mr. Blake for making the attempt, I am impelled to conclude that his recent statement of the hedonist position involves him in a psychological hedonism strong enough at least to put him at serious odds with the modernly recognized facts of the case. His revived view is not only subject to this charge, as well as that of egoism, but it is narrow, intuitively false, and inconsistent. So far as the facts are concerned, we simply do not desire pleasure, and I quite fail to see, so far as Mr. Blake's paper is concerned, that any good reasons have been given why we *ought* to desire it.

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THE CHINESE VERSION OF THE LAW OF NATURE

TAO-WEI HU

If Metternich was right in calling the Paris of his day a madhouse, then China certainly has been no better than an insane asylum at any moment of its history. For, if we may indulge in a little anachronism, we might as well say that China from days of yore has been furnished with all the paraphernalia of the mid-eighteenth-century dogma of natural law, which was all the food that the early nineteenth-century madhouse had in store for its inmates. But, as usual, the name is different. In Chinese political parlance one more often meets with the edict of heaven[1] than with the law of nature.[2] In any case it is the same sort of undefinable and immutable entity—call it heaven or nature—that is proclaimed as the sanction for certain fundamental ideas—call them edicts or laws—which are said to be inevitable and irresistible,[3] but which are, in fact, nothing more than principles arrived at through a process of a priori reasoning by the individual exponents themselves. But it surely is true that this theory, especially in the hands of a skilful manipulator, infuses into the arguments for certain democratic ideas a force which could not otherwise be had. Look above you at night, runs the Confucian metaphor, and you will see the north star sitting, serene and motionless, and receiving homage from the

[1] "Heaven," in Chinese political philosophy, never means "God" as employed by the divine-right-of-kings school in the West; it means rather the "heaven" of John Locke when he speaks of revolution as an "appeal to heaven"; or "god" as used by the early Huguenots of the sixteenth-century France (e.g., *Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos*); or better still, "nature" of the natural-law school.

[2] "Edict of heaven" and "law of nature" are used interchangeably in this article.

[3] Here are some of the much-quoted maxims in Chinese philosophy: "Heaven's command cannot be resisted," "Prosperous is he who obeys Heaven and destroyed will he be who obeys not," and "Heaven is never partial, but is always partial to the good men." "I fear the majesty of Heaven, and will thus preserve its favoring decree" (Mencius, quoting the *Book of Poetry*).

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surrounding stars. Look around you in the day, and you will see the high mountain dominating low ranges, and the majestic rolling ocean accepting tributes from various streams. To frame rules and co-ordinate human activities so as to compel men to act in conformity with natural law and to prevent them from deviating therefrom, such a relation must be established between ruler and subjects as that subsisting between the north star and the surrounding stars, between the high mountain and the low ranges, and between the ocean and the minor streams.[4]

Heaven, earth, and man are the three constituents of the universe, and natural law—fixed, immutable, and inherent in any part thereof—is operating unceasingly and impartially. The function of heaven is to afford seasons; that of earth, wealth; and that of man, to keep peace and order. Seasons are constant, wealth is the same, but government may be good or bad according to the governor. Good government consists in endeavoring to keep in conformity with the natural law, whereas any action in contravention thereof or deviation therefrom is misrule.[5]

Thus, not only is the establishment of political authority to be justified on the basis of natural law, but its quality is to be judged thereby. But, heaven being silent, the really pivotal question to be raised here is: Who is the interpreter of the heavenly edict or natural law? Who is to decide in any particular instance whether or no a government is good? To these questions the Chinese answer has been pre-eminently a generic one, namely, the people.[6] "Heaven sees through the eyes of the people and hears through the ears of the people."[7]

[4] *Confucian Analects,* Bk. II, chap. i. Confucius said: "He who exercises government by means of virtue may be compared to the north star, which keeps its place, while all the other stars turn toward it."

[5] Read Hsin-tse in the essay on "Nature." It is interesting that the Confucianists always justify government by examples of analogy to natural phenomena.

[6] The Chinese philosophers, like some of the West, never have given a clear definition to the word "people."

[7] *Book of Mencius.*

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Wan Chang said, "Was it the case that Yao gave the empire to Shun?" Mencius said, "No. The emperor cannot give the empire to anyone."

"Yes, but Shun had the empire. Who gave it to him?" "Heaven gave it to him," was the answer.

"'Heaven gave it to him!' Did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific injunctions?"

Mencius replied, "No. Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his conduct, and his conduct of affairs."

"'It showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs'; how was this?" Mencius' answer was, "The emperor can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the empire. A prince can present a man to the emperor, but he cannot cause the emperor to make that man a prince. A great officer can present a man to his prince, but he cannot cause the prince to make that man a great officer. Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and the people accepted him. Therefore I say, 'Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs!'"[8]

To make a long story short, Shun was raised to the imperial throne by Yao,[9] his predecessor, simply because the people approved of his personal conduct and his way of doing things. Hence, "the people is the root of the state."[10] Hence, "of the three elements of a state, the people are the most important; the territory, the less; and the king, the least so."[11] Hence also, when Tse-kung asked about government, the master said, "The requisites of government are: that there be sufficiency of food, sufficiency of military equipment, and the confidence of the people in their rulers."

Tse-kung said, "If it cannot be helped, and one of these

[8] *Book of Mencius.*

[9] Yao was the Emperor of the Ton dynasty, the first dynasty of Chinese history. He did not give his throne to his son, but to a virtuous courtier of his, Shun.

[10] *Book of Mencius.*

[11] *Ibid.*

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must be dispensed with, which of the three should be foregone first?" "The military equipment," said the master.

Tse-kung asked again, "If it cannot be helped, and one of the remaining two must be dispensed with, which of them should be foregone?" The master answered, "Part with the food. From of old, death has been the lot of all men; but if the people have no faith in their rulers, there is no possibility of the state being able to stand."[12]

Now, with the people fixed as the interpreters of the natural law or heavenly edict, the question remains, How can the people interpret that law or edict? What is the means of ascertaining it? Again the Chinese answer is strikingly similar to that given by some of the European and American theorists; namely, that it is to be determined by the right reason[13] with which human beings are naturally endowed.[14] The law of nature is the law of reason, and the edict of heaven is the dictate of reason. Says Lao-tse,[15] lamenting the failure of men to keep and exercise their right reason, "If princes and kings could keep Reason, the ten thousand things would of themselves be reformed."[16] "Superior goodness resembleth water. Water in goodness benefiteth the ten thousand things, yet quarreleth not. Because it dwells in places which the multitude of men shun, therefore it is near unto the eternal reason."[17] After spending a good deal of dialectic skill on state-

[12] *Confucian Analects.*

[13] "Right reason" stands for the Chinese word *tao*, which is a much exploited concept in Chinese philosophy. Han Yu, a great scholar of the Tang dynasty, defined *tao* as "what one traverses from here to there." Inasmuch as reason is the only way to enlightenment, it is perhaps the most accurate English word to use for the Chinese *tao*.

[14] One of the usual sayings of the Confucian School is: "Tao is not far from man; but only when he goes in search of 'Tao,' he goes far from it." In the *Book of Odes* we read: Heaven, in giving birth to a multitude of men, endows them with faculties each having its specific law; and the people in exercising the faculties with which they have been endowed love admirable virtues."

[15] Of all the Chinese philosophers, Lao-tse made the strongest appeal to reason.

[16] Lao-tse's *Canon of Reason and Virtue.*

[17] *Ibid.*

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craft and the art of government, that venerable philosopher concludes, "How do I know that it is so? Through reason."[18]

Now so far, the two famed schools of Chinese philosophy headed respectively by Lao-tse and Confucius have been treading on pretty nearly common ground; they agree that nature is at the basis of all things, including the state and government; that in the state people should be left with the right to interpret the law of that nature; and, also, that the means of ascertaining that law lies in the reasoning of mankind. With these fundamental questions put out of the way, however, the two schools presently part company. For, evidently, what Lao-tse discovered as the law of nature by means of his reasoning is not the same law of nature seen by the right reason of Confucius. According to the former, the ideal state which is in perfect harmony with the law of nature is one in which the people are induced

. . . . to return to [the old custom of] knotted cords and to use them [in the place of writing], to delight in their food, to be proud of their clothes, to be content with their houses, and to rejoice in their customs; then in a neighboring state within sight, the voices of the cocks and dogs would be within hearing, yet the people might grow old and die before they visited one another.[19]

But, with Confucius, the Utopia changes its color; for in it—

Reason has its sway, the world is a commonwealth, the worthy and the able are alone called to office, and sincerity and harmony are the principal objects cultivated and sought for. Hence men do not love their own parents or their own children only. There are provisions for the aged, work for the able-bodied, education for the young, and sustenance for the widow, orphans, childless men and women, the defective, and the diseased. All the males are given proper work, and all the females have their homes. The people try hardest to extract wealth from the ground, but not necessarily for their private uses; they exert their uttermost effort in labor, but

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Ibid.* Cf. Chuan-tse's essay on "Theft": "As long as great rulers do not die, so long will there be robbers. . . . . The most tranquil time is that when the people are contented and happy, and when although the crow of the cock and the bark of the dog in one village are within the hearing of another, the people of the two villages are born, grow old, and die without any intercommunication."

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not necessarily for their own benefit. The result is that selfishness, scheming, and monopoly are not seen; robbery, theft, violence, and wrongdoing are unknown; and doors and gates remain open day and night. This is called the Grand Commonwealth.[20]

Two views more divergent can hardly be found. Having accustomed one's self to the restful tranquility of the state of Lao-tse, one would hate to move to the hurly-burly of the Grand Commonwealth of Confucius, pleasant as it seems to be. Nor would one who has long enjoyed the activities of the Grand Commonwealth unhesitatingly accept an invitation to live a life "as solitary as an oyster" in the realm of Lao-tse, leisurely though it actually is. It would be like going from the land of the Eskimos of twenty centuries ago to the Moscow of the present-day Russia, or vice versa. The difference between individualism and socialism would perhaps more nearly suggest the gulf between these two ideas of the state than anything else.

But how do we account for this great difference between two men who, as we have seen, have so much in common? The philosophical foundation of this difference must be sought in the mutually opposing attitudes that the two philosophers adopted in regard to the tenets of the law of nature. In the opinion of Lao-tse, there is only one such tenet, and that consists in the injunction "Do nothing." "If nothing is done, there would be nothing that remains undone."[21] "The more restrictions and prohibitions are in the empire, the poorer grow the people. The more weapons the people have, the more troubled is the state. The more there is cunning and skill, the more startling events will happen. The more mandates and laws are enacted, the more will there be thieves and robbers. Therefore the holy man says: I practice non-assertion, and the people of themselves reform. I love quietude, and the people of themselves become righteous. I use no diplomacy, and

[20] *Li Ki* or *Record of Ceremonies*, ed. by Confucius.

[21] *Canon of Reason and Virtue*.

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the people of themselves become rich. I have no desire, and the people of themselves remain simple."[22] So reason always dictates that we should do nothing, and always nothing.

This is the extremest version of the laissez faire doctrine, and for this Lao-tse has not infrequently been charged with anarchistic inclinations; but in fairness it must be said that his is not a doctrine of no government; rather it is a doctrine of government through non-assertion. And it is only natural that a man, despairing of the transformations, instability, and feverish restlessness of his age,[23] should issue a call for us to return to nature, where simplicity and non-assertion are the order of the day. Plato's "ideal" and Aristotle's "good" were perhaps elicited by the same condition of affairs.

It may very well be, however, that Lao-tse did not discover the true law of nature, for somehow his theory has never had a real hold upon the minds of the Chinese people, at whom he had aimed for his objects of conversion. For ideas with more or less permanent and representative value we are bound to fall back upon the Confucian school.

Confucius and his disciple Mencius (and particularly the latter) set in motion a number of ideas which not only are revolutionary in themselves, but were charged, and with some reason, with connection with the great uprisings of the people in Chinese history.[24] In all the Confucian classics is presented the basic idea that the righteous man is the lord of the world

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] Lao-tse lived in the sixth century B.C., a senior contemporary to Confucius.

[24] It is singular that the rebellious leaders of Chinese history are fond of justifying themselves on the examples of King Tong and King Wu, the two most successful and famous revolutionary leaders of ancient times, who were treated with great approbation by the Confucian school. In fact, their revolutions were influenced by Confucianism, for Confucianism is much older than Confucius; it came down from Yao, the only emperor of the first Chinese dynasty, and was transmitted through successive sages, Shun, Yu, Tong, Wen, Wu, Chau-Kung, and Confucius. It is also interesting that Mencius nearly lost his seat of honor in the Confucian temple in the Ming dynasty because his principles were deemed unfavorable to the monarchy. At present, however, Confucianism is often charged with monarchical or even divine-right inclinations, but not very justly, in the judgment of the present writer.

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not only spiritually, but actually. Therefore no title, hereditary or otherwise, furnishes a sufficient basis for lordship without possession of virtue. "He who exercises government by means of virtue may be compared to the north polar star, which keeps its place, and all the stars turn around it."[25] Indeed, the possession of virtue is necessary to the ruler not only for his own sake, not only to entitle him to the high office, but for the sake of the people. For "to govern means to rectify; if you lead on the people with correctness, who will dare not to be correct?"[26] "Let your evinced desires be for what is good, and the people will be good. The relation between superiors and inferiors is like that between the wind and the grass. The grass must bend when the wind blows across it."[27] "The ruler will first take pains about his own virtue. Possessing virtue will give him the people. Possessing the people will give the territory. Possessing the territory will give him its wealth. Possessing the wealth, he will have resources for expenditure. So virtue is the root; wealth is the result."[28] Hence the injunction: "From the emperor down to the mass of people, all must consider the cultivation of personal virtue the root of everything besides."[29]

Having possessed virtue and rectified the people with his example, the ruler is then to care for the state. It is only another tenet of the law of nature that he should exercise the government for the welfare of his people. "A government is good when those who are near are made happy, and those who are far off are attracted."[30] "Jai and Tsao's losing the empire arose from their losing the people, and to lose the people means to lose their hearts. There is a way to get the empire: get the people and the empire is got. There is a way to get the people: get their hearts, and the people are got. There is a way to get their hearts: it is simply to collect for them what

[25] *Analects.* [26] *Great Learning.*
[27] *Ibid.* [28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Ibid.* [30] *Analects.*

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they like, and not to lay on them what they dislike. The people turn to a benevolent rule as water flows downward."[31]

The ideas that the ruler should be virtuous and that the government should be for the good of the people were iterated and reiterated with great emphasis and tremendous force throughout the lengthy writings of the Confucian school. On the other hand, it seems conspicuously true that such allied ideas as government of the people and government by the people never entered into the philosophy of the Chinese sages. What they were pleading was tolerance and benevolence—not direct democracy. It is more than probable that in their opinion the people's mission is not to govern but to be governed.[32] Besides, their point of view was predominantly traditional and they appealed to history more than to speculative reasoning. Since there was no popular participation in government in ancient China, these philosophers were perhaps too "pragmatist" to venture into such innovations. Even had they been conscious of such ideas, it is doubtful whether they would have taken kindly to them; for is it not true that both Plato and Aristotle relegated direct democracy into the contemptible field of perverted or corrupt form of government? There is perhaps some truth in the saying that human thinking becomes more progressive with the progress of time.

But, for whatever cause, this omission on the part of the Chinese teachers is significant. For now certain questions would seem to suggest themselves: May it not be, for instance, that, with the real popular check off the government, the Chinese democratic ideas become mere forms to please the people's vanity rather than ways to redress their grievances? Who is to decide whether a particular ruler is virtuous or whether a particular government is for the good of the peo-

[31] *Book of Mencius.*

[32] Among the oft-quoted sayings of the Confucian school is: "It is in the natural order of things that people of intelligence should govern and people of manual exertion should be governed." Sayings of a like nature may be reproduced ad infinitum.

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ple? What can the people do if the government and the governor are not what they should be? Fortunately for Chinese democracy, these do not yet remain questions in the arena of political philosophy. For, in face of whatever oppression and misrule, can the good people wish for more than the rights of revolution and of tyrannicide? And these rights, to be sure, were accorded to them in no uncertain terms.

In the *Shuking*, that most ancient classic, three canons of government are laid down, of which one is "that the people have the right to depose a sovereign who, either from active wickedness or vicious indolence, gives cause to oppression or tyrannical rule." Although Confucius represents the sovereignty as a sacred mission intrusted for the time being to the "Son of Heaven,"[33] a successful revolutionary easily becomes the "Elect of Heaven." When King Choa[34] of the San dynasty became tyrannical, one of his own courtiers, in answer to public demands, stepped forward, dethroned and executed him, and assumed the title of King Wu for himself, also in answer to public demands as expressed in folksongs and countryside ballads. Ordinarily such a man would be regarded as a rebel and usurper. But, on the contrary, he was highly adored time and again by the Confucianists. Listen to the poetic praise:

> How splendid was the plan of King Wen! And how energetically it was carried out by King Wu! These acts are of such assistance and enlightenment to the people that the succeeding generations were furnished with models to correct themselves.[35]

This incident also called forth Mencius' theory on tyrannicide. Said he, "He who outrages the benevolence proper to his nature is called a robber; he who outrages the righteousness proper to society is called a ruffian. The robber and ruffian we call a mere fellow. I have heard of the cutting-off of

[33] "Heaven gives birth to millions of people and for them it erects the king and teacher." (*Book of History* or *Shuking*). It is because of such utterances that Confucianism has been charged with monarchical or divine-right inclinations.

[34] The San dynasty lasted from 1766 to 1122 B.C. Choa reigned from 1154 to 1122 B.C.

[35] Wen was the father of Wu. This quotation is from the *Book of History*.

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the fellow Choa, but I have not heard of the putting a sovereign to death, in his case."[36] So, whenever a ruler becomes a blasphemer of heaven and an oppressor of his subjects—that is, when he becomes a tyrant—he is no more to be regarded as a sovereign, but as a private man, and is to be condemned and punished by the edict of heaven. King Wu, in this example, was therefore no rebel, but fought for a cause both just and lawful.

Thus it is clear that while the consent of the governed is not necessary for the basis of government in China, the content of the governed absolutely is. And the latter, with the sacred "right of rebellion" as its method of enforcement, is assuredly no less aggressive a measure against unruly government than the former. Meadows, an Englishman, writing in the midst of the Taiping devastation and in immediate touch with its horrors, justified it by elaborate arguments, and showed historically that such outbreaks had been an essential feature in the nation's development. China has, indeed, been called the classic ground of revolutions, as many as twelve having occurred between A.D. 420 and 1644, and rebellions having been innumerable. And this is only one instance of the Chinese amenability to philosophical doctrines.

However, as regards the content of the natural-law theory —as regards the completeness of the system of rational political speculation—the Chinese saints could hardly compare with the Western sinners.[37] China, unassisted by anything like the highly developed juristic notions of the West, has never produced such a refined theory of natural law.[38] Nor are the ideas

[36] *Book of Mencius.*

[37] Some of the Western exponents of natural law, like Hobbes and Rousseau, have been accused as sinners.

[38] Such coherent though not always practicable ideas as those of an ante-social state of nature, legal origin of civil society, individual rights and obligations both before and after entrance into the civil state, specific relations between the individuals themselves and between the governor and the governed, the libertarian and equalitarian notions, and a host of other such refinements—with which the West is so familiar—are either rudely disregarded or expressly rejected by the Chinese thinkers.

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actually developed entirely logical and consistent. The Chinese theorists have stood at times strenuously for the popular rights of resistance and tyrannicide. But how are they to be exercised? To whom do they belong? To the people—collectively or individually? No one, in fact, can feel sure that the sages did not mean to vest these important rights in the high magistrates of the state as the people's representatives, thus foreshadowing the ideas of the early French Huguenots of the sixteenth century.

Furthermore, to saturate the people with an ill-defined idea of democracy, and even to arm them with rights of revolution and assassination, without, at the same time, providing them a justification and a system for sharing in government, must have caused serious inconveniences to the people themselves in the case of a despotism keenly felt but not strong enough to evoke a common uprising; which instance is by no means rare in Chinese history. Indeed, it is even to train the people in the school of anarchy. For what the philosophers and the framers of the constitution following them have failed to supply in a regular manner, the exigencies of everyday life have compelled the nation to provide by irregular means. In the absence of a share in lawmaking, the people at times simply take the law into their own hands—a rough-and-ready, cruel, and often disastrous remedy for grievances. Even at the present day, in small local questions, the populace will sometimes resent an imposition by seizing the official sent to enforce it, dragging him out of his place, and throwing him into a ditch. Then the magistrate who has failed is either reprimanded as incompetent and removed from office or forcefully retained to let him deal with the people the best he can. When the grievance is more widespread and is long continued and the officials are obstinate, there may be what is called a "local uprising," which has to be put down by massacre, else the smoking flax may spread to a conflagration. And this, the ultimate remedy in the West, is almost the proximate remedy in the East, for want of any adequate intermediate machinery

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of redress. So, it is not only today that China is in a state of anarchy!

As respects the method of reasoning, however, the Chinese thinkers seem to stand on much better ground than their Western counterparts. Those criticisms often heaped upon the Western exponents of natural law—such as that they are unhistorical and impractical and that they confound "what is" with "what ought to be," etc.—cannot with relevancy and justice be applied to the Chinese thinkers. They deemed it essential that an appeal should be made to tradition as well as to the edict of heaven or the law of nature, essential that it should be proclaimed that the rights of democracy rest on historical as well as philosophical and ethical grounds. Even Lao-tse, the most metaphysical and transcendental of Chinese thinkers, was not entirely oblivious of the ways of the good old "ancients who were well versed in Reason."[39] The Confucian Grand Commonwealth to which we have referred was not merely an invention of wisdom but a phenomenon of society. It had, or was alleged to have had, actual existence under the emperors Yao,[40] Shun,[41] Yu,[42] Tan,[43] Wen,[44] and Wu.[45] Nor were the Confucianists so visionary as to insist upon bringing back even that state of affairs. On the contrary, they unflinchingly set about devising a system to secure peace, order, happiness, and prosperity to the extent permitted by the existing circumstances. In other words, they believed that there had been an age of reason,[46] but it had disappeared and royal rule[47] had sprung up of necessity. To quote their own words:

> Since the disappearance of the sway of reason mankind has broken itself up into families, each person loving his own parents and own children, appropriating wealth for his own use and putting forth energy for

[39] *Canon of Reason and Virtue.*

[40] Reigning 2357–2258 B.C.

[41] Reigning 2258–2206 B.C.

[42] Reigning 2205–2198 B.C.

[43] Reigning 1766–1753 B.C.

[44] 1184–1135 B.C., governing as the duke of the Chau principality.

[45] Reigning 1122–1116 B.C.

[46] The age of reason was the Grand Commonwealth described before.

[47] The royal rule was the inferior peace to be described.

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his own purposes. The princes restrict the succession to their own sons and brothers, and to protect themselves and their property they erect high walls and dig deep moats. They carefully formulate a body of morals and rights by which the proper bond between the ruler and the ruled is secured, the affection between parents and children is strengthened, the harmony between brother and brother is promoted, the love between husband and wife is maintained, the rules and regulations for governing the people are established, land for habitation and cultivation is granted, and men of wisdom and valor are rewarded. Works are undertaken and enterprises attempted only to satisfy their personal ambitions. Hence intrigues and exploitation run rife, and clashes of interest necessitate recourse to arms. It is exactly in this way that Yu, Tan, Wen, Wu, Chen,[48] and Chau Kung[49] sprang up. By directing and concentrating their attention on morals and rights—by bringing out the underlying principles and establishing them with examples, and punishing those who violated these rules—they rose to power as kings. Thenceforward any king who attempted to deviate from the road struck out by these six rulers was immediately dethroned and scorned by all as base and unworthy. This is called the Inferior Peace.[50]

It is singular, also, that in the West the natural-law theory has been exploited by such diametrically opposed schools of thinkers as those of Hobbes and of Rousseau. But in China there has been neither of these types. Rather are they Lockes and Blackstones, being immune to both reactionary and radical inclinations. While providing a chance for the people to rectify misgovernment, they preach that as long as the ruler behaves—as long as he is the sovereign—so long his authority must be respected. For, "Heaven produces the seasons, the earth yields wealth, parents afford nurture and education to their children, but the king adjusts and co-ordinates all these agencies. He can do no wrong."[51] Indeed, as long as the ruler is in position to command respect, so long the *Book of History* assures him that:

[48] Chen (reigning 1115–1078 B.C.) was the successor of Wu.

[49] Chau-Kung, or Duke of Chau (died 1105 B.C.), was the fourth son of King Wen.

[50] *Li Ki.*

[51] *Ibid.*

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Under the whole heaven,
Every spot is the sovereign's ground;
To the borders of the land,
Every individual is the sovereign's minister![52]

Then, too, it has not been the custom with any Chinese thinker to formulate a theory with the avowed purpose of ingratiating himself with a Charles II or of glorifying a glorious revolution. The typical Chinese philosopher is a truly strong personality: he is the one that "force cannot bend, wealth cannot confound, and poverty cannot move."[53] Opportunism certainly cannot be charged against him. This would seem to go far to explain the long-continued influence that he has been able to retain on the minds of the Chinese people. Except the ideas of Lao-tse, which, shrouded in mysticism, seem to be as far removed from practical politics as the Einstein formula is from everyday engineering, the Chinese theory of natural law as a whole remains a force always to be reckoned with.

In the West the theory had practically spent its force at the beginning of the nineteenth century. But when the philosophical world turned its head toward the new or semi-new fields of the more worldly utilitarianism and the more mystical idealism, the law of nature not only receded "to the limbo of outworn creeds," but became an idle object of jest and ridicule. In China, however, its fate is happier. It may never have produced a sensational war of independence like the American,[54] or a startling war of revolution like the French,[55] but its influence in practical politics is steady and its hold upon the common minds strong. Steady and strong it always has been almost from time immemorial down to the middle of the last century; when, all of a sudden, and by a combination of circumstances, the Thames, the Rhine, the Seine, and the Mis-

[52] Mencius quoting the *Book of Poetry*. [53] *Book of Mencius*.

[54] See B. F. Wright, "American Interpretations of Natural Law," *Amer. Pol. Science Rev.*, August, 1926.

[55] See Dunning, *Political Theories from Rousseau to Spencer*, chaps. ii and iii.

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sissippi began to flow into the Yang-tse,[56] until today the exotic streams of natural law have been diffused over the whole academic world of great China. For nearly three quarters of a century Chinese thought has been subject, for the first time in history I believe, to powerful influences from abroad. And meanwhile the Chinese thinkers of the day have been busy in seizing the new supply of material and molding and remolding it so as to utilize it to round out their native theory of the law of nature. It may be interesting to note in passing that the most current doctrine in the present revolutionary movement —the "three-people doctrine"[57] of Sun Yat-Sen[58]—is itself a product of an old theory reshaped and reinforced by new influences and new ideas. It is therefore evident that in China that venerable theory, which has been outcast by the West, not only retains its sublimity and brilliance, but is being carried on with added luster by the increasing ingenuity of mankind.

After such a summary statement of the Chinese theory of natural law or heavenly edict and a general comparison of its standing with that of the Western theory, it may be interesting to try to answer, in conclusion, this question: What, after all, is the typical Chinese meaning of the very term under discussion, natural law or heavenly edict? Such a question will naturally resolve itself into two different queries: (1) as to the meaning of "natural" or "heavenly" and (2) as to that of "law" or "edict." In regard to the former, it would seem safe to put down the following significations:

[56] Works of Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, Burlamaqui, Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Rousseau, and others began to be earnestly read either in original or translated form.

[57] "People's nationalism, people's sovereignty, and people's livelihood."

[58] For a brief article in English on Sun's theories, see: *The Chinese Recorder*, November, 1926, "A Study of the Teachings of Sun Yat-Sen," by King Chu, translated by F. R. Millican. Sun acknowledged his indebtedness to Lincoln's apt phrase—"government of the people, by the people, and for the people"—as well as to his own Chinese predecessors and history. But what was Lincoln but an ardent disciple of the natural-law school, his very maxim being an exposition and application of the principle that "men are created equal and free"? However, it is Wright's contention, *op. cit.*, that Lincoln was not a natural-law theorist because he did not appeal to that term, although he had that basic idea.

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(*a*) The rational or reasonable: principles discovered out of the nature of things by human reason. (*b*) The original, i.e., independent of human history and institutions. (*c*) The conventional, or, in accordance with ancient law or custom, i.e., customs or laws that are so firmly established and of such long existence that they are held to be clearly fundamental in their nature. (*d*) Pertaining to the physical system of the universe. (*e*) The ethical, i.e., the appropriate or fitting, or the just or equitable.

While the term "heavenly edict" may seem to suggest "positive" as distinct from "natural" law, in general it is safe to say that in the East as in the West, "natural law is held to be, not enacted law, but rules and principles existing de facto, that is, those inhering in the very nature of the Deity, of the universe, of man, of justice and right, or of civil society, to be discovered by reason, conscience, experience, or some combination of these. Furthermore, those laws or principles are thought of as applying to all alike, and as varying not at all."[59] But it is to be remembered that what is asserted not to vary is not the actual nature itself, but an individual's interpretation of it, and on that account it varies so much the more. After all, the important thing about it is the fact that natural law "is nothing more nor less than man's way of expressing his desire to find a solution for the insoluble, a formula to stand for the great political unknown, or, to put it differently, the attempt to find some higher source for the principles of justice than the will of the individuals who, for the moment, determine the positive law of the state."[60]

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[59] B. F. Wright, Jr., "American Interpretations of Natural Law," *Amer. Pol. Science Rev.*, August, 1926, pp. 524–47.

[60] *Ibid.* My writing the article (and especially the conclusion) was entirely suggested by Mr. Wright's excellent essay which has been referred to in the notes and which should be read for the purpose of comparison between the theories of the two countries. The subject matter of the Chinese theory has necessitated my use of a different way of writing.

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VALUE-INTERPRETATION: THE METHODOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCIPLINE

ALBERT WEINBERG

Between modern psychology and the mind of modern man there exists an unbridged and ever widening gap. Modern man, as represented by his cultural expressions, becomes more and more subjective; modern psychology, dominated by experimentalism and behaviorism, becomes more and more objective. Even before the advent of the most radical of objectivistic psychologies it could not be said that the psychologist was notably interested in the dynamic aspect of mind. While devoted to the study of mental content, the orthodox introspectionism is so punctilious that it misses everything really interesting. And most surprising of all, we are disappointed even in the discipline which might be expected to be more human: value theory. Current study of values, although making a pretension to study of the higher thought processes, presents almost as complete an alienation from the modern consciousness as academic psychology in general.

It is the inadequacy of value theory which particularly concerns us, because in the study of values psychology comes closest to life. By inadequacy we mean not error, but failure to treat the entire problem involved, and neglect of that phase of the problem which is really more interesting. While the investigations of value theory cover an extensive ground, yet the scope of this discipline as a whole is a restricted one. It treats really of only a certain aspect of values, an aspect not of the highest moment. It treats only of the characteristics of valuation *ueberhaupt,* i.e., such characteristics as are possessed by all or a whole class of values in common. These characteristics, while they indicate certain psychological laws,

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are not very interesting humanly. Their study involves us in a discipline which, though academically important, is rather lifeless.

Yet the study of values, we repeat, is not of necessity lifeless. Since values represent volitions, and volitions are the unit of consciousness,[1] it may be said that values are the real subject matter of a *geisteswissenschaftliche* or "psychological" psychology. The entire point is with the approach to them. The change of viewpoint which is needed—not to supersede, but to supplement—is radical, and yet so obvious that one almost hesitates to mention it. What is lacking in current value theory is nothing else than the study of values: we mean to say the study of particular values as unique essences, as indices of individuated modes of sensitivity.

Current study of values does not have to do with values in the foregoing sense, but with, if the distinction may thus be made, valuation. It does not focus the elements of uniqueness in a value, but the elements common to all values, which can only be represented by an abstract category. It seems completely to overlook the fact that it is also possible to study a value in itself and for its own sake.

Now it is only in the study of specific values that we touch the human story of mind, that we learn the notable episodes of the affective life. It does not contribute vitally to the problem of some complex affective experience to know the characteristics of valuation which it typifies. Indispensable as the abstract approach to values may be, it is not right that we entirely stop with it, stop just before the most interesting point, the study of values as living, agitating realities.

By value-interpretation we designate a discipline in which the study of individual values, such as we have been broadly envisaging, is the sole and explicit enterprise. We may now bring out the fact that this study can be formulated in terms of a single, pervasive problem. It is the perception of this

[1] See Holt, *The Freudian Wish*.

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problem which makes the study of individual values psychologically appealing; the failure to perceive it which has caused the exclusive engrossment with "valuation." The problem to which we refer is that of why values are valued, i.e., the psychological grounds, for a value possessing its appeal or cogency.

The same psychological query of "why" must be put to values that is put to the phenomena of behavior, causal determination being as valid a principle with psychic acts as with overt. Values are valued for reasons,[2] and in the case of most values for a wide plurality of reasons. Of course, by reasons for valuing we mean not only the consciously apprehended ends, but also that larger group of factors which operates semiconsciously.[3] Though we usually value without knowing just why we value, yet grounds for valuing exist and are definitely discoverable in the margins of consciousness. These considerations are especially to be noted in the case of so-called "absolute" or "primary" values, values which have an aspect of self-subsistence. This aspect of self-subsistence is completely delusive, and indeed it is our moral values which are most complex. The dichotomy in values is based, not upon the fact that some values are valued for reasons and others not, but that to some there attaches merely an egoistic desirability and to others a spiritual import, a dignity. And precisely because their worth is in a dignity and not a specific usage, the grounds for so-called absolute valuations are complex and elaborate.

It is a matter, then, of not being deceived by the apparent self-subsistency of values, but of perceiving in every value a problem, a latency of significance. The solution of this prob-

[2] Cf. also Dewey, "The Logic of Judgments of Practice," *Essays in Experimental Logic*. There are, however, certain defects in the instrumentalist psychology of valuation: the overemphasis of overt conduct, of purely conscious grounds of valuation, and of practical as opposed to moral dilemmas (cf. the writer's article, "A Critique of Ethical Pragmatism," *Journal of Philosophy*, 1923).

[3] The Freudian unconscious is left out of account here as too debatable.

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lem, however varied the significance, is in translating one value into other values, the values which figure in its motivation. Every value leads on to other values because the factors through which a value has its appeal are themselves values. They are thus, in a sense, components of the value which is under analysis, since they constitute the value of that value. Every value is complex in that to be a value at all is to be valued for something, to have values. Whether or not these component values are consciously recognized does not matter; if we recognized consciously all psychic determinants, there would be no need for the science of psychology. It is just because the grounds for valuation are obscure that there is necessary a method such as the one we expound, a method which introspects upon the margins of consciousness.[4]

The usefulness of value-interpretation lies primarily with moral[5] values, the values which, while in reality most complex, present least of their significance upon the surface. In addition to the particular psychological interest of moral values

[4] The introspection meant is not that of the laboratory, confined to a definite span of time, conditioned by external stimuli and observant of all details whether relevant or not. The entire problem differs from that treated by the laboratory psychologist: there is no question here of what data were in consciousness in a definite period of time. Since a value does not represent a specific psychic state, but a general attitude, the problem is that of why a value has existed with us *in general*. We must thus examine consciousness at many pertinent points throughout the experience with a value. The method is free as to focus, summoning up reminiscences as well as observing the present; it is unhampered by the necessity of reporting the whole content of consciousness; it may pierce straight to the essence at issue. It may be likened to the phenomenological *Wesenserschauung*, which one can apply quite independently of the metaphysical pretensions of phenomenology itself.

Though value-interpretations can have certainty only in application to the introspector himself, they are, in their main import, hypotheses about the way people in general feel toward a value. This is because we have to do with essences, posited by all social psychology in its basic assumption of a similarity of psychic structure.

[5] By moral values we mean a class much larger than the values of ethical behavior. We mean all values which convey inherent dignity and appear to obligate aspiration. Thus moral values can also be purely subjective attainments—decencies of feeling or of thought. One of the most important disclosures of our method of interpretation is that the barrier between moral behavior and inner moral experience is unwarranted, both classes of value being composed of the same sort of elements.

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there is a second reason for beginning our discussion with them—the importance of value-interpretation to ethics. Value-interpretation must be propadeutic to ethics, ethics being unclear if we do not know what moral values mean, that is, what their component values are. It needs to be shown with every moral value what its essence is as an interwoven texture of intentions and aspirations. Then compliance with ethical precepts is not an unenlightened absolutism but an intelligent application of self-knowledge.[6]

One must come to realize that every moral value, no matter how simple of aspect, is latently complex, is the condensation of a whole ethical philosophy. Such attempts as are made by some modern moral philosophers (notably Nelson of Göttingen) to reduce ethical imperatives to one or more fundamental simple values are bound to founder in every instance. Take for example the frequent attribution of ultimacy to that value of altruism embodied in both the Golden Rule and Kant's categorical imperative. This value does look simple at first glance. Moreover it is the chief factor in the largest number of moral judgments. Yet even altruism is a complex value. In the first place we find in it an opposition to egotism, so repellent ethically that every revolt against it is valuable even as a counteraction. Second, altruism is the index of a fine capacity for sympathy, the sensitiveness to the sufferings of another as another (cf. Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*). Third, altruism is valued because it invests the strivings of life with a goal of spiritual import, making life richer and more significant. Fourth, altruism is motivated by

[6] In the discipline of value-interpretation we are reverting to the Socratic method, in principle if not in practical technique. Socrates' fundamental idea was that moral values must be understood with respect to their essential aim or idea. But this sound principle was defeated by the misconceptions which entered into its application. In its application Socrates sought to find the essence of a moral value by conceiving of a single idea that pervaded. There is no single idea or aim, there is a complex. The Socratic method becomes fruitful only when we speak, not of the general *idea* running through a type of ethical behavior, but of the general *ideas*. The reason that all the *Dialogues* are inconclusive is that no single idea will suffice for all manifestations of a value. Its motivation is complex and pluralistic.

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a concern for large social ends, by a perception of the indispensability of mutual help to the existence of society as a whole. Fifth, it is valued because it is frequently accompanied by self-sacrifice, the most romantically appealing of ethical values. Sixth, altruistic behavior is approved in deference to the value of love, distinct from altruism but substantiating it as an emotion gratified in its exercise. Finally, we may perceive in altruism that mystic sense of the oneness of the whole human race which may be denoted as the valuation of humanitarianism. This analysis is still incomplete, but we are limited in these interpretations to mere surveys.

It is not, however, with the values of ethical behavior alone that interpretation finds complexity to unravel; it should also attack the problem of the moral value attaching to social institutions (customs, conventions, forms).[7] The problem of the interpretation of such values must be distinguished from the problem of the genesis of institutions per se. It is not a question of how such institutions objectively arise, but of how they become values. It has been a mistake to imagine that the problem of social values is solved when their origin is traced to the exigencies of primitive society. Present meaning is not identical with genetic mechanism, and we value social institutions contemporarily for quite different reasons from those which operated in their origin. Of course, it is true that even our present valuation includes motives of social expediency and practicality. But in addition to such motives there is a purely aesthetic side which current studies of our valuations tend to overlook. Thus, it must be realized that in monogamy we do not value merely such social designs as the espousal of the family, the attainment of social orderliness, the proper environment for offspring, etc. We also find a stratum of much more subtle motives, involving the values of conjugal love: faithfulness, comradeship, concentration of love, self-sacrifice,

[7] The "social" values are as much invested with moral worth as the values of moral behavior. They also refer to behavior, but their distinctiveness lies in the fact that they can only be formulated in terms of a social consensus.

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patience. Various forms of government are also the foci for a much larger and more subtle complex of valuations than is apparent on the surface. Thus there is a very poetic moral sentiment, composed of many elements, toward the institution of democracy; the multiplicity of motivating factors, ranging from brotherly love to an almost religious exaltation of freedom, can be envisaged in such a book as Edward Carpenter's *Towards Democracy*. As for aristocracy, we have only to open our Nietzsche to see the sophisticated and esoteric pantheon of values amid which this one value is reverenced.

We pass to another phase of the interpretation of moral valuation in viewing the valuation of feeling. We value certain states of feeling for themselves alone, without any or with very little consideration of their expressions in conduct. Thus we should value humility even though it were that of an anchorite and could never ingratiate other human beings. We value it because its attainment involves wise perceptions and rare spirituality, being as much a moral feat or more so than courage or honesty. In the first place humility is deference to the highest standard of excellence, a standard before which all human capacities must feel ashamed. Still another aspect of its motivation is its passionate assault upon the egotism that is the pervading sin of our mortal nature. Also, the valuation of humility is the valuation of an ability to achieve the objectivity and honesty of self-criticism.

Along with moral values stressing feeling, there are moral values emphasizing thought—in the sense of philosophical interpretation of reality. The occasion for such interpretation is precisely in the fact that we have to do here not with mere ontological judgments, but with moral attitudes. Attitudes such as optimism, pessimism, irony are not justifiable so much by reference to fact—for such generalization about life can never have proof—as by the appeal of the moral motives which enter into them. Pessimism is cogent very largely because we perceive a certain hardihood in unflinching perception of the

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evil of life; optimism, on the other hand, is persuasive for those who value pietistic indulgence toward the universe. The moral origin of certain modes of intellectual apprehension is interestingly exemplified in the case of irony, the focusing of painful incongruities between the actual and the ideal. This widespread value of modern thought and literature is not a mere perceiving, a registering of inescapable objective fact, but the cultivating of a very complex moral attitude. The phenomenon of anyone enforcing upon himself this essentially depressing attitude becomes understandable only when one applies the interpretative method and discovers in irony certain appealing and sturdy virtues: devotion to the ideal which life ironically offends, a devotion for which ironic enjoyment is but a defense-reaction; the preference for truth which is capable of acknowledging the defeats of one's ideals; a fastidiousness which is more quick to perceive ironic defeat than the average eye; acceptant Stoicism, the bearing of life's burden of pain with the grace of humor; antisentimentalism, a reaction from the pretty sweetness of Pollyanna; the courageous self-criticism involved in psychological irony which spares neither one's loves nor one's self. The complete analysis of this subtle value would involve, as the writer hopes to show in an ensuing study, a survey of almost the whole *Weltanschauung* of modernity.

From such values of philosophical apperception it is a close step to values embodying a *summum bonum,* an ultimate goal of ethical striving. Interpretation is needed here even when the ethical philosophy is explicitly rationalized, the rationalization covering only a small fraction of the total motivation. If we take, for example, hedonism, we may say that the complexity and plurality of motives is much more evident in the art of an Anatole France than in the technical logistic arguments of the hedonistic philosophy. The hedonist is not a hedonist merely because he believes that pleasure is what all men strive for, and is thus necessarily the highest good. In

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place of this textbook sophistry let us view some of the subtle valuations which actually underlie this hedonistic attitude: the shrewd human wisdom which would make the best of our fleeting but appreciable mortality; revulsion from the undeserved suffering of life and appreciation of any attitude which seeks to obviate it; the valuation of amiable well-being as such; advocacy of any temper which opposes an inhuman and prudish moralism; a somewhat ironic delight in the picturesqueness of hedonistic naturalism; humanitarianism, which would see everyone have his place in the sun; approval of the intrinsic instincts of human nature, regarded as dependable and amiable; acceptance of love and sex as harmless legitimacies. Thus, the ethical philosophy is destined even in its selection of a single supreme value to betray interest in an entire host of values.

Even with philosophies of a purely cognitive pretension we find the same need for analysis in terms of values. This is the view that William James held when he said that philosophies resolve into temperaments, for temperament is a matter of values. James' list of the qualities possessed contrastingly by rationalist and empiricist is concerned with types of valuation and is an application of value-interpretation. Whatever be the academic ground for any philosophical view, one may be fairly sure that its appeal is also aesthetic, an ingratiation of values. One of the clearest instances of the rooting of a philosophy in personal values is in Santayana's *Skepticism and Animal Faith*, where the author takes the most candid aesthetic pleasure in his discovery that essences are the only indubitable data. The values which underlie Santayana's philosophy of essences are fairly clear: unhampered subjectivity; irony, the enjoyment of a pervasive delusion; calm detachment; the courage which does not tremble at a specious universe.

When we are viewing the sphere of subjective values we must not fail to consider the moral valuation which emerges from our literary experience. Our appreciation of literature is

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not wholly technical, but involves also an appreciation of moral-philosophical vistas which literature reveals to us, vistas which make the work of an author identical to us with certain values. Since modern man thinks and feels so largely in terms of literature, the interpretation of values must often be concerned with literary personages and tendencies. We must ask what values a particular philosophically interesting writer represents, and then, according to our interpretative method, what the meaning of these values is. Thus, with Dostoevsky we should have to consider that philosophical Christianity the analysis of which would reveal such an extraordinary combination of religiosity, romanticism, humanitarianism, mysticism, emotionalism, psychologism. In moral philosophy the interest of the philosophical approach to literature is well evidenced in works of two such sensitive philosophers as Santayana and Simmel. In the field of literary criticism a champion of this approach is John Cowper Powys, whose essays on the great masters of literature are really essays in the interpretation of the philosophical valuations which literature dramatizes.

It is, however, not merely philosophical literature which we must view, but also literary philosophy, which deals with moral values explicitly and didactically. A Nietzsche, for example, reveals to us values so cogent that they come into a noteworthy diffuseness and are conceptualized. Such values will call for interpretation, being more subtle and complex than conventional morality. A value of Nietzsche's which has created considerable stir in modern thought—but not sufficient understanding—is a certain *hardness*, so much identified with Nietzsche that it is often what is meant by the term "Nietzscheanism." The value is an interesting instance of how a value can present a perverse surface and yet have intrinsic moral health. If we look beneath the perverse surface of this daring transvaluation we should see that to be hard in Nietzsche's way is not to be callous, but to attain some of the most

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aristocratic of moral qualities: rationality, objectivity in social aspirations, fastidiousness in the selection of aims, immunity to the disintegratingly sentimental, economy of moral energy, disdain of cheap pathos, ascetic self-discipline, unswervingness in purposes—to end is to stop short. Also the antinomianism of much modern literary philosophy might be shown to be largely experimentalism, romantic individualism, and heroic unconventionality. There is great need, in approaching the literary philosophy of modernity, for less literalness and more intelligent understanding. Only by discovering the elements of values can we judge them, and when we search for these elements we must often look rather in our own psychology than the oversensational and histrionic presentation of their particular advocate.

Thus far we have dealt only with moral values (in the broadest sense), preferring this class of values to aesthetic values because the analysis of aesthetic values is a recognized and practiced thing. The art critic takes it for granted that aesthetic values are complex and that his task is to analyze beauty into its elements. But though the general psychologist will leave to the technical critic the study of specific works of art, there are yet certain general questions of aesthetic valuation which only the psychologist would undertake to consider. Thus, the problem of the psychology of aesthetic pleasure *überhaupt* (or the values entering into the aesthetic value) has always engaged the psychologist's study. But the psychology of the aesthetic has been engrossed in this one problem to the exclusion of other problems equally important though of less generality. We need to study also why specific types of aesthetic experience give pleasure and are accredited with value. Take, for example, the question of various literary forms, tragedy, comedy, the romantic novel, the satire, etc. Very much attention has been given to defining the essence of these forms, very little, however, to investigation of our reasons for valuing them (by which we mean reacting with ap-

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preciation to them). Such analyses would involve values which reflect our deepest and most serious moral nature. The analysis, for example, of our valuation of the tragic form leads to such traits of valuation as our love of the heroism of suffering, our pleasure in pessimism, our Prometheanism, our deference to dignified defeat. There are problems in aesthetic values which are not concerned with technical discrimination, but with our general psychic constitution and its moral and philosophical values.

The interpretation of economic values is chiefly of interest in connection with such economic values as have acquired something more than biological or utilitarian import. Even with the simplest type of economic valuation there is a complexity of volitional factors, but as this complexity is quite easily perceptible, interpretation is only of real interest where economic values are something more, so to speak, than merely economic. To realize that economic values can have more than a biological import is to escape a grave error of the orthodox economics. Mr. Thorstein Veblen did much to enlighten the theorists of economic value when he showed how economic values call for a psychological as well as an economic interpretation. His interpretations in the *Theory of the Leisure Class*, analyzing values in terms of an exhibitionist egotism, show that even in the least complex of our values there is enough complexity to render analysis both necessary and interesting. But even Mr. Veblen's account of the case does not display the complexity of economic values sufficiently. It is possible to treat the psychology of economic values adequately only when one realizes that one cannot keep the economic, the aesthetic, and the moral in water-tight compartments. We not only value certain economic goods on aesthetic grounds, but also on moral. Certainly money itself can be valued by some good souls mainly for the occasion it gives to do good.

So much for a hasty survey of the chief applications to which this method lends itself. We have seen how each type

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of value raises its own psychological problem and appeals to a particular mode of interest. Everywhere—in solving such problems—we have encountered complexity, of a degree to which not this hasty survey but only a special study for each value could do justice. We have learned that to unravel the complexity of values is to interpret them in the truest sense, as well as to unbare the roots of desire, of aesthetic feeling, and of moral character.

This method, we believe, is of particular significance in an age of the character of the present. We are characterized by an ever increasing complexity, an expansion of spirit in which not only countless new values are born, but our old become imbued with fresh and greater import. Also, we give evidence of an urgent desire for self-knowledge, a desire so urgent that even a facile and sensational psychology like Freudianism can come into popularity among intellectuals. Never did psychology have a greater richness of material, never a greater zest for its employment. What has been lacking was only the knowledge of a definite and systematic method. With this, however, formulated and in view, psychology need no longer fear to be psychological and can meet in humanistic manner the problems of modernity.

JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

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MORAL JUDGMENTS OF HIGH-SCHOOL STUDENTS

G. S. SLAVENS AND A. P. BROGAN

I

In the last few years three articles have been published in this *Journal*,[1] in which the moral judgments of university students were studied both at the University of Texas and at several northern universities. Those articles dealt with sixteen practices, which were named by the students and then ranked according to comparative value and comparative frequency of occurrence.

The present article reports an extension of the previous work in statistical ethics into the field of the high school. The earlier work with university students attempted both to give a description of their moral judgments and to use this material for verification of certain philosophical theories about the nature and objectivity of moral valuations. The present work with high-school students carries on these general purposes of study, but adds the following special purposes. In the first place, we desire to know if younger students in the high schools have moral judgments which are as definite as the judgments of university students. In the second place, we desire to see how the general tendencies of the high-school judgments, however definite or indefinite they may be, compare with the university judgments. Finally, we wish to see what light our study of high-school judgments about moral matters may throw on the much-discussed problem of moral education in the high school.

II

For the purposes of this experiment, investigations were made in the Senior High School of Austin, Texas, and the Main Avenue Senior High School of San Antonio, Texas. In

[1] XXXIII, 119–34; XXXIV, 254–71; XXXV, 105–24.

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each case, the senior high school includes the last three grades, that is, the ninth, tenth, and eleventh. The students, therefore, are approximately from fourteen to seventeen years of age.

San Antonio is the largest city in Texas, with a population of about two hundred thousand. It does not have any university or large college. It has many Mexican citizens, but few of their children go to the high school studied. Austin is the capital and the seat of the state university. Its population is not over fifty thousand. It is much stricter in such matters as "blue laws" than is San Antonio. The Austin high school is strongly influenced by the university in such matters as student life, teaching practice, etc. Accordingly, we may say that the two high schools studied are markedly different in their urban environment.

During the academic year 1925–26, studies were made of approximately two hundred boys and two hundred girls in each high school. The university list of sixteen practices was used, with the omission, at the suggestion of the high-school authorities, of the topic "sex irregularity." This omission is a loss, though it is probable that this topic would have been confusing in the high school unless it were more carefully defined than was necessary in the university. The list of the remaining fifteen practices may be seen in any of the following tables.

For the sake of simplicity, the previous university studies in what may be called "double standards" were omitted. The two main problems to be studied were thus the ranking of the fifteen practices in order of comparative value or "worseness" and in order of comparative frequency. The comparative value concerned human beings in general, but for the frequency, each sex was asked to rank the frequency among members of its own sex in the high schools. Thus we get for each of the two high schools the following six results: (1) Boys' rank about general worseness. (2) Girls' rank about general worseness. (3) Boys' rank about comparative frequency among

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high-school boys. (4) Girls' rank about comparative frequency among high-school girls. (5) Boys' judgment as to whether each practice is more frequent among high-school boys than girls, etc. (6) Girls' judgment as to whether each practice is more frequent among high-school boys than girls, etc.

Approximately one hundred boys and one hundred girls in each high school filled out the blanks about comparative value, and another hundred of each sex in each high school filled out the blanks about comparative frequency. The blanks were not to be signed, though the sex was to be indicated in each case. The groups of students were so selected that they gave a "fair sample" of the student body in each high school.

III

Table A gives the results for the boys and the girls in both high schools concerning the question of comparative value or worseness. The rankings are based on arithmetical averages in each case. In column 1, the practices are listed. In columns 2 and 3, the rankings of the San Antonio and Austin boys are given. In columns 4 and 5, the rankings of the San Antonio and Austin girls are given. In columns 6 and 7, the former rankings by many hundreds of men and women at the University of Texas in the years 1919–21 are given. Columns 8 and 9 repeat the rankings by University of Texas students, but for the year 1923–24.

A glance at Table A reveals the high degree of uniformity among all the rankings. The different coefficients of correlation are given in Table B. For each coefficient, its standard error is given. Most of the coefficients of correlation are above ninety. In other words, there is usually less than 10 per cent of difference among these ranks. With such high uniformity, it is useless to attempt any profound explanation for what slight differences there are. Among the high-school ranks, the only large difference concerns smoking. But an examination

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of the arithmetical averages (not here printed) on which these ranks are based shows that the difference is really very slight

TABLE A

JUDGMENTS OF COMPARATIVE VALUE BY HIGH-SCHOOL AND UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

PRACTICES IN ORDER OF WORSENESS	HIGH-SCHOOL BOYS		HIGH-SCHOOL GIRLS		TEXAS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS			
					1919–21		1923–24	
	S.A.	Austin	S.A.	Austin	Men	Women	Men	Women
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Stealing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2. Cheating	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
3. Lying	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
4. Drinking	4	5	4	5	5	4	5	4
5. Gambling	5	4	5	4	4	5	4	6
6. Swearing	6	7	6	7	7	8	6	8
7. Vulgar talk	7	6	7	6	6	6	8	5
8. Sabbath-breaking	8	8	8	8	8	7	12	10
9. Snobbishness	9	9	9½	9	11	12	9	12
10. Selfishness	10	10	11½	11	9	10	7	9
11. Gossip	12	11	11½	10	12	9	11	7
12. Smoking	11	13	9½	12	14	14	14½	14
13. Idleness	13	12	13	13	10	11	10	11
14. Extravagance	14	14	14	14	13	13	13	13
15. Dancing	15	15	15	15	15	15	14½	15

TABLE B

COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION WITH STANDARD ERRORS FOR THE COMPARATIVE VALUE RANKS

	r	S.E.
1. San Antonio boys and Austin boys	.98	.01
2. San Antonio girls and Austin girls	.98	.01
3. San Antonio boys and Austin girls	.98	.01
4. San Antonio girls and Austin boys	.96	.02
5. San Antonio boys and university men, 1919–21	.96	.02
6. San Antonio boys and university men, 1923–24	.91	.05
7. Austin boys and university men, 1919–21	.97	.02
8. Austin boys and university men, 1923–24	.95	.03
9. University men, 1919–21 and 1923–24	.95	.03
10. San Antonio girls and university women, 1919–21	.92	.04
11. San Antonio girls and university women, 1923–24	.89	.06
12. Austin girls and university women, 1919–21	.96	.02
13. Austin girls and university women, 1923–24	.93	.04
14. University women, 1919–21 and 1923–24	.97	.02

and is caused by the "bunching" of four practices in the ranks by the San Antonio girls. When the high-school figures are

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compared with the university figures for either period, there are slight differences about snobbishness, selfishness, smoking, and idleness. The respective reasons for these differences probably involve the greater democracy of high schools, more maturity about self-interest, popular teaching about smoking by children, and greater temptation to loaf when away from parental control. But with such slight differences, these reasons should not be overemphasized.

TABLE C

FREQUENCY AMONG HIGH-SCHOOL BOYS AND UNIVERSITY MEN

PRACTICES IN ORDER OF GREATER FREQUENCY	HIGH-SCHOOL BOYS (1926)		MEN AT UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS (1926)
	San Antonio	Austin	
1	2	3	4
1. Swearing	1	2	2
2. Smoking	2	1	1
3. Dancing	3	3	3
4. Vulgar talk	4	5	6
5. Cheating	5	6	14
6. Idleness	6	4	5
7. Lying	7	7	12
8. Drinking	8	12	11
9. Gossip	9	11	8½
10. Gambling	10	8	7
11. Sabbath-breaking	11	9	4
12. Stealing	12	13	15
13. Extravagance	13	10	10
14. Selfishness	14	14	8½
15. Snobbishness	15	15	13

The quartile deviation will be shown in Table H for both comparative value and comparative frequency.

IV

Table C shows the comparative frequency in 1926 for the boys in the San Antonio and Austin high schools and for the men in the University of Texas. Table D shows the similar facts for the girls and women. Table E shows the coefficients of correlation for these frequency ranks, but adds the correlations of the high-school students in 1926 with the university

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students in 1919–22 in larger numbers. The correlations between the two sexes will be considered later.

The details of the frequency ranks call for little comment. The outstanding difference concerns cheating. In the high schools, cheating ranks fifth or sixth in both sexes. In the university, cheating is eleventh among the women and fourteenth among the men. The figures for the men and women at the

TABLE D

FREQUENCY AMONG HIGH-SCHOOL GIRLS AND UNIVERISTY WOMEN

PRACTICES IN ORDER OF GREATER FREQUENCY	HIGH-SCHOOL GIRLS (1926)		WOMEN AT UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS (1926)
	San Antonio	Austin	
1	2	3	4
1. Dancing	1	1	1
2. Gossip	2	2	2
3. Idleness	3	3	4
4. Extravagance	4	4	3
5. Cheating	5	5	11
6. Snobbishness	6	7	7
7. Lying	7	8	8
8. Swearing	8	10	9½
9. Sabbath-breaking	9	9	6
10. Selfishness	10	6	5
11. Stealing	11	13	15
12. Smoking	12	11	9½
13. Vulgar talk	13	12	12
14. Drinking	14	15	14
15. Gambling	15	14	13

university might seem to indicate that there is more cheating among the women than among the men, but this difference has been shown elsewhere[2] to be caused by the infrequency of certain other practices among the university women. It seems improbable that there is any such explanation for the difference between the high school and the university. Such a big difference in rank seems to indicate a real difference in frequency. How can it be explained? There are two factors to be considered. One factor is that the university students are older and more mature. The other factor is that the high

[2] This *Journal*, XXXIV, 261–62.

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schools have a so-called proctor system for examinations, while the University of Texas has an honor system that is a form of student self-government. There does not seem to be any way to estimate the relative importance of these two factors on the basis of our present data.

The other differences in the ranks are smaller ones. The difference between drinking among the San Antonio boys on the one hand and the Austin boys and university men on the other hand should be noticed. The differences about selfishness may easily be due to different interpretations of the topic,

TABLE E

COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION WITH STANDARD ERRORS FOR THE COMPARATIVE-FREQUENCY RANKS

	r	S.E.
1. San Antonio boys and Austin boys	.93	.04
2. San Antonio girls and Austin girls	.95	.03
3. San Antonio boys and university men, 1919–22	.59	.20
4. Austin boys and university men, 1919–22	.76	.13
5. San Antonio boys and university men, 1926	.60	.19
6. Austin boys and university men, 1926	.73	.14
7. San Antonio girls and university women, 1919–22	.84	.09
8. Austin girls and university women, 1919–22	.89	.06
9. San Antonio girls and university women, 1926	.83	.09
10. Austin girls and university women, 1926	.91	.05

which is perhaps concerned with a trait rather than a practice. The difference in regard to Sabbath-breaking is what might be expected.

The coefficients of correlation in Table E present a considerable range. When the boys in the two high schools are compared, their correlation is plus .93. For the girls the figure is .95. But when the high-school students are compared with the university students, there are much lower correlations, plus .59 to .76 for the men, and plus .83 to .91 for the women. These correlations are still fairly high, but much lower than any previous correlations about these topics. However, it should be remembered that a large amount of this difference in the correlations is due to the one topic of cheating.

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V

So far our study of the frequency of practices in the high schools has given two main ranks, a rank for frequency among the boys and a rank for frequency among the girls. But we have not yet had any material for tying these two ranks together. In the abstract we might consider the possibility that every practice of one sex was more frequent than any practice of the other sex. Table F shows the results of a separate

TABLE F

RELATIVE MASCULINE-FEMININE FREQUENCY OF EACH PRACTICE, SAN ANTONIO HIGH SCHOOL

PRACTICES	JUDGMENTS BY		AVERAGE OF JUDGMENTS OF BOYS AND GIRLS	SEX IN WHICH EACH PRACTICE IS RELATIVELY MORE FREQUENT
	Boys	Girls		
1	2	3	4	5
Gambling	95	99	97	Men
Smoking	93	94	93½	Men
Drinking	84½	99	92	Men
Stealing	87½	74	81	Men
Swearing	79½	82	81	Men
Vulgar talk	69	81	75	Men
Sabbath-breaking	58	70	64	Men or same
Idleness	47½	73	60	Same (approximately)
Cheating	55	59	57	Same (approximately)
Lying	54½	59	57	Same (approximately)
Selfishness	31	36	33½	Same or women
Dancing	25	37	31	Women
Extravagance	26	21	23½	Women
Snobbishness	17	14	15½	Women
Gossip	4½	12	8	Women

study as to whether each practice is more frequent among the boys, or more frequent among the girls, or approximately the same in frequency. In order to save space, only the figures for the San Antonio high school are given. The figures for the Austin high school are almost identical in their main results. The methods by which these figures were obtained and reduced to simple forms have been explained elsewhere,[8] and need not be repeated here.

In column 1, the practices are arranged in the order of

[8] This *Journal*, XXXIV, 261–63 and XXXV, 110–12.

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greater frequency among boys rather than among girls. Column 2 gives the boys' votes and column 3 gives the girls' votes. Column 4 gives the average of the votes by the girls and by the boys. Column 5 gives the classification of the practices according to the results of column 4. Those practices for which the percentages run from 66 to 100 are classed as more frequent among the boys. Those practices for which the percentages run from 33 to 66 are classed as approximately the same in frequency. Those practices for which the percentages run from 0 to 33 are classed as more frequent among the girls. There are two practices on the border lines. Sabbath-breaking, with a figure of 64, is barely within the "same" group. The difference between the boys and the girls here is striking. Selfishness, with a figure of about 33, is almost exactly on the border line. Since the Austin students put it well within the lower group, and since the university students put it there, it should be classified in the lower group. So we get the results as follows: Gambling, smoking, drinking, stealing, swearing, and vulgar talk are more frequent among the boys than among the girls. Gossip, snobbishness, extravagance, dancing, and selfishness are more frequent among the girls. Sabbath-breaking, idleness, cheating, and lying are about the same in frequency in the two sexes.

Corresponding figures for the university students give exactly the same classification of these practices as to relative frequency among the sexes.[4]

VI

We are now in a position to tie together the rank about frequency among the boys and the rank about frequency among the girls. Table G gives the results of this study for the San Antonio high school only. In column 1 the practices are arranged according to frequency among the boys. In column 4 the practices are arranged according to frequency among the girls. Column 2 states by abbreviations whether

[4] This *Journal*, XXXIV, 261–62.

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each practice listed in column 1 is more frequent among the boys (M) or more frequent among the girls (W) or about the same in frequency (S). Column 3 does the same work for the practices as listed in column 4. In reading these tabulations, read straight across when *S* occurs; upward when *M* occurs; and downward when *W* occurs.

TABLE G

CO-ORDINATION OF FREQUENCY FOR BOYS AND FREQUENCY FOR GIRLS, SAN ANTONIO HIGH SCHOOL, 1926

PRACTICES IN ORDER OF FREQUENCY AMONG BOYS	SEX IN WHICH MORE FREQUENT		PRACTICES IN ORDER OF FREQUENCY AMONG GIRLS
1	2	3	4
1. Swearing	M	W	1. Dancing
2. Smoking	M	W	2. Gossip
3. Dancing	W	S?	3. Idleness
4. Vulgar talk	M	W	4. Extravagance
5. Cheating	S	S	5. Cheating
6. Idleness	S?	W	6. Snobbishness
7. Lying	S	S	7. Lying
8. Drinking	M	M	8. Swearing
9. Gossip	W	.....	.....
10. Gambling	M	.....	.....
11. Sabbath-breaking	S?	S?	9. Sabbath-breaking
10. Stealing	M	.....	.....
13. Extravagance	W	.....	.....
14. Selfishness	W?	W?	10. Selfishness
15. Snobbishness	W	M	11. Stealing
		M	12. Smoking
		M	13. Vulgar talk
		M	14. Drinking
		M	15. Gambling

There is one contradiction in this table, about idleness. It is ranked as less frequent than cheating among the boys; cheating among the boys is the same in frequency as cheating among the girls; cheating among the girls is less frequent than idleness among the girls. Despite these facts, idleness is ranked as the same in frequency among the two sexes. This contradiction is similar to the one which was found among university students, not about relative frequency, but about the comparative value of practices among men and among women.[5]

[5] This *Journal*, XXXV, 112–17.

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It is possible that this contradiction about the rank of idleness would disappear if we took the votes of each sex about each sex, in place of the votes of the boys about the boys and the girls about the girls. However, similar contradictions in the figures for the university students about the so-called "double standards" did not disappear under those conditions. Moreover, one slight contradiction in this elaborate table should not be overemphasized. There might be much more contradiction. In fact, one might have expected much more, when the intricacy of the table is considered.

VII

We have not yet considered the coefficients of correlation for the frequency ranks among the two sexes. When the frequency for the boys in San Antonio is compared with the frequency for the girls there, we find that the coefficient of correlation is +.04, with a standard error of .25. The corresponding figure for the students at the University of Texas in 1919–22 was +.03.

The comparison of the frequency ranks and the value ranks gives interesting results. When the students in the two cities are averaged together we get the following results: The boys' rank about greater worseness and the boys' rank about greater frequency among the boys have a coefficient of correlation of —.13, with a standard error of .26. The corresponding figure for the girls is —.54, with a standard error of .19. In other words, there is approximately a zero correlation between frequency and value for the boys, but approximately a —.50 per cent correlation for the girls.

VIII

Table H shows the quartile deviations or dispersions for both the value ranks and the frequency ranks in the San Antonio students. It is obvious at first glance that the dispersions for the value ranks are smaller than the dispersions for the frequency ranks. In the value dispersions, the average of

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the boys for all the practices is 1.93, the average of the girls is 1.75. In the frequency ranks, the average of the boys is 3.13; the average of the girls is 2.86. When the average quartile for the value ranks in the high school is compared with quartiles for the university ranks, the figures are approximately the same.[6] But the university quartiles for the frequency ranks are smaller: 2.56 for the men, and 1.78 for the women.[7]

TABLE H

QUARTILE DEVIATIONS FOR SAN ANTONIO HIGH SCHOOL

PRACTICES	VALUE RANKS		FREQUENCY RANKS	
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
1	2	3	4	5
Cheating	1.25	1.5	3.	1.5
Dancing	0.	0.	3.5	4.5
Drinking	2.5	2.	3.5	2.5
Extravagance	2.	1.5	3.	3.
Gambling	2.	1.5	3.	2.5
Gossip	2.	2.	4.	2.5
Idleness	1.5	1.5	3.5	2.5
Lying	2.5	2.	3.	2.5
Sabbath-breaking	4.	3.5	2.75	2.5
Selfishness	1.75	1.5	2.5	3.
Smoking	2.5	2.75	2.5	3.
Snobbishness	2.	1.5	3.	3.5
Stealing	1.	1.5	3.5	3.5
Swearing	1.5	1.5	3.25	3.
Vulgar talk	2.5	2.	3.	3.

IX

Our conclusions can be very short. There is no need to repeat here the remarks in the earlier articles on statistical ethics concerning the ethical and philosophical significance of these studies. In regard to what is peculiar to this study in the moral judgment of high-school students, the following points may be made.

1. The ranks by high-school students concerning comparative value are very uniform among themselves and very

[6] This *Journal*, XXXIII, 127; XXXIV, 108.

[7] This *Journal*, XXXIV, 260–61.

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similar to the university ranks. The moral judgments in the high schools are fully as definite and precise as those in the university.

2. The frequency ranks in the high schools are very similar when the boys are compared with the boys or the girls with the girls.

3. The frequency ranks in the high schools are only moderately similar to the frequency ranks in the university, but the differences seem to be open to reasonable explanations.

4. In the high schools, the frequency between the sexes has the same correlation, approximately zero, that it has in the university.

5. In the high schools, the correlation between comparative value and comparative frequency is approximately —.50 for the girls, which is about the figure for both men and women in the university. But the figure for boys in high school is a much smaller negative correlation.

6. The facts which this paper has collected may be studied for their own sake as interesting parts of contemporary morality, or they may be studied in relation to university morality. But perhaps their most significant use is in relation to the problem of moral education. We have had an immense literature about the question of moral education in schools, especially in the high schools. Usually that literature has been purely speculative or theoretical. Surely the discussion of the place of moral education in the high schools should be based upon the objective study of such facts as we have collected here. Further studies should be made before final conclusions are made. But surely it is obvious, even on the basis of the present paper alone, that the moral ideas and conduct of high-school students are very similar to the moral ideas and conduct of university students. This similarity may not settle the problem of moral education, but it is at least an indispensable bit of evidence concerning this problem.

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A DANISH THINKER'S ESTIMATE OF JOURNALISM

DAVID F. SWENSON

But why misuse the limited space of a philosophical quarterly to discuss the newspaper? The press is a recognized triviality which infests modern life; every man of sense knows that it prints an inordinate quantity of slush, which he does his best to avoid, seeing that he cannot dispense altogether with the newspaper. But philosophy at least deals with high and important matters, and the philosopher only demeans himself when he condescends to treat seriously the trivialities of everyday life—so I imagine some reader reacting to the title of the present article. My answer is twofold. In the first place, a triviality which occupies the major part of the unmortgaged time and attention of millions of men, and which is in fact almost their only mental pabulum, constitutes for this very reason, namely, because it is a triviality which thus engrosses them, a most important matter for the reflection of the ethical thinker. And as for philosophy being too lofty to deal with everyday matters, this was also the view of Callicles, which he expressed in criticism of Socrates;[1] but it is not my opinion, and I shall ask the reader's indulgence while I unfold, in an introductory paragraph or two, a view of the nature of philosophy which I think can properly be called Socratic.

Real thinking is like real charity, in that it begins at home. It does not everlastingly stand on tiptoe to catch a glimpse of the glories of the world; for it knows that the interpenetration of ordinary and everyday matters by the power of thought is both more difficult and more profitable than adventurous speculations in the realm of the extraordinary and astounding. It is not always scanning the distant horizon for something that is new; for it knows enough to suspect that the new will prob-

[1] Plato's *Gorgias*, 490*c*, 497*a*.

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ably turn out to be something old, since it has learned by a thousand experiences that what men call the new differs from the old only by an unimportant change of form. Genuine thinking is not indeed incompatible with an insatiable curiosity for factual detail. But it is not identical with such curiosity; it springs from a deeper source, and its satisfactions are of a higher order. Real thinking does not imagine that a new continent of fact must first be discovered before the enterprise of thought can prosper; it is a suspicious circumstance when a philosophy announces that its own essential content (not its accidental stimulation) depends for its existence absolutely upon "modern" discoveries and "modern" inventions. A suspicious circumstance; for it suggests that such a philosophy has consciously or unconsciously raised some relativity to the rank of an absolute, and confounded a difference of degree with a distinction of kind.

Genuine thinking is content to know only what everybody knows. It is even content to know much less, if only it may know what it knows with categorical precision, making its *corpus* of fact luminous with an intellectual clarity, and significant as the focus of precise relations. It is indeed true that Greece had thinkers of eminence who deemed it profitable to make extensive journeys in order to gather materials for philosophizing. But the greatest of all Greek thinkers, the man aptly described as "equally great both as character and as thinker," never willingly left his native city, but found in the daily life of his immediate surroundings an infinite abundance of food for thought. And it is a well-known fact that he was content, after extraordinary and strenuous dialectical exertions, to arrive at the goal of "ignorance," so that he was conscious of knowing less than the humblest of his contemporaries; without however being on that account an ordinary ignoramus.

But if real thinking begins at home, it necessarily concentrates upon the thinker himself, and the situation that con-

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fronts him. When the thinker turns his thought in this direction he finds himself standing in a multitude of relationships, acting and acted upon. He is in part dependent upon an immediate physical environment, and his mental furniture is, generally speaking, of the same pattern as that which serves for his contemporaries. All of these relationships make demands upon him; they require determination and clarification, interpretation and valuation. If his intellectual impulse is at all profound, he will become aware of a systematic scheme of possible and actual knowledge, the tentatively organized answers to the questions which his environment forces from him; and he will in his reflection become increasingly conscious of a technology of thought. He will note that the solution of the problems of thought involves both the acquisition of factual detail and the utilization of logical categories; he will observe that the latter, as instrumentalities, in their turn demand clarification and testing, reflection and inquiry.

It is at this point that there arises what might be called the thinker's temptation. If the vital impulse in him is permitted to become weak in proportion to the abstract-intellectual impulse, if in consequence he slips into the rôle of a semidetached talent, instead of assuming the full responsibilities of a deeply rooted individual, he will lose himself in the exploration and organization of the data or the instrumentalities of thought for their own sake. He will heap up what constitutes for him an unmanageable load of factual detail, of historical knowledge or natural science; or he will perhaps develop the necessary abstractions of thought into an imposing edifice whose home is in the clouds. In forgetting to think all these things in relation to himself, he will cut the umbilical cord which alone can convey life and meaning into the mass of brute fact, or into the otherwise ghostly "ballet of the categories." He will be like a man who takes a running start in order to jump a stream, but who runs so far that he arrives at the bank breathless and spent, unable to jump because of an unreasonably

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thorough preparation; or perhaps he will even have forgotten his purpose, thus devoting himself to preparation for preparation's sake.[2]

In order to be vital, thought must be concrete, not only in relation to its object, but also in relation to the thinker whose thought it is. But in order to be intellectually significant, it must be sufficiently abstract to justify the claim of universality. Thinking therefore involves a mutual and untrammeled intercourse between the abstract and the concrete, the concrete being apprehended through the abstract, and the abstract being exemplified in the concrete. A well-balanced thinker is therefore as abstract as he is concrete, and as concrete as he is abstract.

Philosophy is thus in its ideal form only that most intimate and thorough penetration of reality by thought, which the thinker finds humanly possible. And this reality is no esoteric realm of mystery, but is that daily reality of human life which the philosopher shares with all his fellow-men. A modern thinker who understands himself after this fashion will necessarily have his attention attracted to the modern newspaper, with its complementary correlate, public opinion. Public opinion existed also in the Greek state, and exercised its influence upon the individual mind; it had, then as now, its servants and its instrumentalities. But the immense comparative size of modern states, together with the development of means of communication undreamed of by the ancients, gives to this concept an extraordinary special significance for the modern thinker. Where as many as three human beings are gathered together, the potentiality exists for the formation of

[2] It seems to me highly probable that this is what Socrates meant by his abandonment of the scientific speculations of his early manhood, having determined, in the beautiful and simple words of Diogenes Laertius, that "physics was not man's proper business"; and thereafter began to "philosophize about moral matters" wherever men were gathered together (Diogenes Laertius' *Lives*, II, 5, 21). And I take it that this is also what the first of living American teachers and writers of philosophy means when he says that all philosophy is "in some sense a branch of morals" (Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, p. 33).

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something that might be called public opinion.[8] With so limited a scope, however, the abstraction inevitably involved in the recognition of a "public," as well as the degree of impersonality fostered thereby, is at least subject to a ready and immediate control. But when millions of human beings are brought together in a multitude of essential or accidental forms of contact, the force of "public opinion" becomes at once more inescapable and irresponsible.

Of this public opinion, the modern press is both servant and master, both creature and creator. It gives a tongue to the impersonal impulses generated by the multitude, and so intensifies their power and extends their scope. Press and public are thus a mutual fit, and the essential faults of the one are also the essential faults of the other. The press mirrors life; but this does not mean that it clearly reveals the nature of life's underlying realities, so that he who runs may read. The mirror of the press reflects a mere surface, a confusing phantasmagoria of appearances more or less distorted in the reflection; the depths underneath these appearances are never reliably revealed in the light of life's meaning and value. In fact, "journalism" and "journalistic" are words that have come to stand for the treatment of any subject in terms which neither make nor fulfil any claim to the communication of such deeper insight. He who cannot understand life *without* the newspaper will be still more unable to understand it *with* the newspaper, since the latter will in that case serve only to intensify and vary his misunderstandings.

This tendency to smother the dawning consciousness of life's meaning under the agglomerate mass called the "news of the day" is one which presses upon the modern man with so steadfast an insistence that, if it be true that education is the process of arriving at an understanding of life, then no modern man can be called educated unless he is able to read his

[8] Perhaps it was for this reason that Socrates always demanded that the issues raised by his questions should be confined to himself and his interlocutor; any human being might play the latter rôle, but only one at a time.

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newspaper between the lines. For this reason, if for no other, it is a vital necessity for every modern thinker to have a theory of the newspaper, and to have a theory of the newspaper which corresponds in its intellectual significance to the significance of his thought in other fields. In the absence of such a theory he may doubtless exhibit extraordinary talent, and make contributions of weight to the more abstract fields of philosophic science; but he is not an ethical thinker. And of one malady he must stand convicted: the malady, namely, of "professorial absent-mindedness," which has other forms than those exhibited in forgetting one's umbrella when it rains, or holding the egg in the hand while the timepiece boils.

More than one nineteenth-century person of eminence has found himself prompted to reflection upon the phenomenon of the press. Of these, Balzac has perhaps been the most explicit in public appraisal. What he has said on this subject in *Illusions perdues,* the second part of *Un grand homme de province à Paris,* seems to me in very large measure invested with a permanent significance. It is true, as the book itself suggests, that the universality of the comment is to a certain degree impaired by a too particular application to a condition in the journalism of Paris which was already past when the novel was published. It must also be confessed that sometimes the violence of the expressions bears testimony to a certain thinness of the thought; so that criticism is carried to the borders of vituperation. Nevertheless, this novel of Balzac's would doubtless make wholesome reading for students in our schools of journalism, if in their haste to learn the petty tricks of the trade, and eagerness to enjoy the artificial stimulations of the "newspaper game," they permitted themselves time to think deeply on any fundamental problem of life. It would be tempting to quote Balzac at length. But the material is readily accessible, and I shall cite merely a phrase that sounds like a summary conclusion: "If the press did not exist, it ought never to have been invented."

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Nietzsche has permitted to Zarathustra an expression of disgust: "They vomit their bile and call it a newspaper."[4] In several other passages this writer comments upon the insincerity (*Unredlichkeit*) of the press, ascribing its power, among other things, to the fact that each individual who serves it feels himself only fractionally responsible.[5] And elsewhere he makes the shrewd remark that no one who wishes to become a thinker can afford to read a newspaper every day.

Emerson has also evaluated the press. What he says on the subject is quantitatively insignificant, but the sureness of touch by which he lays hold of the essentials gives proof also in this field of his significance as a thinker. I shall quote two passages, the first from his little pen portrait of the *London Times* in *English Traits:*

> The parts are kept in concert, all the articles appear to proceed from a single will. The *Times* never disapproves of what itself has said, or cripples itself by apology for the absence of its editors, or the indiscretion of him who holds the pen. It speaks out bluff and bold, and sticks to what it says. It draws from any number of learned and skilful contributors; but a more learned and skilful person supervises, corrects, and co-ordinates. Of this closet, the secret does not transpire. No writer is suffered to claim the authorship of any paper; everything good, from whatever quarter, comes out editorially; and thus, by making the paper everything and those who write it nothing, the character and awe of the journal gain.
>
> The morality and patriotism of the *Times* claim only to be representative, and by no means ideal. It gives the argument, not of the majority, but of the commanding class. . . . . The editors give a voice to the class who at the moment take the lead; and they have an instinct for finding where the power now lies, which is eternally shifting its banks. Sympathizing with, and speaking for the class that rules the hour, yet being apprised of every ground-swell, every Chartist resolution, every Church squabble, every strike in the mills, they detect the first tremblings of change. They watch the hard and bitter struggles of the authors of each liberal movement, year by year; watching them only to taunt and obstruct them—until, at last, when they see that these have established their fact, that power is on the point of passing to them, they strike in

[4] *Also sprach Zarathustra,* XI, "The New Idol."

[5] *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches,* I, par. 447.

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with the voice of a monarch, astonish those whom they succor as much as those whom they desert, and make the victory sure. Of course the aspirants see that the *Times* is one of the goods of fortune, not to be won but by winning their cause.

Here we have two fundamental attributions. First, the creation of a fantastic quasi-unlimited institutional authority to replace a real but limited personal authority, achieved by the clever use of anonymity. This characteristic will be enlarged upon in the quotations which follow, and which lend a title to this article. Second, the specious creation of the appearance of leadership, by a calculation a little in advance of the apparent fact, of the direction in which the cat of public opinion is about to jump. This latter analysis reminds me vividly of what an energetic and zealous missionary spirit once said to a friend of mine, who had attempted real leadership and consequently found himself in difficulties: "I'll tell you the secret of leadership, *Follow!*" Writing for the press is, generally speaking, commercialization of talent, and publishing a newspaper is today a branch of Big Business. It is therefore evident that what Emerson says of the *Times* when it was surnamed the "Thunderer" could in his spirit be applied *a fortiori* to the press of today, and especially to the great majority of daily newspapers. To expect moral or intellectual leadership from this quarter is as absurd as to expect figs from thistles.

The second passage is found in Emerson's "Lecture on the Times," delivered in Boston in 1841, and embodied in the volume published as *Nature: Addresses and Lectures*. He speaks of the scholar as existing for the sake of furnishing hospitality to every new thought and every untried project, in so far as it "proceeds out of good will and honest seeking." Then he adds: *"All the newspapers, all the tongues of today, will of course at first defame what is noble;* but you, who hold not of today, not of the times, but of the Everlasting, are to stand for it; and the highest compliment man ever receives from

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heaven is the sending to him its disguised and discredited angels" (italics mine). And is not this the very truth? Even at its best, the newspaper is of the moment, for the moment, and by the moment; and no man who has the least inkling of the eternal in his breast can cease to wage everlasting war against the perspectives and points of view of the moment, which are the perspectives and points of view that dominate the daily press.

By these quotations from well-known men I have sought to gain relief for the passages that follow, containing an estimate of journalism by a writer relatively unknown to the English reader, though he is doubtless the greatest thinker yet produced in the Scandinavian north. The translation is made from entries in Sören Kierkegaard's diaries of the years 1849 and 1850. The reader will not need to be reminded that in their present form the passages cited were not intended for publication. In the works published during the author's lifetime, most of which appeared before the date of these jottings, no closely parallel passages, explicitly dealing with journalism, are to be found. But the view of life reflected in them is identical with that which gradually emerged as underlying the varied and abundant Kierkegaardian literature. I have thought that what this thinker has to say about the press might have its significance for the readers of a philosophical journal devoted to ethics, as capable of arresting the attention and giving a challenge to thought.[6]

I

In every profession, and in relation to every subject, it is the minority that knows; the multitude is ignorant. The truth of this is as clear as daylight, for if it were not so, everybody would know everything. But

[6] When these jottings were made in his diary, Kierkegaard had a decade of extraordinary literary productivity behind him, during which time he had produced, as Brandes says, "a literature within a literature." The reader who may be interested in Kierkegaard will find very little material in English. Besides the theological and other works of reference, which contain articles of varying value, there exists a little volume of specimen translations, made by Professor Lee M. Hollander, of the University of Texas. They were published as a bulletin of that University under date of

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just because this is not so, it follows that every human being ought to have his own particular field, of greater or less scope, and more or less involved and difficult, in which he knows more than the rest; so that he is the teacher, and the others, the crowd, the plurality of men, are learners. And so on all the way around, every man having his own special sphere of knowledge and authority.

But now the press, what are its tactics? Everything that the press has to say, whether the subject be politics or criticism or what not, it says in such a manner as to suggest that knowledge is the possession of the many, of the majority. It is this which makes the press the most profoundly demoralizing of all the forms of sophistry. People complain that a newspaper occasionally publishes a lying article. How trivial a fault, when set over against the fundamental fact that the whole form and spirit of this means of communication is essentially a lie!

In ancient times they flattered the multitude by material means: bread, money, and the circus. In modern times the press flatters the middle classes intellectually and spiritually. To meet this situation we have need of a species of Pythagorean silence. We need total abstinence societies with respect to the reading of newspapers much more than with respect to the drinking of intoxicants. How ridiculous for a newspaper to assume an aristocratic pose! No indeed; if the publisher wants to be an aristocrat, let him first cease to publish a newspaper. To be an aristocrat among journalists is like being an aristocrat among *lazzaroni*.

II

After much hard work, an intensive self-cultivation, and a long period of development, the most gifted talents in a country at last become authors, and authors of books. But the reading of books is confined to a comparatively small number. The daily press has, on the other hand, a practical monopoly of circulation; it is read by all. Here we find busily engaged these spiritually bow-legged, knock-kneed, club-footed, flat-footed, *item* long-fingered creatures, the half-witted and yet cunning derelicts who go by the name of journalists; here they keep themselves busy, and their *raisonnement* is read by all. *Pro dii immortales!*

July 8, 1923. The present writer has published a brief biographical account in *Scandinavian Studies and Notes*, Vol. VI, No. 1, and an article in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 4, entitled "The Anti-Intellectualism of Kierkegaard." A translation of Kierkegaard's chief works into German has been published in twelve volumes by Eugen Diederichs, of Jena. Höffding has written a critical account of his philosophical position, which has appeared in German under the title of *Sören Kierkegaard als Philosoph*. Brandes has also written a book on Kierkegaard, dealing authoritatively in matters of aesthetic criticism, and popularly with his thought.

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If there were only one speaking trumpet on board a ship, and this was in the possession of the pantry-boy, and if everybody looked upon this as a perfectly natural and proper state of affairs: what then? Everything that the pantry-boy had to say: "mouse in the larder," "fine weather today," "Lord only knows what's wrong in the ship's hold," etc., etc., would be published abroad through the speaking trumpet. The captain, on the contrary, would be limited to the use of his own natural voice, for what he had to say was of course not so important. At times he would be reduced to begging the assistance of the pantry-boy, in order that his commands might be made audible. At such times the pantry-boy would feel at liberty to revise the words of command; so that in passing through him and his trumpet they would become nonsensical and misleading. The captain would then be compelled to strain his voice in competition, but without success. At last the pantry-boy would become the master of the ship, because he had the speaking trumpet.

Pro dii immortales!

III

As soon as the truth is defined in terms of what the majority can understand, it is *eo ipso* betrayed. For most men are precisely in the position of needing a very long period of discipline and preparation before they can even begin to understand the truth. So that what most men can understand is galimatias. We should therefore speak as follows: What most men are ready at once to understand, without further preparation, is unequivocally nonsense. Then comes the next thought: What most people regard as nonsense may really be nonsense; but it may also be the truth. The truth is always in the minority, although it does not follow that the minority always has the truth.

IV

The following is the relation that exists between literature and the press. An author writes a clear, consistent, connected, fully matured presentation of some thought, perhaps the fruit of many years' labor. Nobody reads it. But a journalist reviews the book; in the course of half an hour or so, he writes something that is neither more nor less than pure nonsense. This is then supposed to be the purport of the author's book; moreover, everybody reads it. The significance of an author's existence thus becomes evident: he exists for the sake of affording some journalist an opportunity to write nonsense for everybody to read. Had there been no author the journalist would not have had this opportunity; *ergo,* it is of the utmost importance that the supply of authors should not fail.

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V

The daily press is the evil principle of the modern world, and time will only serve to disclose this fact with greater and greater clearness. The capacity of the newspaper for degeneration is sophistically without limit, since it can always sink lower and lower in its choice of readers. At last it will stir up all those dregs of humanity which no state or government can control.

Only a very few people will ever understand the fundamental falsity of the daily press. And of these few only a very small number will have the courage to speak out, since it will involve a species of martyrdom to break with the majority, and with the power of the press and its enormous circulation. The press will always mistreat and persecute such a man.

VI

The ruinous and demoralizing influence of the press does not consist so much in the fact that it prints what is false, as in the demoralizing security it affords in connection with every opinion that it presents, namely, that there are a lot of people who say and think the same. The mere fact that an opinion is printed in a newspaper is a sufficient guaranty that this is the case. And sad to say, what most concerns the majority of men is not whether a given opinion be true or false, but whether it will appear that they do or do not stand alone in their opinion. The guaranty of security which the press affords is therefore a demoralizing leading-string, dragging men down to ever lower and lower levels; and this calamity is far greater than the mere communication of something that happens not to be true.

VII

Complete publicity makes it impossible to "govern." All government is rooted in the thought that there are a certain few who have superior insight, who see so much farther into the future that they are able to govern. Complete publicity, on the other hand, is rooted in the thought that *all* should rule.

There are none who understand this better than the gentlemen of the press. No institution has been more anxious to set the seal of secrecy upon its entire domestic economy: the identity of its contributors, the nature of its purposes, etc., all the while insisting that the processes of government ought to be public. And quite consistently. For the underlying idea of the press has been to do away with "government"—in order to secure the powers of government for itself; and for this reason it has also attempted to secure to itself the secrecy without which it is impossible to "govern."

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VIII

The fact that in modern times almost all communication is through the medium of the press has given rise to universal confusion. There has been collected in modern states a huge inorganic precipitate: the multitude. No one ever really comes to grips with this huge mass. Those who teach are not personalities who make their appearance in character; they are authors who have found for themselves a hiding-place from the world, and now and then from the place of their concealment send out a few thoughts.

The only conflicts we have hitherto had in modern life have been the conflicts with the governments; for the governments have had it in their power to inflict penalties upon the press. But the real conflict, truth's conflict, the conflict with multitude and public, these abstractions which furnish an evil refuge for every lie—this conflict has been utterly lost from sight.

IX

The cause of this terrible evil (the evil of the press) lies among other things in the following facts of human nature. The world is once for all ruled more by the fear of man than the fear of God. Hence the fear of becoming an individual, and hence also the tendency to conceal one's self behind some abstraction; hence anonymity, calling oneself "we," and the like.

On the other hand, every outstanding individual is always an object of envy. Human envy cannot endure the thought that a mere individual should amount to anything, let alone that he should be pre-eminent, and exercise genuine leadership. Envy therefore favors the creation of abstractions; and over against an abstraction even the most eminent individual is lost in insignificance. This holds even when it is a notorious fact that the abstraction in question was created simply through some individual calling himself "we." Envy cannot stand the sight of superiority; hence it promotes the growth of abstractions, which are invisible.

And lastly, an abstraction is always *en rapport* with the fantastic element in human nature, and the fantastic has a tremendous power. Even the most gifted individual is only an actuality, and as such finite; but "we, the editors"—God only knows what capacities conceal themselves behind this sign.

Summa summarum: The human race ceased to fear God. Then came its punishment: it began to fear itself, began to cultivate the fantastic, and now it trembles before this creature of its own imagination.

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X

Public life has become permeated with consciencelessness from beginning to end.

There exists a huge monster—whether bloodthirsty or not I shall not attempt to decide, though the history of the last few years shows how readily the thirst for blood can be aroused—in any case a hungry monster. This monster is the "public." With desperate passion it hungers for "something to talk about." And the journalists are its obedient servants; they see to it that the public is provided with something to talk about. In ancient times men were thrown before wild beasts; in modern times it is the public that devours men, after they have been prepared by the journalists in the form which the public finds most palatable, namely, in the form of idle gossip. Every public man is as such a victim. If he happens to be an egoist, and has made up his mind to endure this exploitation because he knows that it is unavoidable if he is to attain worldly success, he will suffer less. He will not in that case be a martyr; he will not suffer sympathetically, and he will be more nearly understood by his contemporaries. But he will be devoured by the public just the same, and the dish will be prepared by the journalists as idle gossip.

XI

As long as the daily press flourishes, Christianity is an absolute impossibility. For if Christianity is to enter into daily life as a real factor, it is *ipso facto* inevitable that its representative will attract considerable attention to his own person. Not protected by any illusion (and this is an absolute necessity for anyone who desires to preach Christianity in truth), he must direct attention to himself. But the moment he does this, the press will lay hold of him. It need not say a single malicious word, a continuous stream of idle gossip will be quite enough. Let a widely circulated newspaper publish his picture twice a day for two weeks, simultaneously exploiting the most trivial details concerning his person: it will be enough to undermine him. To endure such treatment he will have to possess a considerable degree of heroism. But this we must assume him to have, and in so far he is not enfeebled. But then it will require an almost equal degree of heroism on the part of his contemporaries, in order that they should not lose, under this treatment, all ideality in their conception of him; and there exist in each generation very, very few who in such circumstances are capable of holding fast to an ideal conception of a man. The constant reiteration of the nonsense will exercise its power over them —and so he is undermined.

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XII

The world's deepest misfortune is the unhappy objectivity (in the sense of the absence of personality) characteristic of all speech and teaching, and that the one great mechanical discovery after the other has made it possible to expound doctrines impersonally in constantly increasing measure. There no longer exist human beings: there are no lovers, no thinkers, etc. By means of the press the human race has enveloped itself in an atmospheric what-not of thoughts, feelings, moods; even of resolutions and purposes, all of which are no one's property, since they belong to all and none. It is a torture to the soul to note the callous incorrigibility with which a human being can resort to wherever he thinks there is some truth to be had, for the sole purpose of learning to expound it, so that his music-box may add this piece to its repertoire; but as for doing anything of it, the thing never even occurs to him.

XIII

Jesuitism was in its degenerate days a shameless attempt to control the consciences of men. The press is the basest conceivable attempt to make want of conscience the chief ruling principle of the state, and of the human race.

XIV

Woe, woe, woe, unto the daily press! If Christ now came to earth, as sure as I live, he would not attack the high priests and the like; he would focus his attention upon the journalists.

Thus for Kierkegaard's "fourteen points." I refrain from extended comment, preferring to leave the reader to his own impressions. Perhaps I ought at once to say, however, that my own experience of and reflection upon the contemporary American press would not justify me in using this absolute and sweeping language with which to clothe my own personal impressions in words. Not that I intend to criticize this language as wholly inapplicable to the contemporary scene; a few modest essays of mine into the public life of my home community have enriched me with an experience of the press which enables me to understand, at least, the criticism I have here presented, even though the experience in question does not permit me to adopt as my own, in all respects, the language I have quoted. I do not claim the right to look down from the heights

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of a superior moderation upon the "extreme and paradoxical exaggerations" of the Kierkegaardian polemic, as I imagine that some doughty champion of mediocrity in both life and thought might speak; I can respect the insight of genius even when I cannot assimilate all its expressions to my own more limited experience.

It scarcely needs to be pointed out that one cannot very well compromise with the criticism here offered, by endowing it with a real but limited applicability to the Danish or Parisian press, say of the years between 1830 and 1850 (which were the years falling within the scope of Kierkegaard's personal experience), but denying to it any relevancy with respect to the American press of the first quarter of the twentieth century, for example. The intelligent reader will readily perceive that the criticism claims *philosophical,* and not merely historical, validity; that the press is here conceived as constituting a category, namely, *the sophistical exploitation of the moment for the sake of livelihood, profit, or power.* It is the immanent dialectic of the press that Kierkegaard purports to lay bare, not merely some transitory phase of its external embodiment; and it is on this basis that the criticism must stand or fall.

I believe it to be of major importance clearly to apprehend the point of view from which Kierkegaard's polemic proceeds. The evaluations which appear in it and which motivate it are the evaluations of an ethico-religious individualism. It is apparent that these severe judgments upon the press presuppose a powerful ethical passion which supports them and urges them to expression. The ethico-religious view of life here disclosed is *democratic* in the best and truest sense of that much-used word; for it assumes the existence of an essentially human problem, in the attempted solution of which every individual human life becomes significant, not merely for an external observer, but for itself. It dignifies every human being by assigning to him, and to him alone, the realization of his

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own proper human task. It refuses to puff the individual out romantically into fantastic proportions, by pretending to endow him with the capacity to solve another's problem in his stead, or assuming to saddle him with the doubtful duty of saving another's soul; to say nothing of dooming him like an Atlas to bear the world on his shoulders, and requiring of him an advance solution of the problems of future generations.

There exist certain contemporary criticisms of the press that achieve a considerable degree of significance, but none of them proceed from the foregoing point of view. Mr. H. L. Mencken has expressed himself upon the newspaper with his customary frankness and vigor; it is hard to see how anyone could carry adverse criticism to farther lengths. But the point of view is that of an *aesthetico-aristocratic* individualism, an individualism which looks down upon the "booboisie" from the lofty heights of cultural superiority, and which knows of no ethical principle of life powerful and profound enough to constitute a common bond between privileged and unprivileged. Mr. Mencken's criticism, however, has the very great advantage of perceiving that the public shares essentially in the sins of the press; though it must not be forgotten that the press has the greater responsibility of catering to the weaknesses of the public in order to make money. Mr. Mencken sees that it is nonsense to paint the newspapers as the chief or sole corruptors of an otherwise immaculate people. Mr. Upton Sinclair, on the other hand, scarcely perceives this truth; his merit is that he has salvaged from the almost universal bankruptcy of modern culture in this respect, the capacity for moral indignation. At least this is a point which I, if no one else, shall always count in his favor; believing as I do that even the cleverest man, if he lacks moral passion, is only a cleverly constructed automaton. When Mr. Sinclair speaks of the press he sermonizes upon the theme that the love of money is the root of all evil. But he tends to identify the love of money narrowly with a desire, and sometimes still more narrowly

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with a successfully realized desire, to share in the prizes of a capitalistic society. Consequently he dreams that some more or less radical change in society's form of organization, political or economic, but chiefly the latter, would make it positively easy for us all to be good and happy. In other words, Mr. Sinclair is essentially an externally-minded politician, who looks to the forms of society for the principles of life; he is not essentially an ethical thinker, despite his strong moral bias.[7]

Finally, I shall mention Mr. Walter Lippmann, who is a competent analyst of newspaper technique, and of the physics and psychology of public opinion. His social psychology is concrete and intelligent, in close touch with the facts of contemporary society. But he is too abstractly intellectual, and also too oversophisticated, to approach the phenomena with any considerable degree of moral passion; and in my opinion, at least, there does not emerge from his criticism any clear or distinctive ethical view of human life. The reader of these pages who has felt the lack of such a view, adequately expressed, in contemporary philosophy and literature, may perhaps find his need satisfied by a study of the writings of Sören Kierkegaard.

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[7] Mr. Sinclair also displays a truly journalistic overconfidence in the illuminating power of a wealth of factual detail, leading him to stress the faults of particular individuals and institutions, to the risk of his reputation for accuracy, and the detriment of his capacity to understand and portray what is universal.

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AUGUSTE COMTE'S CONCEPTION OF HUMANITY

MABEL V. WILSON

There is no idea in Comte's positive philosophy which needs discussion and clarification more than does the conception of humanity. In order to make progress in such a study we must lay aside at once the vague, popular notion that humanity connotes human nature in the mass, or a vast, dim aggregate of people located nowhere in particular. We must also guard against the assumption of pious minds that humanity is entirely a religious conception, in short, a Great Being, who is but another name for God. Littré and others have encouraged the view that all the ideas in the *Système de Politique Positive,* and in Comte's later treatises in general, have significance only for followers of positivism as a religious cult. This is not true. The conception can with much profit be studied from a purely philosophical and ethical standpoint.

It is our purpose, then, to ignore the common notions, religious or otherwise, concerning humanity, or at least to subordinate them as far as possible, in order to investigate the particular philosophical meaning which is attached to this term in positivism. We must not hastily assume, however, that Comte was the sole originator of this conception. His predecessors had developed social theories, which, if not identical with the positive doctrine of humanity, certainly bear a close relation to it. Turgot, Condorcet, and Saint-Simon, for example, had in their writings popularized the idea of human civilization as a continuous, growing whole. And Rousseau's theories, too, were based on the assumption that mankind constitutes a unit, for he advocated the return to nature for all men alike. Furthermore, the Greek notion of society as an organism, and of man as possessing an inherent social quality, had again come into vogue. All such doctrines, current in the early nineteenth century, represent certain aspects of the

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groundwork out of which the positive conception of humanity developed. Although they may seem to us merely vague, or even fanciful, speculations on mankind, civilization, and society, Comte was wise enough to appreciate their full force and to utilize them.

Pascal, Leibniz, and Condorcet, in particular, furnished valuable source material for the positive theory of humanity. Pascal conceived of the whole past development of the individual and of the race as "converging" toward the present. Leibniz helped to clarify this obscure notion of human progress by establishing a definite relation of dependence between the future and the present. Then Condorcet contributed the important conception of the human species as one people. All these partial truths Comte undertook to develop, organize, and incorporate into his positive theory of humanity. Although he refused to acknowledge all of his indebtedness to his predecessors, he did take cognizance of the various anticipations which we have just mentioned, and furthermore suggests that even primitive man in some of his polytheistic beliefs had given intimation of the positive doctrine.[1] In fact, a sociological study of early group life is of real value in determining the origins of the idea of humanity. The simplest and most spontaneous form of human association is the family, in which there exists the germ of all social unity and progress, and the same principle of love and harmony which is at work in humanity.

But it is not our purpose here to examine in detail the source materials of positivism or to trace how the doctrine of humanity developed historically, for it is a sufficiently difficult task to analyze the meaning of the conception as it functioned in Comte's thought. All the positive treatises, the earlier as well as the later, contain references to humanity, and there is every reason to suppose that Comte would have made the idea still clearer had he lived to write his intended works on ethics. In fact we may regard this doctrine as the

[1] *Système de Politique Positive* (Paris, 1851–54), II, 95; IV, 29–30.

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very basis of the positive sociology and ethics, and, if interpreted properly, as the means of unifying positivism as a whole.[2] Doubtless such a reference to humanity as a philosophical principle of co-ordination and unity will seem very "abstract" and generally undesirable to the religious positivists. It should be recalled, however, that Comte never made a separation of his religion from his philosophy, but always regarded the former as an opportunity for the symbolic representation of his ideas.

The scientific positivists, on the other hand, would naturally question the efficacy of humanity as a co-ordinating principle of positivism, because they assign this function to Comte's hierarchical classification of the sciences according to their increasing concreteness or decreasing abstractness. But a study of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive,* where this means of unifying knowledge is attempted, reveals that the result was not so satisfactory as had been anticipated, because the treatise appeared to be an artificial linking together of various groups of scientific facts in an encyclopedic fashion rather than a systematic, unitary organization of the sciences. The positive sociology shows Comte taking a fresh start on his problem of achieving *l'esprit d'ensemble,* but it also fails to unify human knowledge completely, since it is so clearly divided into two departments, the social statics and the social dynamics. Of course we are told that there is a complementary relation between the two, expressed in the principle that progress is the development of order. But as a matter of fact, more time is spent on distinguishing what is statical from what is dynamical than on finding their points of connection. So, although sociology had been hailed as the high point from which all the other sciences could be viewed in their proper relations, we find that it must be defined as the "science of humanity" if it is really to exercise this important function.

Doubtless there is a general impression that in positivism

[2] *Système,* I, 6–7, *La Synthèse Subjective* (Paris, 1900), I, 2, 35–36.

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the terms "sociology" and "science of humanity" are synonymous, and one cannot deny that often they may thus be used, for the line of demarcation between them is difficult to draw. In general, however, sociology may be said to resemble the natural sciences, having as its aim an investigation of social and political phenomena, while the "science of humanity" has the broader, more theoretical aim of setting the sciences in their true perspective. The latter is normative in nature and more akin to ethical theory, and presents sociological truths in their more spiritual aspects. Even a superficial study of this problem shows that humanity is pre-eminently a spiritual and ethical reality, though this is not to say that Comte means to give it a transcendental existence outside of nature. As in the case of ordinary human individuals, the very existence of humanity depends upon external, physical conditions, and its activities reveal the same principle of universal order which is exhibited in natural processes as well as in human affairs.[3] Otherwise there could be no science of humanity.

This fundamental harmony between humanity and the natural universe is its first characteristic that we can recognize. The second is the inner unity, or "solidarity" of humanity, which causes it to function as a unit, and have a definite course of history in time. This last-mentioned attribute of historical continuity is of distinct importance, for Comte thus connects humanity with his theory of progress, representing it in a teleological manner as "the chief impelling force (*moteur*) behind men's destinies."[4] The quality of solidarity is, in the language of the positive sociology, the static aspect of humanity, while continuity is its dynamic characteristic. At last Comte has found a way of co-ordinating order and progress by showing them to be subordinate to a larger conception, humanity. Since harmony with nature represents the relation of humanity to the natural sciences, we see that this conception embodies not merely the sociological principles, but all

[3] *Catéchisme Positiviste,* Pécant ed. (Paris, n.d.), p. 68.

[4] *Système,* II, 364.

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the essential aspects of positivism. This is the sense in which the doctrine of humanity is a means of co-ordinating and unifying the positive philosophy.

Such a method of study is so purely abstract and technical that it may seem little more than a manipulation of terminology. Granting that humanity has the attributes of solidarity, continuity, and harmony with nature, and that it serves as a principle of co-ordination, we must undertake a more detailed analysis of the conception and of the terms by which it is defined.

Throughout the several treatises Comte often compares humanity to various kinds of unified wholes, especially organisms. But this is hardly sufficient as a means of clarification, for a great number of social and political theorists have used the same idea of a "social organism," leaving its meaning undefined. Comte clearly refers to a biological organism, for in making his analogy he attributes to humanity the characteristic of a living body which develops from a single nucleus, has a spontaneous growth, and possesses different organs for its functions.[5] It is in this sense, rather than the religious, that humanity is a great being which has the characteristics of an individual, namely, inner organization, or solidarity, and a continuity of growth in time.

Comte goes on to elaborate this analogy by comparing the stages of man's history, theological, metaphysical, and positive, to the infancy, adolescence, and maturity of humanity. He further develops this similarity to an individual by pointing out that the classes of society, priests, working people, and women, correspond to the intellectual, volitional, and effective aspects of human nature. This comparison very clearly reminds one of the Platonic parallelism between politics and psychology. But Comte recognizes that the analogy between humanity and a biological organism, or human individuality, must not be pushed too far. Humanity is vastly more com-

[5] *Cours de Philosophie Positive* (Paris, 1830–42), IV, 409; V, 13–15; *Système*, I, 421; II, 60, 451.

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plex in its organization than is an individual life, although they do have certain points of resemblance. The method of analogy can never give final satisfaction. There is some value in the comparison, however, since it reveals Comte's conviction that individual and social life cannot be radically different: any theory of the individual mind must also account for its relations with other minds.[6] So, in a certain sense, humanity is human nature writ large.

There are various expressions and phrases used in the positive philosophy to describe and clarify the notion of humanity, and elaborate the theory that it is an organism. These are often obscure and fanciful, such as "a vast and timeless social unit," or "the center of human unity."[7] More significant, however, is the use of the term *ensemble*, especially since there is no exact French equivalent for the English word "whole." From the very beginning of Comte's work, *ensemble* is a favorite term, e.g., in the phrase *la point de vue d'ensemble,* as well as in connection with humanity. Just what does *ensemble* mean? Does the unity of an *ensemble* reside merely in the mind of the observer, or is it independently inherent in the structure of the *ensemble* itself? Descriptive terms, such as "collective" and "collective life" seem to suggest that when speaking of humanity as an *ensemble,* Comte means that it is a vast aggregate. This interpretation is encouraged by the remark that the Great Being makes a constant effort "to conserve the union of the separable elements of which it is made up."[8]

However plausible this definition of the meaning of *ensemble* may appear, even with quotations as a basis, it was openly rejected by Comte, who held that any view of society as a mere "agglomeration" of individuals in a fortuitous and transitory union is an ideal characteristic of the theological

[6] *Système,* II, 9, 10, 277; *Discours sur l'Esprit Positif* (Paris, 1909), p. 71.

[7] *Cours,* IV, 559; *Système,* II, 62.

[8] *Cours,* IV, 178; V, 68, 15. Frederic Harrison inserts this interpretation in his translation of *Système* (London, 1875), II, 369. Cf. *Système,* I, 417.

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stage of man's mental development.[9] "The disintegration of humanity into isolated individuals," he stated, "is an irrational as well as an immoral analysis, which tends to dissolve social existence without explaining it. It is as vicious in sociology as is, in biology, the chemical decomposition of the individual into irreducible molecules, a separation which never takes place during life."[10] Comte goes so far in his opposition to reducing humanity to an aggregate of individuals that he declares that man does not even exist in his own right: only humanity so exists.

We may conclude, then, that the common view of an *ensemble* as an aggregate of separate elements is not adequate as a definition of humanity. And it is very confusing that both *ensemble* and "organism" should be used without any clear definition of either. Comte's conscious attempts to elucidate the notion of humanity in a philosophical way can, therefore, hardly be said to be successful. We may be able to make more progress in studying the conception by a more direct examination of what sort of human individuals humanity is made up. Needless to say, the common identification of humanity with all of mankind or the human race in general is not made by Comte, or else we should not have the problem of discussing the doctrine at all. According to the positive view, humanity includes only a certain portion of mankind as its members. More interesting still is the idea that humanity is not merely a component mass of members, but rather that it *has* members. These individuals are the means, the organs, by which humanity acts, and are indispensable instruments; but there is a certain aspect of humanity which is independent of them. The question then arises as to just what humanity apart from its members, in this detached sense, can mean, and this is indeed an enigma. Perhaps it signifies mind (*l'esprit*) in that broad historical and social sense which is so often used in posi-

[9] *Discours*, p. 87; *Système*, I, 411.

[10] *Système*, II, 180–81.

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tivism.[11] Since there is no discussion on this point, however, we must content ourselves with examining the problem of who are the members.

Comte declares that humanity consists essentially of the dead; life is a period of probation, during which individuals may prove or fail to prove that they are worthy of being incorporated into humanity. This theory of gaining immortality by deeds and influence on the lives of living persons, thereby remaining in their memories and becoming part of the social heritage, has been so popularized since Comte's day that few of us remember that it was a part of the positive doctrine of humanity. The dead play a very real part, according to positivism, and as time goes on the living are more and more ruled by them. This, of course, is only a more striking way of asserting the tremendous force of history on present events, and that the pressure of the past is so great that we cannot oppose it, but only understand it.

Needless to say, all historical facts are not on the same level of importance. Not everything that has happened is an integral and necessary link in the course of events; and likewise not all who have lived become members of humanity. Comte very clearly declares, "Humanity is not composed of all individuals or human groups, past present, and future, indiscriminately brought into an aggregate (*agglomerés*). No real whole can be brought about, except from elements that are essentially "associable." The Great Being is formed only by the concurrence, either in time or in space, of lives that are "assimilable," or, in other words, sufficiently capable of being incorporated. Those who are mere encumbrances on the race are not members of humanity."[12] In another passage humanity is defined as "the continuous whole of converging beings" (*l'ensemble continu des êtres convergents*).[13] In short, all

[11] G. H. Lewes, in his book *Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences* (London, 1887), p. 23, suggests such a view by asserting that the evolution of humanity corresponds to the evolution of thought.

[12] *Système*, I, 411. [13] *Ibid.*, LV, 30.

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men are born children of humanity, but few become its servants; some are merely passive, digesting machines, or parasites.

Like Carlyle, Comte had a profound admiration for the great men of history. He realized that one of the chief dangers of the doctrine of humanity lies in its tendency to overshadow its individual members, and perhaps for this reason sought to appreciate and recognize the distinctive personalities who have been creative leaders of civilization. For this purpose the positivist calendar was organized, and became an important feature of the religious cult. Positivists revered the men of genius thus listed and deemed worthy of the honor by their master, almost worshiping them as the Roman Catholics do their saints. What are the characteristic qualities of these great men whom Comte has specially chosen? In order to discover his criterion of personal greatness, and hence of membership in humanity, we must determine what is meant by lives that are "sufficiently assimilable," and beings that "converge." At the outset of this inquiry it is somewhat surprising to learn that the higher animals may become members of humanity, since Comte considers that they are capable of noble, voluntary services to men, although he admits that they have no consciousness of performing a social function. Of course the faithfulness and courage of dogs in rescue cases, for example, seems to bear a real resemblance to human actions that we call good. It is quite a different matter, however, to go on to say that animals actually realize the ethical principle, "Live for others" (*Vivre pour autrui*), which is the first requirement for membership in humanity.[14]

Altruism, then, is the means of achieving incorporation into the Great Being. But this must not be interpreted in a petty way as meaning playing the lady bountiful, or the good Samaritan. A member of humanity must be a great soul, and in transcending egoism give expression to the universal, eter-

[14] *Système*, IV, 37.

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nally significant, or "social" possibilities of human nature. Civilization advances at a rate corresponding to the degree of dominance of altruism over egoism which we can achieve. Some might contend that every human life exhibits some altruism, however infinitesimal, and therefore all can claim a place in humanity. But a member must do more than this; his life must reveal a preponderance of altruism over egoism, for this is what a real advance in civilization means. Only that part of a life which does so contribute has eternal meaning. In other words, humanity assimilates from each individual only that part of his life which has significance from the point of view of the whole.[15] Comte does not demand any uniformity in the type of contributions which are made, but only in the fact of disinterestedness. Altruistic lives in this sense are homogeneous, they fit in with one another, or are "convergent," and are "assimilable" because they and they alone are capable of incorporation into humanity.

The emphasis on the altruistic life as the indispensable condition for membership in humanity is only another way of stating the doctrine that the individual must be subordinated to society. If Comte had shown clearly that there is a fundamental harmony or identity between the purposes of humanity as a whole and the ideals and needs of individuals, then he might have justly maintained that morality consists in contributing to the good of humanity.[16] But this he never does, and the idea that the individual must never be used for a purpose which does not include his own good is not given expression in the positive philosophy. Followers of Kant were wiser in recognizing this human need for a consciousness of self-expression and self-realization, for while they, too, held that participation in a common, shareable good is essential, they also saw that this good must be one which expresses personal, as well as social, ideals. Comte fails to see this. He interprets the ethical meaning and goal of individual life in

[15] *Système*, II, 62.

[16] Cf. T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics* (Oxford, 1906), pp. 210–29.

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terms of humanity, but does not recognize that the converse of this truth is just as valid and significant.

One reason why humanity appears to transcend individual lives and to treat men as its servants lies in the fact that it crystallized into an object of religious worship. Even for Comte, not to speak of his followers, it was too difficult to develop the conception of humanity along purely ethical lines. While a symbolic Great Being may be of value in establishing a religion for the masses, there is in it very little contribution to a philosophical theory of the common good. We find, for example, that the Great Being is often described as kind and sympathetic toward his servants, who, in turn, are brought into unity through devotion, and so are made better and happier. Thus taking Comte at his worst, we see that he finds the same paternalistic relation between humanity and the individual which is characteristic of the old theistic idea of God. Unfortunately, his attempts at a more truly philosophical interpretation are too full of obscurity to be of value.

We have seen that not only is this question of the relation of the individual to humanity unsuccessfully treated, but the very nature and constitution of humanity, whether "organism" or *ensemble,* is left uncertain. No doubt this confusion explains why so little study has been made of this part of the positive philosophy. These problems have been largely ignored, and understanding of the conception of humanity has come through insight rather than careful analysis. Perhaps, however, future study will reveal more of Comte's meaning than we can now discover. Notwithstanding the undeveloped nature of his theories, they were of distinct value in pointing the way to a new social and political type of ethical inquiry. The positivist's opposition to the abstract individualism of the eighteenth century, and insistence on the social nature of morality based on the doctrine of man's inherently social nature, have proved fruitful in developing a broader conception of ethics than was hitherto possible.

Comte, however, stressed the idea of humanity too much

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without giving sufficient recognition to the human individual and the necessity of his conscious self-realization. Hegel, who has recently so often been accused of exalting the state above its members, and making it a mystical entity, is, in comparison with Comte, quite a champion of the individual. An examination of the *Philosophie des Rechts* reveals the theory that the state is the ultimate form of human organization, and both an actual and a symbolic embodiment of concrete freedom, in which "personal individuality, and its particular interests, as found in the family and civic community, have their complete development."[17] While this language is not the latest philosophical jargon, we cannot afford to ignore the fact that Hegel saw that the good of society as a whole must include the good of the individual, and this is more than Comte achieved.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the positivist with the Hegelian doctrine of rights. Comte was so hostile to the eighteenth-century insistence on rights that he went to the other extreme and recognized only man's duties to humanity, ignoring rights altogether. This, of course, is a necessary corollary of the theory of the individual's subordination to humanity. For only in a limited sense are individual members separate or independent, because they have ethical significance only in so far as they embody the spirit of humanity as a whole. So the rights and duties of mankind, which had previously been so carefully distinguished, were in positivism merged into the notion of one's duty as a member of humanity. Hegel, on the other hand, had kept the old distinction between rights and duties, but attempted to correlate them justly.[18] This does not embroil him in the difficulties of explaining just how rights can disappear in the supreme notion of duty to humanity, which, of course, is a question Comte never clearly answers. In fact, he is so absorbed in contemplating humanity that he is scarcely conscious that there might be any difficulty about the free development of indi-

[17] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, Dyde trans. (London, 1896), p. 248.

[18] *Système*, I, 146. The Hegelian correlation of rights and duties did not occur to Comte. Cf. *Philosophy of Right*, pp. 249–50.

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vidual charachter and destiny, or that he needs to reveal how the good of humanity can be identified with all possible personal aims that are good. So the problem of an intimately personal realization of ethical ideals, whether of right or what not, is ignored by Comte.

To this challenge to positivism as failing to encourage, or even recognize, the necessity of an individual's having his own ideals and striving to attain them, positivists no doubt would make a number of responses. Few would care to accept the theory of subordination at its face value, but many would deny that such an interpretation of Comte need be made. The latter might contend that humanity, instead of being regarded as a super-individual entity, is merely an anthropomorphic conception, a greatly magnified or symbolic self, and that life in accord with its purposes is really life in accord with personal aims and desires.[19] But this makes humanity mean merely human nature, and this most certainly was not Comte's idea. Study of the positive philosophy does not reveal an exalted egoism, but simply an altruism that is too abstract to admit of reconciliation with the fact of personal ethical consciousness and achievement.

Frederic Harrison, writing on *The Ethic of Humanism,* takes cognizance of Comte's confusion in dealing with this problem, and in his own, we might say neo-positivist, theory he attempts to make room for the ethical significance of individuality. He asserts: "The sympathetic social life is the life of self, in a true sense. We do not cease to be ourselves by loving, thinking, and working for Humanity. We develop, realize, manifest ourselves. . . . . Why ought we to live for Humanity? Because we *must*. We are so constituted by nature. Because we live only by Humanity, in Humanity and through Humanity."[20] This is a development of Comte's thought at its best, which rather resembles the Hegelian doctrine that the state is the objective spirit and the individual has his truth, real existence, and ethical status in being a member of it. Such

[19] J. H. Bridges, *Essays and Addresses* (London, 1907), p. 86.

[20] Frederic Harrison, *On Society* (London, 1918), p. 16.

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an interpretation, however, is very clearly not the original Comtean doctrine. Naturally enough, some positivists seek to put their master's ideas in as favorable a light as possible, and to develop those aspects of his doctrine which are most fruitful. But the meaning of individuality and membership in humanity is a real problem, and it is doubtful whether any one can interpret Comte's statements in such a manner as to make them appear as a basis for a theory of the individual's right to a life expressive of his own ethical ideals.

Before ending our discussion of this point, however, we must recognize that in a sense there is a positive theory of ethical perfection, for Comte wanted to harmonize all the interdependent aspects of human life, the affective, the intellectual, and the active, or volitional, thus achieving a unity of man's character.[21] This synthetic state, he believes, can be brought about only by concrete realization of the principle of love or altruism, and co-operation in humanity as a whole. We must note, however, that Comte understands human life and man in a generalized, abstract sense, never as concrete individuality.[22] The subordination of the individual to humanity is an idea that inevitably shows itself in positivism, no matter what the starting-point may be. Indeed, it is declared that a man cannot even be known at all except through his relation to humanity. And the only real means of an individual attaining unity of character or life is by participation in the perfect order of humanity itself, because harmony within any of the parts of a whole depends upon the harmony of the whole.

So we see that there can be no individual good life. In positivism all the stress is laid on the social well-being and progress, but it can be seriously questioned whether this position is any more valid than that of the old individualism, to which it stands in antithesis. While it is true that all morality must be social in nature, it is also true that the individual realization of a good life is a necessary condition for the har-

[21] Cf. *Système*, IV, 45, 46. *Synthèse Subjective*, I, 1.

[22] Congreve in his translation of the *Système* (London, 1877), IV, 40, gives this interpretation.

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mony and advance of humanity. Great personalities, by their very nature, cannot be bound down by a sense of subservience to humanity, for greatness consists in the persistence to realize one's potentialities of mind and character in an untrammeled way.

This whole difficulty in determining the relation between an individual's life and the purposes of humanity might have been avoided if Comte had held that humanity is merely synonymous with civilization, or the accumulated social heritage. For this ever increasing heritage, which results from the activity of mind in its broad, historical sense, could easily have been considered as a unified developing whole without a personal character. Humanity, thus interpreted, would never have become a Great Being, demanding servility from mankind, but would have been another word for the spirit (*Geist*) of progress, or civilization. Such a conception is just as expressive of the intellectual and ethical possibilities of the individual as it is of those of society as a whole; indeed, we might say that, in such a theory, individual potentialities would receive more recognition than ever. This, of course, is not the Comtean doctrine, but only a possible development of it.

The notion of humanity as a Great Being is not conducive to the best results in the field of ethics, and it hardly seems possible that Comte would have achieved any measure of success in his proposed treatise on ethics if he had consistently held to this theological view. Perhaps the failure of positivism to provide any definite ethical theory for the individual explains why there are so few positivists today. Inevitably man will break away from any idea which does not recognize the nobility and eternal significance of the human individual as such. We may conclude, then, that the conception of humanity has value as a principle of philosophical co-ordination, but that it does not furnish a sufficient basis for developing a system of morals.

ITHACA, NEW YORK

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BOOK REVIEWS

PROFESSIONAL AND BUSINESS ETHICS. By Carl F. Taeusch. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xiii+370. Price, $3.00.

This book is, so far as I know, the first of its kind, the first to discuss (1) professional ethics (lawyers', doctors', teachers', engineers'), (2) business ethics, and (3) the ethical problems of labor unions and farmers' co-operatives, all within the compass of a single volume. Professor Taeusch has also included chapters on (4) the characteristic marks of a profession, (5) on the distinction between morality, law and ethics, (6) on fees and charges, and (7) on the place of professional groups and business groups within the overarching authority of the nation.

The work is admirably well done. The arrangement of topics and subtopics is clear and convenient. The knowledge of professional ethics, their development and complications, their impressive codes and their imperfect working is comprehensive. One is constantly wondering how a man who presumably has not practiced all the professions discussed in this book can know so much of their inside workings.

The writer distinguishes ethics as "confined largely to the relations assumed by the members of limited social groups" such as the members of a profession. This usage, which certainly would be surprising to most college teachers of ethics, has a clear advantage in marking off the relatively simple problems of professional life (or of industrial life more generally) from the wider field of what has hitherto been known as ethics, viz., the study of right and wrong conduct wherever its issues arise. "Unethical" in Professor Taeusch's usage becomes the same thing as "unprofessional," i.e., the infringement of the "rules of the game" as explicitly stated in the code. What is left of general "ethics" after its professional slice is cut off he calls "morality." Socrates, obedient to the voice of conscience in refusing to escape from prison, is, he says, in a "moral," as distinguished from an ethical or a legal, situation.

I doubt whether this distinction, useful though it is, will come into general use. The extensive literature on the "history of ethics" and on "ethical theory," as well as on "social ethics," is inevitably in the mind of any careful student of conduct, and all this literature is based on another definition.

The central core of doctrine in Professor Taeusch's book is, I think, this:

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1. A professional group should be limited to "a group of men trained by education and experience to perform certain functions better than their fellow-men, ... and giving evidence of sufficient preparation and skill to differentiate them from amateurs."

2. A code of ethics should be drawn up by the members of each profession.

3. A "practice committee" should next formulate "practice cases" (as the American Association of Engineers has done) which definitely elaborate their code and show what sort of concrete problems are most likely to arise under it. These cases, with the committee's solutions of them, should then be published in a professional journal so that further discussion of them and further cases may be elicited.

4. "Any man who brings into disrepute other members of his profession" by violation of the professional code thus elaborated should be subjected to professional discipline, with expulsion from the professional group as the extreme punishment.

Such discipline has no legal force and takes no account of the individual's ultimate moral worth. It is a means of holding up professional standards and so retaining public confidence.

In the interesting chapter on "Fees and Charges" as an index of professionalism, Professor Taeusch lays down the following rule: "No particular professional services should be made dependent on the size of the fee or the certainty of obtaining it . . . . for these services are assumed to be necessary to the welfare of the state." The professional is to get his income "in the long run," i. e., in large fees from the rich to balance work done *gratis* for the poor.

This is in contrast with the methods of *business*, which apparently is not supposed to furnish services necessary to public welfare (presumably the public utilities which furnish light, heat, water, transportation, and food are excepted here, or would be put on the borderline between the professional and the non-professional).

Of interest and value in this book is the large group of concrete ethical problems discussed in the text and sure to be seized upon by teachers of ethics. Naturally the fifty cases analyzed by the engineers' "practice committee" are drawn upon more fully than those relating to other professions.

Commenting on the ethical shortcomings of the different professional groups, Professor Taeusch finds that: (1) Lawyers identify ethics too much with legality. (2) Doctors should "put teeth" into their code (*a*) by working out illustrative problems through a practice committee, (*b*) by disciplining members for obvious breaches of professional ethics.

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(3) Teachers often lack professional standards of preparation, and hence are unable effectively to advance their salaries towards a proper figure. Their professional standards have not been elaborated (in most places) by a practice committee and are almost never enforced by professional discipline. (4) Engineers are not selected and licensed by an examining board, as is the case with lawyers and doctors; and in this group, as in medicine, professional scandals are usually hushed up.

The chapters on business ethics and on labor unions and farmers' co-operation, though full of interesting points, are on the whole less penetrating and intimate in their grasp than those on the professions. The author insists that "business is to be differentiated from the professions, in which service is prior to monetary considerations." When business men lose sight of this patent fact and sentimentally assert that "service is above profit," their statements are meaningless or misleading, since "the making of a profit is a very obvious and important function of business."

"The actual world of business experience," he says, "is plainly a cut-throat, 'dog-eat-dog' proposition. Hence ethical codes published by old established firms are often an advertisement, rather than a business sacrifice . . . . and are not applicable to struggling young merchants."

High-sounding codes of business ethics which are not illustrated by published "practice cases" or enforced by expulsion from an association expose business men to the charge of hypocrisy or of sentimentalism.

Of organized labor the author's chief criticism is that the laboring man has "nowhere publicly proclaimed and definitely acted so as to convince people that he is aware that his main social function *is to do the job well*. . . . ."

The crux of the situation may be presented in a simple illustration. A baggage man was throwing crates of red raspberries from a platform in such a way as obviously to injure the fruit. A traveler waiting at the station remonstrated: "Do you realize that carelessness of this sort, going on everywhere, is contributing immensely to the high cost of living that you perhaps are often complaining about?" "When you show me the connection," replied the baggageman, "between the way I handle these raspberries and the price I pay this noon for beefsteak, I'll put myself out enough to take care of this fruit."

No better illustration, Professor Taeusch goes on to say, could be offered of the futility of depending on Kant's categorical imperative or on the Golden Rule to solve our social problems, or he might have added, on the bankruptcy of an ethics dependent on the calculation of consequences.

Of farmers' co-operation he says: "The likelihood is that pure co-

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operation is either incompatible with American individualism or unnecessary in our economic order."

The final chapter on the "social philosophy of the professions and business groups" discusses their relations to the authority of the state and of religion, illustrating the conflicts between a man's various "loyalties to the several social groups of which he is a member." This is to be settled, he says, by "evaluation, or the comparing of incommensurables." I cannot say that I find Professor Taeusch's exposition of this subject quite satisfying. He reviews the facts and theories of present-day social philosophy, but exactly where he stands himself on these problems he does not make clear to the present reviewer.

But this is no reproach to a book which is planned to contain as little theory and as much objective and informing description as possible. In this admirable object Professor Taeusch has succeeded, and thereby leaves us much in his debt.

RICHARD C. CABOT, M.D.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ASPECTS OF MEXICAN CIVILIZATION (Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1926). By José Vasconcelos, former Secretary of Education of Mexico, and Manuel Gamio, Department of Education of Mexico. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. Pp. ix+194. $2.10, postpaid.

SOME MEXICAN PROBLEMS (Lectures on the Harris Foundation, 1926). By Moises Saenz, Subsecretary of the Department of Education of Mexico, and Herbert I. Priestley, of the Department of History of the University of California. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926. Pp. ix+175. $2.10, postpaid.

The Norman Wait Harris Foundation has set as its purpose the "promotion of better understanding on the part of American citizens of other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world-order." These two volumes contain the public lectures delivered at the Third Annual Institute held at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Foundation.

Anyone who has had occasion to plod through the dreary waste of special pleading and interest-ridden propaganda which makes up the body of literature in English dealing with our southern neighbor will wel-

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come the cool objectivity of these lectures. And by this statement it is not meant that here we have the whole truth and nothing but the truth; but one is impressed with the demonstration of the fact that when two or three are gathered together in the name of science, there sometimes does occur that meeting of minds which represents our closest approximation to the truth.

To be sure, each of the contributors to these volumes has his own interests and his own point of view. It is the frank recognition of this fact which lends them their unique value. José Vasconcelos (former secretary of education, and at present a political "out" living in Paris) envisages Mexico as a land of eternal contrasts—contrasts of culture, geography, and peoples. He sounds the keynote of all the lectures when he points out that the problem of Mexican civilization is to bring order and unity where nature and history have wrought to the end of chaos and disorganization. The well-known Mexican anthropologist, Manuel Gamio, grapples with the same diversity of cultural and racial forces, and expresses his belief that in the indigenous underlying Indian groups lies the hope of the new Mexico. If Mexico would achieve unity, let her build upon the native culture, not by seeking to superimpose strange and alien ways, be they Spanish or French or American, but by studying to understand the life of the natives, and to incorporate them into the body politic.

Moises Saenz, the subsecretary of the department of education, in his lectures speaks as the representative of the present labor government in Mexico. As such, he sets forth in more concrete fashion the actual problems confronting the administration, particularly as these center around foreign investments and Mexican nationalism. For him the path of progress lies in the direction of the "humanization of the Mexican laborer" and in the "integration of Mexico through education." Professor H. I. Priestley, of the history department of the University of California, agrees with Sr. Saenz concerning the importance of education, but is a little doubtful about the labor movement. He fears that up to the present, at least, the unions have been more disposed to insist upon their rights than upon their obligations. Professor Priestley's lecture on the relations between the United States and Mexico gives a refreshing turn to this moot question by his discussion of the cultural interchange taking place between the two nations.

EYLER N. SIMPSON

MEXICO CITY

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THE ETHICS OF THE HINDUS. By Sushil Kumar Maitra. Calcutta: University Press, 1925.

Mr. Maitra has undertaken in this work to give a philosophical exposition of Hindu ethical ideas. It is not of the nature of a history, but is said to be an analytical inquiry into meaning and value. Consequently he ignores all questions of chronology, and simply treats the views of Hindu thinkers according to subject matter. The first part consists of objective ethics, by which the author means a classification of duties divided into (1) relative duties, those binding on certain castes and stages of life, and (2) common duties, those without reference to social position. It turns out, however, that this classification does not belong to Hindu ethics as such. It belongs to the Lawbook of Manu and a Vaisheshika commentator named Prashastapada, and the author also gives two quite different classifications, those of the Mimamsakas and the Ramanujists, without any attempt at reconciliation. However, what most strikes a non-Hindu is the fact that these schemes of duties or moral rules should be made the groundwork of ethics. It is like starting ethical science with the Ten Commandments. For Mr. Maitra they are the basis, and the subjective psychological Hindu ethics are "a necessary supplement to objective ethics, as being the treatment of the moral life from the internal standpoint of the spirit as a free moral agent."

This supplement forms the second and most important section of the book, and is divided into chapters on volition, conscience, springs of action, virtues, and special features. What we are told of one of the Hindu views concerning springs of action will give an idea of the method. The author gives the views of four classifications, and one of these is that of Yoga as represented by Patanjali. According to Patanjali, the passions of cruelty, mendacity, sexual indulgence, etc., are to be traced to three roots, greed, anger, and delusion. The passions are next divided according as they may determine the agent in various ways, and then again according as they are mild, of mean intensity, or violent. On this last distinction Mr. Maitra makes a comparison with the view of "Aristotle and his rule of the golden mean," but as usual in his comparison with Western thinkers he finds the Hindu philosopher superior. "What Aristotle does not furnish in his ethical scheme, Patanjali gives us in his theory of the quantitative gradation of passions." The Stoics also fare badly in Mr. Maitra's judgment, for we are told that "Patanjali does not teach the extirpation of the passions as the Stoics do." However, he immediately contradicts himself by saying that "according to Patanjali some impulses must be put down altogether," and he finally states certain special characteristics of these various psychological analyses of the

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passions without deciding which of them expresses most psychological common sense.

Mr. Maitra claims that his comparisons with European and modern thought are an essential part of the enquiry he has undertaken, but he never refers specifically to a European author's statement or work, and there is nothing to indicate that he has read a single author. Nor does he make his comparisons where the vital points of contact occur. He describes Nyaya as being "self-deterministic hedonism," and he makes the Mimamsakas equally hedonistic. "According to them whatever does not produce pain (*dukkha*) in excess of pleasure (*sukha*) is an *artha* or good, and whatever produces pain in excess of pleasure is *anartha*, or evil." Here surely is a point on which we should like to know how such systems are related to Western forms of hedonism, but he gives us nothing. Mill is named only once in the book, and Bentham twice, and not a single living European author appears to be adduced. His views about the beatific vision and "the familiar controversies amongst the medieval mystics" are amazing.

Brahmanism, so Professor Radhakrishnan has lately told us, has absorbed the best elements of the Buddhist faith, but Mr. Maitra does not deal with Buddhism except incidentally. Even the Vaishnavas, he says, go beyond Hinduism, though they are not anti-Hindus who renounce or disclaim it. This does not answer the charge that much of Hindu ethics is Hinduized Buddhism. Anyhow, Vaishnavism is alive, and so is Buddhist ethics. Hindu ethics is here made to appear rather as a conglomerate of disparate dogmas, and it does not seem that they can be anything else if theories of conscience and springs of action are raised on the foundation or groundwork of external duties.

The subject of ethics is not one which forms a special branch of science in Indian thought, and the author has had the difficulty of mapping out for himself his sphere of investigation. This is a fact that must be recognized, even if we have to conclude that he has not always been successful in drawing the right dividing lines. But his investigation is one of great importance, and will be of service both for his own further studies, which he promises, and for other workers in the same field.

E. J. THOMAS

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY, Vol. II. By S. Radhakrishnan, King George V Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Pp. 797. 25*s* net.

In his second volume, which is devoted to the study of the six Brahmanical systems, Professor Radhakrishnan exhibits the characteristics

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which marked out his first volume as an important and valuable contribution to the understanding of Indian thought. He frankly claims to have adopted "what is acknowledged to be, the true spirit of philosophical interpretation, viz., to interpret the ancient writers and their thoughts at their best and relate them to the living issues of philosophy and religion." It is possible to take exception to this conception of the function of the historian of philosophy, and to ask that he should interpret the writers of the past dispassionately rather than seek to exhibit their strength; and it is impossible, during the perusal of this interesting work, to avoid the conviction that, in relating Indian thought to modern ideas, there is more than a risk of obscuring what is characteristic in it, and that the presentation is somewhat one-sided. Though we may readily admit that the problem set to philosophers is one and the same, nevertheless it has been approached in very diverse ways by Indian philosophers, and undoubtedly there is need of an exposition of Indian philosophy which will take as its fundamental object the presentation of what is specifically individual in the tenets of the systems. This is not the prime aim of Professor Radhakrishnan. Deeply versed in Western philosophy, he finds a wide field for his talent in expounding Indian doctrines in the light of modern discussions. The result unquestionably is far more interesting than any history of Indian philosophy can be, if it adheres closely to the thought of the ancient writers. They grew up without knowledge of Greek philosophy, and the religious mysticism of the Upanishads forms the basis of the most valuable of their speculations; to interpret even Çankara in the light of Hegel is distinctly to modernize and reconstruct rather than expound. Professor Radhakrishnan ascribes to Çankara's system "elemental calm and persuasiveness of rational conviction" (p. 655). But this is hardly the impression left by the writings of Çankara himself; it is doubtless of interest to compare Bradley's view of the Absolute with that of Çankara (p. 638), but it is essential to remember that Çankara, unlike Bradley, accepts without reserve as authoritative the teachings of the Upanishads, and there is a great gulf fixed between the thinker who is bound by no authority and him who is fettered. Again we are told that Çankara's "repugnance to anthropomorphism makes his religion appear a little cold." But Çankara's religion consisted in the full recognition of the popular theism of his day, which was not in the slightest degree cold, and which he appears to have industriously propagated. A follower of his doctrines has thus not the slightest difficulty in finding satisfaction for his religious needs, nor is he in the least illogical in doing so. Again it is said (p. 654) that "by the inculcation of his Advaita doctrine, he helped men to interpret God in terms of spiritual value." It is difficult to

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discover any authority for this view, which does not appear to stand in any logical relation with Çankara's thought, and, what is far more important, seems to be wholly without support in anything written by Çankara, voluminous as are his works. It seems impossible to agree that Çankara "would in a manner indorse Spinoza's dictum that he who truly loves God cannot wish that God should love him in return." There is no proper sense in which the Absolute of Çankara can be deemed God, and in the lower sphere of existence love of God unquestionably would expect to be requited.

When, therefore, Professor Radhakrishnan urges (pp. 778 ff.) the revival of Indian philosophy in India, it is not the traditional doctrines as understood, for instance by Mādhava in the fourteenth century, that he would see once more in honor, but these doctrines viewed in the light of Western philosophy, and, it may be confessed, transmuted in the process into something which probably would have been difficult of acceptance by the sages to whom they are attributed by the author. But the work also contains very much that is not unduly colored by Professor Radhakrishnan's own philosophic view, while his very real power of exposition adds to its value, and his frequent reference to modern speculation conveys a perhaps delusive sense of familiarity to ancient doctrines. Moreover, though not, in the strict sense of the term, learned, the work is normally very well informed, and it constitutes beyond doubt a very valuable addition to the literature of Indian philosophy. It is all the more meritorious because at present there is a dearth of detailed studies on the basis of which alone is it possible to construct with security and reasonable ease. All attempts at present to write histories of Indian thought as a whole are necessarily in a degree premature, but they serve a most useful function in calling attention to the serious gaps in our knowledge, and the innumerable problems still demanding solution. The steady progress of research in India will doubtless in due course make good these defects.

On points of detail, as is inevitable, divergence of view is often possible. Sometimes Professor Radhakrishnan is too ready to follow tradition; it is really impossible to believe (p. 18) that the *Kauṭilīya* dates from 300 B.C.; it is most improbable that the Çankara who commented on the *Gauḍapādīya Kārikā* was the great Çankara; and that there was a historical Kapila, author of the *Sāmkhya,* is contrary to all probability. It may gratify feminists to learn of Gārgī as a great thinker (p. 781); but they will do well to remember that her historical existence in this capacity is unproved, and to accord this description to Mahāvīra appears a

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gratuitous compliment, for it would be difficult to find in early Jainism, even if we attribute what it has of philosophy to Mahāvīra, anything that could by any effort of the imagination be styled serious thought.

A. Berriedale Keith

University of Edinburgh

The Rise of American Civilization. By Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. I, pp. xv+663; II, pp. 828. Price, $12.50.

Main Currents in American Thought: The Colonial Mind (Vol. I); The Romantic Revolution in America (Vol. II). By Vernon Louis Parrington. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927. I, pp. xvii+413; II, pp. xxii+493. Price, $8.00.

It marks a high level of historical productivity to have two great studies of American culture by Americans appear in one year. But the substantial quantity of these four volumes is less impressive than their uniformly high quality. Both works are histories, comprehensive studies from colonial times to the present; but they are histories with distinction. They both manage to put into practice what the "new historians" have been preaching—they have a sharper eye for the intellectual, the economic, the scientific, the religious, the social factors than for the political and the military. Moreover, as already suggested, they are both written from an acknowledged liberal point of view. Beard's philosophy is already well known in its general outlines. Professor Parrington, who is not so well known, professes also to be "liberal rather than conservative, Jeffersonian rather than federalistic." Moreover, he confesses that he has perhaps in his search "found what he went forth to find." Either of these works might easily, but for the other, claim to be the best interpretation thus far of the main currents of American life, the best synthesis of the American mind. Appearing together, as they do, the high honor is sufficient to be divided between them.

Few men in America have so clearly won the right as has Charles A. Beard to swing loose from concrete materials and bolstering authorities and tell the story of this continent on a grand free scale. He now appropriates the prestige of prodigious early labors and speaks here no longer as the scribe of other days but as a patriarch having authority. But in temper it is a considerate authority that he wields. Where others have boldly spoken pro or con with evidence attached, Beard, surveying all

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their evidence, and oftentimes more, declares in favor of suspended judgment when in his vast sweep he might well escape with a more haughty air. For instance, in regard to the moot claim of Catholicism for credit for the famous Toleration Act in Maryland, he declares that "the truth is that there are no authentic records upon which to settle the dispute."

In such a free account as this purports to be, the point of view becomes the thing of primary significance. Beard is here the same liberal, not to say rebel, that he has ever been, though unquestionably mellowed by the kindliness of years or by the point of view of his collaborator. Detached in form though weltering actually in the morass of concrete interests at every stage of the narrative, he still manages to maintain a uniform geniality, deepening here into humor, rising there into brilliant irony. No form of deflation is more effective than with the advantage of subsequent events to describe the enterprises of men in the same high moral terms as the prospect of them called forth originally. Beard is master of this technique. If his treatise be read in the dim future by one who knows as little about Beard as we know about some early American characters, it is likely that his irony would be taken for dead earnest. The centrality of economic interest, for which Beard was noted in earlier studies into American backgrounds and which more recently he has generalized into a principle for the interpretation of all history, seems here at the outset to be lacking. In the settlement of America, in the subsequent foundation of the Republic, he sees and avows both the inadequacy of economic interest to account for the whole story and the other supplementing motives that were at work. But there abides with him the conviction, coming to the surface in places less expected, that philosophies and literatures and legalities are in large measure rationalizations that point sooner or later to harder economic and cosmic verities. The discussion of American literature during its golden age is organized around the "Hamilton-Webster-Clay system" as opposed to the Jefferson-Jackson democratic tradition. In the famous Dartmouth College case Beard sees the federalistic tradition reasserting itself, and victoriously, to prevent higher education in America from an indicated rapprochement with the democratic movement of the time. The theater is constantly scanned for the type of social philosophy that lies back of and gives substance to the plays of various periods. In all this emphasis Beard is clearly right at heart, even if here and there his specific interpretations be more dubious than he allows. If it requires less courage and implies less audacity to assume this, it is due in large part to Beard's earlier grubbing in the preserves of both federalism and Jeffersonianism. Beard sees in the Civil War the "Second American Revolution," a cataclysm

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which, like the first, had its primary and permanent significance in the protest by one economic and social class against the dominance of another. Through the clang and terror of war northern industrialism rode into power over the permanent prostration of agrarian feudalism in the South. The Fourteenth Amendment represents at once the union of puritanism and capitalism. Here is caught in a single article that humanitarianism which sacrificed much to free the slaves and that sagacious greed which under the guise of personification sanctified for final judicial blessing the corporate instruments of industrial expansion. Most of Beard's second volume is devoted to the results that flowed from this military and philosophical achievement, culminating in complete industrialization of American life in our time.

Professor Parrington does not presume upon a method so free and bold as that of Beard. He ends each volume with a bibliography; he constantly cites authorities; and on the whole relies rather largely upon the opinions of others for the skeleton of his own narrative. It is more or less necessary that he should do so, since he purports in fact to write a history of American literature, but along "the broad path of our political, economic, and social development, rather than the narrower belletristic." His first volume, entitled *The Colonial Mind*, covers American thought down to 1800; his second volume, entitled *The Romantic Revolution in America*, reaches to 1860; and a third volume, to be entitled *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America*, is to bring the account down to 1920. While throughout his narrative the economic, the political, the industrial elements do not appear so much for their own sake as they do in Beard, they are present—present to give content, explanation, and justification to American literature in a way that has not hitherto been shown on so generous a scale. Allowing for individual predilection in the choice of men and books to be treated, allowing for not a little liberalistically prejudiced interpretation, allowing for errors in technical fields, as for instance Parrington's assumption that since John Locke favored a constitutional monarchy he could not be a democrat—allowing for these and other possible defects, there is little ground for doubting that this work will long remain the best history of American literature. For the author sees literature as a sociological and economic phenomenon, and so sees it divested of all false romance and invested with a maximum of cultural significance. Literature becomes in the hands of this sane mind not verbal delicacy, but a record of the deprivations and complementary aspirations that drive men to self-expression. Literature so conceived is philosophy—philosophy with its feet on the ground, wherever its head may be.

The first volume, published in part already in the *Cambridge His-*

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tory of American Literature, represents the influence upon early America of English factors, particularly of English independency. The heroes, as would be expected from the point of view openly espoused, are Roger Williams, Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and other lesser figures of their kind, though it must be admitted that there is a sense of fairness toward, and not infrequently of genuine appreciation for, the villains of New England pietism. With the theocratic state a thing of fading memory and Jefferson in political power, the first volume ends. The second evaluates the native reactions to the world now partly conquered and discovered anew under the influence of French romanticism. The scene of action between the two changes from New England to the South and the West. The method followed amid such a welter of material is that of laying out logical divisions and developing them around biographical nuclei. In an enlightening discussion of "The Chief Stewards of Theocracy," for example, John Cotton is presented as the "priest," John Winthrop as the "magistrate"; and in a constrasting chapter Thomas Hooker figures as a "puritan liberal" and Roger Williams as the "seeker." Where so many characters must be presented this method gives a certain choppiness of effect and makes a genuine integration very difficult; but it must be admitted on the other hand that the method makes for concreteness and the dominance of the human element. Indeed, the ever near cosmic background that at times superinduces in Beard a suggestion of bravado in the face of futility is entirely lacking in Parrington. Of men and their ideas he writes; of metaphysics and destiny he has nothing to say.

All students of American literature and life will look forward eagerly to the completion of Parrington's fine work. It will present, when finished, an intelligible picture of letters upon this continent, and it might do something to change the emphasis in the teaching of English from dry-as-dust linguistics to the lively expression of human emotions and passions and interests which literature as a body comprises. Beard's two great volumes will stand out as a satisfying synthesis by a mind mature, urbane, and mellow, of the welter which we call America. And in their joint and individual excellencies, these literary productions will enforce alike the same lesson, a lesson beautifully stated by Parrington: "To enter once more into the spirit of those fine old idealisms, and to learn that the promise of the future has lain always in the keeping of liberal minds that were never discouraged from their dreams, is scarcely a profitless undertaking, now without meaning to those who like Merlin pursue the light of their hopes where it flickers above the treacherous marshlands."

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE: ITS MEANING AND BASIC PRINCIPLES CONSTRUED IN TERMS OF INTEREST. By Ralph Barton Perry. Longmans, Green & Co., New York. Pp. xvii+702.

The value of this treatise of Professor Perry's is in direct proportion to its length, the texture being so firm and even that each paragraph is a substantial addition. The surface is not lustrous, but it is smooth; and the book has the rare distinction of being clear and direct throughout. It thus fulfils what may well be thought the primary function of philosophical speculation; it is the clarification of a complex subject, and this not only positively in offering a general theory of value which is applied in relevant illustrative detail, but also negatively in making clear opposing opinions and crucial considerations at those points where the author's theory differentiates itself. It articulates a structure and at the same time exposes its foundations. It thus prepares the way not only for Professor Perry's projected volume on the specific realms of value, moral, religious, and so on, but also for the development, by those not convinced of its soundness at all points, of their critical objections and differing constructions on issues unambiguously drawn up.

The first section of the book is largely taken up with a review of opposing accounts of the general nature of value, and it will of course be objected that the treatment of these is too brief and abstract to be convincing as refutation. But it should be remarked that brevity and abstraction are absolutely necessary if the opposing views are to be presented at all, and that while we might easily accuse the author of failing to present such views with full sympathy, it is clear in the nature of the case that they seem to him always to some degree erroneous. Error is the one thing that a philosopher cannot love. Moreover, the statements give every evidence of being in summary the long-considered criticism of a mind particularly at home in the subject. If this criticism can be met, the clear presentation of it here offers a most auspicious point of departure for profitable discussion, while for students such a résumé is invaluable. It may be added, too, that the patient study and exposition involved in presenting it so completely and systematically, and with such thorough documentation, are scarcely less to be admired than the directness and lucidity of the presentation itself.

Professor Perry's own view of the general nature of value, a view which he has given briefly in several more or less controversial articles scattered through some ten or twelve years of various journals, not to mention his *Moral Economy* of 1909, is that value is "the peculiar relation between any interest and its object; or that special character of an

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object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it" (p. 124). "Any object of any interest" has value. That no character, whether relational predicate or simple quality, can possibly be a fact, seems to some of us a fundamental deliverance of an analysis of the categories, unavoidable moreover as embodying one of the distinctions upon which the possibility of logical articulation rests. But for Professor Perry's main results this is not an important consideration, even if it is so; for Professor Perry is an empirical investigator, a "scientific" philosopher—like Aristotle, let us say—and what he investigates in this volume is interest: the biological approach to it, its modes, its relations to cognition, its manner of integration in individuals and among individuals in society, its genesis and mutations, and its comparison and measurement. These six topics fill the rest of the book. Whether the given definition of value in general is or is not invulnerable, no one doubts that interest has here an extremely important bearing. If value is not the interest-relation as existentially established, perhaps value is, like God, not a subject for rational investigation. Thus, while the realistic importance of Professor Perry's analysis remains unquestioned, the importance of any so-called values not intimately bound up with human interests, or of a theory of value which is not also an account of such interests, is highly dubious. Except as unenlightened faith or prejudice, masquerading as rational philosophy, it would in fact seem quite impossible.

The chapters on the biological approach to interest and the modes of interest are a critical acceptance of behaviorism. If one feels that some of these psychological analysis are figurative or diagrammatic, or even mythical, one also reminds one's self that no science is quite literal, and that the realm of modern psychology, instead of being a mapped continent, is a vast—though no doubt partly imaginary—sea, not thoroughly charted, stirred to its depths by the winds of vigorous inquiry, and perilously rough with the waves of confident dogma that ride over its surface and burst loudly and sometimes spectacularly on its shores. Mr. Perry, not being a professional psychologist, has had to be content with a searching review of recent theory, in which, as elsewhere, he is always mindful of the teachings of his beloved master, William James. But this review is of great scope and infinite detail, and from it he is able to draw for us a most acceptable and enlightening account of interest in terms of biological tendencies and the adjustments of governing and subordinate responses, positive and negative. The distinguishing feature of interested human behavior is the fact that the response is directed upon an object "somehow presented or represented," "the expectation of which is the cause of its existence" (p. 236).

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This leads to the analysis of cognition, where Professor Perry is at his best. Characteristically dispassionate and meticulous, he lays bare, and thus removes, one confusion after another; and while he introduces a few new and somewhat forbidding terms, it is plain enough that for clarity this was all but imperative. In any case the resulting analysis leaves little to be desired. The sense in which judgments give us the objects of interest and thus may be said to embody the expectations which lead to their own fulfilments, either progressively or recurrently, leaves it also perfectly clear that the active constituents of a given interest, that which gives an object value, are not themselves judgments. Interest thus creates value; and cognition, while it serves interests much as Hume said it did in presenting ends and guiding us to means, reason being necessarily and therefore properly only the slave of the passion—cognition, while it thus serves interests, cannot directly either create or destroy values, but only mediate them. This section of the book would appear to settle a long controversy, not by denying flatly what has been most convincingly contended for, but by analyzing these contentions to show that they do not, if unambiguously put, make out the case for judgment as *against* interest in the constitution of values. The two play clearly distinct rôles, and that of interest is primary.

The treatment of integration of interests precedes that of genesis and mutation and comparison because, as I take it, Mr. Perry is anxious to show that interests themselves are primarily individual and not social. This of course follows from the biological approach; for if interest is a special sort of biologically conditioned response to a represented object, society as such cannot have interests in the sense in which individuals do. One might hope that Professor Perry's acute and convincing arguments here would be seriously taken into account were it not that what he says will always seem to a certain type of mind destructive of the highest values in life. If it could only be recognized by such minds that accurate analysis cannot by any least shadow of a possibility destroy either truth or values, we should not only eliminate much vague insistence on eternal and immutable values, and on such confused and confusing concepts as social value and the communal mind or soul, but we should also have disposed of the quarrels of religion and superstition with science and philosophy. And one does not expect such sudden millenial effects from the study of *any* book. If they are ever to be achieved, however, this is the sort of book to help in the achievement. For while its spirit is rigorously analytical and scientific, there could hardly be a more authentic and convincing expression of a guiding moral ideal than the concluding chapter; Mr. Perry is the negative instance to refute the

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bugbear of tender-minded moralists, the fear of analytical destruction, for in Mr. Perry, while analysis is rampant, his moral ideal remains supremely integral. This ideal is, as he says, the offspring of Christianity and of democracy, and he names it the all-benevolent will. But it is still a personal and *therefore* individual will; and its supremacy is grounded self-evidently on intensity, naturally upon preference, and rationally upon inclusiveness, for these are the standards of criticism and measurement of values that are theoretically available, and, as is fully shown, the standards that are constantly applied in practice.

As to the consistency of a standard of preference with more strictly quantitative standards, the case is made out on the basis of independent but compatible kinds of magnitude rather than merely different dimensions; so that Mr. Perry avoids the conventionally ridiculed slip of Mill as a Utilitarian. Magnitude being thus of three different kinds, inclusiveness is the only standard for final comparison, and when it cannot be employed, as between conflicting interests of different individuals having different scales of preference, one value cannot be held to outweigh another. Mr. Perry's account here is extraordinarily interesting; but his three chapters are as brief an exposition as would even make the points out, and it would be useless to try and give them in a few sentences. I think that it can safely be said, however, that he so fully meets the often urged objection to any relative theory of value, viz., that such a theory furnishes no basis for criticism or comparison, that the burden of proof must for the present lie with the objectors. It is also to be remembered that a theory which should make all interests commensurable, much less actually harmonizable, would belie the facts, and that a theory according to which there is no strictly rational procedure for balancing all interests satisfactorily one against another in the same world seems on the face of it to come out in the right general direction.

The least adequate, and, as I think, the least convincing, parts of the book are the treatment of feeling, and perhaps in consequence, the treatment of aesthetic value, so far as to include it under the general theory. If Mr. Perry is right as to the nature of all value, and if it happens also to be the case that beauty is directly intuited as a so-called tertiary quality of an object, and not an interest-relation, nor yet mediated by judgment, the realm of fine art will not be included in any "proper sequel to the present work," since beauty as feeling, or as an immediately felt character of things, or as appearance constituted by mistaken reference, can hardly be called an interest-relation even of the recurrent sort. On Mr. Perry's own account it would *have* value, but it would not

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be a value or a specific kind of value.[1] Aesthetic theorists may be quite wrong in thinking that we behold or intuit beauty on the very surface of sense-experience, but Mr. Perry has not shown that they are wrong. If they are right, beauty is not a case of value under Mr. Perry's definition, but at most only valuable, as gold might be, and as, according to Mr. Perry, truth is. Moralists, too, would object that the heart of morality has escaped Mr. Perry's scrutiny. But their case against him is less easy to maintain since morality, unlike beauty, cannot be seen as on the face or the intuited form of the object of sense preception. And in the best of worlds, measured by Mr. Perry's standards, a world where the greatest possible number of the most highly preferred interests were harmoniously maintained at their maximum intensity, one has a suspicion that morality as such would be superseded by goodness. Not so beauty, I think, which might well be the very real and objective appearance of that world to its inhabitants.

The *General Theory of Value* is, as might go without saying, a distinguished and scholarly achievement of masterly proportions. Some such comprehensive study has long been badly needed, more particularly by students whose reading must be in English, and to have this want supplied by so complete and authoritative a work is great good fortune. If the reader could sometimes wish that its author were more often possessed and swept along by the power of an idea, that would be wishing him to be not quite sane and either more or less than a philosopher and a scholar. Who but the absolutely disinterested sage could so fully analyze the social phenomena of interest, its changes and conflicts, its complex integrations, with no hint of irony and no touch of bitterness, no committing of himself to praise or to blame? But if Mr. Perry avoids the pitfalls of poetic possession and the false persuasiveness of reforming zeal, he cannot altogether escape the charge of moral enthusiasm. The fact that he never deviates from the level tread of considered judgment does not prevent the revelation of himself as an enthusiastic, though strangely well-grounded and critical, exponent of that ideal of the Christian and democratic traditions that he so carefully and analytically expounds as the Highest Good. And there is also the exciting force of personal conviction and the quicker tempo and sharper tone of personal concern in pages devoted to defending the efficacy of reason and to correcting misleading statements about complexes and rationalization. If a philosopher is to have enthusiasms, surely these are legitimate ones; and it is at any rate comforting, if irrelevant, to feel that even this most sane

[1] See especially p. 305: "The so-called tertiary qualities . . . . are the appearance constituted by such mistaken reference," and the rest of the paragraph.

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and balanced of contemporary American thinkers must now and then betray his own very personal and human concern for philosophy itself as well as for men's highest good.

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SHORTER NOTICES

INDIVIDUALISM AND INDIVIDUALITY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL. By Charles Larrabee Street. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1926. Pp. 136. Price, $1.25.

Done as a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University, this little book presents a survey of the literary work of John Stuart Mill from a specialized point of view. "Its thesis is that the expanding idea of individuality and a growing concern for individuality in society (which was directly related to his own growing personality) played an important part in Mill's thought and is essential to the understanding of his social and political philosophy." Mill's own philosophy, as distinguished from that taught him, is shown to have as its key the tremendous significance of human personality, and reasons are adduced to show that it sprung from joy in his own emancipation and growth and from his deep attachments to the few intimate friends that he had, especially from his relationship to Mrs. Taylor, later his wife. There is no index, though a working bibliography. As an appendix there is reprinted Mill's review of G. C. Lewis' *Use and Abuse of Political Terms*.

T. V. S.

SCHLEIERMACHER'S SOLILOQUIES: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE MONOLOGEN WITH A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION AND APPENDIX. By Horace Leland Friess. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1926. Pp. lx+176. Price, $2.00.

This is the first translation into English of Schleiermacher's *Soliloquies*. But the book contains much more than a well-done translation. The introduction, which covers the first half of Schleiermacher's life and development, characterizes in a finely balanced manner "the romantic spirituality of the *Soliloquies*, shows its origins in the growth of our culture and its relations to modern religious currents." Following the translation itself is an appendix in which is presented in measure less full, but with the same appreciative insight, the second half of Schleiermacher's life. There is a selected bibliography and a full index. The work as a whole is very competently done and is attractively published.

T. V. S.

UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE. By an editorial board of five. New York: Universal Knowledge Foundation, Inc., 1927. Pp. vi+1694.

This is the first of twelve proposed volumes of an encyclopedia of universal knowledge. Its purpose, however, is hortatory as well as didactic. It proposes not only to explain briefly and non-technically everything worth knowing in modern times, but also "to develop in those who use it that sense of proportion which should result from the educative process, either in the school or

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through other agencies." The first volume extends from A to Azymites. There seems to be a partiality shown for religious topics, and a further partiality for Catholic authorities in the treatment of such topics. The partial list of contributors published at the end of this volume furthers the suspicion that the aim of the volume is, *sub rosa*, apologetic as well as expository. Under "Atomism" one reads that "at bottom, neutral monism is only a new and specious name for the old materialism." Under "Authority," one reads that "the State is established by God, as is proved by reason and revelation. . . . . Only in the keeping of the Church which God established are the fundamental rights of man, whether natural or supernatural, secure from violation."

T. V. S.

THE BRIDGE TO FRANCE. By Edward N. Hurley. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1927. Pp. xiii+338. Price, $5.00.

This is a straightforward account by the war-time Chairman of the United States Shipping Board of the achievement under great difficulties that finally made possible the maintenance of a substantial American army in France. Many of the notable characters of the war flit across the pages so heavily dotted with ships: Wilson, Schwab, Edison, Ford, Colby, Hoover, Pershing, March, Northcliffe, Geddes, Kerensky, House, Dawes, Reading, Foch, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and many others. Among the many problems overcome by the Shipping Board, as described by the author, are the conceiving and building of the fabricated steel ships, wooden, composite, and concrete ships, operating the carrying fleet, supply of materials, recruiting, housing, and transporting shipyard workers, making seamen out of inexperienced human material, protecting ships from submarines, and convoying ships across the Atlantic. The general temper of the discussion of both tasks and men is romantic rather than critical —especially is this true of the treatment accorded Woodrow Wilson.

T. V. S.

THE IDEA OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A STUDY OF LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE BETWEEN 1900 AND 1926. By Charles W. Popkin. With an Introduction by W. G. S. Adams. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. xvii+595. Price, $3.50.

It may be that Professor Adams sees too kindly the work of his student in declaring that this book is "the first attempt by a comprehensive survey to examine how the idea of social justice is finding new forms of expression in two of the great states of the world," but the merits of the treatise are such that he certainly must be applauded when he declares that "it deserves a generous welcome." The treatment itself is highly specific and careful; it is a well-documented study of what actually has been done in the two countries surveyed in the direction of a fairly well-defined ethical goal. The notion of social justice serves as an orientation for the detailed research as well as a justification of it. Many people believe in times of great intellectual specialization that the head and the heart cannot thus closely associate without disastrous consequences. Especially in America is the tendency strong to make ethics all ethics and economics and politics all themselves. This book may be commended to all special workers, not merely for the carefully selected data that it contains, but also for the union it achieves by overtly treating politics as an ethical instrument. The changed relationship of the state to individual welfare revealed in this careful study of a quarter-century progress is in the direction and of the order indi-

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cated by the English schoolboy's version of Nelson's famous words: "Every man expects England to do her duty." An extensive selected bibliography of the parliamentary debates in England and France during the period, as well as of books that lay out the issues and drift, is given.

T. V. S.

SPEECH: ITS FUNCTION AND DEVELOPMENT. By Grace Andrus de Laguna. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927. Pp. xii+363. Price, $5.00.

Taking definite issue with those who have treated language from the point of view of individual psychology, the present author not only sees language as a social manifestation, but puts it in the orientation afforded by social psychology. As over against those who historically have conceived speech as a mode of expressing thought and emotion, she finds her allies in Malinowski, Dewey, and others who have treated speech as a mode of action. The common element between the animal cry and human speech is the function of both in "co-ordinating the activities of the members of the group." The distinct thing about this volume is the persistent way in which both the social nature and social function of language is kept to the fore. As the author says, "there has been no attempt to apply the conception of speech as a mode of action, and not merely of expression, to the problems presented by the evolution of language-structure, on the one hand, and of human intelligence, on the other." The style is simple and direct, and the argument moves forward rapidly and convincingly. It is a pity, to renew an ancient quarrel, that a book which so generously catches up the most forward-looking emphasis of the time upon a matter so important as language and carries it out logically and effectively in correlated fields should by the publisher's price be made practically unavailable to many private individuals.

T. V. S.

MOLE PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS. By Cassius J. Keyser. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1927. Pp. x+234. Price, $3.00.

Taking the earth-bound mole as the antithesis of all that philosophy ought to be, Professor Keyser in characteristic style initiates this volume of essays by preaching the superiority to attainable ideals of ideals that in their unattainability eternally urge man's search to vaster issues. "Pursuit of the unattainable is the proper vocation of man." There follow thirty brief but vigorously, and at times beautifully, expressed essays on as many subjects—subjects ranging from "An Educational Test" and "Side Remarks" to "The Nature of Man" and "The Significance of Death."

T. V. S.

THE TEACHING OF THE EARLY CHURCH ON THE USE OF WINE AND STRONG DRINK. By Irving Woodworth Raymond. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. 170. Price, $3.00.

This is a careful first-hand study of the attitude of the Christian church during the first five centuries of its existence toward the use of wine and strong drink as beverages. The general conclusion is that the early church regarded nothing as bad in itself, but all things good if rightly used. There was a right use of strong drink. Drunkenness was uniformly condemned, but the moderate use of alcoholic drinks was generally accepted. The major question was never to use or not to use. While there were ascetic emphases, they were sectarian rather than general. While abstinence was sometimes advised for certain classes and for special purposes, total abstinence was never preached or ac-

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cepted as the general view of the early church. While the author's declaration that he has "no cause to plead in this study" may be true so far as the question under issue is concerned, the general attitude of the volume as a whole pleads apologetically the cause of Christianity. There is a bibliography and a good index.

T. V. S.

HISTORY OF PROSTITUTION. By Paul La Croix (Pierre Dufour). Translated from the original French by Samuel Putnam. 3 vols. Chicago: Pascal Covici, 1926. I, pp. x+565; II, pp. 584; III, pp. 600. Price, $30.00.

These three volumes claim to trace the history of prostitution "among all the peoples of the world, from the most remote antiquity to the present day." In so far as that task were seriously essayed the method would be set in advance, and set inadequately; for only such a foundation as is laid in travelers' stories, in literary askances, and a minimum amount of personal research could possibly be available. The history was written in 1851–52, much of it from libraries, by one who came to be called "Bibliophile Jacob," with industry that is assiduous and a motivation that is equivocal. His apology for writing the book is to teach "a grave lesson of real utility," and he constantly adopts a hortatory tone in his descriptions and expositions. But the translator suspects him of being "a sly old fox" who knows when and where and why to adopt tones of respectability and sobriety.

As regards the volumes themselves, the first is given over to antiquity, Greece and Rome. The second to Rome and the Christian era. The third is devoted entirely to the Christian era. Despite its claim to come down to date, the study really extends only through the reign of Henry IV of France, and the emphasis of the study is heavily upon French manners and morals. Indeed, we have here no history of prostitution as such, but loose, uncritical, gossipy observations upon the history of morals, with especial regard to the relations between sexes.

The translator warns us not to look for literary graces in La Croix. The reviewer adds a *caveat* against expecting scientific graces. There seems little intellectual curiosity back of these indefatigable labors. Of human interest there is much. Destiny marches through the pages led by one who warns against human foibles but is suspected of a wink on the side when the virtue of the great is revealed as small as the virtues of the small. The edition is an artistic sample of bookmaking at its best. There is no index. Only 1,250 sets were made, and these for subscribers only.

T. V. S.

THE SPIRIT OF '76. By Carl Becker, J. M. Clark, and William E. Dodd. Washington: Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government, 1927. Pp. 135. Price, $1.50.

These three lectures delivered by the three authors in commemorating the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the year that witnessed the publication of the *Wealth of Nations* and the Declaration of Independence might seem initially to constitute a book only by grace of being delivered on a common occasion. But there is unity of tone also. Three such outstanding liberals as these American scholars must see their age and every age more or less alike. Each has taken his own method of recreating the spirit of the stirring year in the celebration of which the lectures were arranged. Professor Becker presents, under the guise of a hitherto unpublished document, the analysis of an influential New York business man, Jeremiah Wynkoop, as he slowly changed from a

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loyal British subject to an American patriot who would see the cause of independence through to victory. Not only does the document recreate the contemporary scene, but it also gives a psychological analysis almost poignant in its intimacy of the rationalizations which a transfer of political loyalty may involve. Professor Clark succeeds in interpreting Adam Smith in the light of the mercantilist theories against which Smith reacted, as well as in the light of the industrialism to which he pointed by his emphasis upon economic freedom and by his faith in its certain beneficence. Professor Dodd paints with little flourish and a minimum of moralizing an impressionistic picture of the men and local measures involved in converting Virginia from a favorite colony of the British crown into a stiff-necked rebel determined to make 1776 the beginning of a new era. There is, however, a unity about this small volume deeper than that of occasion or of tone. It is a unity of ethical emphasis: a common belief that the "spirit of '76" is a persisting will to universalize the liberty and opportunity that the few in every age have tasted and found to be good. Jeremiah Wynkoop was stirred by this will; Adam Smith was its eighteenth-century voice; and Patrick Henry became its revolutionary propagandist.

T. V. S.

THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE (Upton Lectures, Oxford, 1926). By S. Radhakrishnan, King George V Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan Co. Pp. 133. Price, 5*s* net.

This is an "apologia" for Hinduism without any critical appreciation of the peculiarities of that religion. The idea that every human being and every nation and group has an individuality of value is said to be Hinduism; but in what sense the very latest conceptions of moral quality can be said to be either Hindu or Christian or of any other ancient tradition—that is not explained. Again the author says "India has known for centuries what Freud is popularizing in Europe," which can only mean that the author has never read Freud. As for "caste," the author says that "while it has resulted in much evil, there are some sound principles underlying it," but neither the evil nor the good is analyzed. Indeed the book may serve as a vague popular indication that the modern Hindu can read into Hinduism as much as a liberal theologian can read into Christianity; but it has no value as a statement of historical fact or as analysis of a particular religious experience. The general statements of principles are merely repetitions of the current platitudes, which are serviceable in the pulpit.

C. D. B.

MIND IN EVOLUTION. By L. T. Hobhouse. 3d ed. 1926. London: Macmillan & Co. Large 8vo. Pp. 483; index. Price, 12*s*.6*d*. net.

This edition is a reprint of the second, with the addition of two interesting and important appendixes, one on "Configuration," or the *Gestalt* theory, the other on "Instinct in Man." In the former appendix Professor Hobhouse indicates that the term "correlation," which he had himself already used, seems to be more significant of mental activity than *Gestalt;* and indeed, structure or configuration does seem to exclude movement. In the appendix on "Instinct" there is a much fuller discussion, which will be found illuminating by students of moral theory as well as psychologists. Indeed, Professor Hobhouse's clarity of exposition and sanity of judgment give his analysis a special value, now that "instinct" plays so large a part in theories of mental life.

C. D. B.

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A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

Vol. XXXVIII JANUARY 1928 Number 2

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The PRESS IMPRINT

January and February 1928

A New Old Testament

As advance accounts in the newspapers some time ago intimated, J. M. Powis Smith of the University of Chicago, Theophile J. Meek of the University of Toronto, Alex. R. Gordon of the United Theological College and McGill University, and Leroy Waterman of the University of Michigan, have completed their American Translation of the Old Testament. The excitement that the new version has caused in the daily press recalls that brought forth by the appearance of the Goodspeed translation of the New Testament four years ago.

While controversy rages the translators let the matter rest as stated in their Preface to the translation:

"Why should anyone make a new English version of the Old Testament? With the Authorized Version of King James and the British and American revisions, to say nothing of unofficial renderings, have we not enough? This question may quite fairly be asked. The only possible basis for a satisfactory answer must be either in a better knowledge of Hebrew, or in a fuller appreciation of fundamental textual problems, or in a clearer recognition of poetic structures, or in such a change in our own language as would render the language of the older translations more or less unintelligible to the average man of our day. As a matter of fact, our answer must be found in all of these.

"The most urgent demand for a new translation comes from the field of Hebrew scholarship. The control of Hebrew vocabulary and syntax available to the scholar of today is vastly greater than that at the command of the translators of the Authorized Version, or of its revisers.

"Modern studies of textual problems reinforce the need for a new rendering. . . . . The science of textual criticism has made great progress in recent years, and no translation of the Old Testament can afford to ignore its results. Our guiding principle has been that the official Massoretic text must be adhered to as long as it made satisfactory sense. . . . .

"Much of the text that has long passed as prose is now recognized as really poetic both in form and spirit. This adds to the necessity for a new translation. Poetry should not be printed as prose. The present translation brings into clear light many of the hidden beauties of Hebrew poetry. . . . .

"The English of King James's day is not wholly natural or clear to the average man of the present day. . . . . The use of 'vinegar' in the sense of a wine or liquor for drinking has long since ceased to be recognized. . . . . Facts like these make the reading of the Bible a scholarly rather than a religious exercise, and clearly point to the need for a new translation. . . . .

"The content of the Old Testament is, with little exception, on a high literary plane. The language of the translation, therefore, cannot be allowed to fall to the level of the street. In this translation the foregoing principles have been kept clearly in mind. It tries to be American in the sense that the writings of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Wilson are American . . . . it aims at being easily understood wherever English is spoken. . . . .

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"The translators and the University of Chicago Press have sought to give this translation the appearance of a modern book. This purpose has determined the make-up of the page and has led to the addition of headings for paragraphs, and to the *insertion of half-titles before* individual books. It has also kept verse numbers out of the text and relegated them to the margin. . . . ."

In the best tradition of modern English writing this new version interprets the impressive, eloquent Hebrew of centuries ago.

The following passage from "The Song of Songs, Which Is Solomon's" is illustrative of those sections which the translators have cast into poetic form:

THE MAIDEN TO THE YOUTH

Kiss me with kisses from your mouth,
for your love is better than wine;
the fragrance of your ointments is sweet;
Your very self is a precious ointment;
therefore do the maidens love you.
Take me along with you, let us hasten;
bring me, O king, into your chamber,
That we may exult and rejoice in you,
that we may praise your love more than wine;
rightly are you loved.

And here is a part of the story of Ruth in the new translation:

RUTH'S APPEAL TO BOAZ

Then her mother-in-law Naomi said to her,

"Should I not be seeking a home for you, my daughter, where you may be comfortable? Now then, what about our relative Boaz, with whose women you have been? See, he is going to winnow barley at the threshing-floor tonight. Wash and anoint yourself therefore, put on your best clothes, and go down to the threshing-floor; but do not let your presence be known to the man until he has finished eating and drinking. See to it, however, when he lies down, that you note the place where he lies; then go in, uncover his feet, and lie down yourself; he will let you know what to do."

"I will do just as you say," she responded.

So she went down to the threshing-floor, and did just as her mother-in-law had instructed her. When Boaz had eaten and drunk, and felt content, he went to lie down at the end of the grain-heap. Then she came in stealthily, uncovered his feet, and lay down. At midnight the man started up, and turning over, discovered a woman lying at his feet!

"Who are you?" he said.

"I am Ruth, your maidservant," she said. "Take your maidservant in marriage; for you are a near relative."

"May the Lord bless you, my girl!" he said. "This last kindness of yours is lovelier than the first, in that you have not run after the young men, either poor or rich. And now, my girl, have no fear; I will do all that you ask; for all the counselors of my people know that you are a fine woman. . . . ."

THE OLD TESTAMENT: AN AMERICAN TRANSLATION. Edited by J. M. Powis Smith. ***Cloth $7.50, leather $10.00, postage 25 cents extra.***

Silly? Crazy? Damnable Heresy?

Since the appearance of his *Jesus: A New Biography*, Shirley Jackson Case has been heralded from the Atlantic to the Pacific by newspaper reporters as the arch-heretic of the century. Dr. Case, in attempting to show the modern reader "not the Jesus of the stained-glass window, but the Jesus who lived and walked with men," has, it seems, done something exceedingly sensational. The feeling of the publishers about the matter, however, has been expressed by the Nashville *Presbyterian Advance*, a by no means radical magazine, better than they could do it themselves:

"It appears that Professor Shirley Case, who has published several excellent volumes, has written a book on the life of Jesus. It is not yet published. [It has since appeared.] Some newspaper writer, however, learned something about the book and wrote a sensational story affirming that in the new book Dr. Case declares that Jesus did not affirm his own divinity. Whether this is a fact or not remains to be seen, but on the basis of the assertion of the 'exclusive story' (unfortunately the word 'exclusive' in such cases has come to have about the meaning of 'lying' to discriminating readers) other reporters got busy and interviewed some ministers. These ministers, without having seen the book, promptly proceeded to call it 'crazy' and 'silly' and at least two of them are quoted as calling it 'damnable heresy.' If there is

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anything 'crazy' or 'silly' about the whole business, it is to be found in those persons who so violently denounce what they know absolutely nothing about, except on the 'say-so' of some untrained reporter who is probably unable to distinguish between theological dogmas and historical facts."

Hasty and popular as they are, entirely oblivious to the unique methods of scholarship upon which Dr. Case's biography rests, the newspaper accounts have nevertheless shown one significant thing: that the public is intensely interested in new interpretations of Jesus' life and work. The modern reader is eager to look back over the intervening centuries to Jesus as he actually was.

Professor Case has long been known as a scholar who has studied, more fruitfully, perhaps, than any other, the social background of early Christianity. His method has been his most original contribution. It has enabled him to bring the reader of today into direct contact with the environment of beginning Christianity. It enabled him to dispel in his *Historicity of Jesus* the recurring hoaxes that treat Jesus' existence as a myth. And it has now made it possible for him to bring the reader closer than ever before to the real Jesus of history, as he appeared to the men of his own time in Palestine over 1900 years ago.

Within the past few years there have been many unhistorical and sentimental lives of Jesus, but there has not been a biography dealing in so thoroughgoing a fashion with the results of scientific investigation. *JESUS: A NEW BIOGRAPHY.* By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. *$3.00, postpaid $3.15.*

* * *

The Ten Princes

Somewhere beyond the Himalaya Mountains lies Magadha, a land notorious for its unscrupulous delight in sensuous beauty and its ribald worldly wisdom. From this country, at a time when its people were gay, in love with poetry and pleasure, and shamelessly given to lying, fared Rajavahana and nine companion princes to conquer the four quarters of the universe. Dandin told the story of their adventures over a thousand years ago in *The Ten Princes*, his only prose novel. Arthur W. Ryder has retold it in a translation which retains the beauty of the original and adds a modern piquancy.

It seems that Rajavahana disappeared, and the nine companion princes, scattering to find him, met with a series of gay adventures in the course of which each gained a throne and an incredibly beautiful lady. Mr. Ryder's translation is a racy re-telling of Dandin's record, first of Rajavahana's experiences, and, as the other princes rejoin him, of their own exploits, related by them with appropriate flourishes and due exaggeration.

In these adventurers runs a pronounced strain of the picaresque. But rascals as they undoubtedly are, they must nevertheless be accredited with pleasant accomplishments. Handsome as no other mortals, erudite in ethics, astronomy, and metaphysics, they have a gift for the lute, are masters of magic, excel in horsemanship, and possess a scientific skill in thievery, gambling, and the arts of deception in general.

In their travels, they meet many beautiful maidens (versed in the arts of flirtation both major and minor), whom they charm by artifice and natural endowment, and describe in warm detail. And through their stories troop as great a crowd of shady characters, curious villains, and examples of shining virtues, as ever emerged from an oriental fancy: Buddhist nuns, unfaithful wives, sages, rakes, and kings, gay girls and gods, court ladies, merchants, thieves. Each has his appropriate philosophy which the princes remember to the last degree of subtlety, and readily report, whether the subject be the conduct of courtesans or the rules of political science.

Dandin was the master of a beautiful prose

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style which has not lost in the translating. One feature of his art is sententious brevity. He looked upon prose as a more exacting medium than poetry itself. Of his life we know little more than that he flourished in India in the seventh Christian century. *THE TEN PRINCES.* Translated by ARTHUR W. RYDER. *$2.00, postpaid $2.10.*

Arthur W. Ryder has also translated from the Sanskrit *The Panchatantra* and *Gold's Gloom.* Achmed Abdulla says of *The Panchatantra:* "Fairytales. But Fairytales for grown-ups. Fairytales suffused with a wisdom that is ironic, slightly bitter, wire-drawn, perfectly civilized. Mr. Ryder's translation is most excellent. It shows not only a thorough knowledge of the subject but understanding, sympathy, style, and a keen sense of humor."

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The World and Man

Critics unite in calling *The Nature of the World and of Man,* by Sixteen Ranking Scientists of the University of Chicago, one of the finest and most engrossing popularizations of current science in existence. A handsome new edition, with bright-hued covers, has just appeared. In accordance with its authors' wish that it should always represent the most recent knowledge of science, revisions have been made throughout the book.

Forest Ray Moulton, the astronomer, says of the volume's theme: "The Nature of the World and of Man is not only a great subject—in fact, the greatest one that human beings may investigate—but it is one rich in romance and filled with stirring adventure. It will satisfy, if anything can, the love of youth for heroic things. The giants of mythological days are far surpassed by the huge machines that are the untiring slaves of modern men. The eye of the fabled Cyclops was not even prophetic of the great telescope on Mount Wilson, the pupil of whose eye, so to speak, is 100 inches in diameter. Not all the magic of antiquity can match the marvels of any chemical laboratory. Physicians cast out demons by means of surgery, by the use of extracts of ductless glands, and by prescribing chemical compounds, and if they have not raised the dead even in a single instance, they have at least within a few decades increased the average span of human life by ten or fifteen years. . . . . In fact, reason and the laws of nature (mark well *reason* and the *laws of nature*) have become a sort of intellectual telescope, as it were, with which modern science looks back across the geological ages. . . . ." *THE NATURE OF THE WORLD AND OF MAN.* By SIXTEEN RANKING SCIENTISTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO. *$5.00, postpaid $5.15.* (*Textbook Edition $4.00, postpaid $4.15.*)

More Contemporary Americans

In his second series of appraisals of American life and letters, Mr. Boynton gives the reader an unusual view of public taste in America, a view marked by absence of ridicule and obloquy, in short, a glimpse of what American culture has to show on the positive side. The design of the book centers around the theme that certain fine inherited traditions are surviving, that the public is not oblivious to them, and that a new public is developing with a taste distinctly its own.

Beginning with Melville, Bierce, and Hearn, men who wrote before their time and who belong in spirit to the present

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day, Mr. Boynton proceeds to Hergesheimer, Anderson, and Lewis. Believing that it is as necessary for the critic to see and declare what the artist is trying to express as for him to discuss the mode of expression, he conducts the reader to the very center of each artist's own particular world.

Various aspects of the American scene from Paul Whiteman and the movies to the college insurgents appear in a lively discussion that ranges freely over the seven arts and over the traditions and innovations of American life. *MORE CONTEMPORARY AMERICANS.* By Percy Holmes Boynton. *$2.50, postpaid $2.60.*

Some Contemporary Americans, Mr. Boynton's previous book, still retains its popularity. In it he interprets the drama, the short story, and the poet's art from his background of American life and tradition, and gives his personal reactions to the new modes, forms, and men.

Sandburg, Dreiser, Mencken, Robinson, Frost, Lowell, Wharton, Tarkington, Cabell, Cather, O'Neill, and Bradford appear in this brilliant and engaging series of estimates of contemporary American literature. *SOME CONTEMPORARY AMERICANS.* By Percy Holmes Boynton. *$2.00, postpaid $2.10.*

Chinese Painting

An extraordinarily beautiful volume with fifty-seven plates in collotype is *Chinese Painting* by John C. Ferguson. Chinese art as it really is and as it is valued by the country that fostered it is written into this book with authority and understanding.

Mr. Ferguson's qualifications for judging the art of China by Chinese standards—as it must be done—are many. For thirty-five years he has lived in China in close association with all the connoisseurs and critics of his day, who have been his guides in the examination of extant specimens of writing and painting.

Beginning with the earliest records of China, Mr. Ferguson has written the history of painting in that country to the eighteenth century. The introductory paragraph is characteristic of the spirit of the book:

"More than three hundred years ago Chang Ch'ou wrote in the Preface to his *Ch'ing-ho Shu Hua Fang* that he would like to be transferred into a bookworm, and promised that he would not injure any of the manuscripts or paintings in which he lived, but would be contented with mere existence in their company. Such was the delight with which one of the ablest critics of Chinese writings and paintings reveled in his enormous task of separating the good from the bad, the genuine from the false, among the accumulated ink-remains of previous generations. If Chang Ch'ou could have had his wish gratified by becoming a bookworm, he would not have been of that variety which Emerson placed in contrast with 'Man Thinking,' for he had a keen mind. His wish was the measure of his appreciation of the worthy writings and paintings that came under his observation. These were the products of man's soul and were quite unlike the work of man's hands in bronze or clay or jade. Through these writings and paintings Chang Ch'ou held communion with the spirits of the great artists and calligraphists who preceded him, and in their unseen world there were no limits of time or space." *CHINESE PAINTING.* By John C. Ferguson. *Boxed, $12.50, postpaid $12.75.*



Roosevelt

Turning aside from the hero-worship which has in the past been an almost unavoidable snare to biographers, however desirous of presenting Roosevelt as he actually was, Howard C. Hill has written a book which even at this late date shows Roosevelt in a new light.

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The source material to which Mr. Hill has had access is more extensive than Roosevelt's biographers and historians have hitherto found available. Of this material, the most important part is the Roosevelt papers of the Library of Congress, to which only two or three others besides Mr. Hill have ever been given access. Although perhaps a quarter of his notes were censored by the official in charge, his book still includes the greatest amount of material that has ever been taken from this source.

Roosevelt the man, the creator of the Roosevelt myth, Mr. Hill would place before Roosevelt the statesman. Representative of Mr. Hill's view of Roosevelt in his official capacity is the following: "Rooseveltian imperialism as manifested in the Caribbean was opportunist in character, not planned or predetermined. Like the conscript fathers of ancient Rome, Roosevelt was led from one action to another by the swift current of events which during his administration seemed to change with kaleidoscopic rapidity. . . . . With each problem he dealt in the manner of a practical man of affairs rather than in the fashion of the doctrinaire or the man of predetermined policies."

The Boston Transcript comments, "We have Professor Hill to thank for a most interesting glimpse of our ex-President. . . . . He does not hammer away at his conclusions; he presents them gently. . . . . He invites us to strike a compromise, and therefore proves himself a most gracious gentleman, quite unlike any of his kind in the past or present. In his book we find for the student, an essay; for the interested reader, a narrative; for everyone, a striking portrait penned upon a background of living detail."

Harry Hansen in the *New York World* calls Mr. Hill's book "the sober second thought of the historian . . . . a very able study." And the *Herald-Tribune* says, "Professor Hill has turned the X-ray of historical criticism upon Roosevelt's Caribbean policy." *ROOSEVELT AND THE CARIBBEAN.* By HOWARD C. HILL. ***$2.50, postpaid $2.60.***

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The American Philosophy of Equality

By

T. V. SMITH

¶Equality, in its present vague status, has lost much of the meaning that the founders of this country attached to it. In his book Mr. Smith has set out, in effect, to rescue from oblivion whatever truth the earlier doctrine contained. If the concept of equality is to continue in the fundamental place it has held in our political, religious, and social assumptions, it must certainly be restated in terms more applicable to current situations. "Perhaps men are not actually equal," writes Mr. Smith, "but even so, they ought to be treated more equally than they now are, for in that way they really can be made more equal."

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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THE GROUND OF MORAL OBLIGATION

RALPH M. BLAKE

Kant maintained that the moral *ought* constitutes a "categorical imperative." In this contention I believe he was fundamentally right. But he also believed in a principle which he called the "autonomy of the will." This principle seems to me thoroughly mistaken. Moreover, it seems to me that the false view of the nature and ground of moral obligation involved in the acceptance of this latter principle prevented Kant from holding that the imperative of morality is truly categorical, in the full sense of the term. I shall argue that if one is really serious in maintaining the categorical nature of moral imperatives, he must necessarily deny the "autonomy of the will."

Kant develops his view of moral obligation as a categorical imperative by way of contrast with what he calls "hypothetical imperatives." The latter express obligations which are binding only under certain conditions. They are not, like the categorical imperative, absolute and unconditional. They express the obligation which an agent is under of doing whatever is an indispensable means to a given end, provided he wills that end. If he does not will that end, then there is no obligation involved. Now Kant maintains that the obligation attaching to actions that are categorically obligatory is not limited in this way. A categorical imperative expresses the obligation an agent is under of doing certain things, not merely because they are the means to some further end which he has in view, but

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entirely independently of any such condition. But although a categorical obligation is independent of any such condition, it is not, in Kant's view, independent of every condition whatsoever, and thus is not fully unconditional or strictly categorical at all. It is true that Kant often speaks as though he did mean that moral obligation is absolutely unconditional and strictly categorical, and, as I have already indicated, that is what it seems to me he ought to have maintained. But as a matter of fact, as we shall see, his acceptance of the "autonomy of the will" stood in the way of his giving a full development to the doctrine of the categorical imperative.

Kant introduces the principle of the autonomy of the will by way of explanation of the ground of moral obligation. The observance of the supreme moral principle, "Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of nature" (*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by Abbott, p. 46), is obligatory, he tells us, for the will of every rational being. But if we ask why it is thus universally obligatory, Kant replies that it is so only because it is a principle which we ourselves will, so that it is self-imposed. If we did not so will, it would not constitute an obligation for us at all. "Thus the will is not subject simply to the law, but so subject that it must be regarded *as itself giving the law*, and on this ground only subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author" [*ibid.*, p. 59]). "The laws to which he (*sc.* man) is subject are *only those of his own giving*, he is only bound to act in conformity with his own will" (*ibid.*, p. 61). It is only because, *qua* rational being, I will that this principle be observed that it is obligatory upon me at all. "For this 'I ought' is properly an 'I would,' valid for every rational being, provided only that reason determined his actions without any hindrance" (*ibid.*, p. 82).

Now I submit that this doctrine robs moral obligation of any fully categorical and unconditional nature. The view is that it is only because my duty represents what, in my deepest

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nature, I really myself will and desire, that it is my duty at all. Kant writes:

> The practical use of common sense confirms this reasoning. There is no one, not even the most consummate villain, provided that he is otherwise accustomed to the use of reason, who, when we set before him examples of honesty of purpose, of steadfastness in following good maxims, of sympathy and general benevolence (even when combined with great sacrifices of advantage and comfort), does not wish that he might possess these qualities. Only on account of his inclinations and impulses he cannot attain this in himself, but at the same time he wishes to be free from such inclinations which are burdensome to himself. He proves by this that he transfers himself in thought with a will free from the impulses of the sensibility into an order of things wholly different from that of his desires in the field of the sensibility . . . . and from this point of view he is conscious of a good will, which by his own confession constitutes the law for the bad will that he possesses as a member of the world of sense—a law whose authority he recognises while transgressing it [*ibid.*, pp. 89–90].

Or again, "But why then should I subject myself to this principle and that simply as a rational being, thus also subjecting to it all other beings endowed with reason? I will allow that no interest *urges* me to do this, but I must *take* an interest in it . . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 81–82).

The doctrine of the "autonomy of the will," then, involves this view of moral obligation: I am under obligation to do only what at bottom I want to do. Only on condition that a given mode of action enlists my ultimate interests, expresses my deepest will, is recognized by me as embodying my own highest ideal, can it be rightly asserted to be my duty. And thus moral obligations are not after all fully categorical. They are categorical as compared with those expressed by hypothetical imperatives, i.e., they are binding quite independently of any connection as means with some further end which I will; but they are binding, after all, only because they are themselves willed, willed as ultimate ends, indeed, but even so obligatory only under that condition.

Now I find that this same view of the basis of moral obli-

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gation is very widely accepted at the present day. It is accepted, for example, by the whole of the "idealistic" school of writers, is implied in their formula of morality as "self-realization," and lies at the bottom of their paradoxical doctrine of self-sacrifice. Nor is it by any means confined to writers of this school. In fact, if we were to put the question generally to the moral philosophers of the present day, "Why ought I to be moral?" they would apparently reply with practical unanimity, "Because that is in the end simply what you yourself want, what alone will really satisfy you, what at bottom represents your own ultimate interest."

If we go on to ask why this view of the basis of moral obligation is so generally accepted, I think we must answer that to a great many minds this principle of the "autonomy of the will" appears as self-evident. At any rate I have never met with any attempt, either on the part of Kant or of any other writer, to demonstrate its truth. It is simply assumed to be true, and I gather that it is assumed to be true because it is taken to be self-evident.

For my own part, however, not only does this principle not seem to me in the least self-evident, but it actually seems to me to be evidently and monstrously false. What does seem to me to be evident is precisely the contrary principle of the categorical imperative in the strict and full form in which Kant, as we have seen, did not himself maintain it. I do not mean that I should formulate the supreme principle of moral obligation in the same terms as those employed by Kant. I should myself formulate it somewhat as follows: "So act that in every case there shall be nothing better that thou couldst have done instead." But I should maintain that the obligation to act in accordance with this principle is valid for the will of every moral agent, absolutely and unconditionally. I hold, moreover, that the proposition that this obligation is universal and unconditional is strictly self-evident.

Accordingly, if a person were to ask me, "Why ought I to

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do this or that particular action? What makes this to be my duty?" I should reply, "Because if you acted otherwise there would be something better that you could have done instead." If he were not convinced, in the case of the particular act in question, that if he acted otherwise there would be any alternative that would be better, I should attempt to show him, in accordance with whatever theory he or I might accept concerning what it is that makes one act better or worse than another, that this was indeed the case. But if I succeeded in showing him that this was the case, then I should consider that I had fully answered his question as to why this act was something that he morally *ought* to do. In other words, I should answer questions concerning the ground of particular moral obligations by exhibiting them as cases that fall under the supreme principle of moral obligation. The general principle of duty is the ground of all particular duties that fall under it. But if a person were to ask me, "Why ought I to act in accordance with this principle anyway? What makes *this* to be my duty?" I could only answer that it self-evidently is so, and that there is no higher principle from which a demonstration could be drawn. For the *ultimate* ground of moral obligation, naturally, cannot itself have a further ground. And if anyone thereupon, with full consciousness of exactly what he was doing, were seriously to dispute the supreme principle of duty itself, we two should then have simply to agree to differ. Most particularly I should not consider it *ad rem* to point out to one who questioned whether it was his duty to obey this supreme principle that after all it expressed only what he himself really wanted, or represented only what in the end was his own ultimate interest. I should indeed hope that this might be the case; but to adduce its being the case as a ground of the obligation to follow the principle would seem to me to be a mere *ignoratio elenchi*.[1]

[1] NOTE.—The query sometimes takes the form, "Why ought I to do my duty?" In that case the answer is simply that one's "duty" just *means* what one "ought to do." In admitting that it is your duty you are already admitting that you ought to do it.

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The question might be raised, however, whether the proposition "It is an agent's moral *duty* to do whatever act is better than any other act that he could do instead" is not rather a definition of what we mean by duty than a significant moral proposition. I must admit that I myself formerly took this to be the case. Further reflection, however, has convinced me that I was here mistaken. For it seems to me that a person might perfectly well admit that a given act was better than any alternative that he could do instead and yet significantly deny that this fact in itself made it therefore his *duty* so to act. In fact, those who believe in the "autonomy of the will" are, it seems to me, bound to make just this denial. And false as their view appears to me, I cannot quite bring myself to believe that it represents any failure to understand what the term duty means, but rather a decidedly significant, if nevertheless radically mistaken, view of how an agent's moral duties are determined, i.e., a mistaken view, not of the nature, but of the ground of moral obligation. Accordingly I hold that this proposition is, to adopt once more the Kantian terminology, "an a priori synthetical practical proposition" (*ibid.*, p. 45) "which does not deduce the willing of an action by mere analysis from another already presupposed (for we have not such a perfect will),[2] but connects it immediately with the conception of the will of a rational being, as something not contained in it" (*ibid.*, p. 25, n. 1).

I am happy to find myself sustained in this view by Mr. Laird's recent *Study in Moral Theory*. It was, in fact, the reflection stimulated by his discussion that finally led me to perceive the synthetic nature of the supreme principle of obligation. Mr. Laird writes as follows:

The *ought* of morality may very well justify itself; but if we are right it can do so only if it contains within itself the reason for its inde-

[2] NOTE.—Kant, as we have seen, does elsewhere maintain that we have such a "perfect will," and does deduce the obligation from that fact, thus in effect obliterating any radical distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

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feasible authority. And this reason must be the supremacy of the value it enjoins, contains, or sustains. This, I submit, is entirely evident. . . . . A decree of what *ought* to be done is justified by its value and by nothing else. The cardinal principle here is that the thing that ought to be done is the best thing that can be done; and this principle implies, in its turn, that any man's duty, that which he ought to do, is, quite simply, the best that he can achieve. This assertion, indeed, may appear entirely trivial, since no one could possibly dispute it; and I hope that no one will. It is one thing, however, to show that a statement is manifestly indisputable, quite another to show that it is trivial. . . . . When we say, for short, that duty is the adoption of the best, we are not saying simply that duty is duty, or that the best is the best. We are asserting a necessary and a fundamental connection between value and obligation, excellence and authority, worth and duty. In the language of philosophers this connection is a *synthetic* connection, a union of things significantly different, not simply the empty iteration of that which is eternally the same. We are saying, indeed, that the character of excellence implies a command, that excellent things, just because of their excellence, ought to be sought and achieved. I cannot think that this is trivial. On the contrary, it seems to me momentous and very well worth investigating" [*op. cit.*, pp. 20–22].

Unfortunately, however, Mr. Laird seems to be still entangled in some measure in the snares of the "autonomy of the will," for on the very next page he writes: "In our own case the 'ought' presents itself as a command to action self-accepted and self-imposed. It is not a thing that can be forced upon us. Although it may be *told* us by others, we *ourselves* have to accept it when we act responsibly." If this means that I cannot be forced to recognize that it is my duty to do the best, it is true in precisely the same sense, and to precisely the same degree, that it is true that nobody can be forced to accept any belief. If it means that unless I accept it as my duty to do the best, and impose this as a duty upon myself, it is not my duty, I must register an emphatic dissent. A little farther on Mr. Laird remarks: "We recognize that the *knowledge* of good and evil imposes an obligation to act in accordance with such knowledge" (italics mine). How does this square with his for-

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mer statements: "A decree of what *ought* to be done is justified by its value *and by nothing else* (last italics mine)," and "the character of excellence implies a command; excellent things, *just because of their excellence* (italics mine), ought to be sought and achieved"? It is not the *knowledge* that a given act is the best possible for me that makes it my duty, but the *fact that it is* the best possible. Duty is not grounded in knowledge of the best, or in recognition of the best, but in the fact of the best. My duty remains my duty, whether I know that it is, whether I recognize that it is, whether I admit that it is, or not. For there is such a thing, I take it, as being in ignorance or doubt concerning one's duty.

But do you seriously mean to maintain, I can imagine an objector so putting it, that a moral agent would still be under a moral obligation to follow your supreme principle of morality even if he in no sense recognized its validity or the legitimacy of its claim over him? That he would still be under this obligation even if he in no sense felt it as an obligation? To this I can only reply that these propositions are precisely what I do mean seriously to maintain. In Kant's language, "I connect the act with the will without presupposing any condition" (*op. cit.*, p. 45, n. 1).

But why then is it, one may well ask, that the categorical nature of moral obligation is not more commonly recognized as excluding any "autonomy of the will"? Why is it so generally felt that a moral obligation must somehow be such as necessarily to have some sort of deep psychological foothold in the nature of every being upon whom it is obligatory at all? Why is it felt that to do the best possible is an obligation only for those who somehow take an interest in so doing? I am inclined to think that the explanation is to be found in the fact that questions such as "Why ought I to do this?" or "Why am I under any obligation so to act?" are really ambiguous, and that the answer that is appropriate to them when understood in one of their possible senses is therefore thought to be equal-

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ly requisite and appropriate when the questions are understood in a quite different sense. For such inquiries may be intended, and I think often are intended, to raise questions which are not properly ethical at all. The question "Why ought I to do this?" for example, may quite well mean, and I think often does mean, "What motive have I for doing this?" or "What interest of mine is touched by the matter?" or "What advantage will accrue to me from so acting?" Now I do not think it at all illegitimate for people to raise or to answer such questions. In fact, I think it would be highly desirable if it could in some way be shown that a person's duty is always in some way so connected with his own ultimate advantage or highest interest that he has a very real motive for doing it. I do not know whether this can be shown. I rather suspect that it cannot. At any rate the elaborate hocus-pocus which the self-realizationists have adduced to this end has not so far succeeded in inspiring my confidence. Nevertheless, I sincerely hope that it can be shown. But I cannot see that the question how this or that course of action can be shown to be to the interest of an agent, or to redound in some way to his advantage, is a question concerning his *duty* at all. It seems to me to be, strictly speaking, an entirely non-ethical question.

But such inquiries as "Why ought I to do this?" may also be intended to raise a genuinely ethical question. The intention may be to ask, not concerning motives, or advantage, or interest, but simply about duty. And in that case to introduce consideration of these other matters into the reply seems to me nothing short of frivolous. The reason why a particular act is my duty, if it is my duty, is that it is a particular case that falls under the supreme principle of moral obligation. For, to quote Kant, "all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle" (*op. cit.*, p. 46). As for the supreme principle itself, there is no reason why it is universally obligatory, unless the fact that it self-evidently is so be such a reason.

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The failure to distinguish between these two very different senses of inquiries concerning moral obligation, and the fallacious reasoning to which it gives rise, are well illustrated by one section of Mr. G. C. Field's little introductory work on *Moral Theory*. "Whatever goodness is," he writes (p. 52), "it is at least in some way a reason for action, a reason for pursuing those things where it is present and avoiding those where it is absent. And any account of it which fails to show why it should be a reason for action, still more an account which describes it in such a way that it could not possibly be a reason for action, stands condemned." To these statements, taken in one sense of the words, I heartily subscribe. It has been precisely my contention that the best, simply because of its value, is itself a reason for action, more particularly that it is what Mr. Laird calls a justifying reason, in the sense that it grounds an obligation. And an ethical system which failed to discover a fundamental ground of moral obligation would certainly be seriously defective. But Mr. Field confuses a "reason" in the sense of a justifying reason with a "reason" in the sense of a motive, and proceeds to argue throughout on that basis. Thus he makes it a criticism of Kant and of Mr. G. E. Moore that both of them believe in the existence of some things which are good in themselves and make this the fundamental basis of their moral theories. He writes:

> Goodness . . . . is not a quality which belongs to things in themselves, quite apart from their effect on or their relation to us or some conscious being. And if it were it could only be related to us as an object of cognition. And if it were simply an object of cognition, something that we merely knew without having any feeling towards it, it could not move us to action, or indeed be of any practical interest or importance at all . . . . if our argument has been at all correct, we must maintain . . . . that the simple intellectual apprehension, the bare knowledge of anything can never move us to action. And consequently his [i.e., Kant's] idea of a good in itself is incompatible with one of the most deeply recognized characteristics of the moral fact, namely, that it is somehow a reason for action [*op. cit.*, p. 51].

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I cannot in the least make out how, from the premise that the good is a quality which does not by virtue of its essence imply that anybody has any particular sort of feeling toward it, or that anybody finds himself moved to action with regard to it, or that anybody finds it of some interest or importance to him, Mr. Field manages to derive the conclusion that the good can never *per accidens* have such relations, and that the only accidental relation it can sustain to conscious beings is that of being "an object of cognition"; but it is sufficiently plain that he thinks, what I am precisely concerned to dispute, that the only way in which goodness could intelligibly be said to be a *reason* for action is that it should be so related to our desires and interests as to supply us with a *motive* for action.

This all too common failure to distinguish between a reason and a motive for action is further to be explained, I am inclined to think, by reference to another closely connected ambiguity in our use of the term "obligation" and other allied terms. For when a person uses such expressions as "I do this because I am obliged to," or "I am under no obligation so to act," he may be intending to express simply the presence or absence of some actual physical or psychological force that compels him, or impels him so strongly as practically to amount to compulsion, to the action in question. And because of the frequent use of the term "obligation" in this sense it comes all too easily to be thought that this is its only legitimate sense, and that moral obligation must itself involve some sort of force or compulsion, some sort of compulsiveness or impulsiveness. Whereas the very essence of a moral obligation (and that is precisely what we mean by distinguishing it as a *moral* obligation), is that it contains no sort of reference to anything of the sort.

The doctrine of the "autonomy of the will" forms the basis of what I am accustomed to call the "higher egoism." By "egoism" as a practical attitude I mean the attitude of one who should never deliberately adopt as an object of interest or

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pursuit anything which he did not view as in some way redounding to his own private advantage. I do not know whether there are in this sense any egoists *pur sang*. Most of those whom we call egoists seem at best merely to approximate to this, so to speak, ideal. By "egoism" as an ethical doctrine I mean any doctrine which purports to give a theoretical justification for the adoption of such an attitude. Most would-be egoistic doctrines, as Mr. G. E. Moore has shown, either involve flagrant self-contradiction, or turn out on analysis not to be egoistic doctrines at all. I can think of but two ways of stating a theoretical egoism which shall be really egoistic, free from internal contradiction, and, so far as I know, logically irrefutable. One of these would assume the form "The only intrinsic goods in the universe are those intrinsic goods which fall within *my own* experience." This view involves such outrageously paradoxical consequences that I strongly doubt whether anyone has ever genuinely held it. The other statement would run somewhat as follows: "That act of mine which under the given circumstances is better than any other alternative open to me is nevertheless no moral obligation for me, unless I recognize it as somehow to my own interest or advantage." By the "higher egoism" I mean those idealistic doctrines of the "autonomy of the will" which conceive of a "higher self," somehow latent in each one of us, that does always feel it to its interest or advantage (or would always feel it to its interest or advantage if it were fully and consciously explicit) to pursue the best, and which maintains that to do the best is *on this ground only* morally obligatory upon us all.

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TYPES OF INTERNATIONALISM IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE

GEORGE BOAS

It was against a background of national culture suffused with foreign color, of cosmopolitanism ill defined, of national loyalty identified with allegiance to one's overlord, that the philosophy of the French Revolution must be placed. But the French Revolution was a denial of just such allegiance to a person as the *ancien régime* seemed to illustrate. The myth of the social contract was used to justify this denial. And as the alignment was before long the people against the nobles and as the people in all countries were in the same predicament, it was not difficult to confuse the people with humanity, as if kings and nobles were either superhuman, as their apologists sometimes suggested, or inhuman, as the revolutionists were soon agreed.[1]

The revolutionists became citizens of the world because their theories of sovereignty demanded it. They were men, not Frenchmen. So they were determined to spread the benefits of their new régime to their fellow-men who did not as yet enjoy them.[2] As they carried their victories into Italy and the Netherlands, they carried what they believed to be the priceless gifts of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The soldiers in those armies talked like many of ours during the war with Germany, of liberating humanity from something inhuman. Those wars were wars of ideals, it was said, and even Napoleon grew eloquent in his earlier days about the blessings he brought the conquered.[3] When Kant's *Project of Perpetual Peace* came to

[1] See the closing chapter of Sorel's *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, p. 538. Cf. such discussions as Clauzel's in the Convention, October 4, 1794, of whether a love of humanity is incompatible with patriotism, *Moniteur* (reprint), XXII, 132. All references to the *Moniteur* are to the reprint.

[2] Cf. Aulard, *Hist. Polit. de la Rév. Française* (1901), p. 111.

[3] See his speech to the Venetians, *Moniteur*, XXVII, 314.

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the notice of the government, that part of it which suggested that a republic's destiny was the assurance of the rights of the people was reprinted with eulogies in the *Moniteur* (XXVII, 100). And again when great liberals from other lands visited Paris, and sometimes when they did not, they were made honorary citizens of the French Republic as if it were a club.[4] Curiously enough, it was during this period that national sentiment was developing much more fervently than it had under the sophisticated old régime. When the French became ringed around with enemies they became more intensely French than they had ever been before, though they continued to preach cosmopolitanism.

In the early days of the Revolution even the clergy approved of its emphasis on humanity. For what were the rights of man but a tacit recognition of what the great scholastics and their predecessors had always taught, namely, that the race is solid, a family, and that national distinctions are of no major importance?[5] So Maistre, who had voiced his disgust over phrases which dealt with man in the abstract in a well-known apothegm, developed from scholastic premises the first type of internationalism.

Joseph de Maistre's *Du Pape* is an eloquent plea for a theocratic empire whose head will be Rome and whose lands will be all the nations of the earth. Man was essentially a religious and social animal for Maistre; unity was the highest good; unity of the religious and social kind would be achieved in the Pope's supremacy. But Maistre had no intention of eliminating national existence. The revolutionists saw as their most important problem the liberating of the people from the tyrants; Maistre agreed that despotism was an evil, but maintained that the only check upon the despot was a moral check. Who could apply it? Only a moral power. Where was there

[4] See the list in the *Moniteur*, XIII, 541. The decree which names them is peculiarly interesting in connection with the subject of internationalism.

[5] See the speech of the Abbé Joli in the *Moniteur*, IV, 712.

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such? Only in Rome. In other words, Maistre re-emphasized the medieval distinction between temporal and spiritual power. There was no question in his mind of the Pope's interfering in purely governmental affairs. He would leave the individual nations temporally free but spiritually controlled by the Vatican. The revolutionists also would have left them temporally free and put them under the spiritual control of the reason. Since reason, it was believed, always gave harmonious decisions, leading as it did to truth—which was of course one and absolute—the society of European republics would all be alike. Reason would direct their governments and their interrelations. This function in Maistre's Europe would have been performed by the Pope. It was an ideal the realization of which was full of difficulties, approaching as a limit the Europe of Gregory VII. For after all the spiritual supremacy of the Pope was bound to have temporal effects. When faced with that objection Maistre evaded the issue by saying that he was not responsible for the ultimate implications of his proposal, but that since the Pope could do no wrong, these implications could not be evil.

A second type of internationalism arose out of postulates not unlike Maistre's. It arose in the philosophy of Lamennais. Lamennais's central idea was human solidarity. Human solidarity is manifested in many ways, but above all in the common social reason which is the final test of truth. The revolutionary doctrine of what might be called social atomism, which states that society is fundamentally a collection of similar and elemental units, to wit, human beings, is rejected by him in favor of the doctrine of social organicism, which states that society is irreducible to its members. They may be physically many lumps of matter, but are spiritually nothing when considered out of their social interrelations. What binds them into society is religious tradition, a mystical growth which not only transcends all individuals but transcends nations as well. The differences between nations are not accepted by Lamennais as

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they were by Maistre, for he was interested in kings only as they are instruments of the church. On the contrary, the ramifications of tradition were all evil in his eyes, a wandering from the truth, just as savagery was not a primitive but a degenerate condition. The main tradition with which all the others have a certain fundamental consistency—or better, similarity—is Catholicism, which in accordance with the accepted notions of the church ran back through the Popes to the apostles, to Christ, through the high priests of Israel to Aaron, the brother of Moses, and through him back to Abraham.

But Lamennais in his later years was impressed with the obstacles to international unity. The church, upon which he had staked so much, played him false, as he thought, in refusing to eliminate those things which stood in the way of religion's binding power and the humanity which it was to serve. These obstacles are pointed out in the *Paroles d'un Croyant* in the passage in which the Seven Kings plan the perpetual enslavement of the human race. Slavery is opposed by religion, science, and reflective thought; it is encouraged by luxury, fear, local pride, and national boundaries. Accordingly Lamennais began to see the necessity of eliminating national differences.[6]

The Mennaisian theory of internationalism was invented to preserve the liberty and solidarity of the human race. Because of his organicist ideas of society, its author did not believe that freedom was a removal of social bonds; it was, however, a removal of political bonds. The authority of the state was not inherently operative; its power was to be recognized only when consonant with morality, and to Lamennais "morality" meant his own interpretation of Catholic morality. Real authority was duty, which, though inspired and commanded by God, is nevertheless so harmonious with man's nature that when one does his duty he seems to be acting independently of restraint. The voice of duty needed no royal

[6] See *Livre du Peuple*, sec. vi, and especially *Paroles*, sec. xix.

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mouthpiece; society needed no political organization. Lamennais said to his readers, "Votre patrie, c'est le ciel," as the revolutionists had said, "Votre patrie, c'est là où règne la raison." Hence he dreamed of a Europe which would be politically one, but, if necessary, socially diverse—as diverse as the natural talents of the various peoples demanded. So within the boundaries of France he encouraged what is known today as "regionalism." But it is doubtful if Lamennais knew in how different directions the natural talents of peoples might lead them. He always tended to believe that human differences were superficial and that under the surface mankind was all alike.

In this respect Lamennais was joined by most of his fellows in France, whose theories of history were developed from Bossuet and Augustine. It is interesting to compare them with the Germans. The difference is brought out in the romanticism of the two countries. One of the things which all Romanticists had to prove was that "ideal beauty" did not exist and that the kinds of art legitimately varied from age to age and from nation to nation. But the aesthetic canons of the so-called "Classicists" were on the whole survivals of the French seventeenth century, and preromantic art was really seventeenth-century French art. Consequently the cry against the French Romanticists was that of antinationalism; they were introducing foreign barbarisms into the national culture. The Romanticists could not agree, nor could they assert that their innovations, English and German as they obviously were, were really French. Hence they retorted that all art changes or progresses, or that—the plea of *le Globe*—the differences between national cultures should be minimized. The Germans, on the other hand, had to meet the problem of justifying an art which, though native, was inelegant. They did it by their theory of national genius, which was most clearly enunciated in such a man as Herder. What had Herder to do with humanity? He was interested in Germans. It was the characteristic attitude

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of the oppressed, a typical "rationalization." Maistre and Bonald would have said that it was the inevitable effect of Protestantism, which disintegrated all authority. But they maintained that even the French Revolution was started by Luther.

In the meantime new forces moving toward internationalism were making themselves felt. Various international secret societies arose between the time of Napoleon I and Napoleon III, of which the Carbonari was perhaps the most important. The Carbonari were founded in Italy but soon spread throughout the continent. Their philosophy was the cosmopolitanism of the Revolution, and scant attention was paid presumably to love of homeland. On the other hand there was a movement which could more properly be called internationalism, as opposed to cosmopolitanism, whose founder seems to have been Mazzini. It was in the thirties that Mazzini began touring the oppressed countries of Europe with the revolutionary idea in mind that people sharing a common misfortune would unite to rid themselves of it. It was obvious that one could not stir the Italians, Hungarians, and Poles to action by telling them that nations and languages should be lost in the melting-pot of humanity. They were in the melting-pot and not finding it to their liking. Nor could they be told that no bonds linked them to other nations, for they were in a situation where chauvinism was not practical. Hence Mazzini developed briefly a theory which gave due respect to both national and supernational demands. He contrasted it with cosmopolitanism by pointing out that his starting-point was "country," whereas that of the cosmopolitans was individual man.[7]

According to Mazzini, as to Lamennais, kings were the great obstacle to the association of peoples. When kings shall be disposed of, each people will be free to develop in accordance with its past and its peculiar genius. The law of duty will take the place of competition, and international law will exist

[7] "Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini" (London, 1886), III, 7.

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for "the progress of each for the benefit of the others."[8] To bring this era into being, Mazzini organized the association known as "Young Europe."

France, having achieved nationality, was omitted from this group. Mazzini divided Europe into three families, the Hellenic-Latin, the German, and the Slavonian, of which Italy, Germany, and Poland were to be the nuclei. Young Europe was pledged to liberty, equality, fraternity; to a belief in one God whose sole interpreter was humanity; to a belief in the "special mission," not only of individuals, but of nations, which was to be fulfilled, however, in harmony with the progress of others; to the reciprocity of rights and duties, and to the furtherance of what was called "the constitution of humanity," which at that time existed only potentially.

The influence of Lamennais upon the *risorgimento* is unknown to me, but I should be inclined to feel that it had a counter-influence upon him. For in his later years he attempted a practical realization of his internationalism in his *Comité démocratique français-espagnol-italien,* while his friend and sometime collaborator, Ledru-Rollin, formed about 1850 a *Comité démocratique européen central,* whose other members were Mazzini, Ruge, and Darasz.[9] Its purpose was to begin the democratic organization of Central Europe, and Lamennais's was to do the same thing for the Latin countries. There was undoubtedly some connection between them, and both existed to renew faith in democracy after the *débacle* of 1848. Ledru's aim, which Lamennais probably shared, was to form a federation of nations which would prevent war and oppose monarchy. In 1855 he and Mazzini were joined by Kossuth and issued a manifesto calling for international action. They hailed the fall of Sebastopol as the beginning of a world-war after which European democracy would be born and subject nations freed. They concluded that the war must be fought

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[9] See A. R. Calman's thesis, *Ledru-Rollin après 1848* (1921), p. 95.

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and won, not by governments then existing, but by the people in revolt. The emphasis now shifted from the spiritual effect of internationalism to the political. What each member of the committee was interested in was the liberation of his particular country from its particular government. And whereas Lamennais and Mazzini alike had originally been vague enough about the practical details of their brands of internationalism, now the general idea was lost entirely in discussion of the machinery which was to realize it.

Meanwhile the Mennaisian philosophy was finding expression in the peace movement. In August, 1849, the second of a series of peace congresses was held in Paris. Victor Hugo was elected its president; Cobden, its vice-president. In Hugo's address, which opened the congress, we recognize many of the leading ideas of his master, Lamennais, the emphasis upon international fraternity, upon the fact which Lamennais or Hugo had no doubt learned from Mazzini, that nations must preserve their cultural individuality though united to other nations. His concluding words might have been written by Lamennais himself.[10] And when Hugo was offered the honorary presidency of the peace congress at Lausanne twenty years after, he addressed his "fellow-citizens of the United States of Europe" in words which sound as if they might have been quoted from the *Livre du Peuple*.

This, then, was the course of Maistre's theocratic empire.

In 1826 the young philosopher Jouffroy had developed another argument for internationalism, which again hoped for the cultural development of each of the nations by the elimination of their political differences. Though his results were the same, his premises were slightly different and had no apparent affiliation with medieval doctrines.

There are in the world, he believed, three civilizations: the

[10] See *Actes et Paroles, Vol. I, Avant l'Exil. Oeuvres Complètes* (1882), p. 485. This speech is also interesting for its anticipation of the argument that "preparedness" brings on war.

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Christian, the Mohammedan, and what he called the Brahmin. These civilizations are differentiated by the religions they profess. Savages are not considered, since they have neither civilization nor religion, and will moreover sooner or later be won over to Christianity. He believed that bit by bit religious differences would disappear and society would evolve toward greater homogeneity. Coupled with this hypothesis was a belief in the various talents of the different peoples among the Christians, which, fine as they are, yet obscure in the eyes of statesmen the needs of humanity as an entirety.

Humanity was for Jouffroy more than the abstract universal of the scholastics. Vico taught him, on the contrary, that man differed from the lower animals in his changeableness, and, although he did not wholly agree with Vico on all points, yet he derived many of his ideas of the movement of history from him or at least from him as interpreted by Michelet. He learned, as he also learned from Reid, that certitude about human affairs was drawn from "common sense" (il senso Comune del Genere Umano), in which peoples, nations, or humanity as a whole participate. Upon this common sense are founded all the principles of "natural law," which is a law superior to statutes, so that no nation in itself can be called its initiator. Thus, given the same social conditions, the same social institutions will arise, regardless of the lack of intercourse between the societies concerned. Just as there is common sense running throughout humanity, so there is common language which it is the business of the true philologist to study. Curiously enough, this strange idea, obviously derived from Plato's *Cratylus*, is also reproduced in Reid.

The operations of common sense, as of natural law, are obscured in the course of history. Nations move through a cycle which ends in the destruction of all their political institutions, at the end of which men are in the same condition of civilization as they were in the beginning. But there always remains their natural intelligence to guide them, and its wisdom may

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be called the laws of the "eternal republic." Hence as the common sense is to articulate reason, so is the eternal republic to nationality; and it was not difficult for Jouffroy to suppose that the eternal republic which lay concealed behind national differentiation could at some time be brought into the light of day. In Vico such a hope is nowhere expressed, to the best of my knowledge; and indeed he could hardly have been expected to express it, for common sense is a sort of divine revelation in his opinion by which God's providence directs the human race. Its emergence from its natural obscurity would be inconsistent with what we know of God's ways. Yet in Michelet's paraphrase of Vico the suggestion that such an emergence might occur is very tempting.[11] But it is only a suggestion.

The second of Jouffroy's masters was Reid. Common sense in Reid is identical with the intelligence of Vico's humanity. It is a philosophy anterior to those of the schools and reconciling them. True philosophy is a clarification of its dim but reliable insight. Its operation is impeded by nationalism, which, though Jouffroy does not say so in so many words, seems to separate men from one another and thus prevents cultural and political agreement. Jouffroy's plea for internationalism, for "adjuring the dogma of patriotism," is the hope that it will release the reason of humanity and, since that reason cannot err, will attain truth.

But Jouffroy, as far as I know, had no program of realizing his ideal, nor was his position such that he could have published a plan had he had one. There were, however, internationalists in France who had very specific plans for bringing about the new order. The first is that amazing writer, Fourier, whose strange mixture of satirical insight and logical caprice are the delight of every reader. His main work, *Théorie des Quatre Mouvements* (1808), is full of concrete images of what the world will be like when civilization shall have been outgrown. The details of his scheme had best be left for a more

[11] J. B. Vico, *Philos. de l'Histoire* (1827), p. 384.

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complete study of our subject, and we must be content with noting here his place in the movement. His main interest was in social and economic reconstruction, and his interest in international affairs is secondary in his system.

Something of the same sort could be said of Auguste Comte. He too had a specific idea of the government of humanity, but it arose in his later years and would by no one, I imagine, be considered the most important of his contributions to French ideas.

Humanity as a unit seems the negation of nationality, and Comte on the whole says very little about the purely national interests of men. But where he was specifically interested in social reorganization, he did not neglect human differences. He distinguished, as Maistre did, between the spiritual and temporal affairs of humanity; and whereas he considered the former to be international, he asserted that the latter were national. This, however, must be accepted with reservations. He did not wish to preserve the frontiers of his day. On the contrary, he recognized their viciousness and would have redrawn almost all of them. But he did see the value of keeping smaller national units for administrative purposes. In fact, even spiritually he recognized five leading civilizations: the three Latin, the British, and the German.

For Comte, government would tend to become more and more spiritual as it facilitated the natural progress of human intercourse. As it became more spiritual, the political administration of the associated nations would become less serious. Comte, like Fourier, was advocating a scheme of things in which what each believed to be the natural endowment of man, aided by education, would assert itself and—this was of course a pure assumption—would assert itself for the best interests of all. He believed that human beings could be educated into acting with the same pacific motives toward other nationalities that they seem to have toward their fellow-citizens; that just as the members of a family do not require governmental inter-

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ference in their private affairs or make war upon one another, so the new nations would learn to gather together for mutual support. A by-product of this arrangement would be universal peace, for war can be organized only for one's country, whereas labor becomes an instrument for humanity as a whole. The industrial state makes all nations spontaneously converge by assigning to each an end which can become universal because it always remains external to any one nation. The exploitation of the natural resources common to all nations involves a division of labor equivalent to what one sees within separate societies. Such exploitation would be impossible without international co-operation.

We have then the following types of internationalism:

1. *Cosmopolitanism.*—A doctrine that nationality is insignificant from every point of view, both temporally, i.e., as a means of government, and spiritually, i.e., as a source of culture. This doctrine was supposed to be that of the Carbonari and may have been held by certain of the French revolutionists. It was held in a Christian form by Lamennais.

2. *Spiritual internationalism.*—A doctrine that temporally nationality is not an evil, but that spiritually it blocks the realization of whatever ideal its holders may happen to think are important. We have the following varieties: (*a*) *theocratic internationalism,* the doctrine of Maistre, which retained the national frontiers then existing; (*b*) *positivistic internationalism,* the doctrine of Comte, which modified the national frontiers and substituted science for religion; (*c*) *humanitarian internationalism,* the doctrine suggested by the writings of Jouffroy, which resembled Maistre's except that it substituted humanity for the church.

3. *Temporal internationalism.*—A doctrine maintaining the opposite of spiritual internationalism, viz., that culture arises from consciousness of nationality. This seems to have been the doctrine of Mazzini and his group, and probably of Lamennais in his later years.

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CONTACT AND CONDUCT

BRUNO LASKER

I

"What is wrong with our manners and morals is that the peasant today reigns supreme." This is the verdict of many who have seen old customs and institutions disintegrate before the assault of the immigrant hordes. The diagnosis is fairly obvious when we see the children of these "peasants" set the tone in politics and business, and even in the social life of our higher institutions of learning, or when the newly rich bring into our suburban communities the atmosphere of the kermess and of the ghetto, translated into Hollywood dimensions. Yet the diagnosis is superficial and mistakes one of the symptoms of our troubles for the real cause. The source of the problem lies even farther back than the Industrial Revolution; it is the intermingling of social groups that broke up the feudal organization of society. Indeed, all the gigantic changes which science and invention have brought about, and their effects on conduct, are unthinkable without that interpenetration of classes, races, nationalities which distinguishes modern history from that of all previous ages. Before this new mobility folkways have crumbled, and with them the firm moral traditions which always were rooted in a specific background of experience. Moral traditions belonged primarily to the local group. While we speak vaguely of English morals or of American standards of behavior, these concepts really include an immense variety of group traditions. For example, the ethics of the mill town are, and always have been, different from those of the seaport, the approved behavior of the mining village different from that of the health resort.

With the increase of mobility and the greater richness of experiences in individual careers, the old customs and commonly held social attitudes have become disrupted, until in

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certain environments—the more cosmopolitan sections of our great cities, for example—they have practically ceased to operate. And with the traditions have gone the simple conceptions of mutual obligation which in other days regulated the relations between individuals and groups. Even a single generation ago the majority of Western people lived in an environment that contained all the elements for clear-cut moral choices: master and servant, husband and wife, children and parents did not question their respective rights and responsibilities, however short they might fall of their complete exercise. As we go farther back and visualize country life in the eighteenth century or city life in the seventeenth, the difference in ethical fundamentals from those of today is even more plain. The privileges of the feudal lord were rarely questioned, and the son of the peasant rarely dreamed of being anything but a peasant. Historians have to soft-pedal in describing the social habits of our American Fathers because the moral notions of these great and good men were so different from those of today. The last remaining powers of the guilds in many European countries reached far into the nineteenth century. The family, even half a century ago, normally included a much greater diversity of ages and degrees of relationship than it does today. Few situations arose for which the individual did not find a precedent in the experience of his immediate associates; and trusted counselors were never wanting in an emergency. Moreover, there was a true "common sense" way of dealing with an event, and the occasions for the exercise of unaided individual judgment were relatively few.

Yet the main difference between the predominant moral difficulties now and then is more qualitative than quantitative. In one sense, if we may trust letters and biographies, the average person in the seventeenth century was more sensitive to moral duty than he is today. The inner struggles out of which new religious creeds were born sometimes were around issues which today are almost incomprehensible. They were related

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to the way of life as a whole, and not to specific actions of the kind in which now most of our ethical discussions center. Even when he battled fiercely with the devil, the Puritan rarely felt puzzled by the demands of everyday life. The limitation of his environment made the range of possible moral choices in practical conduct much more narrow than it would be today.

Unless they were geniuses or tramps or philosophers, our forefathers had little conception of those moral conflicts which today provide most of the problem material—not only for the ethical leader, but also for the neuropathologist. The boundaries of their moral universe were firmly fixed; and even when they did not recognize external authority, the current behavior patterns of the community and of their group were followed as a whole unless the individual was in revolt against social convention as such. In that case he was engaged in a war against the ethical philosophy of society, not in a daily struggle with the details of a social code which eluded his understanding.

In contrast, the moral universe of the modern—or of that younger generation which two decades of sermons and editorials have made conscious of its existence—is practically boundless in its offering of choices of behavior. The individual conscience, of which there was so much talk in the days of Milton, is only now becoming really free from the fetters of accepted conventions in those things that are of practical concern. In the seventeenth century it hardly ever occurred to a man to rise out of his class in this or that particular personal interest; and women even more did what was expected of them in the round of daily duties. Even in the higher ranges of society choice of vocation and of avocation was exceedingly limited so long as one did not choose to leave one's inherited status. Normally, a family could not choose its abode; nor was marriage to any large extent a matter of personal selection. Few people ever traveled more than twenty miles from

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the place of their birth; hence the knowledge of other social customs and concepts was exceedingly restricted. Environment and vocation had a determining influence on the average man's outlook on life to an extent which in the Western world can be found today only in exceptionally backward or primitive communities.

Obviously, life is too short for a continual inner struggle over every smallest conflict of purposes. Therefore the larger variety of situations in which the individual today finds himself obliged to act according to his personal judgment must be compensated in some way. And, indeed, what is happening just now is a growing conformity with customs and attitudes that seem of minor import. An era of great moral confusion, because of the rapidity of social group interpenetration, is also an era in which the individual increasingly submits—but this time of his own free will—to conventional sanctions. The substitution of fewer and larger issues for an unending succession of choices in small things once more makes possible the deepening of moral consciousness. This is the characteristic and the opportunity of our time.

We hear much about the lack of originality today, about the submission of individuals to the dictates of the mob. But is this as unmixed an evil as liberals are in the habit of making it out to be? If life seemed more colorful and interesting in the old days, what was the price that society had to pay for this richer pattern? Surely a very heavy one, since the very causes that enabled groups and individuals to cultivate their peculiarities also were pressing upon them the mold of a caste-ridden social organization.

Gone are the attributes of class that used to distinguish the members of established social groups, their costumes and customs, their rites and habits. Risen above these demarcations of status into a potentially unlimited freedom of association we no longer concern ourselves overmuch with the minutiae of individual taste in matters of detail. For we have the widest va-

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riety of choice in those functions and activities that really count in self-expression and in the satisfaction of personal desires. And so, in the very realms in which our grandfathers most assiduously asserted their individuality we conform to "correctness" of style. Able to choose the place of our residence and the set we associate with, to change our occupation when we want to, to move about actually and figuratively, we good-humoredly tolerate the particular etiquette which each type of association imposes upon us.

II

What looks like confusion to observers of present-day manners and morals really is the first movement toward recovery from the actual confusion which marked the period between the eighties and the World War. It may be said that we are returning to a situation which superficially resembles that of the seventeenth century in at least one respect: We are again concerning ourselves more with the larger outlines of a moral life, and therefore pay less attention to originality in matters of detail. But we are doing it rather self-consciously, and they did not. We know that there is a mental hygiene and that we must not live in constant uncertainty as regards immediate choices of conduct if we would be free to examine our attitudes toward the social environment in which we live and toward the ethical concomitants of social life under the more specific aspects of our own larger choices. In smaller things our judgment is suspended; we don't care. We feel that some time we may have to come back to thinking through this or that relationship or policy of action; in the meantime we accept the current convention.

But in this very acceptance lie the sources of many of our difficulties. We are moving so rapidly from one range of experiences into another that we are apt to carry with us the abstract lessons we have learned instead of renewing the struggle with concrete facts and happenings out of which we have

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forged our convictions. We confuse the ethical requirements of different situations. We fail to forget those attitudes that were serviceable and realistically moral in the old environment when we seek adjustment to a chosen new environment. We do not analyze the precise nature of the bonds that hold us to a given form of behavior, and so we are continually tempted to do the impossible, to remain within the general sphere of our major choice, yet also to exercise our judgment freely according to experiences gained prior to, and independent of, that choice.

For example, having wrestled, let us say, with a choice between an artistic and a diplomatic career, and having finally decided in favor of the latter, the artistic streak in my temperament and tastes does not suddenly vanish. It may gradually die out, or it may get itself integrated (as it has done in more than one notably successful career) with the chosen vocation, which then expresses and satisfies the whole personality. More often it offers an obstacle to peace of mind, remains a force in one's life that pulls in a contrary direction from that of the chosen path. Clearly, I cannot decide every day anew whether I want to be artist or diplomat, married or single, Methodist or Catholic. Nor can I, as a diplomat, permit myself forms of behavior that properly belong to the functions or privileges of artists, or as a married man choose to behave as though I were single, or as a Methodist demand a priest's absolution for my sins. But this precisely it is that our younger generation seems to find it difficult to learn. It desires liberty, yet also certainty; major choices which in themselves imply binding loyalties, yet also freedom of action in lesser things.

If, in confronting a minor question of conduct, we strike an implied necessity from which we shrink, that minor point may, of course, upon meditation turn out to be really a major point and force us to reconsider the whole basis upon which the unpalatable "duty" was first regarded as unavoidable. Indeed, moral conversions frequently hinge upon issues which in them-

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selves seem of no great importance. "After I had been in business for some time," writes a young man, "I was asked to describe a certain brand of merchandise as imported when I knew it was home grown. This made me think of other practices which hitherto I had taken for granted in a competitive world. The immorality of that world gradually so grew upon me that I chucked over my business career altogether and started anew." In the same way, a little tiff between husband and wife may suddenly disclose the existence of a real rift in their whole thinking and feeling which had never before become visible, and precipitate a break in a marriage which, according to all surface appearances and in the consciousness of the couple itself, had been regarded as a happy one.

The frequency with which minor demands for moral judgment break into the larger life adjustments of people indicates that there is something wrong with the way in which major choices are made. And this, indeed, is the predominant cause of moral difficulties today. The most glaring evil in the life of modern society is not this or that specific form of conduct or attitude, but the levity with which major decisions are made and the ease with which their implications are set aside and their substance frittered away by minor defalcations. There is not enough deliberation before pledges are made (whether to one's self or to others); and therefore there is no sureness afterward that the choices made have been right choices. Hence also a too frequent re-examination, too much pulling up by the roots of personal commitments. There is too much impatience, too. We do not wait until a really urgent, unmistakable conflict requires us to re-examine past choices. We are too ready to compromise. The greater binding force of engagements voluntarily entered into—as compared with those forced upon the individual by the older social orders with their outside authorities—is not yet expressing itself in a correspondingly larger loyalty; every opportunity for compromise

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is treated as though it represented a new situation necessitating a new decision.

Obviously, having undertaken—not perhaps without inward struggle—to do a certain big thing or to live a certain kind of life, it does not follow that we can at all times be cheerful under such commitment. Every major choice lived up to will at one time or another bring with it duties that are irksome, even highly disagreeable. What is needed in such cases is not the suppression of desire, the forced smile, the optimism of mechanical autosuggestion, but a self-reminder of that evaluation of aims in which the particular duty under contemplation receives its due weight and significance. Yet something more is needed, and that both more difficult and more far-reaching: Having set my mind on a large objective, I must try, as best and as fast as I can, to get whatever belongs to its pursuit out of the realm of conscious choice into that of subconscious habit. I must apply to my own training those discoveries about the formation of subconscious reactions which Kilpatrick and others are now applying to the education of children. What is needed here is a new technique of self-study and conscious self-direction based upon our present knowledge of the process of learning, and not the hocus-pocus of the hypnotist.

To come back to an earlier comparison, this voluntary renunciation of freedom of action through habit-training is very different in character and effect from that unquestioned assumption of the yoke of limitation which at other times birth and feudal social arrangements, or reliance upon the authority of a church, imposed upon the individual. For what we are asking for is the means, and a necessary means, of attaining greater freedom in essentials. My own master in the shaping of my destiny, I need not follow every passing whim to express my personality.

Much of the talk about individual liberty that one hears today really discusses the liberty of the prisoner within the

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limits of prison discipline; it misses the distinction between self-indulgence and self-government precisely because it assumes that there are definite limits to self-development and that complete freedom postulates the absence of all minor bonds. Wherever an individual's way of life is determined for him by outside forces he will obviously, in order to sustain his self-respect, tend to magnify the importance of those minor choices of behavior and association that are left open to him. Thus the unorganized workman at the mercy of a strongly intrenched employers' association may haggle with his foreman over details of his job that are not of the slightest significance, but to him mean an assertion of personal worth in a position which regulates his conducts in all material aspects without his being consulted at all. The group-conscious person is likely to be less of a "character" in the conventional meaning of the word, but he will not need the little make-believe assertions of individuality with which the slave props up his self-esteem. It is similar in matters of self-discipline. Only those who feel themselves morally adrift on currents which they do not understand will insist upon the constant satisfaction of minor cravings for the expression of their conscious desires.

One hears much about the decay of loyalty in these days. But it is doubtful whether the great deeds of loyalty which we have been taught to admire really were as sublime as pictured in history and legend. Romance has embroidered a cloak of moral perfection around actions which in their time were largely necessitated by rigorous family and caste discipline, by habits of loyalty which were impressed upon the individual from earliest childhood without his having had a conscious part in their formation. In comparison, the free man in modern society takes upon himself a larger number and variety of sacrifices for the causes he has adopted and the associates he has chosen. For instance, the laborer who chooses to remain loyal to his class instead of availing himself of individual opportunities to make life easier for himself and his family is a more

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truly moral person than the medieval guildsman who stood by his class when he had no other possible group to stand by. The teacher who refuses to compromise with truth as he sees it is a more truly moral person than the knight who followed his kinsman into battle, and the proponent of an unpopular cause at least as much of a hero as the crusader who ventured to defend the church which was his own defense.

III

Saying that our younger generation often refuses to accept the implications of its own chosen loyalties does not provide us with a key to the heart of the problem. We have to inquire further, What has brought this about? The answer is in part, as we have seen, that, because of rapid changes of environment and associations, the memory of past experiences, even in young people, plays tricks upon the conception of the moral issue in present situations. But in part it is that even those who recognize that conformity in minor things inevitably belongs to freedom in the more important choices do not wish to eliminate all choice in the imponderable values of life. They look with envy upon the individual exercise of taste in bygone ages. They complain of having to live in a machine-made and machine-ruled environment. They are conscious of conflicting desires within themselves, and they feel that to let their conduct follow their major aspirations in an unbroken curve would violate other legitimate needs of their personality. Even those persons with a predominant ambition are constantly impeded by the knowledge which our newer psychology has given us of the dangers of repressing other urges within ourselves.

The smallest group today is composed of individuals with many varied experiences. Congeniality even within the family and within the carefully selected social set is reduced to a minimum when we compare it with that large sharing of interests and tastes that characterizes the family and group in a simpler society. Yet the search for complete understanding

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never entirely disappears. The individual wavers in his loyalties precisely because the satisfaction of his spiritual hungers requires so many ingredients. So, long after his way of life has been marked out in its main course, he yearns for a more complete sympathy in intimate associates, for a more varied activity to satisfy his many curiosities. The problem is inherent in the disintegration of the older social group arrangements, the interpenetration of classes and races. Opinions, temperaments, tastes, interests cannot be as close as they were when friends or brothers and sisters or man and wife grew up in a homogeneous community. A psychoanalyst with a large practice not long ago said that the same incompatibilities that used to be associated with unhappiness in marriages between persons of different race or nationality today prevail in purely American marriages, often when husband and wife have grown up in the same neighborhood and social set. If such are the dangers of conflict within the most intimate limits of association, how much greater is its likelihood in those secondary associations which marriage, partnerships, and, in fact, every chosen way of life involve. While the mother-in-law has always functioned as the symbol of group differences, the distances between the relatives of a newly married couple today are likely to be much greater. Increasingly we embrace a cause only to discover our lack of sympathy with other crusaders in its behalf. We may delight in the social atmosphere of a community, yet detest some of its leaders.

Often, in making a major decision, we attempt to crowd these impending conflicts into the background of our consciousness; we prefer not to think of them. We vaguely hope that in time differences will disappear, or that we shall conquer adverse circumstances in the situation. Too rarely, before making a vital decision, do we deliberately test these possibilities, think through the incompatibilities and contrasts of interest we shall have to face, weigh the sacrifices we shall have to make for the sake of a desired good. Hence the poignancy of

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later regret: We know, when we can no longer avoid the conflict, that we ought to have foreseen it; and we rationalize our remorse over our own inadequacy into a quarrel with others or with fate.

"I am obliged," writes a correspondent, "to waste my time and my energies doing things for the wrong people." Of course, from one point of view they may be the wrong people—the point of view of an abstract economy of one's personal powers. But really it is that point of view that is wrong, not the people. Our moral qualities are put to the test by circumstances as they are, not as they might be could we choose over again how to arrange our lives. After deciding to live in a certain social environment (which, in the case quoted, was through marriage), the individual at once assumes the obligation to live with certain people, to find personal satisfactions, even self-realization, in association with them. Indeed, the involuntary associations implied in the voluntary choice of a way of life provide the soundest test for the sincerity of our purposes.

Of course, where difficulties have not been foreseen, where irritations and lack of congeniality become increasingly serious, or where we recognize self-frustration in the chosen path, nothing may avail but a complete re-orientation. But here again we meet with a moral failing characteristic of our time: Instead of resolutely changing our course, we are apt merely to play with the idea. It may be that here also the richness of our preceding experiences is the underlying cause of hesitation, but more probably it is a newly acquired skill in drugging our conscience with illegitimate compensations. Thus, like the cartoonist's type of whom "there is one in every office," we paint for ourselves and those willing to listen to us a vivid picture of the heroic things "we'll tell the boss" when he comes in; but when the moment for courageous action comes, we slip quietly back into our seat and speak to our neighbor of a world in which "one must know how to give and take." Unable or unwilling to muster the energy that is required to realize our

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dreams, we permit our wandering imagination to embellish them with ever more ornate and pleasing furnishings until we dangle before our desires the day-dream picture of a situation so far removed from possible realization that we have a good excuse for doing nothing to bring it into being. And by this course, the original "if only" of remorse is transformed into a regretful "if only" applied to circumstances beyond our control. Against the danger of this mental process—which is apt to become a habit—we must ever be on guard.

Unless there is something seriously wrong with our adjustment to the social environment, something so palpably wrong that we cannot escape it, that it haunts us, that it prevents us, not temporarily only, but continually, from living effectively, there is only one remedy: and that is to try to visualize our environment as it might be and then set to work and make it as nearly so as we can. This counsel is neither as platitudinous nor as utopian as at first it may seem. Not platitudinous, because we realize that moral steadfastness is just that quality which it is most difficult to attain in an age of constant change. Not utopian, because modern psychology here comes to our aid and shows us how we can gain stability by a purposeful training of habit.

The mood of despondency, of frustration, which often overcomes the best of us is due precisely to the fact that we are still carrying around with us minds trained in the eighteenth century; for that is practically what our educational system comes to. We are wavering between absolutes of moral choice when we ought to be conscious of the demands of expediency. There is nothing blameworthy in the desire which many sensitive persons feel at one time or another, to "run away from it all"; if it were not for such impulses no Mr. Polly would ever get away from his nagging wife and her cold potatoes to begin life anew. But the frequent repetition of such a mood, unchecked, erodes the moral conscience and gradually substitutes for the solid rock of character the slush of sentimental

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self-pity. There is no merit in repeatedly contemplating a revolutionary solution of our troubles if we are too weak to revolt. For most of us it is more courageous to see things through, either by tolerating with good grace what cannot be changed or by setting to work seriously to mend broken links and readjust strained springs of life. To run away from responsibilities previously recognized is in most situations the more dangerous an act of cowardice because we are so skilled in rationalizing our motives into some form of social idealism.

This does not mean that every cobbler should stick to his last or that marriages should never be dissolved. Nor is the best way to reform an institution always from within. But major choices demand a sense of social and personal economy; and a known ill, if not too unbearable, may be preferable to the risks of a surgical operation. It is the glory of our age that we can each individually make great moral choices, that we have as individuals and as groups the power to affect the common interests of society as well as our own. To do justice to this immense human responsibility we must begin with an effort to understand our own motives and the ways we have come by them, so that we shall not continually deceive ourselves about the nature of our conflicting desires and their respective urgency. A truly moral life requires a *sense* of values, almost an aesthetic quality. Yet the recognition of these values and our reaction to them must become automatic in the lesser exigencies of life so that our energies shall be free for making major choices and for courageous action in their light.

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DEMOCRACY OR EDUCATION?

WILLIAM ORTON

In a letter written in the year 1900, William James unburdened himself of a rather startling piece of social prognosis:

> Mr. Bosanquet somewhere says that so far from the dark ages being over, we are just at the beginning of a new dark age period. He means that ignorance and unculture, which then were merely brutal, are now articulate and possessed of a literary voice, and the fight is transferred from fields and castles and town walls to "organs of publicity"; but it is the same fight, of reason and goodness against stupidity and passions; and it must be fought through to the same kind of success. ***But it means the re-educating of perhaps twenty more generations.***

Had the writer of that letter lived through the European war he would have had still stronger reason for considering Mr. Bosanquet a good prophet. He might have come to wonder, when he considered the part played in that vast hysteria by propaganda, deliberate misinformation, and appeal to the mob mind, whether anything at all had been gained by teaching the majority of Western mankind to read. He might even have subscribed to the facetious suggestion of a writer in the *Living Age* of 1926: "If the State Department prevented us voters from getting any information at all, the cause of peace would be advanced a good thousand years."

Since the war there has existed among a majority of writers for the general public something like a tacit conspiracy to ignore the distrust of the democratic principle that characterizes so much unpublished thought and speech. There is of course nothing very new about the attitude itself; the present phase dates at least from Carlyle, and has been periodically furbished by neo-Darwinians, neo-Marxians, neo-Hegelians, neo-Nietzscheans without number. The recent emphasis has however a certain cynicism which suggests that James's "twenty more generations" may well be prolonged to the Greek kalends

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if in the meantime demagogues, dictators, or the devil do not make short work of their inanities.

For much of this the artists are responsible. An attitude of this kind is contagious. Without knowing it, the intelligentsia has taken a toxic scepticism from such men as John, Picasso, Satie, Stravinsky, Milhaud, Massine, the Sitwells, Cabell, and many another. It has felt the significance of their eclecticism, their deliberate eschewal of the broad Victorian appeal in favor of limited and peculiar minorities. And the contagion runs the wider since our fundamental attitudes to life are shaped by art as much as by thought: everything being, in the last resort, a question of taste. Then there is the school of contemporary criticism represented in fiction by Sinclair Lewis and in *belles-lettres* by the *American Mercury* school of essayists, whose burden is apparently that a democracy has neither the tastes nor the ethics of an aristocracy. The naïveté of their surprise at this discovery is almost as edifying as the perverse delight they seem to take in it. But on the whole it is the sociologists who have contributed most toward the democratic disillusion. For them *vox populi* is now no more *vox dei* than it was for Plato—and Plato's gods were hardly as respectable as the late lamented Jahveh. Despite its androgynous ancestry from Spencer to Le Bon, the conviction is spreading that the limitations of sociology are not simply those of the sociologists; and with the joyful company of Freudians exploiting the social aspects of subjective analysis, there will be little ground on which posterity can erect sentimental rationalizations about itself.

It is a sad decline for Tom Paine's "illuminating and divine principle" and Adam Smith's "obvious and simple system of natural liberty" which "establishes itself of its own accord." A sad decline—but inevitable; for all social gospels, true and false alike, are first conceived as simple and natural to a degree which experience cannot possibly substantiate. The disorders of society are never simple; and for that very reason, popular specifics usually are. Experience of a social *impasse,* in all its

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discrete pluralistic reality, is so exhausting that any solution generally received is certain to be simple and unitary. The twin gospels of the nineteenth century—democracy and education—were no exception to this rule; and the former at any rate is proving more and more vulnerable to the higher criticism started by J. S. Mill.

Certain urgent dilemmas in which democracy now finds itself are in fact clearly forecast in Mill's second thoughts about the doctrine. Mr. Lippman's work is largely an elaboration of Mill's contention that the machinery of representative government embodies will, not intelligence; and that such intelligence as modern communities may collectively exhibit is naturally based on self-interest, and a short-sighted and uninformed self-interest at that. Both Bukharin and Mr. Mencken might find their main theses anticipated in remarks like the following from the essay *On Liberty:* "The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest." Unfortunately Mill's prescription was not adequate to his diagnosis; and in its failure modern democracies have increasingly fallen back on the one function for which he pronounced them "radically unfit": the function of governing. The current expression "law-making bodies" gives a clue to the whole problem; and the measure of their law-making (18,230 bills and resolutions in the six months of the Sixty-ninth Congress, of which over 700 became law, to say nothing of state enactments!) is largely a measure of their incompetence. What of course Mill considered their true function—with safeguards which the new German constitution and some American states are attempting to observe—was "to watch and control the government"; and so to interpret general opinion that "every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind as well or better than he could speak it himself." And the weakness of the argument lies in its too-

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easy assumption that a body of men competent neither to legislate nor to administer will "watch and control" with sufficient wisdom, or represent opinion with sufficient catholicity.

Experience demonstrates that in fact most of the "watching" is done by highly paid expert representatives of particular interests; that the "controlling" frequently amounts to stultification of any positive leadership the system may accidentally produce; and that the opinion represented, even were it impartially so, is mostly worthless. Henry C. Adams, in that little classic of 1887, *The Relation of the State to Industrial Action,* noted two assumptions as characterizing contemporary laissez faire: (1) that individuals know their own interests in the sense in which they are identical with the interests of others; and (2) that they will in this sense, without coercion, follow them. In substituting these, said he, for the older utilitarianism, political economy had degenerated from a science based on a principle to a philosophy based on a maxim. It now appears that the maxim was not a sound one.

But in order to rationalize, agreeably to its self-esteem, the resulting struggle of sectional interests that do not in fact resolve in any adequate synthesis, later democracy has had to postulate two more assumptions that its forefathers would never have dreamed of: namely, competence and interest, not merely in the representatives, but in the people at large. The longevity of these assumptions in the presence of so powerful a body of hostile evidence must surely be ascribed to the fact that we walk by faith, not by sight; as must also the shock of the belated discovery that they do not hold.

As to the former—the assumption of competence—few reflective people would now contest Mr. Lippman's verdict in *The Phantom Public:*

> The individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs. He does not know how to direct public affairs. He does not know what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen. I cannot imagine how he could know, and there is not the least reason for thinking, as

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mystical democrats have thought, that the compounding of individual ignorances in masses of people can produce a continuous directing force in public affairs. . . . . General information for the informing of public opinion is altogether too general for intellectual decency. And life is too short for the pursuit of omniscience by the counting in a state of nervous excitement of all the leaves on all the trees.

The old faith, however, lives on in the tendency of much liberal theorizing to appeal from the partial and passionate "opinion" that is all we know to a hypothetical "true" or "real" opinion that is as beneficent as it is vague—a sort of divine right principle for demos. And when this is countered by the suggestion that any such opinion, if it exist at all, is neither prompt enough nor spontaneous enough to meet the need, the response of radical and conservative alike is always the magic word "education." To doubt that invocation, and the elaborate ritual that accompanies it, still savors of sacrilege.

The other assumption—that of interest—fares little better in the presence of "get-out-the-vote" campaigns that get out less than 50 per cent. It is indeed a delicate question how far organized vote stimulation can go without defeating its own ends. The business was demonstrated on a grand scale in the Republican primaries of Pennsylvania in 1926, when three candidates for senatorial nomination spent upwards of three million dollars on a vote-getting campaign. Apart from the magnitude of the sum there was nothing exceptionally startling about the proceedings. There were, it is true, some sixty thousand paid "watchers" at the polls receiving ten dollars a day; and a good deal of the money came from propagandist groups that had decided to support (on terms) one or other of the candidates. The moral, however, was generally missed. It may or may not be a good thing that only persons able to command the expenditure of huge sums of ready money can obtain even a bare chance of election; and the particular interests represented by the successful candidate may or may not be those which would, in an impartial view, most contribute to

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the common good. But what sort of public is it that can be stimulated to the point of action, wise or unwise, only by such tactics? Even if, as some modern Jefferson has proposed, we jail all the non-voters, what is the "opinion" thus elicited likely to be worth? Apparently neither more nor less than ten dollars a day.

Here also Mill has touched the heart of the matter. "When we talk of the interest of a body of men, or even of an individual man, the question what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. . . . . What it is the man's interest to do or refrain from depends less on any outward circumstances than upon what sort of man he is." *"What sort of man he is"*: again the familiar invocation echoes on the wind of optimism, and the gospel of education is appealed to to strengthen the foundations of the older evangel. And again the quantitative fallacy assails us—the idea that since a certain nostrum has worked passably in a certain situation and in moderate doses, our welfare will be indefinitely increased, and the millennium ultimately attained, by the simple process of applying more and more of it. The exposure of this notion by Mr. Mencken and others as applied to the democratic dogma has not affected its prevalence in regard to education; partly because that gospel is newer, and the memory of its early struggles is still present to many minds; partly, and mainly, because it is the last hope of those who strive to keep unspotted their faith in its predecessor. Accordingly, the quantitative fallacy is rampant: more schools, more colleges, more pupils, more teachers, more books, more money, more subjects—and ultimately, perhaps, more chaos and more disillusion.

Now even from a mercenary standpoint it is time this education business were submitted to a general accounting. The United States has a heavier investment in it than any other society, past or present: an investment not merely in money, but in life. One-fourth of the population—an unprecedented

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amount—is segregated in educational institutions of one sort or another, as compared with about one-seventh in England and Germany, and considerably less everywhere else. Are the dividends adequate? The evidence suggests a decided "No."

At the lowest level there is no need to challenge the assault on illiteracy. It is undoubtedly necessary to civilization that the masses be able to figure the election returns and the professional sport statistics and read the subway advertisements, the tabloid newspapers, the semipornographic journals, the movie captions, and whatever of popular science or mythology they have time for. It is even expedient that they be taught to lift their collective voice in "The Star-spangled Banner," "Sweet and Low," "Yankee Doodle," "Yes Sir, She's My Baby," and other traditional ululations. But that after all represents a mere fractional percentage of the investment; and the returns, like the entrants, peter out as they ascend the scale of attainment. College teachers of less than twenty years' standing are annually dismayed to find how small a harvest of twelve years' toil comes in the baggage of the Freshman. The Scotsman's traditional bag of oatmeal held more solid pabulum. And at the end of four, five, or six years more, there stands no bridge of custom over which the pick of the survivors carry their gains into the service of government and administration. In its place is a gigantic dump heap where the majority strip their souls again for the struggle of the commercial arena.

Even the strictly scholastic results bear, so far as these things can be estimated, a less favorable ratio to the academic investment than elsewhere; and the contribution to the cultural life of the community is meager and ineffective. Even at its best, education in this field would have more than enough to contend with; for its essence is the training of individual judgment and discrimination; and how much chance has that among a people committed commercially and politically to the cult of size and quantity, whose colossal advertisements of

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standardized consumption invade the very waves of the two oceans? We are too easily tempted to assume that the educator must necessarily in the long run have the best of it. The odds are against him. The movie, deliberately capitalizing the lowest common denominator it can reach in sentiment, taste, and ideology; the newspapers with their unspeakable "comics" in which the public is amused by, and so taught to condone, the worst of its own banalities; religion, with its horde of sensationalists and publicity-mongers, patterning the morals, as commerce does the tastes, of its myriad adherents on the lines of the "nation-wide selling campaign"—these and endless others are interests too deeply vested to be displaced by the transient efforts of the educator; and they are "at it" all the time, day and night, from youth to age, with an efficiency education can neither rival nor purchase. For they know how to seduce the tired mind, with its primary needs most urgent and its controls weakened; they know how to mobilize the pitiless compulsion of crowd esteem; and their success is much more closely identified with the national ideals than that of the educator they subsidize. The occasional nonconformist who survives the regimentation of college and fraternity living may be tolerated, but not emulated; and the cultural heretic can make money as an entertainer more easily than he can make disciples on the shores of the Gadarene lake.

Why worry? "They besought him to depart out of their country." Let us acknowledge that in no modern community is there as much simple happiness, as much common comfort, as in contemporary America. Let us even grant—what is more doubtful—that the educational investment contributes to this in an important degree. The pessimistic turn of social philosophy, superficially paradoxical, finds a deeper justification in this very felicity. Its significance was noted, in terms even more pessimistic than those of James, by the Russian Hertzen fifty years ago. The trend of European, and still more of American, civilization, said he, was toward an occidental equivalent

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of old China—not ignorant, not illiterate, not unhappy; but replete, static, sterile: "the Celestial Empire, the Median Kingdom, a kingdom not of God but of man." To this, adds Merejowski, its practical positivism must ultimately lead; since the "religion of mankind" is no more than the mummified wrapping about the body of a dead God. "Both in the worship of ancestors and the worship of descendants the only visage of man is equally sacrificed: personality to impersonality, to a countless race, to the people, to mankind—'the masses of some prolific spawn, compressed out of the myriads of bourgeois shallowness.'"

Spengler arrives independently at the same position. And in both the Russian and the German analyses the spectacle of the inexorable departure of life, of meaning, from a society settling into the crystalline ossification of a spiritual ice-age evokes an involuntary horror.

> Cultures are organisms, and world-history is their collective biography. . . . . Every Culture has its own Civilisation. The Civilisation is the inevitable destiny of the Culture. Civilisations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are a conclusion, the thing-become succeeding the thing-becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stonebuilt petrifying world-city following mother earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable. . . . . The end is a sunset reflected in forms revived for a moment by pedant or by eclectic—semi-earnestness and doubtful genuineness dominate the world of the arts. We today are in this condition—playing a tedious game with dead forms to keep up the illusion of a living art.

If this were true, what would one expect to find as the dominant aspects of an educational system? One would expect to find it mainly concerned with negative adaptation: the adaptation both of its cultural heritage and of its human material to the demands of its present social and economic environment. One would expect its purely scholastic aims and achievements to be relatively unimportant to society at large, save in so far as they might be made to minister to the comfort and

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amusement of contemporary living. One would expect to find it practicing a dogmatic positivism while preaching the tolerance that is another name for agnosticism. One would expect to find it confronted occasionally, in a few unhappy individuals (like those of whom Hertzen said "we are not at all the physicians—we are the pain"), with a choice between a traditional idealism and the acceptance of social norms and standards conceived as given; and on the whole, choosing the latter. One would expect, in a society like that of America, to find a growing incompatibility between the inherited ideal of education and the current idea of democracy.

The subversion of the educational ideal in such a case is the vindication of Spengler's pessimism. To educate for things as they are, only more so; to accept as ends the desiderata of the "conglomerated mediocrity," and to devote one's energies to facilitating their realization, regardless of what other values may be jettisoned in the process—that is subversion. And to that we are all but come.

Consider, for example, the influence upon education of the popular conceptions of what constitutes success in life. "The highest compliment that can be paid a philanthropic, religious, or educational scheme is to pronounce it 'business-like'; whereas a man is insulted if you call his business philanthropic, or religious, or educational. A school board must be a 'business' board; scholars must be picked and officered by a business man as university president; and the ultimate control of churches, colleges, and charities is left to the solid men of business whose money makes these possible."[1] One does not need to distort the situation in the black-and-white perspective of an Upton Sinclair to perceive that there are possibilities of loss as well as gain in it.

The risk to education is still more imminent in another and wider sphere. Education for democracy—almost a slogan of the American school system—is an exceedingly dangerous maxim for education. Whether in the Prussian state of yester-

[1] E. A. Ross, *Sociological Principles*, chap. xlvii.

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day or the fundamentalist states of today, the acceptance of a given social institution as an end for education has wrought mortal injury to education without in the long run availing much to the institution. Protestant Americans are swift to denounce it in the Roman Catholic system, while they are blind to their own approach to it in respect of the political state. When a prominent authority describes the public schools as "the chief factories of American citizenship" he states a fact which admits of very questionable import. When he goes on to enumerate as the functions of a university "the training of leaders for the institutions of democracy, and the formulation of standards for democracy's undertakings," he does better service to democracy than to education, but little to either. For the ills of an institution that works none too well will not be cured by adapting human nature to fit it, or something as near like it as may be, but by adapting it to fit the best that we can make of human nature.

The sacrifice of genuine educational values on the cracked altar of democracy can be justified by no consideration of expediency. And there is reason to think such values are being sacrificed, not merely to political but to social democracy as well. The abandonment of all but "the most commonly used words" in the spelling and language work of the schools, to which the before-mentioned authority refers as an improvement; the abandonment of grammar, along with the spirit, if not the letter, of other formal disciplines are cases in point. "The technical grammar on which elementary school children used to spend so much time and effort has also been shown to be of but little value." Value for what? For the living of life *as it is currently lived.*[2] And is that the level on which the ideals

[2] The following passages from a recent report of the City Schools Division of the Federal Bureau of Education are instructive: "A curriculum prepared only a few years ago no longer meets the needs of modern city life. . . . . Not so many years ago the course in arithmetic was weighted down with 'mental discipline problems.' English grammar courses were exercises in parsing and diagramming. No reputable educator today thinks of holding to these courses founded on a philosophy that has no scientific support. According to present-day thought the curriculum should be reconstructed largely in terms of contemporary American life."

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of education are to be built in future? So also of the curtailment of arithmetic and mathematics: "few people have occasion for anything more." The gain to democracy is not conspicuously evident; the loss to education is cumulative and patent.

All this of course might be well enough if alongside it there were another educational system for a master class, which would presuppose some adequate means of selection. But that is precisely what is lacking: the present educational system is all in this kind that we have, and about the best we can say is that selection goes on in spite of it rather than because of it. Meanwhile the society that it produces develops in such fashion that the need for leadership is automatically increased while the supply of it is automatically reduced in proportion. Could any more striking proof be wanted of the inadequacy of current democracy as an end for education?

For, after all, we might resign ourselves to Spengler's fatalism and settle down to make the best of a not too uncomfortable process if we had any guaranty of its going on long enough for us to get used to it. But the only sort of guaranty that is decipherable on the bond seems of the exactly opposite tenor. "It is surely strange," comments F. C. S. Schiller, "that the great war did not lead to the rise of a great general or a great statesman anywhere. This must mean either that armies and politics are so organized that genius cannot rise to the top in them, or that there is no genius to rise." Positive eugenics may be debatable; but the facts of dysgenic selection are past all argument. There is no need for metaphysical quarrel as to what is the absolute *summum bonum* in humanity: "the social order operates so as to weed out the very qualities it *deems* most admirable." Apart altogether from vital statistics, there is simple enough evidence on this point. "It is not good for society that a cricketer or a prize fighter, a film actor or a dancer, should be esteemed and rewarded more highly than the man who discovers a cure for malaria or cancer"—or even, one might add, the genius in education. For there are ailments of

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the body politic as well as of the individual; and they take, in the end, as large a toll of human life. Crowd-thinking, mob psychology, upon which it is now customary to place the burden of blame for social disaster, is a condition, not of the illiterate rural populace, but of the literate city aggregates. It is a failing of quite nice people, like one's self, who have been through the present regimen of high school and, in many cases, college. It is as prevalent today as it ever was: there is more of it at this moment associated with the term "bolshevism" than there was a few years ago associated with the mythical "Hun"; and it is as ready to be touched off to another conflagration. From such liability it is the educator, if anyone, who can save society; and upon his ability to do so the security of all other gain is contingent.

To ask him, therefore, to accept any given system of customs, tastes, and institutions as the end of his endeavors is to abrogate his whole possibility of service, and a treason to the state. For the intellectual, the moral, and the aesthetic conscience of the community is in his keeping; and the freedom he asks to grope for his own ends is also that which it is the highest interest of society to preserve for him. The lot of a leader in this field is hard enough anyway. His values cannot always be self-evident to his pupils—indeed, it is a criterion of his work that they should be in some measure novel to them—nor to the mass of mankind. He must be perpetually at war, as all the great teachers have been, with the forms and conventions that he finds around him; that is his function, his value in the world. However fine they be, for him they must be better yet. For he is charged with a challenge to all achievement, bearer of the faith that the spirit of humanity is greater than all its forms. And his is the figure that mankind has chosen as its perennial symbol: bound—but not for ever—on cross or crag in the dawn of wisdom; and after, riding the farthest verge of human knowing, to break the lone lance that is life into the void that is destiny.

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THE ETHICS OF PROHIBITION

J. ELLIOT ROSS

The question I propose to discuss is whether the state has the moral right to prohibit the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating liquor. As far as possible, I wish to divorce this discussion from the particular form which prohibition has taken in this country. I am not concerned whether one-half of 1 per cent of alcohol is in fact intoxicating, or whether the Eighteenth Amendment really represents democratic opinion in the United States. Again, the possibility of enforcing the Volstead Law is ruled out. All these are definite, concrete questions, with a high emotional content that makes their calm discussion almost impossible. I want to get back of them to the abstract, underlying ethical principles.

It follows from this that I am discussing prohibition, and not the lack of prohibition. It ought not to be necessary to say that, but there has been so much confusion in the minds of some people that evidently it is necessary. For on all sides we hear it said that prohibition has done this or that, whereas it is not prohibition at all, but the absence of prohibition. If we may emphasize the obvious, prohibition is a governmental arrangement by which citizens are kept from using intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes. I think it should be clear, therefore, that when people die from drinking illicit poison liquor, it is not prohibition that has killed them, but a violation of prohibition. The only cases of death that could reasonably be charged to prohibition would be those of such confirmed alcoholics that the deprivation of liquor killed them.

My question, then, might be formulated: Given the fact that the abuse of liquor in any particular state is an extremely serious social evil, has the state the moral right to use the extreme means of totally prohibiting the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating beverages?

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The mere statement of the question in this way assumes that the state sometimes, at least, has such a moral power of legislation that it can sometimes create a moral obligation of obedience on the part of its citizens. And at the same time it recognizes that such a right of the state is not unlimited, that there may sometimes be a tyrannical exercise of civil power which does not bind the consciences of its subjects.

I know that these assumptions are not granted by all ethicians. Some know no moral obligations, or at least no obligations that are moral in the sense in which I have used the word. And others know no inalienable moral rights of individuals as against the power of the state. The state *may* do whatever the state *can* do. But these differences are so fundamental that they cannot be gone into here. It would take too long, and probably would not bring conviction in the end. But there are enough others, I think, who agree substantially with my use of the terms, who yet feel that there is here a real problem of ethics and government. Perhaps the *International Journal of Ethics,* therefore, will open its pages to a discussion of this question of prohibition from the standpoint of the assumptions I have made.

My statement of the question assumes, too, that the abuse of intoxicating liquor is a very serious social evil involving a large proportion of the population. Whether this is so in fact is for the statesman or sociologist to determine, not the ethician. It does not come within the scope of my purpose to discuss the actual conditions in the United States when the Eighteenth Amendment was passed. My question is only:

If in any particular nation the abuse of intoxicating liquors is a very serious social evil, involving a large proportion of the population, may the government justly prevent from getting liquor even those who can use liquor wisely, in order that those who abuse liquor shall be unable to get it?

Since the vats and distilleries were presumably dried up, printer's ink has flowed quite freely in discussing the pros and

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cons of the question of prohibition. But to the narrow ethical question I have set myself, most of what has been written is irrelevant. It concerns the practical possibility of enforcing prohibition, or the way in which the amendment was passed, or is a comparison of B.V. and A.V. days. Or it deals with the political aspects of the question, as to whether it is advisable to include sumptuary legislation in a written constitution.

Granted the assumptions I have made, I think that the ethical arguments bearing on the question may be reduced to three. Probably the most common argument against prohibition is that it does not accomplish its purpose, that conditions are worse now than before prohibition. Lurid pictures are drawn of high-school girls and boys with hip flasks, of the thousands of deaths from alcoholism, of the freedom with which liquor can be obtained almost anywhere in the country. The argument is given an ethical slant by asserting that the state has no right to pass a law that will produce such conditions.

From the standpoint of practical politics this argument may have some weight. The present conditions of enforcement of prohibition may make it advisable to repeal or modify the law. But this has nothing to do with the right of the state to pass the law. For it is only a certain confusion of thought which can attribute these evils to prohibition. They are due, not to prohibition, but to the lack of it. Prohibition—that is, preventing men from getting intoxicating liquors—would automatically wipe out these evils.

That may sound like a truism, but it really is not. For it may happen that the enforcement of a law—and not the lack of enforcement, as we have in regard to prohibition— may fail to attain the purpose in view. There is, for instance, the direct primary. This law is not violated. Men are nominated for office in this way. But it would be a hardy optimist who would assert that it had attained the objects of its proponents.

The distinction between the right of doing a thing and the

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advisability of doing it may be clear from an illustration or two. Thus parents may have the right to forbid their daughter to receive a certain young man in their house. But it may be inadvisable for them to exercise this right for fear that the daughter may see him elsewhere under more dangerous circumstances. Or a man may have the right to erect a spite wall, though the unpleasant consequences to himself in the way of social ostracism may make it inadvisable for him to do so. Certainly a man may have the right to wear a brilliant crimson dress suit to a dinner party, but unless he happens to be Mark Twain it would probably be better for him not to run thus counter to social customs.

All these things, however, are simply a matter of what is advisable. They do not touch the ethical right of the individuals to act in these ways. And so, no matter what the violations of prohibition may be, they do not touch the ethical right of the state to prohibit. They may be very sound arguments in the sphere of practical politics, but they have no standing in the court of conscience.

Some opponents of prohibition have seen this, and so in order to get some moral as well as practical ground for opposition, they have claimed that the state has the right only to reinforce the natural or divine law. It may not go beyond this sphere to forbid what is not already forbidden by God's own legislation, either positive or through the nature of man. Fabian Franklin, for instance, maintains this in his book *What Prohibition Has Done to America.*

But such a position is clearly untenable, because it cannot be carried out consistently. The state has forbidden many other things not forbidden by the divine or natural law, and that without any protest from the strictest constructionist of its powers. For example, the state has forbidden bucket shops. There is nothing certainly in God's positive legislation to forbid gambling in this particular way, when it is not dishonest. If a man wants to bet on the rise or fall of particular stocks,

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without any actual purchase being contemplated, he has as much right under natural law to do this as to bet on raindrops sliding down a window.

A more striking illustration of the prohibitive power of the state is the prohibition of possessing or carrying firearms. The right to defend one's self against unjust aggression is one of the most fundamental of all rights, yet this law leaves many an innocent man powerless to protect himself against a burglar. For this law is enforced against law-abiding citizens, and not against gunmen. I do not mean that the state deliberately makes this discrimination; but, as a matter of fact, it works out that way. For it is just as impossible to prevent altogether the bootlegging of automatics as it is to prevent altogether the bootlegging of whiskey. As a consequence, the reputable citizen may find himself defenseless when attacked by fully armed thugs. It would probably not do him much good if he did have the latest improved forty-five in his hip pocket; but why should the state have the right to prohibit his putting a Colt in his pocket if it has not the right to prohibit his putting a flask there?

There is nothing in the Ten Commandments, or in the natural law, prohibiting traffic at fifty miles an hour. But the state steps in to regulate this traffic. And it does it on the general principle that the end of the state is to secure the temporal well-being of its citizens, and therefore the state has a right to the means to accomplish this end. Whether under particular circumstances it is to be the regulation of automobiles, or the prohibition of gambling, or the limiting of broadcasting, the state decides.

I do not mean to imply that the state is always right. In the opening paragraph of this article I have admitted that sometimes the state may exercise its power tyrannically. But that is to be judged on some other principle than the mere fact of being over and beyond the prohibitions of the natural or divine law.

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Those who oppose prohibition on ethical grounds can make out a more plausible case when they approach it from the standpoint of the fundamental and inherent rights of the individual. They echo the Declaration of Independence. Like the fathers of our republic, they hold that men are endowed with certain inalienable rights, and that among these are the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The emphasis of those appealing to this principle is on the right to liberty. They argue that prohibition is an infringement of individual liberty. And of course this must be granted. Prohibition does take away the liberty of using intoxicating liquors. But when stated thus broadly, the argument proves a great deal too much. For every law is an infringement upon the liberty of some individual. The very idea of law implies such a restriction. If we are to take the position that no restriction of individual liberty is ever justified, then we must advocate anarchy.

Nor is the argument helped much by saying that prohibition would be an infringement of liberty for an insufficient reason. For this, too, leads to anarchy. If it be for an insufficient reason, who is to judge of the insufficiency? We already have the judgment of the state expressed by the passage of the law. It must be, then, the individual. And if the individual is to judge of the injustice of this law on the ground that the reasons for it are insufficient, then he is to judge of all other laws. And we come ultimately to a condition of anarchy.

There is a sound principle of our legal procedure, that no man is a judge in his own case. For the human mind is so constituted that it can always find a justification for itself. There would be no use in passing laws if each one were to be his own judge. It would be a mere farce. Open anarchy would be much cheaper.

Where the state is organized on a democratic basis, the only safe thing is to leave the judgment of particular laws to the voters. When, following the duly constituted procedure, a

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law has been passed, the assumption is that it is just. And if it is seriously unjust, there is only a question of time before such strong public opinion will be mustered against it as to effect its repeal. It is conceivable that an aggressive minority may be able in a particular instance to put over unjust legislation. But it is inconceivable that they should be able to keep it in force indefinitely. We get back to Lincoln's homely judgment that you cannot fool all the people all the time.

Others have argued more plausibly that although the state may restrict liberty through its laws, this is only upon condition that the restrictive law secures liberty in another direction to compensate for the loss inflicted by the law. Liberty is looked upon as the greatest common good, and any law which takes away liberty is therefore attacking the greatest common good. Hence a law should always leave the sum total of liberty the same.

An example of this principle is the law limiting the speed of automobiles. This restricts the liberty of drivers, but it secures the liberty of pedestrians. And in a way it also secures the greater liberty of drivers themselves. They are less liable to accident from other drivers. We can, for the sake of argument, grant this principle. But it does not seem to render the prohibition of intoxicating liquors necessarily unjust. For we have assumed that the abuse of liquor had been a very serious social evil before the state attempted to remedy the situation by prohibition. In this country, I think, if we take family in a wide enough sense—as embracing aunts and uncles, nephews and nieces—there was hardly a family that had not had one member wrecked by drink.

But, assuming that there has been this very serious abuse of liquor, does the prohibition of intoxicating beverages secure any liberty corresponding to the loss of liberty through being unable to indulge in drinking?

To answer that question I think we ought to divide the population into several groups. There would be, first of all,

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the men who have gotten the habit of drinking to excess, and who are ruining themselves. They are no longer free. They have deprived themselves of freedom by becoming slaves to this habit. If they are allowed to get liquor freely they will have less and less freedom as the months go by. At present they have not the freedom to use their money for the support of their family, to buy comforts for themselves, to fulfil serious obligations as sons, or fathers, or husbands.

Prohibition—that is, the actual prevention of using intoxicating beverages—by limiting their liberty in the one direction of drink will restore their liberty in every other direction. Certainly for them there is a compensating gain, no matter how they may, because of their present slavery, object to it. For this class prohibition increases liberty, taking the matter in this broad way, instead of decreasing it.

There is, secondly, the class who do not drink, but who are the victims of those who drink. They are the wives and daughters of drunkards. They are the dependents, generally, of those who waste on gin what should go for their support. They are the innocent people who are being dragged down into a living hell by the abuse of liquor on the part of others. They are the pedestrians or careful drivers who are maimed or killed by men whose sureness of sight and touch has been decreased by liquor.

Surely for these, too, there is a gain in liberty. They are freed from the constant fear of what the drink addict may do. They are free to spend on the necessaries of life what was previously going for the bestial satisfaction of the drunkard. They are free to face their friends unashamed. They are free to get some of the comforts of life, to have some ambition that is not eternally blighted by this constant specter of drink. They are free to walk the streets or to drive their cars without fear of the drunken carelessness of others.

Then there is the class who are total abstainers by free choice and who would not drink even if drink were offered them. Their liberty is not infringed, because they do not wish

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to drink. They are like the man who doesn't own a car in relation to the speed laws, or like a man who doesn't bet in relation to gambling laws. His liberty may not be increased, but neither is it decreased.

Again, we have the class of those who are moderate drinkers. They have never abused liquor, never been intoxicated. But then this group subdivides into two. A certain number of these moderate drinkers are going to become drunkards. How many we cannot tell. But we know from experience that some will. No man starts as a drunkard. He always begins by drinking moderately. But for some there will come the time when they are no longer masters, but slaves. They will be drunkards.

Now these moderate drinkers who are going to be drunkards are also gaining in freedom by prohibition. They are going to be able to keep their manhood. Instead of ending in the gutter, they will remain self-respecting and respected citizens. The restriction of the law is balanced by an enlargement of freedom. And of course, it is an enlargement not only for them but for all those who would have suffered by their becoming drunkards.

Now, how large any one of these classes which I have enumerated really is, no one can say with accuracy. But I think that certainly the classes whose liberty is enlarged by prohibition must far outnumber the classes whose liberty is restricted. For you have in the end only those who are moderate drinkers and who will remain moderate drinkers as suffering a restriction without a corresponding gain. They must be a very small minority compared with the other groups.

I would point out, too, that this appeal of the antiprohibitionists to the principle of liberty has some analogy to Shylock's pound of flesh. There is a backfire to it. If there are no traffic laws, the reckless driver is free to endanger the lives of others, it is true; but is not that restricting the reasonable freedom of others from unnecessary danger? Now giving liberty to all to use liquor freely is going to restrict the liberty of large classes in something the same way that giving perfect

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freedom to reckless drivers would restrict the liberty of innocent pedestrians. The drunkards themselves are going to get into a condition where they are no longer free. And the wife who needs for food the money that has gone for drink is going to have her freedom restricted. And the children who ought to be going to school, but who have to work because their father spends in drink what should go for them, are going to be restricted.

It is not, therefore, as is sometimes assumed, a case of restricting or not restricting liberty. It is a question of how to restrict liberty least, or of how to gain the greatest freedom for the greatest number. Those advocating prohibition maintain that the greatest liberty will be secured through prohibition. Those opposing prohibition claim that it will be obtained by allowing the free use of intoxicating beverages.

Here is a fundamental difference of opinion. Which side is right? How is the state to determine? It must take one side or the other. It must restrict the freedom of one group or of the other.

Well, it seems to me that the judgment can be made only in the duly constituted ways. A right judgment depends upon the constitution of the various classes enumerated. Their constitution is something for the statesman or the sociologist, not the ethician, to determine. As a moralist, I can only answer that if a particular state in its usual way determines for prohibition, it seems to be perfectly within its right. For to refuse it the right to judge on this matter would be to throw the case to the other side. It would be a virtual judgment that the one class of moderate drinkers who are never going to abuse liquor far outnumbers all the other classes.

Certainly the individual citizen has no right to make such a judgment in the face of a contrary judgment by a great majority of his fellow-citizens enacting prohibition, and to maintain that judgment by a practical nullification of the law. He may of course stick to his opinion and try by all duly consti-

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tuted methods to have the law revoked. But while it remains a law he is bound by it just as much as by any other law.

For to give to the individual this right of nullification would mean anarchy. No law would be sacred against such a principle. As I have said, no man can be a safe judge in his own case. Assuredly a man with the habit of drink is no judge when the thirst is on him.

Moreover, the practical nullification of the law would be an evil out of all proportion to the infringement of liberty involved. An ethician may admit that the passive resistance—or even forcible resistance—to an unjust law may sometimes be justified. But certainly one of the conditions to be fulfilled is that the evil done by the resistance should not be disproportionate to the evil resisted. And where there are legal measures provided for agitating against a law, for building up public opinion to have it changed, it is difficult to see how passive resistance can be justified.

In conclusion, may I say that I have been discussing prohibition, that is, the securing by governmental interference that citizens shall not manufacture, sell, or transport intoxicating beverages. It is necessary to repeat this because persons say that prohibition does this or that, when it is not prohibition doing it, but the violation of prohibition. Furthermore, I have been discussing prohibition only from the ethical standpoint. The social advisability of attempting prohibition, the practical possibility of enforcing it, the means by which it was actually passed in this country, are all beside the mark. And I have been discussing prohibition with several assumptions in mind: that the abuse of liquor was a very serious social evil, that the state has the right to legislate, and that citizens have certain inalienable rights.

Freed, then, from all extraneous questions, the matter is reduced simply to this: Assuming that there is a very serious abuse of liquor in a particular state, may that state, through its duly constituted methods, prohibit the manufacture, sale, and transportation of intoxicating beverages? I answer, "Yes."

NEWMAN HALL, NEW YORK

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ETHICS AND THE PRESS

HARVEY C. LEHMAN AND PAUL A. WITTY

Until very recently the press and the pulpit were regarded as molders of public opinion of paramount significance. The latter has decreased in power and consequent significance, but the former has become increasingly potent, until today it is perhaps the most active single agent in effecting the attitudes and determining the opinions of the public. This condition is looked upon by many with apprehension.

No one is able to state accurately the exact status of the influence of the press. Influence is a factor so complex that quantitative statement is difficult and unreliable. Certain facts indicative of influence have been expressed in terms of such magnitude as to be suggestive only to a limited degree.

Everyone is aware that most adults read the newspapers. That the effects of the wide circulation of newspapers are far reaching, no one questions. One conspicuous effect is the increasing frequency of newspaper-reading among children. Little has been written regarding the effect of newspaper accessibility upon the growing child. The spectacular nature of the statement of material as well as the choice of subject matter which characterizes the modern paper combine to effect important changes in children. These changes must be ascertained by a qualitative study of *how* children read the newspaper. Preliminary to such an accounting it is desirable to ascertain the *extent* to which children read current newspapers.

In a recent publication it is reported that more than 12,000,000 newspapers are sold daily in the twelve largest cities of the United States.[1] In another current periodical the total daily sale of the newspaper is estimated to be 36,000,000 copies.

[1] Anonymous, "Sell the Papers," *Harper's Magazine* (June, 1925). (This article by an anonymous newspaper man undertakes to show how the modern newspaper, in its effort to secure greater circulation, has lost sight of the aims and ideals which inspired the best American journalism of the days of Greeley and Dana.)

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We are living in a day of gigantic circulation. There are actually sold in this country, every week-day of the year, no less than 36,000,000 newspapers. There are in the country, by official count, something like 24,000,000 families. We have accordingly arrived at an era of splendor for the press in which each family buys an average of a paper and a half a day. And this average, it must be remembered, includes outlying rural districts beyond the reach of news-stand circulations. In urban areas the density of circulation is of course much greater.[2]

In so far as the present writers are aware, no quantitative study of the extent to which newspapers are read by children has been reported. The following paper reports an investigation of the frequency with which the newspapers are read by children of various ages.

METHOD

Over 5,000 children were asked to check from a comprehensive and catholic list of two hundred play activities those

TABLE I

NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS INCLUDED IN THREE INVESTIGATIONS OF PLAY BEHAVIOR

AGES	BOYS			GIRLS		
	November 7, 1923	February 20, 1924	April 30, 1924	November 7, 1923	February 20, 1924	April 30, 1924
8½	98	90	80	100	97	99
9½	169	161	114	174	139	144
10½	182	169	160	215	199	176
11½	187	167	184	235	222	220
12½	249	201	176	326	289	266
13½	280	231	259	269	235	263
14½	274	252	238	301	282	278
15½	230	247	247	261	244	256
16½	210	181	193	251	223	235
17½	145	130	146	182	208	193
18½	115	170	130	120	174	167
19½	95	119	102	101	115	93
20½	50	73	59	73	124	76
21½	53	57	43	41	85	66
22 or above	79	105	68	44	114	68

in which they had voluntarily engaged during the preceding week. The directions were specific; the teachers were instructed in giving the tests; and the data were assembled from un-

[2] Charles Merz, "The American Press" (a summary of the changes in a quarter-century), *Century Magazine* (November, 1926), pp. 103–10 (p. 106).

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selected pupils in order that the results of the investigation might be reliable. The data were secured from children in Kansas City, Lawrence, Bonner Springs, and Moran, Kansas. The older individuals were for the most part students of the University of Kansas.

In order that seasonal differences might be taken into account, the list was checked by the foregoing groups on each of three different dates, namely, November 7, 1923, February 20, 1924, and April 30, 1924. The same list of activities was checked on each of these dates and the same procedure in administering the test was used at each testing. The number of pupils included in the study is indicated in Table I.

TABLE II

PERCENTAGES OF BOYS AND GIRLS OF VARIOUS AGE LEVELS WHO INDICATED THAT THEY HAD BEEN "READING THE NEWSPAPERS" DURING THE COURSE OF ONE WEEK PRECEDING THE DATE OF A GIVEN INVESTIGATION

AGES	BOYS			GIRLS		
	November, 1923	February, 1924	April, 1924	November, 1923	February, 1924	April, 1924
8½	60	67	58	45	70	55
9½	63	66	64	66	73	60
10½	74	70	69	79	75	72
11½	75	77	75	77	81	78
12½	78	87	79	84	86	86
13½	80	87	82	85	94	86
14½	82	85	81	76	83	75
15½	77	83	79	86	86	85
16½	84	82	81	88	86	82
17½	85	85	79	88	87	79
18½	85	88	75	85	85	77
19½	83	71	90	69	77	80
20½	90	86	83	66	81	77
21½	88	95	93	73	88	85
22 or above	86	90	93	91	85	87

The following are three items included in the list which was checked by the children:

No. 62 . . . . . Looking at the Sunday "funny paper"
No. 63 . . . . . Reading jokes and funny sayings
No. 64 . . . . . Reading the newspapers

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The inclusion of items No. 62 and No. 63 operates against the child's stating that he had been reading during the past week when he might only have engaged in the almost universal practice of reading the so-called comic or joke supplement of the daily paper.



FIG. 1.—Percentages of boys of various age levels who participated in "reading the newspapers" during the course of one week preceding a given investigation.

November 7, 1923 ————————
February 20, 1924 — — — — — —
April 30, 1924 ————————

RESULTS

Figures 1 and 2 present the results of the investigation for the sexes. It will be observed that the findings for "reading the newspaper" are fairly consistent from season to season. There is also close agreement between the data presented for the sexes for each season. Reading the newspapers apparently is an activity little affected by the seasons. Nor are there conspicuous sex differences displayed by these data. The conspic-

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uous and vital fact herein presented is that *newspaper-reading is an activity commonly engaged in by school children.*

Particularly striking is this fact when comparisons are made with other activities in reference to percentage of children participating in them. Reading the newspapers and reading the "funny paper" are the two activities to which children most often *voluntarily turn* in their leisure.



FIG. 2.—Percentages of girls of various age levels who participated in "reading the newspapers" during the course of one week preceding a given investigation.

November 7, 1923 ————————
February 20, 1924 — - — - — -
April 30, 1924 ----------

Tables III and IV show clearly the universality of interest in the newspaper. Data are presented herein only for activities in which 70 per cent or more of individuals of a given age participate. Each of the numbers in the body of the tables represents a given activity. The percentage of children of a given age engaging in a given activity is found by reference to

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the vertical column at the left. The activities found in Tables III and IV follow:

TABLE III*

THE PLAY ACTIVITIES MOST COMMONLY INDULGED IN BY PERSONS OF DIFFERENT AGES, I.E., BY 70 PER CENT OR MORE OF INDIVIDUALS. BOYS' DATA FOR ALL SEASONS COMBINED

PERCENTAGE	Number of Cases														
	268	465	512	538	617	717	764	724	584	423	416	323	186	156	264
	Ages														
	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	17½	18½	19½	20½	21½	22 and up
94															
93															
92														64	
91															
90		62		62											64
89					62	62									
88			62				62								
87	62														
86															
85													64		
84															
83															
82						64	64			64	64				
81					64			62	64						
80								64	62			64			
79															
78										62					
77															70
76		66		66										70	
75	66	~~	66	64						27				43	
74	~~				66										
73															
72															
71			49												
70			64						27	43	62	62		62	62
69															
68															
67													62		
66															
65		~~													
64		64													
63	~~														
62	64														
61															
60															

* Read Table III as follows: Of the 200 play activities listed in the Lehman Play Quiz, activity No. 62 was the one that was most commonly indulged in by boys of age 8½. Of the 268 boys of this age included in our study, 87 per cent had indulged in this activity. The activity next most commonly indulged in by these 268 boys was No. 66. Several of the activities ranking next in order are omitted owing to lack of room. Note the relatively high ranking among the 200 activities of No. 62 and No. 64. The jagged lines indicate omissions for lack of room on the chart.

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TABLE IV*

THE PLAY ACTIVITIES MOST COMMONLY INDULGED IN BY PERSONS OF DIFFERENT AGES, I.E., BY 70 PER CENT OR MORE OF INDIVIDUALS. GIRLS' DATA FOR ALL SEASONS COMBINED

PERCENTAGE	Number of Cases														
	296	457	590	677	881	767	861	761	709	583	461	309	273	192	246
	Ages														
	8½	9½	10½	11½	12½	13½	14½	15½	16½	17½	18½	19½	20½	21½	22 and up
94					62										
93			62												
92				62											
91															
90		62				62									
89							62								
88	62					64								70	
87															64
86					64			62–64							
85									64	64					
84														64	
83															70
82				64							64				
81							64		62						
80		66											70		
79	66				66							70			
78			66			66									
77															
76				66						27					
75			64							62	27	64	64		
74	173	65	65		65			66						53	
73	175				49	49	66							51	
72	~~	173					49	27–65	27		70	27			
71		49		65		65								27	
70		165	165				27						48–51	43	48
69		~~													
68															
67															
66		64									62				
65															
64															
63															
62															
61	~~														
60															
59															
58	64														

* Read Table IV as follows: Of the 200 play activities listed in the Lehman Play Quiz, activity No. 62 was the one most commonly indulged in by girls of age 8½. Of the 296 girls of this age included in our study 88 per cent had indulged in this activity. The activity next most commonly indulged in by these 296 girls was No. 66. Activity No. 173 ranks third, and activity No. 175 ranks fourth, etc. Note the relatively high ranking of No. 62. "Looking at the Sunday 'funny paper,'" and of No. 64, "reading the newspapers." The jagged lines indicate omission of certain numbers for lack of room on the chart.

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62	Looking at the Sunday "funny paper"
66	Reading books
64	Reading the newspapers
49	Chewing gum
27	Riding in an auto
43	Going to the movies
70	Writing letters
173	Drawing with pencil, pen, chalk, or crayon
175	Cutting paper things with a scissors
65	Reading short stories
165	Just singing
48	Visiting or entertaining company
51	Having "dates"
53	Social dancing

From tables III and IV it is apparent that the nearest approach to unanimity of interest for children of ages 8½–15½ is demonstrated in their response to item No. 62, "Looking at the Sunday 'funny paper.'" Approximately 90 per cent of children of these ages report participation in this activity during the week preceding each of the investigations. The most generally interesting activity for children of ages 12½–16½ is "reading the newspapers." Boys 16½ and above in chronological age report reading the newspaper to be the activity most generally engaged in. This condition holds for girls 16½–22½, with the exception of ages 19½, 20½, and 21½.

These data reveal that reading the newspaper is a common practice of children of *all* ages from the time they learn to read. They demonstrate further that newspaper-reading is one of the activities in which the growing child *most generally participates*.

That newspaper-reading occupies so important a place in child life may come as a surprise to many of the readers of this article. However, it is likely a condition of very recent origin and development.

Since such large numbers of school children read the newspapers, it becomes the duty of society to examine critically the

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character of the publications generally perused. Does newspaper-reading enable the reader to participate intelligently in the thought life of the world and appreciatively in its recreational activities? In a recent magazine article it is contended that newspaper ethics are being subordinated to the demands of the circulation manager, sensationalism being the inevitable result.[3] The following paragraph is taken from an article entitled, "'Sister Aimee' Mrs. McPherson (Saint or Sinner) and Her Flock."

> The Sister [Mrs. McPherson] is a world figure now. When she appeared in May, only the Los Angeles papers went mad. While they were devoting six pages to her, New York buried the story in a quarter column on page 29. But no more. In the recent weeks of her trial, column after column was daily flashed from Southern California to every part of the so-called civilized world. In most districts of the United States she has far outdistanced even Queen Marie, Peaches Browning, and that Old Faithful word-geyser, the Hall-Mills case. This, as every editor knows, is as it should be. Of the unfailing heart-string pluckers, the Peaches Browning case has money and sex; Queen Marie, sex and snobbery; but Aimee's Affair has sex, money, mystery, crime and the invaluable unique aspect, which these others can only envy, religion.[4]

The preceding quoted paragraph reveals the type of material selected by publishers for emphasis. It is clear that the modern newspaper, in its effort to secure greater circulation, has lost sight of the aims and ideals which inspired the best American journalism of the days of Greeley and Dana. This is strikingly true of the city newspapers of large circulation.

In a recent publication the charge is made that the small-town newspaper has become the refuge of subtle propaganda, such propaganda being the more potent because the guileless reader is unaware of the attempt that is being made to influence his opinions.[5]

[3] Anonymous, "Sell the Papers," *Harper's Magazine* (June, 1925).

[4] Bruce Bliven, "'Sister Aimee' Mrs. McPherson (Saint or Sinner) and Her Flock," *New Republic* (November 3, 1926), pp. 289–92 (p. 290).

[5] Carrol D. Clark, "The Small-Town Press Sells Out," *New Republic* (January 20, 1925, pp. 236 ff.

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The possibility of almost universal dissemination of propaganda is illustrated by the following quotations:

All of the Catholic publications which make any pretense of supplying their readers with news as distinguished from material of a purely pietistic character . . . . are subscribers to the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service. It has long been the theory of that organization that a story sent out by it and printed by every subscribing paper will reach approximately 7,000,000 readers. Some of this circulation, it is true, would be outside of the United States, but at least 95 per cent of it would be among American Catholics. The estimate sounds rather high, but it can be demonstrated statistically if that means anything. Thus the N.C.W.C. News Service constitutes an almost ideal agency for influencing opinion. Imagine a potential audience of 20,000,000 all bound tightly together by certain fundamental beliefs and then picture an agency able to reach all of its more literate members every week, and you come very near to describing a propagandist's dream of perfection.[6]

There is scarcely a newspaper in the country that does not make the most of syndicate material. And one result is a certain sameness about the looks and manners of the press regardless of its place of publication. When Queen Marie talks confidentially to the readers of the "Daily Tweedledee" in Boston, she talks equally confidentially, and by way of the same syndicate, to the readers of the "Daily Tweedledum" in San Diego. When Mutt slips on a banana-peel he falls with the same thud on the same morning in Oregon and Maine.[7]

Consolidation of newspapers has brought an increased power to the publisher:

. . . . As far as newspapers are concerned, the tendency toward consolidations has certain definite disadvantages in democratic theory. Every "consolidation" is necessarily a step toward further centralization of control over news and opinion. Surely the greater the number of divergent points of view represented in the press, the more protection there is against propaganda, demagogy, and hysteria.

He [William Randolph Hearst] today owns a string of twenty-two newspapers published in fifteen cities with a combined daily circulation of 3,350,000 copies. This is only a little less than 10 per cent of the

[6] William C. Murphy, Jr., "The Catholic Press," *American Mercury* (December, 1926), p. 401.

[7] Charles Merz, "The American Press," *Century Magazine* (November, 1926), p. 108.

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aggregate daily circulation of all the newspapers in the country. The circulation of Mr. Hearst's Sunday press is 4,084,000 copies; one Sunday reader in every six reads Mr. Hearst.[8]

The press is of huge proportions, its types of service are varied, its future is unknown; small wonder that there are signs of apprehension. From many quarters comes a demand for reform which shall include suppression of those details of crime and vice, publication of which is not demonstrably for the general good. Action taken by the National Society of Newspaper Editors on April 23, 1923, indicates that in the judgment of the editors themselves the situation has become increasingly acute of late years. At this meeting, which was held in Washington, D. C., a code of newspaper ethics was adopted which has since been indorsed by a number of state associations and other groups.[9] A current writer has shown that this action was merely symptomatic of a widely prevalent desire among editors: "Within three years we have had the adoption of no less than eleven 'codes of journalistic ethics,' by such organizations as the American Society of Newspaper Editors and the Southern Newspaper Publishers' Association. These are the first codes of their kind ever to be written for and by the press."[10]

The preceding widespread demand for reform from within the ranks of the editors themselves has twofold significance. First, it indicates recognition of the tremendous influence of the press in molding public opinion. Second, it signifies that the editors themselves are aware of the need of control of the type of material printed. Perusal of current magazines discloses that writers who discuss the modern press are in most instances either doubtful or frankly pessimistic regarding the future influence of the newspaper.

Though the foregoing demand for reform from within the ranks of the editors is from one point of view a most hopeful

[8] Charles Merz, *ibid.*, p. 107.

[9] "Problems of Journalism," *Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting, American Society of Newspaper Editors,* Washington, D.C., April 27–28, 1923.

[10] Charles Merz, *ibid.*, p. 110.

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sign, it is exceedingly doubtful whether journalistic shoddiness can be eliminated by editors alone. The law of supply and demand is such that neither can depart far from the other except in very unusual instances. He would be a rash editor indeed who would undertake to publish a newspaper without taking account of the kind of reading matter for which there is a general and continuous demand. The point here insisted upon is the fact that newspaper influence is a force that is becoming increasingly potent and that newspaper editors themselves are doubting the wholesomeness of this influence.

Former ambassador Bryce has pointed to the fact that the opinions of numerous individuals are molded by what they read in the newspapers.

> Whatever the services of the newspaper in other respects, it has the inevitable defect of superseding, with most of those who read it, the exercise of independent thought. The newspaper—I speak generally, for there are some brilliant exceptions—is, in Europe even more than here, almost always partisan in its views, often partisan in its selection of facts or at least in its way of stating them. Presenting one side of a case, addressing those who are already adherents of that side, putting a color on the events it reports, it serves up to the reader ideas, perhaps only mere phrases or catchwords, which confirm him in his prepossessions, and by its daily iteration makes him take them for truths. Seldom has he the leisure, still more seldom the impulse or the patience, to scrutinize these ideas for himself and form his own judgment. He is glad to be relieved of the necessity for thinking, because thinking is hard work.[11]

Another writer emphasizes the fact that full access to facts is no less important to the citizen than freedom of speech.

> It is beginning to be understood that access to accurate accounts of what is going on about us is one of the indispensable conditions of freedom. We talk a great deal about the right of the individual to express his opinions, and somewhat less about the advantage to the community, or the nation, or the world, of determining its collective notion after the freest discussion; but we are just beginning to see that it is still more vital that the individual shall be able to form his opinion upon the facts. If the facts are withheld from him or misrepresented to him, his opinion is as valueless as that of a judge who has heard incomplete or

[11] Reprinted by R. L. Lyman in *The Mind at Work* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1924), pp. 273 f.

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false evidence in a case. Though the individual may be at liberty to shout his ideas from the housetops, he is still a slave to illusion; and all the more completely a slave than if he were in bonds, because he fancies that he walks freely in the light.[12]

The influence of the newspaper in influencing American opinion prior to our entry into the recent world-conflict is now well known. Quite apart from the question of whether America's participation was or was not justifiable, the present writers are concerned merely with pointing to one of the means by which her entry was made endurable to a peaceably inclined nation. If there are to be future wars one dreads to contemplate the possible consequences of cleverly planned propaganda. Full access to facts is indeed no less important to the citizen than freedom of speech.

The situation is even more serious for the child than for the adult. Most adults read uncritically of course, but children are even more likely to accept what they read than are adults. Suggestion is a potent factor during the formative period of youth. What the children read in the newspapers of today will condition how and what they will think as the citizens of tomorrow. Propaganda continued over a period of years can therefore have results of even greater import than heretofore suspected.

It was previously stated that leading representatives of the press have recently manifested their sense of responsibility for what is being printed. Even if we assume that the more idealistic editors will act as a leavening influence upon the press as a whole, it seems that there are only two outcomes to the present situation: (1) Society must exert greater control over the newspaper, or (2) it must remain content to yield itself still further to newspaper domination. It is doubtful that legislative enactments will afford a satisfactory solution. The problem is obviously one that demands the careful consideration of all thoughtful persons.

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[12] Frederick L. Allen, "Newspapers and the Truth," *Atlantic Monthly* (January, 1922).

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MR. HOOPER ON FREEDOM

EDWARD F. METTRICK

To the April number of the *Journal of Philosophical Studies* Mr. Hooper contributes an article on "Freedom." Its charming style can hardly fail to appeal to many cultured readers of that *Journal,* and its moderate views, combining the heart of more than one philosophical tradition, will gain a wide acceptance. And yet there arises the misgiving that this very charm, this very acceptability will but lull, as discussions on freedom have too often lulled, readers into the comfortable belief that they understand the subject of debate, whereas nothing can possibly be understood since the terms of the discussion are unknown and too often subordinated to an ideal which is really devoid of meaning and of content.

Against this representative view we should like to show that the term "freedom" has a meaning and a content.

Now according to Mr. Hooper a limb released from a bandage is free, and a clock wound up—and in good mechanical condition and unhampered by external impediments—is relatively free from external restraints, but, since the former is still part and parcel of an anatomical system, and the latter of a mechanical sphere, their freedom is conditioned. The limb is only free from the bandages and only free to function as a limb, and the clock only free to go as it was built to go. And, he continues, since everything but the universe must be in some way restrained, freedom must mean something less, or at least other, than the absolute freedom of the whole. So a man is humanly free from restraint when released from prison and harsh coercion, though this is not sufficient to guarantee the higher kind of freedom that we call moral. For we may be slaves to our own passions, and even if the will masters all recalcitrant impulses and reigns supreme (whatever may be the meaning of these facile metaphors), a man is not necessarily

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free: he may be disowning the just claims of the intellect; he may be the slave of a limited social convention, because the will never actually coincides with the entire man. But there is, we are assured, freedom in so far as there is internal harmony amongst the multitude of constituents of human nature. We start from a hereditary and a social given, and only "by mutual modification of conflicting impulses and sentiments, guided by fuller knowledge and deeper insight acquired through experience," do we establish that inner harmony which is freedom. But more yet, for experience proclaims that this inner harmony is achieved under the control of the ideals of love and beauty. So moral freedom is tantamount to self-determination, and this is possible because we see, as against the argument for Laplace's calculator, that life is creative; that there emerge, besides mathematical quantitative determinations, qualities which prove life to be a unique and a vital causation.

Now let us, leaving on one side that oratory of the market place that is so confident as to what history or experience proves, ask Mr. Hooper, and with him so many of the moral philosophers, if he can really, within the bounds of his acquaintancy, within the sphere of history or biography, point out to us a freedom that is a wholeness, a freedom that emerges somehow from, and yet is somehow determinative of, life, and that moreover emerges specifically under the ideals of truth and beauty. And will he tell us, too, if his answer be in the affirmative, precisely what each of these terms means? For unless he can do so his rare words of consolation may but prove those counters that deceive the wise.

Take that entire man, that harmonious unity that transcends class conventions, enslaving passion and ruthless intellect, and where do we find him? I know him not—unless all these phrases have such a literary laxity as to be useless for scientific discussion. And I am afraid that such vague generalities are what we usually get in discussions of freedom.

Consider the harmony: Now if a pig peacefully snoozing on a full belly or placidly grubbing about among the roots and

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mire may be, as no pig-breeder will doubt, so perfectly content, so inwardly harmonious, we see at once that such a term is not enough—it is far from enough—to provide a key to morality. It must by its very inclusion into a moral debate be the harmony of a moral nature. We have explained nothing, but have all the explanation yet to do. We must know of what and with what our harmony is to be.

Or will Mr. Hooper tell us in any more exact manner what he means by freedom from class conventions, or by freedom from dominance by passion and intellect? Will he, knowing that all historical fact is liable in the very process of its becoming historical fact to suffer the judgment of posterity, tell us with anything beyond vague and useless generality by what criterion we may know such freedom when we see it—if see it we do? Are we never, even in theory, to escape that Victorian logic that defined itself as right and judged all men accordingly? Or will he draw us the mean between passion and intellect? For if he cannot give us this determination, then I fear his ideal holism cannot stand as a practical proposition of morality. And, even if we suppose all this done, we are still in need of a proof that such a holism is actually determinative of life.

Let us look at some of his propositions again. The limb free from bandages is free—from bandages; and I for one positively refuse to believe that Mr. Hooper can deduce any further proposition from that simple piece of information. All the valid information we have and can have comes from our knowledge of the limb and the systems of which it is part. So with the clock: the wound-up clock is free—to go; but that statement has no significance apart from, and no significance beyond, our knowledge of the clock and the system of clocks. And there is this further point, the point of Green and Bosanquet's doctrine of a hindrance of hindrances: If the limb is broken or deranged, is the bandage then essentially an alien restraint, or may it not be, in some very patent sense, a condition of the limb's freedom?

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But let us turn to the man. A man in prison or one groaning under tyranny is, in a precise and obvious meaning, not free; from such an immediate starting-point many besides the Benthamites have argued not only that there are alien restraints, but that there are limits to the restraints that may rightfully be put on a man. Yet no one has precisely determined the point at which illicit constraint occurs. Bosanquet's polemic against the self- and other-regarding actions of Mill's laissez faire has left the field open again, but in the absence of a practical working line leaves us meandering from the extreme of libertarianism to the extreme of state absolutism. The trouble is that we have not even in politics and morals such a concept of normality as the physician and the physiologist have when they approach the broken limb. I suggest that the absence of a concept of human normality in these spheres, and the absence of the conditions of that normality such as comes to the physician from chemistry, physics, biology, and the rest, invalidates all our notions of freedom. I do not, of course, suggest that there are no studies comparable to these; but only that the notion of freedom can have scientific meaning only in proportion as these encircling and conditioning studies become definite.

It is very far from likely that the tenor of this criticism will be strange to Mr. Hooper, for he has definitely stated that any freedom short of that of the universe cannot be absolute, and he has thereby propounded the notion of freedom as something conditioned: it is very far from likely that I or any other can give a precise definition of freedom. All I have attempted is to put forward as a sort of prolegomena to a discussion of the idea of freedom the conviction that the obvious task is the investigation of those limits and conditions.

Now it may be objected that I am but laboring the obvious, since Green's freedom was certainly more deterministic than several other people's determinism, and Kant's freedom was the self-imposition of a sort of law-of-nature necessity, and

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since both these thinkers made heroic efforts to understand what exactly was meant by freedom and what were its conditions; but these have at most, from the point of view presented, stated the problem rather than solved it. If we admit that men are not absolutely free (and Mr. Hooper has told us that only the universe can be absolutely free), but that the term freedom is in common use and has a significance, then what is that significance? The contention here is that freedom is used in two senses, both with a great amount of latitude and inexactness, and both capable of closer determination, but that neither usage is of much value to philosophy; moreover, that the supposed value of the notion of freedom to moral philosophy has arisen from the confusion of these two meanings. These meanings are physical and social.

Physically considered, a man is not absolutely free, for only the universe is so free; but, it is argued, he is free to be what he is. But to say that a clock when wound up is free to go, i.e., to be a clock, is not very profound; nor does it seem so to say that a man is free to be what he is. In fact, the moralists themselves give us the proof, because what they have wanted to prove is that man is free to be—or rather become—something that he is not at the moment. Now there seems an obvious sense in which this is possible, inasmuch as life is a growth, a continual becoming from birth to death; but this is not what the moralist seeks to demonstrate: He wants to demonstrate that the immoral may become moral, the bad become good. And I am not sure that this also is not patently possible in at least one prominent sense, for the political philosophers have always sought to determine what arrangement of the mechanism of the social life, what institutions, what reforms would or peradventure might produce good citizens. We can hardly look around us in common life without seeing on every hand the embodied belief that the bad may be altered in some measure, that the growing young may be trained aright. But it is at least as patent that very few moral philosophers would be

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satisfied with this amount (whatever that amount may be) of molding men into what we see them here and now to be.

Already, however, the physical has run into the social with that fatal tendency which vitiates our ethics; and if we are resolutely to keep them distinct, it seems doubtful whether under the heading of physical freedom we should do more than reach a concept of normality, comparable to that of our concept of the nature of the clock, and containing a statement of man's physical capacities. But many will refuse to be restricted to such a narrow limit: they will ask with Ward if the world is not different from what it would have been had he never appeared thereon, or with Bergson if life does not channel out its own way as it proceeds. But the proof of these would have to be forthcoming before they could be of any use to ethics, and I very much doubt if even these are the moral freedom that we seek. For the arguments can hardly prove more than that human beings in their aggregate and throughout their history have been and are capable of altering their environment, or that life in general is somehow of itself capable of determining the forms of its manifestation; and neither of these has any connection with the moral demand that an individual can here and now become of himself implicate with a higher moral value than he has up to now possessed.

But isn't this, one will object, precisely what the spiritualist moralists have been doing all the time? Haven't Hegel and Green wrestled with the metaphysic of humanity for the express purpose of discovering just what human nature was and implied? Undoubtedly that is so; but one may be very far from the imputation of cynicism and still hold that the "real man," Green's man of the timeless self, is very different from the wayfaring man as we know him in this concourse of world, flesh, and devil, in this realm of moral effort and striving, in short. But perhaps it is an article of a creed, and as such subject to persuasion and not to proof, that the being of the subject of morals is what he is in a very much more terrestrial and

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immediate sense from that of their beliefs. At any rate there can be no agreement on the first points of any discussion until there is a prior agreement as to the question of human normality.

When we turn to the social aspect we see that between our wants, desires, impulses, and their satisfaction is a gap which may or may not be bridged. Men do die of hunger and thirst and the like; but somehow, though we are here at the very bed rock of all the social and political agitations for freedom, moral philosophers hardly seem to discuss this sort of thing. Satisfaction of these prime needs is, for man as we know him, social; is implicate with the satisfaction of the like needs of others; and patriot and poet have dreamed of a freedom from prison, from oppression, from harsh and iniquitous burdens, from enforced labor, and from all other impediments to the free gratification of their impulses and desires. The connection with the English economists and utilitarians is obvious, but on the whole moralists have been more ready to point out to a wicked and errant humanity that freedom to satisfy desires may so readily become license. This, I take it, is Mr. Hooper's "enslavement to passion," and so freedom becomes a sort of mean between abstinence and license. But this conception is far too vague and indefinite to be of use to ethics. So long as the ancient, customary landmarks remain it may be sufficient; but what if they do not hold? This is ever the weakness of the Aristotelian intuitionism. Besides, it depends on too many factors that are usually considered to lie beyond the scope of the moral: on military domination (as Seeley pointed out), on harvests, on population, on a host of circumstances that seem rather to determine moral conceptions than to be determined by them. So the only practical suggestion that the politically minded philosophers have reached is that freedom is a political question, a resultant of a political system. Yet none has ever been able to clear the field of the space-time militaristic, economic, and "political" influences sufficiently to

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grasp an essential mean between desires and their objects. It is significant that Plato and Rousseau set in the forefront of their schemes (though these postulates are the first to be set aside and treated with contempt by their followers) a stable economic condition, a fixed tradition, and an absence of military cataclysms and of embouchments of population.

This much at least is obvious: that, taking freedom in the sense understood by the wayfaring man, the freedom possessed by an individual to satisfy his desires is a pragmatic outcome of a competition between men and terrestrial productivity. And it may be possible, as Soddy argues, that science and industry can enormously increase products, and thereby satisfactions, and that this would affect social freedom in ways hardly yet conceived; but none of this can have any vital concern with ethics as a discipline until we have solved that prime requisite, the normality of man. And in reaching that concept we may have passed away from Mr. Hooper's "higher freedom that is called moral." But this can hardly be a matter for regret; at any rate such a notion had nothing but vagueness to recommend it, and in perceiving that freedom comes under positive social sciences, the iatric moralist may, peradventure, be able to do what the older moral preachers and exhorters could not with confidence do, i.e., turn bad men into good. And if this result is as vague as the rest, we might ask if we ever could mean by freedom more than the full satisfaction of the normal man when we have seen that this is a definite social aim.

HEALEY, BATLEY, YORKSHIRE

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MACHIAVELLI

NORMAN WILDE

On the twenty-second of June, just four hundred years ago, Niccolò Machiavelli died at Florence. Apparently the life of this apostle of efficiency had been a failure. After having devoted fourteen years of his early manhood to the service of the Republic, he was deprived of his office by the return of the Medici, and died a disappointed man without ever having secured again the position and the opportunity he craved. It is true that this political inactivity was the occasion of his literary productiveness, but the most brilliant of his works remained unpublished at his death, and, for centuries after it, involved his name in hatred and contempt.

Yet in our own day the most effective political personality in Europe has avowed himself his disciple and proclaimed his political principles as valid for all time. Speaking at Imola in 1924, Mussolini said: "I believe Machiavelli's *Prince* to be the statesman's supreme guide. The question may be asked: After a lapse of four centuries, does life remain in that great work the *Prince?* Is it possible that Machiavelli's advice may still be of some use to modern statesmen? Is the value of the political system given in the *Prince* limited to the period during which the book was written? Is it out of date, or is it universal and everlasting? My answer is that Machiavelli's doctrine is alive today even more than four centuries ago."

If this is so, and Mussolini's career during the three years since his words were spoken seems convincing evidence of the fact, it is worth while at this time to attempt once more the interpretation of the position of his notorious Florentine master.

Although Machiavelli was not a systematic writer on politics, or on political philosophy at all in the strict sense, his works are of primary importance as the most genuine docu-

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mentary expression of the ideas implicit in the political realities of his age. Shocking as his principles appeared to be, not merely to the men of the modern age but also to those of his own century, they were yet the principles of the process by which the modern world was being built up out of the ruins of the medieval system. The bonds that had loosely held together the multiple groups of the earlier period had weakened. The empire had become a name, and the papacy, grasping at universal dominion, had lost its authority through the corruption involved in its temporal supremacy. The groups themselves also, under the pressure of economic change, were losing their internal cohesion, their control over their members was relaxed, new groupings were being formed, and customary controls everywhere were losing their authority.

The result was the individualism of the Renaissance with its consequent problem of social control, nowhere more evident than in the Italy of Machiavelli's day, torn by the struggles of its irresponsible tyrants and open to the foreign invasions they invited. Both religion and morality seemed to have lost their restraining power; the civic virtues had vanished; and political life presented the appearance of a struggle for existence in which the only standard of fitness was physical or intellectual ability to survive. The people, in the sense insisted upon by Cicero, as an organized body with a common purpose, seemed to have resolved itself into a mass of individuals careless of the common good and seeking each his own. It is true that relics of the older feudal system still persisted; but they had lost their vitality and served only to obstruct the creation of a new and more effective system.

If social and political order were once more to be established, it must come either from within or from without, either from a moral regeneration of the social body, a revival of civic virtue, or from the establishment of a strong external authority. Of the former means there seemed little hope. Machiavelli himself was firmly convinced that the degeneration of the

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body politic had gone too far to admit of a reversal of the process through popular initiative. Like Luther he believed that the corruption of the human heart could only be remedied from without, but unlike the reformer, he looked for his salvation, not from the grace of God, but from the fear of the prince. "It will be clearly seen that in Italy, by reason of her corruption, there is little or nothing to hope, save by the daring and violence of some great man who may be able and willing to strive for her improvement. In Italy all is corrupt, as in part Spain and France are also corrupt; but in the two latter nations things go much better as they are already established kingdoms" (*Discourses,* I, xviii; Villari, *Life and Times of Machiavelli,* II, iii).

As is evident, Machiavelli is here merely drawing on his experience. The popular movement in both church and state during the fifteenth century had come to nothing; but in the national monarchies of England and France he had illustrations of the way in which unscrupulous princes had been able through their own aggrandizement to impose peace upon their peoples. The power of the papacy had been neutralized, feudal privileges abolished, dangerous rivals destroyed, until the crown had become virtually the sole effective power in the nation. It was true that this involved tyranny and oppression, but it was also true that individuals had been restrained, private wars abolished, a single system of royal justice established, internal security maintained, and national independence made safe. The self-interest of the prince had coincided in its results with that of his subjects. The vital problem of control had been solved by the strong man.

But while the England of Henry VII, the France of Charles VIII and Louis XII, and even the Spain of Ferdinand the Catholic seemed to have obtained success, Italy had made no progress. The Kingdom of Naples in the south, the Papal States in the middle, and the Duchy of Milan and the republics of Venice and Florence in the north, still divided its terri-

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tory between them, allowing no respite from their internal factions and external strifes; while always beyond the Alps or across the seas were France and Spain and the Turks ready to take advantage of their fatal disunion. There was now no imperial power, as in the days of Dante, from which external aid might be expected, nor was there any power within the peninsula obviously fitted for control. The papacy, the only power with more than local authority, was the chief obstacle to national unity, using as it did its ecclesiastical influence for the extension of its own temporal possessions, yet unfitted by the nature of its government to develop an abiding political power. As Machiavelli clearly saw, "the church alone has prevented this union in Italy; for, having had her seat there and held the temporal power, she has neither been strong enough to occupy it entirely, nor so weak as not to be able, when fearing the loss of the temporal power, to summon a new potentate to defend her against anyone threatening to seize it" (*Discourses*, I, xii). If salvation was to come, then, it must be through the advent of a strong ruler able to apply intelligently and thoroughly the methods by which in all times effective centralized power had been built up. It is the keenness and amazing honesty of his analysis of these methods that give to Machiavelli's writings their great historical significance. They seem like an immediate transcript of the historic process itself turned into a prescription for the making of an absolute national state.

Machiavelli's life well fitted him for his work. Born in 1469, spending his youth in the Florence of Lorenzo the Magnificent, witnessing the spectacular attempt of Savonarola to inaugurate a truly Christian republic, becoming a secretary to The Ten and visiting all the important courts of Europe on the business of the Republic, serving for months as an official observer in the circle about Cesare Borgia and witnessing his success in pacifying the Romagna, and finally dismissed from political life with the return of the Medici in 1512 and devoting the evenings of his enforced leisure to the study of the Ro-

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man historians, he felt peculiarly well qualified to interpret for his generation the experience of the present in terms of his reading of the past.

The writings most important from the point of view of political philosophy are the *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy* and the *Prince,* both started in 1513, but the *Discourses* not finished until several years later. The two works belong together, the former containing the most complete expression of his views, the latter being a special elaboration of his theories of the tyranny. Unfortunately for Machiavelli's reputation, the briefer and more sensational *Prince* was destined to be the better known, with the result that his republicanism has been ignored and the ideal of unprincipled despotism, as illustrated in the career of Cesare Borgia, ascribed to him as his own. The essay on the *Art of War* also throws light on his ideals, and the *History of Florence,* which he was commissioned by the Medici to write about 1520, gives concrete illustration of the principles of his political psychology.

Machiavelli's republicanism did not forbid his dedicating the *Prince* to the younger Lorenzo dei Medici, nor his seeking office under the new tyranny, but he was just beginning to come back into public employment when the Medici were again driven out and the republic re-established. In spite of his recent relations with the banished family, Machiavelli hoped that his earlier services to the republic might serve to secure him his former position; but his too easy acquiescence in political change seems to have stood in his way, and the place was given to another. He died in 1527.

This apparent indifference to party loyalties has earned for Machiavelli the title of time-server, and the explanation both of his political action and his writing has been found in a mean personal ambition. But while it is true enough that interest in place and power was a strong motive in his life, and that he had small taste for political martyrdom, it is equally evident from both his life and his writings that his interest was

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not limited to the fortunes of his personal self. His fourteen years of faithful service to the republic, his statesman-like grasp of the need for a united Italy, as well as the genuineness of his interest in history and political psychology, all show a mind of larger sweep than such petty ambitions can explain. Nor yet, on the other hand, is it quite possible to see in him the fervent patriot that nationalist writers of the nineteenth century have discovered. There is no evidence of a consuming enthusiasm, even for a united Italy. Machiavelli was not a man of enthusiasms. The motives that moved him were neither personal ambition alone nor a pure love of the public welfare, but rather a hatred of bungling and a contempt for the half-measures that meant inefficiency. His was an intellectual rather than a moral passion, an interest in political effectiveness rather than a sympathy with the results to be produced. By calm conviction a republican, his admiration was for the man who could get things done, and it was as a contribution to the science of political efficiency that he offered the principles drawn from history and his own experience.

It is in accordance with this practical motive that Machiavelli's method is realistic and historical. He is not primarily interested in ideal states and their citizens, but in the actual human material with which statesmen have to build, hence his ruthless analysis of the motives he finds everywhere effective in the society of his day, as well as involved in the movements of the past. It is not a flattering picture he presents: a human nature moved solely by fear, pride, and self-interest, and perhaps not wholly an accurate picture even of the society of his age; but it is an intensely vivid picture, and is, in intention at least, an attempt to found the art of government upon an empirical study of human nature. In this respect it marks the beginning of the modern period of political philosophizing, and is indeed far in advance of the work of most of his successors for nearly two centuries.

Consistently with this empirical spirit there is a complete

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absence of all appeal to the authority of church or Scripture. The whole medieval system of theological argumentation has disappeared. His writings are purely secular. So far as he finds it necessary to go beyond his own experience it is on the Roman historians and on Polybius that he relies. As with them, it is Rome as the organizing conqueror of the world that is the object of his admiring study, and it is from an analysis of its success that he confirms the conclusions of his own experience. His history is not critical, and his interests are mainly political, civic, and military. The moving forces that he recognizes are purely personal: he has the "great man" conception of history, ignoring the influence of social and religious institutions. He has a keen eye for what he is looking for, however, and, within the limits of his interests, his analysis is usually acute.

In the use of this realistic and empirical method one has to go back to Aristotle to find his equal; but his work is far less complete and systematic than that of his great predecessor, much more confined to the immediate political problem before him. He is correspondingly less interested in the ideal end of the state and absorbed in the practical question of means, and this instrumentalism and positivism give a strong impetus to the later tendency to separate politics from ethics. This narrowing of the problem, however, does not seem to have been the result of any theory of method, but was apparently only the expression of his own lack of ethical interest. The necessity of political power is taken for granted and the only problem becomes that of securing, maintaining, and extending it.

Machiavelli's rather perfunctory treatment of the traditional questions of the origin of society, the stages in its development, and the varieties of political constitution is found in his *Discourses* and follows closely the history of Polybius. For the founding of a state he thinks that it is an advantage to have a single strong personality to give it unity and direction, but for its maintenance there is needed a blending of the interests and wills of many (*Discourses*, I, ix). For Machia-

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velli, in spite of the impression given in the *Prince,* is a convinced republican in his general ideal, as is evidenced by his ardent admiration of republican Rome and of the military Swiss republics of his own day. But he is no abstract doctrinaire, and follows the Aristotelian tradition in recognizing the limitations imposed by conditions. Where the citizens are animated by civic virtue and there are no great inequalities of wealth, there a republic may properly exist and serve the needs of security and freedom; but where these conditions are wanting, republican forms can only lead to faction, weakness, and tyranny. To escape from the worst of such evils the forms of freedom may have to be renounced under the rule of a strong prince, but much of its substantial content may be preserved. Under a really strong ruler lesser tyrannies are abolished, inequalities removed, group privileges destroyed, factional strife suppressed, and the state made one in the common equality of all its citizens before their one lord. A strong government is at least the first essential for civic freedom.

The value of this princely rule is especially evident in the case of conquered peoples, since citizens of a conquering republic are never willing to place the conquered on the same plane of privilege with themselves, while to a prince all are equally his subjects. This is the more significant for Machiavelli since, with the Roman state as his model, expansion is essential for the safety and vitality of the political power. In this his divergence from the classic Greek ideal is marked. For him the state is not the organized unity of the common life, a moral personality with its natural limits fixed by its own inherent character and form, but rather a governing and military body knowing no limits save those imposed by its own weakness. While it is implicitly recognized that its duty is to promote the arts and to secure the conditions for peaceful living, its real essence is in its power, and its success lies in the maintenance and expansion of this. It is in this ideal of power, growing out of the need for unity as the fundamental good and

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to find expression later in the concept of sovereignty, that we find the mark of the modern state; and it is in Machiavelli that we get, if not its systematic formulation, at least its earliest pronounced expression.[1]

It is with this ideal of political power as an end in itself that Machiavelli's name is most closely associated. The idea finds its most vivid and complete expression in the *Prince*, but the principle is equally fundamental in the *Discourses*. Speaking of the advantage derived from the killing of Remus by Romulus, he writes:

> When his deeds accuse him he shall be justified by their results; and when it is a good deed like that of Romulus the deed itself is sufficient justification, since he who commits violence for purposes of destruction does verily deserve censure, but not he who commits violence in order to establish security [*Discourses*, I, ix].

And again:

> Where it is an absolute question of the welfare of our country, we must admit of no considerations of justice or injustice, of mercy or cruelty, of praise or ignominy, but putting all else aside, must adopt whatever course will save its existence and preserve its liberty [*Discourses*, III, xli].

And from the *Prince* to the same effect:

> Those princes who have done great things have held good faith of little account. Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear merciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a mind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and know how to change to the opposite. . . . . It is necessary for a prince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. [And this justifying statement:] If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them [*Prince*, chap. xviii].

[1] The suggestion of Dunning (*Political Theories Ancient and Modern*, p. 296) that if Aristotle had witnessed the career of Rome he might have had a similar ideal of expansion, seems to indicate a failure to understand the Greek ideal of perfection as involving finiteness and limitation. Unending expansion would have meant for them the negation of form.

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And these maxims he illustrates abundantly and unambiguously from ancient and contemporary history, accepting the most abominable cruelties and treacheries as unfortunate yet necessary means for the realization of the political end. His answer to the old Greek problem of whether the good man is also the good citizen would thus be in the negative; the political virtues are not the same as the personal virtues. The man who aspires to rule the state must cultivate other qualities than those that would fit him to live among his fellow-men as friend and equal. Christian morality and religion may be valuable for the saving of the individual soul, but their principles are not such as to develop the civic virtues making for political strength and independence, and he approves of the saying of Gino Capponi that the Council of Ten for War should always be composed of men "who loved their country better than their souls" (Villari, *Life and Times of Machiavelli*, II, 81).

Neither the *Prince* nor the *Discourses* were published during the author's lifetime, though the former was probably circulated privately and a plagiarized version of it was issued in 1523 by a certain Agostino Nifo. His ideas aroused no scandal, however, until changes in political and religious conditions brought them into unfavorable notice. The Medici returned to power in 1529, put an end to the Florentine republic, and established themselves as acknowledged absolute masters of the city. It was natural enough, therefore, for the oppressed people to associate the counsels of Machiavelli's *Prince* with the policy of the family to whom it was dedicated, and to see in its author the agent of their own enslavement. In the popular imagination he tended to become himself the embodiment of the character he had advocated for the prince.

In the religious sphere also a transformation was taking place that brought his doctrines into evil relief. The Reformation and Counter-Reformation were in progress, and an attitude tolerable and natural enough toward the religion of Alexander VI and Julius II could no longer pass unchallenged by

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either Protestant or Catholic. His secularism and rejection of ecclesiastical supremacy roused the hostility of the Jesuits and evoked bitter attacks on his life and ideas. In 1559 his works were placed on the *Index*. From that time almost to the present, Machiavelli's character and the import of his ideas have been subjects of heated controversy, moralists decrying his immoralism and state-builders practicing his precepts. Even his apologists have been apt to be half-hearted in his defense, some interpreting his doctrine as a purely hypothetical abstraction, some as a social physician's study of disease, and some as simply an expression of the spirit of the times.[2]

It is perhaps impossible to remove all ambiguities and inconsistencies in a writer so little systematic as Machiavelli, but a few points seem fairly clear. In the first place he evidently does not conceive himself as denying the validity of the accepted rules of conduct for the ordinary citizen. The virtues and vices of everyday life retain for him their customary value, however far he may allow himself occasionally to depart from the ideal. Nor does he hold these virtues as meaningless, even for the ruler. Power obtained through inhumanity and unnecessary cruelty can never be a source of true glory. It is only when respect for the moral virtues stands in the way of political effectiveness that they must be disregarded. Machiavelli is a consistent utilitarian moralist, so far as implicit principle goes. No rules are absolute, but all are relative to results. It is the end that justifies the means, and that alone justifies them. Given an end to be accomplished and it is only ignorance and weakness that hesitate over the necessary means.

As to what that end is to which even morality must give way, there is little question. It is not the private happiness of the individual, but the welfare of the state. Machiavelli is no preacher of individualism or egoism, however like his doctrine

[2] For an account of these varying estimates, see the Introduction to Burd's edition of *Il Principe*, Villari's *Life and Times of Machiavelli*, Vol. II, chap. v, and Morley's lecture on *Machiavelli*.

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may sometimes seem to that of Nietzsche. Individualism had been at the root of the political evils of his time; the end he glorifies therefore is the state, its independence, and its power. The supreme virtue is the antique virtue of patriotism as exemplified in the citizen of the Roman Republic or the city states of Greece. The only religion to which Machiavelli gives more than lip service is this civic religion of the pagan world.

The reason that this group ideal of his has been ignored lies in the fact that he embodied it in the person of the prince. Had it been realized that the same immoralism he preached for the tyrant he intended to apply equally to a republic, his doctrine might not have aroused quite so much indignation. It is not the prince as an individual he wishes to free from moral restraint, but the prince as the embodiment of political power and the condition of the unity and vigor of the group. He is far from ignoring the motives of personal ambition in the princely actions, but the justification of them is found solely in their results for political stability. It is the state as such whose conduct is above moral criticism.

This irresponsibility characterizes political action in both internal and external affairs, but Machiavelli, interested as he is primarily in the establishment of power, puts most emphasis on its application in the latter field. It is freedom in the crushing of enemies, not violence in the ordering of domestic affairs, that he demands. In international relations he thus accepts the anarchy consequent upon the breaking up of the medieval unity, recognizes the facts of the struggle for existence between nations, and admits no law higher than that of political self-preservation. The Roman and medieval conception of a natural law is ignored by him as completely as is that of revelation, and sanction is given to that idea of an international war of each against all, against the evils of which Grotius was to protest so vigorously a century later in his *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*.

And this doctrine was not merely the frank formulation of

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the unacknowledged principles actually governing political action from Machiavelli's day to our own, but, as Figgis has pointed out (*From Gerson to Grotius*, chap. iii), there was ample ecclesiastical justification for it in the theory of the power of the pope to absolve men and princes from their oaths and contracts, and in the decree of the Council of Constance which sealed the fate of John Hus, that faith was not to be kept with heretics. Reasons of state, secular or ecclesiastical, had always been held to take precedence of private morality. It was Machiavelli's service to have generalized this doctrine and given it open recognition, as it was his misfortune, perhaps, to have given it too exclusive illustration in the forms of personal rule. That which might have provoked little comment when enounced as a principle for the impersonal state could not but rouse righteous indignation when offered as a maxim for an individual prince.

Moreover, it was an anachronism to attempt to restore the state to the position it had held in ancient times. The Greek city state had been to a large extent a moral personality embodying the spiritual life of its citizens. It was natural enough therefore to identify its service with the highest duty of man. But in the Christian society there had grown up a separate institution for the expression of its moral and religious ideals, and tending therefore to empty the state of its spiritual significance. The patriotism which in the pagan state, as including religion in its sanction, might claim an absoluteness of devotion, could, in the more differentiated modern state, make no such claim to supreme obligation. In the Christian conscience the state had become merely one means for the realization of an end not definable in terms of political values. There was coming into existence a moral individualism that had made the absoluteness of any external civic loyalty forever impossible. The temporary values involved in the attaining of any merely external form of political power were felt to be gained at too great a cost if gained at the expense of those "living

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forces by which societies subsist and governments are strong" (Morley, *Machiavelli*).

But the very ugliness of the portrait of the prince drawn by Machiavelli constitutes its value. His realistic exaltation of the state has in it far more of wholesome truth than have the panegyrics of its more romantic partisans. Politics is a rude business, and not a nursery of the Christian virtues. He who is not content to await the result of the slow processes of moral development, but would force his way directly to his goal, must expect to run counter to the moralities. It was this truth that Machiavelli emphasized so forcefully in his precepts for the tyrant, but the idea might be given more general application by reference to the necessary limitations of all political action. The state is a power among powers and, as such, imperfectly moral. Its mind is the imperfect intelligence of the mass; its will has the blunted sensibility of the group. To expect the same high standard of morality in the action of states as is to be found in that of individuals is to be blind to political realities. If by an imaginative use of the term we may regard the state as a person, we must also remember that it is a defective, and itself in need of the guardianship it offers. Whether we characterize this condition as supermoral or as submoral is perhaps a matter of indifference; but in any case it is Machiavelli's service to have drawn the contrast between the necessities of public and private conduct with unsparing realism, as it is the service of his modern follower to have exemplified it in the conduct of the state.

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BOOK REVIEWS

PLATO: THE MAN AND HIS WORK. By A. E. Taylor. New York: Dial Press, Inc., 1927. Pp. xi+522.

This book explicitly follows the general plan of Grote's well-known work. There is a "life," an account of Plato's writings, and an analysis, with historical and philosophical interpretation, of each dialogue. The author aims at historical fidelity, i.e., at transporting the reader mainly to the fifth century B.C., and at telling us "just what Plato has said, and how he has said it." This means, in practice, that what Plato presents as Socratic is regarded as really Socratic, and not as Plato speaking through a mask; that what Plato presents as Pythagorean is regarded as really Pythagorean, etc. In short, the book takes the standpoint, associated with the names of Professors Burnet and Taylor, that the real Plato was the teacher, administrator, and organizer of the Academy, while his writings deal, for the most part, not with "opinions of Plato," but with "Socrates made young and handsome," as the well-known Epistle has it. The greater part of the book thus really deals with the life and opinions of Socrates rather than of Plato; and the last chapter, which professes to deal with Plato himself, is admittedly "little more than a series of hints."

The book is written mainly for two classes of readers: university honors students, and readers with interests in philosophy rather than in Greek. From this it might, perhaps, be inferred that others would not find the work worth reading. This, however, is not the case. Like all Professor Taylor's publications, this work is full of good things. The analyses, taken as a whole, are more illuminating than any other analyses in print; and the treatment of the later and more difficult dialogues stands out as peculiarly excellent. The interpretation of the *Parmenides* as a *jeu d'esprit*, which retorts upon the Eleatics that their hypothesis of "the one" can withstand Zenonian criticisms even less well than the Socratic hypothesis of "ideas," is brilliant. The philosophical insight displayed throughout can only have been attained to by considerable effort; but none of the effort appears in either text or footnotes. The historical and scholarly knowledge in evidence on every second page helps to make the work much more concrete and "human" than most studies of the dialogues, and the exact references to modern and even contemporary treatment of Plato's problems serve to bring out the significance of Socratic and Platonic thought as perhaps nothing else could have done.

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On the other hand, the tone is frequently somewhat didactic. When we remember that our author's presumptive readers are still largely *in statu pupillari* and, as the Preface puts it, "need to be told," perhaps a little ex cathedra dogmatism is in place. Perhaps. Almost all lecturers to undergraduates regard themselves as justified in oversimplifying problems and in treating opposing views with scant courtesy. But does the customary propaganda whereby a lecturer strengthens his position by asserting that those who maintain the same views are "plainly right," while divergent views are dismissed are "absurd, perverse, preposterous, unintelligent, unthinkable blunders," really assist the cause of scholarship or philosophy? Propaganda of this type is very much in evidence in our author's pages and stands out in painful contrast to his quite genuine philosophical insight. So also the not infrequent appeal to "good taste," a "sense of humor," "intelligence," and "sound literary feeling," etc., while not inappropriate in writing for youthful students, raises doubts when it is invoked against an Adam, a Natorp, or a Wilamowitz. *Platonisches Gefühl*, under whatever name it is invoked, is, after all, a subjective and relative affair, and can hardly be regarded as a final criterion when *both* parties to a scholarly dispute are men of sensibility. Is the cause of humor and sound taste really furthered by asserting that Adam was deficient in the first and that others (including the greatest names in Platonic scholarship) are deficient in the second? Would not Professor Taylor really feel better satisfied with his book, now that it is all written, if he went over it with a blue pencil and ruthlessly eliminated all such passages?

And further. There are certain discrepancies between the expectations awakened by direct statements in the Preface and what we actually find in the body of the work. Thus, the Preface states that the author's presumptive readers do not need "to be told what some contemporary thinks Plato should have said." Plato's sense is not "to be trimmed to suit the tastes of a neo-Kantian or neo-realist." The author's comments are "to supply exegesis based . . . . on Plato's own words" and not "to applaud or denounce." The implication of this is surely that, while other writers "force their own systems on the Platonic text" (i.e., read modern thought into Plato), our author intends to stick to that text, and not to leave the fifth century B.C., except in interpreting the *Laws*, when he will deal with the fourth century. In practice, however, we find our author "using the language of Christian mysticism," explicitly "without apology" (p. 192), in interpreting the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, and using the terminology of contemporary thinkers, including terminology derived from the neo-realism disavowed in the Preface, in order to bring out in sharp relief what he takes to be Plato's philosophical meaning. This is very well

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done, and the reviewer would be the last person to suggest that one who is himself a contemporary thinker should not utilize all the resources at his command in interpreting Plato. But the point is that, if it is right for Professor Taylor to do this, it cannot be altogether wrong in other contemporary thinkers (e.g., Natorp); and the statements in the Preface should accordingly be qualified or omitted. And about "applauding" and "denouncing." There are ways of doing these things; and if Professor Taylor's way is subtle, it none the less expresses the conclusion of *his* value-judgment. He does not hesitate to tell his readers what is "important" (in his own opinion) and to reinforce or correct Plato's position, every now and then, by independent assertions of his own (e.g., in connection with the unteachableness of tact [p. 262], in connection with the idea of good [p. 288–89], and in connection with the theory of mathematics [pp.512 ff.]). Plato "rightly" says this, and "is deficient" in that.[1] If it is right for our author to do this—and the reviewer would not suggest that it is not perfectly permissible—is it not equally legitimate for other Plato-students to use *their* value-judgments? And, finally, as to "system." We are told in the Preface that Plato "hated" system-making, and that accordingly our author does not attempt to systematize the contents of the dialogues under headings. Surely such statements would give pause even to Professor Taylor's narrowest class of readers. Does not every honors student believe that all philosophical thinking, as such, is systematic? Does not every reader of the *Euthydemus*, not to mention the *Gorgias*, discover that the views of Socrates are contrasted with the position taken by others, not only in ethical tone, but also in logical consecutiveness, i.e., in being systematic? And is not Professor Taylor's own account of the Socratic position at least quasi-systematic? And would it have spoiled pages 26–28 if Professor Taylor had dropped the reference to the (non-Platonic) *Alcibiades*, and had made his statement more systematic? Of course Plato, as an artist, does not obtrude formal logic upon us at every turn. But when the situation calls for it, who can be more systematic? And do not dialogues like the *Sophistes* and *Politicus* seem to betray almost a growing love of system *propter se?* Perhaps our author means something else by the "system-making" which Plato "hates." But if he does, revision of this part of the Preface might assist the readers for whom he intends his book.

One other doubt. As a whole, the book is well informed on all points

[1] The author's value-judgment is not confined to logic and philosophy generally, but includes criticism of Plato as a literary artist. Thus we are informed that the *Gorgias* is too long and diffuse. It drags, misses its opportunities, and betrays the hand of the prentice (p. 103).

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of Platonic scholarship. In fact, it bristles with the latest information and gives frequent exhibitions of scholarly virtuosity. But in one direction, while clear and final on the surface, it seems to the reviewer to be fundamentally vague. If the reader will put together the author's references to the Pythagoreans, he will find that these persons seem to be shadowy and enigmatic figures; far more so, in fact, than the author's actual words indicate. And if the reader happens also to have read E. Frank's *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer,* the resulting comparison will not be to our author's advantage. The reviewer is well aware that his assertion may be treated by our author as "perverse" and "absurd." But it looks as though Professor Taylor either has not studied this work (which is generally regarded as holding the field on such points), or else declines to take account of theories which seem to clear up much which in Professor Taylor's pages remains fundamentally obscure.

In conclusion, it should be said that the book will certainly be read by those for whom it was written, and that they will learn much from it, in fact, very much. But whether they will find themselves encouraged to undertake independent investigations in this rich field in which there is (surely) still room for many workers, is doubtful. In the Preface, our author roundly states that "the last thing he could wish is that his readers should see Plato through his spectacles." But students who read the entire work will find the conclusion growing upon them that Platonic interpretation is a complicated game, with no rules to which they can safely appeal, and with Professor Taylor holding all the trumps and obviously prepared to use them against all comers. The prospect of being told (if one's views diverge from Professor Taylor's) that one can't read Greek, or that he mixes his dates, or that he can't think, is not encouraging.

The book is well (though closely) printed, with only a few misprints of Greek and Latin words, and is provided with a useful Index.

RUPERT CLENDON LODGE

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THE GOOD WILL, A STUDY IN THE COHERENCE THEORY OF GOODNESS. By H. J. Paton. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan Co. (Library of Philosophy, edited by J. H. Muirhead), 1927.

The general philosophical presuppositions of Mr. Paton's study of *The Good Will* are those of the traditional Oxford idealism of the nineteenth century, considerably modified, in more recent times, chiefly under the influence of Mr. J. A. Smith, by strong infiltrations derived partly from Bergson, but still more largely from the contemporary Italian ideal-

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ism of Croce and Gentile. Mr. Paton is evidently a strongly indoctrinated person, but one who has, nevertheless, within the general limits of the tradition, genuinely tried to think for himself. The solid merits of his work lie, as it seems to me, in those central chapters which Mr. Paton especially commends to the attention of the non-professional reader (p. 10), where, proceeding, as he says (p. 78), "as far as possible, on the basis of a reasonably critical common sense, in the light of which action itself commonly takes place," he describes, with a minimum of technical apparatus and a wealth of concrete detail, the life of the human spirit on its various levels of moral development, and the values, positive and negative, therein involved. If in the result we find no startling novelty, I feel sure that that is only what Mr. Paton would himself wish; for he has evidently aimed not at novelty, but at soundness of doctrine. And it seems to me that in the main he has been notably successful in this attempt "to describe and to understand the good life as it is actually lived" (p. 346). Whatever one's hesitation about underlying metaphysical or logical doctrines, or whatever one's qualms about the treatment of this or that particular point, I think it is scarcely possible to come away from these main chapters of the book without feeling that Mr. Paton has kept his feet pretty solidly on the ground of actual human experience; that he possesses a sound insight into the realities of human nature, and a fine and discriminating sense for genuine moral values; and that he has helped one to understand more fully and more deeply, in its fundamental unity amid manifold complexity, the concrete nature of the good life. And in so far it seems to me that his account is one with which many, even of those whose general ethical theory is very different from that of Mr. Paton, might well in large measure agree.

But Mr. Paton's treatment of fundamental problems of theory is a rather different story. At least I must confess that I have myself found this aspect of Mr. Paton's study decidedly unsatisfactory; and I hope that I shall not appear unduly censorious if I devote the rest of this review to the enumeration of a few of the difficulties that have troubled me. It is not merely that I find myself unable to accept Mr. Paton's conclusions; it is rather that he has all too frequently left me in considerable doubt as to what his conclusions really are. Mr. Paton is animated throughout by a strong polemical interest. His *bête noir* is Mr. G. E. Moore. Mr. Paton has evidently been outraged by *Principia Ethica* and other writings of Mr. Moore; and I cannot help thinking that in the violence of his reaction he has developed more heat than light. At any rate, not only is his criticism of Mr. Moore exceedingly confused and obscure, and frequently based, as it seems to me, upon radical miscon-

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ceptions as to what Mr. Moore really holds; but also Mr. Paton's exposition of his own views is infected with such distressing ambiguities that it is often extremely difficult to make out, amid the dust of battle, what positions he really is attempting to defend.

For example, it appears that Mr. Paton at least intends to hold, as an important part of his central thesis, that goodness is a quality which in some degree characterizes all cases of "coherent willing" and also all things that are coherently willed, but absolutely nothing else. So much at least seems to be clear. But our difficulties begin at once. Is goodness a complex or, as Mr. Moore holds, a simple quality? Mr. Paton replies as follows: (1) "I do not believe that anything is simple in the sense in which Mr. Moore seems to use the word" (p. 38) and (2) Mr. Moore "will not allow us to say that it (*sc.*, goodness) has parts, and . . . . most of us are probably not indisposed to agree with him" (p. 39)! Is goodness a definable or an indefinable quality? Mr. Moore holds that, being simple, it is not definable by analysis. Mr. Paton replies as follows: (1) "There is nothing in the nature of definition to assure us, *a priori*, that a definition of goodness is impossible" (p. 40) (I should have supposed that, on Mr. Moore's view, it was the nature not of definition but of *goodness*, that made its definition by analysis impossible); (2) "Even if goodness is not definable by analysis into parts, Mr. Moore has not shown that it is not definable in some other way" (p. 40) (Mr. Moore in fact has explicitly disclaimed any intention of showing that goodness may not be defined in *some* sense of the term "definition"); (3) "There is no apparent reason why goodness should not be defined, not by analysis into parts, but in a way analogous to the way in which Mr. Moore proposes to define beauty" (p. 40) (a way which upon examination appears to me to consist in an analysis into parts), "or at any rate in the traditional way *per genus et differentiam*" (p. 41) (which is *surely*—although Mr. Paton strangely denies it— analysis into parts); (4) "I am not anxious to maintain that goodness can be defined by analysis into its parts or even that goodness can be defined at all" (pp. 40–41). Nevertheless, (5) Mr. Moore's argument (cf. p. 43) against attempted definitions of the form "Goodness means x (or xyz)" (on the ground that the question "Is x [or xyz] itself good?" still retains a meaning which is not simply identical with "Is x x [or is xyz xyz?]") is inconclusive; for it is not sufficient logically to compel a "consistent hedonist" to abandon his doctrine "that 'good' means 'pleasant'" (p. 42), or to refute the view that "to be good means to be desired" (pp. 44–45); and although it *would* otherwise be fatal to the view that "to be good means to be that which we desire to desire" (p. 49) (query, Why so, if it is not fatal to the two foregoing?), *this*

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view can fortunately be stated in the more adequate form "for a thing to be truly good, it must be such that it can be willed with a man's whole soul" (p. 46) (N.B., it is no longer clear whether this is or is not a definition of the form which Mr. Moore is criticising at all), whereupon Mr. Moore's argument becomes as innocuous against *it* as against the other two views! (6) Nevertheless, if Mr. Moore persists in pressing his uncomfortable queries, it must be admitted that "to be good and to be coherently willed are not merely different names for the same thing" (p. 52); and yet (7), despite this admission, (*a*) although "we may abstract from the reference to the will, ... unless the reference is somehow there, the goodness of things has no meaning at all" (p. 54), and (*b*) "good things have no common characteristic beyond their goodness, and good actions have no common characteristic beyond that of being good actions" (p. 368)—which latter proposition, together with (6), surely implies the falsity of Mr. Paton's original thesis.

Again, does Mr. Paton hold that "coherent willing" is *good in itself*, i.e., as Mr. Moore would say "intrinsically" good, or does he not? His main drift seems to be in favor of the view that he *does*. Thus we read (1) "that goodness applies primarily to willing itself, and that its application to things is secondary, derivative and abstract. Concretely it is the good will alone which is good . . . . and the goodness of things is entirely subordinate to that of the will which wills them" (p. 55); (2) "The only thing that can be good in itself is just the good life, ... if nothing is good in itself there can obviously be nothing good at all" (p. 381); (3) "To ask why a thing that is good in itself is good in itself is meaningless and self-contradictory. For it implies that a thing both is and is not good in itself" (p. 382); yet on the other hand, (4) "Answers of this kind are not altogether convincing" (p. 382); (5) "There is something lacking in a view which makes goodness and duty merely external to the individual's will" (p. 383); (6) "While thinking does not and cannot offer any external reason for morality, it offers the only possible justification for morality, by attempting to understand systematically the very rationality of the moral will itself" (p. 385). From which it would appear that "coherent willing" is *not*, strictly speaking, good in itself at all, but is good only in so far as it is itself coherently willed—i.e., goodness is not "essentially bound up with coherent willing" (p. 34), but belongs to it only *per accidens*. And quite in line with this ambiguity in Mr. Paton's own view, we find him on one and the same page criticizing Mr. Moore both for holding that "good things are good in themselves" and for holding that goodness is "just a flavour" which things have, "something which seems to be independent of and external to their other qualities" (p. 36).

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But to hold that good things are good in themselves is to hold, in Mr. Moore's terminology, that they are intrinsically good; and to hold that a thing is intrinsically good is, as he has amply explained, to hold not merely that it is *de facto* good but also that it would be good even if it existed entirely alone without any accompaniments or effects whatever, i.e., that it would be good under any and all circumstances. And this, in turn, is clearly to hold that its goodness is no merely accidental property, but an essential property, resulting from its very nature. All this is evidently quite incompatible with the view which Mr. Paton prevailingly attributes to Mr. Moore, viz., the view that there is no essential connection between the nature of things which are good and their goodness, that, on the contrary, the connexion in question is a purely "external" one. And although Mr. Moore may have been so foolish as to hold both these views at once, Mr. Paton seems to object to his holding either.

Again, what is the point of Mr. Paton's polemic against Mr. Moore's contention that judgments of intrinsic value are ultimately intuitional in character? Mr. Paton holds up to scorn those realists who "affirm without shame or subterfuge" (p. 24) "that they know what goodness is, and that this thing that thing and the other thing, are good in themselves," "who do not even profess to offer reasons for their assertions, although they can perhaps point out a way by which they hope that others may come to share their vision" (p. 25). Yet we also find Mr. Paton affirming that "the good life must be good because it is the good life. To suggest that there could be a reason for the good life being good is to suggest that it is good because of something outside itself" (p. 380). And again, "The full and clear judgment of goodness is unique and direct. It cannot be deduced from anything or demonstrated by anybody. It demands a direct vision of a unique and individual reality" (p. 349). But Mr. Paton, despite these declarations, evidently thinks that he has more than a merely intuitive basis for his beliefs about what is intrinsically good. And he evidently thinks also that this gives to his view a solidly rational foundation that is denied to that of Mr. Moore. Mr. Paton is not prepared to deny "that there is an intuitive element in all our apprehensions of value" (p. 25) and seems inclined to admit that it is "impossible to prove that any particular thing is good" (p. 25). But in his view, that is by no means the whole of the matter. And if we ask what then the rest of the matter is, Mr. Paton seems to indicate the nature of his answer when he proposes to take the proposition that coherent willing is intrinsically good as an hypothesis "which may be worked out in the different branches of philosophy, and must be judged by its success or failure in rendering our experience intelligible" (p. 53). I think Mr. Paton would say that he

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holds this proposition to be true not merely on the basis of any bare and isolated intuition but also because he has found it to be coherent with the rest of the beliefs which he holds about the world. And he seems to think that Mr. Moore does not hold his beliefs about intrinsic value upon any such grounds as these. He seems to think that Mr. Moore relies simply and solely upon a sort of bare intuition or mere inspection, which simply ignores all considerations of coherence. But I think that it is pretty clear, if we reflect upon what Mr. Moore's procedure really is, that Mr. Paton has sorely misconceived the matter. For Mr. Moore has surely sufficiently insisted that before we allow our intuition to pronounce upon any question we should first get that question quite clearly and distinctly before our minds so that it is not confused with any other question, and more particularly that we should fully realize all that is implied or involved in the assertion or denial of the proposition which we are considering. And this, of course, includes knowing how far the proposition in question is or is not coherent with the rest of our beliefs about the universe. And Mr. Moore has certainly never suggested that he would attach any value whatsoever to any kind of "intuition" which simply dispensed with such precautions and thus amounted merely to a superficial snap judgment of the question at issue.

I have no space to consider further difficulties. But I will just note that, so far as I can see, Mr. Paton's view of the ground of moral obligation is utterly confused by his failure to perceive the entire incompatibility of two doctrines which he (like many other writers) attempts to hold simultaneously (viz., the doctrines of the categorical imperative and of the autonomy of the will)—a matter upon which I have commented at some length in the current issue of this *Journal*.

In closing I should like, for the moment, to put all differences aside and to refer the reader once again to Mr. Paton's central chapters, in which, as I said at the beginning, I have found so much "sound wisdom and discretion."

R. M. BLAKE

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

MORALS IN REVIEW. By A. K. Rogers. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. xii+456. Price, $3.50.

Previous works by Dr. Rogers have taught us what to expect in a historical study. On the one hand it will be based on independent study of the original sources; on the other hand it will make no mention of the work or theories of other scholars, although the student who is familiar

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with the course of critical discussions will be aware that such discussions have often set the problem or defined the issues of the treatment. As to the first aspect, there is little or no room for difference of opinion. Dr. Rogers is a sympathetic, judicious, yet keenly critical interpreter. Few historical scholars combine insight into motives and logic of systems so successfully with critical poise. Given certain limitations of space and perhaps of expenditures (the book is admirable in typography, paper, and binding), it would be difficult to make a better use of the opportunity allowed. A directness of style and a feeling of close, first-hand contact with the authors are favored by an eye fixed upon the text rather than upon variant readings or disputed renderings. And yet this directness has possible disadvantages. A certain dialectic interest and dramatic effectiveness are sacrificed. And it is at least debatable whether for the young student it may not be better to have variant or conflicting interpretations tagged with the names of advocates.

But leaving this possible scruple, we may be grateful for what is given: a closely reasoned, fair-minded, and clearly presented account of the leading ethical theories. It is the fruit of a scholarship which has ripened through many years of productive work since *A Student's History of Philosophy* appeared.

Dr. Rogers disclaims any attempt at a complete history of ethics. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and Epicureans, from the Greeks; Thomas Aquinas for the church; and the prominent schools from Hobbes to Spencer and Guyot, are selected. One or another reader would have been glad to have some note of the Roman law of nature, for this came down through the Middle Ages and English rationalists to play a rôle in Kant. Augustine's *Civitas Dei* exercised a lasting power over men's minds, and—to leap over intervening centuries—Nietzsche has been an originative spokesman for a distinctive class-consciousness. But once more the reviewer is in the mood to praise what has been done so well.

If I were to voice a regret, it would be that the theories are considered in such detachment from the lives and the times of their authors. To have done full justice to these factors would indeed have required a larger book and exacting labor, but someone will have to begin the task soon.

J. H. TUFTS

THE FUNCTION AND FORMS OF THOUGHT. By Albert E. Avey. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xii+395. Price, $2.50.

The succession of new textbooks in elementary logic, each attempting to cover in simple and coherent fashion a most complex and heterogeneous

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series of developments, testifies to a still unsatisfied demand in this field. Professor Avey has seen the central difficulty in the situation and has been more than moderately successful in overcoming it. The juxtaposition of Aristotle, Mill, and such of the "newer" logics as an author happens to prefer can only reproduce in the mind of the student the confusion already obvious in the subject matter. What is needed is a re-orientation in terms of valid and comprehensive principles which unify the subject from a coherent point of view. Such a reconstruction "based on symbolic principles" is here attempted, with important results.

The spirit of Royce presides over the introductory and "philosophical" chapters, the result being an "absolute pragmatism" of the familiar sort. In basing the claims of thought on those "reflexive" principles which are the conditions of thought itself (p. 78), the author is on dangerous ground; but it appears that such absoluteness is relative after all, serving as a goal and ideal for thought in "the human realm" (p. 82). As such, it furnishes a good working basis for the more formal portions of the work. Boole and DeMorgan definitely supersede Mill and Aristotle in the analysis of proof, but with a difference. The syllogism remains as a special form of more general logical operations; and Professor Avey omits nothing of the traditional analysis, which, however, is here placed in its wider and more legitimate setting. Mill fares much worse, appearing merely as an appendage to the account of symmetrical relations. The symbolism is simple and teachable and has the two great advantages of starting the student on the road of logical development in which ordinary "deductive logic" is hardly more than a by-path and of providing an adequate technique for the analysis of particular problems. The chapters on classification and on immediate inference show clearly the advantages of this more general approach.

Yet just because Professor Avey has been consistent in his attachment to "symbolic principles," he has been forced to neglect or to treat casually much of the subject matter of traditional logic. Induction and scientific method find no adequate treatment, and probability is seen only as "a problem of permutations and combinations" (p. 302). There are two chapters on applied logic, but the formal principles previously developed have little to offer here. Before the problem of relevance (p. 369) in concrete argument, formal logic is quite helpless. It is ungrateful to complain of omissions in a work which avowedly treats the matter from a single aspect. For those who desire to develop that aspect and to present it to students in a comprehensible form, Professor Avey's book will be of genuine value. If that development only serves to fortify some of us in the belief that that aspect is not of particular profit or enlighten-

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ment for elementary students, it is because, seeing it here at its best, we are in a better position to estimate its scope.

A. E. MURPHY

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

SHORTER NOTICES

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts: September 13–17, 1927. Edited by Edgar Sheffield Brightman.

The editor is to be congratulated for the remarkable promptness with which he has brought out this complete report of the proceedings of the Congress with practically all of the papers which were presented. Several of the ethical papers have already appeared in this *Journal*. In addition to the technical ethical papers, attention may be called also to the papers of the session of "Philosophy and International Relations and to those of the session devoted to the Rôle of Philosophy in the History of Civilization." One of the great purposes of the Congress was to promote a better mutual understanding between philosophers of all countries, and in this the meeting was singularly successful. The well-planned program and the gracious hospitality of Harvard were important factors in achieving this end.

MIND AND BODY. By Hans Driesch. Authorized translation by Theodore Besterman. New York: Lincoln Mac Veagh, Dial Press, 1927. Pp. 191. Price, $3.50.

The translation is from the third German edition revised by Dr. Driesch. The first edition appeared in 1916. An extended critique of psychophysical parallelism constitutes Part I, which occupies the larger half of the volume. Part II substitutes a different set of terms and conceptions, and presents as a true psychophysical parallelism that between processes in my mind, processes in my psychoid (entelechy), and my true conscious experience.

THE MORAL SELF: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS. By Charles L. Sherman. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1927. Pp. x+365. Price, $2.60.

An elementary text centering in the conception of the self. Successive chapters deal with the self as biological, as psychologically determined, as socially realized, and in its relationship to moral judgment and to personality. The author's aim is to make a book that shall be less difficult than the average text. The problems are treated from the psychological rather than from the sociological point of view, and the practical problems considered are chiefly those of the individual character rather than those of institutions and the relation of the individual to social processes. The book is clearly written.

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THE INCOME AND STANDARD OF LIVING OF UNSKILLED LABORERS IN CHICAGO. By Leila L. Houghteling. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. 224.

A careful and fundamental study of the income and standard of living of a large number of families, with a more intensive study of a smaller number of families. Undertaken in the hope of throwing light on the relation between standards of relief-giving and the wage-levels, it gives a picture of actual conditions. In more than two-thirds of the families the earnings of the chief wage-earner were insufficient to provide a standard of living provided by the Chicago Budget. Other sources of income enabled about one-half of the total number of families to maintain a standard equal to or above the estimated Budget. Families living on a lower standard "are living under conditions which fail utterly to provide a standard of living that will make possible a high standard of physical, mental, and moral health and efficiency for adults, the full physical and mental growth and development of children, and make provision for their moral welfare." It is greatly to be regretted that the author died before seeing her work in print.

GLADSTONE AND BRITAIN'S IMPERIAL POLICY. By Paul Knaplund. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. 256.

The author aims to supplement Morley's *Life of Gladstone* by presentation and discussion of Gladstone's attitude toward Britain's imperial policy. Gladstone is shown as an advocate of voluntaryism in relations between Britain and her colonies: "What we wish is to see the growth of the true spirit of freedom in the colonial communities which would make them not only willing but eager to share in the common burdens." "Gladstone must be reckoned among the great architects and builders of the British Commonwealth of Nations." The notable address on "Our Colonies" of 1855, in which the changes in the colonial policy are impressively set forth, is included.

HSÜNTZE, THE MOULDER OF ANCIENT CONFUCIANISM. By Homer H. Dubs. London: Arthur Probsthain, 1927. Pp. xxxi+308.

In the present situation of affairs in China, American and European interest is awakening to the problem of understanding Chinese ideals and institutions. The account of the system of Hsüntze, who gave a stable and consistent foundation and expression to the Confucian philosophy, comes as an important contribution to this end. The background of Hsüntze's life and writings is followed by a study of the principal topics of his philosophy. A translation of the writings will form an accompanying volume. "The study of Hsüntze reveals better than any other writer the true genius of Confucius and his writings give us a fuller view of ancient thought than we get anywhere else. So we see that he is of fundamental importance in the study of Confucianism." The students will be grateful to the publishers for the excellent typography and to the author for his clear exposition.

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LENIN: COLLECTED WORKS. Vol. XIII. MATERIALISM AND EMPIRIO-CRITICISM. Translated from the Russian by David Kvitko. New York: Harper & Bros., 1927. Pp. 687. Price $5.00.

This volume shows Lenin plunging into the highly technical problems of the theory of knowledge. The positivism of Mach, the doctrines of Neo-Kantists, and the writings of a large number of present-day contributors are examined in the effort to defend materialism. The amazing fact is the extent to which Lenin mastered technical philosophy and the attention which he thought it worth while to give to the subtle problems of idealism and empirio-criticism in his defense of orthodox Marxism.

BOOKS RECEIVED

ABEL, ANNIE HELOISE, and KLINGBERG, FRANK J. A Side-Light on Anglo-American Relations, 1839–1858. Lancaster, Pa.: Lancaster Press, Inc., 1927. Pp. vi+407. Price, $2.15 by mail.

ALEXANDER, S. The Herbert Spencer Lecture. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927. Pp. 23.

AVEY, ALBERT E. The Function and Forms of Thought. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. ix+395. Price, $2.50.

BARRY, FREDRICK. The Scientific Habit of Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. xiii+358. Price, $3.50.

BRYCE, JAMES. Modern Democracies (reprint of 1921 ed.). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. Vol. I, pp. xiv+508; Vol. II, pp. vi+682. Price per set, $5.00.

BURGESS, JOHN W. The Sanctity of Law. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1927. Pp. ix+335.

BURTON, ERNEST D., and MATHEWS, SHAILER. The Life of Christ (rev. ed.). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. xi+390. Price, $2.00.

CASE, SHIRLEY JACKSON. Jesus, a New Biography. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. ix+453. Price, $3.00.

"Constructive Studies": Right Living, by Morris J. Neuberg, Series I and II, Teacher's Manuals for the foregoing; Our Church, by John Leslie Lobinger; Problems in Living, by Mary K. Cowles, price, $0.75 each. A Christian's Education, A Christian's Patriotism, Christianizing Our Community, The Other Fellow's Religion: a Suggested Plan for Young People's Groups, by Erwin L. Shaver, price, $0.50 each. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925–27.

CROCE, BENEDETTO: An Autobiography Translated from the Italian by R. G. Collingwood. New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. Pp. 116. Price, $2.00.

DASGUPTA, S. N. Hindu Mysticism. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1927. Pp. xii+168. Price, $2.00.

DEWEY, JOHN. The Public and Its Problems. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. vi+224.

DICKINSON, JOHN. The Statesman's Book of John of Salisbury. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927. Pp. lxxxii+410.

DIESENDRUCK, J. Z. Struktur und Character des Platonischen Phaidros. Wien: Wilhelm Baumüller, Universitäts Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pp. viii+56. Price, R.M. 2.70.

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GOODSPEED, E. J. The Formation of the New Testament. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. ix+210. Price, $1.00.

HART, HORNELL. The Science of Social Relations. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xix+664. Price, $4.50.

HART, JOSEPH K. Inside Experience. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927. Pp. xxvi+287. Price, $2.50.

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ODUM, HOWARD W. Man's Quest for Social Guidance. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xxi+643. Price, $4.50.

PAVEY, CORSETJI ERACHJI. Iranian Studies. Bombay: Captain Printing Works, 1927. Pp. xxii+239. Price, Rs. 10. Copies of the book can be obtained from Messrs. Luzac and Co., 46 Great Russell Square, London, W. C. 1.

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SMITH, T. V. The American Philosophy of Equality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. x+339. Price, $3.00.

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TURNER, J. E. The Nature of Deity. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1927. Pp. 248. Price, $3.50.

WIEMAN, HENRY NELSON. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. vii+256. Price, $2.50.

WISMAR, ADOLPH L. A Study in Tolerance. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. xvi+108. Price, $1.50.

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A Quarterly Devoted to the Advancement of Ethical Knowledge and Practice

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The American Philosophy of Equality

By

T. V. SMITH

¶Equality, in its present vague status, has lost much of the meaning that the founders of this country attached to it. In his book Mr. Smith has set out, in effect, to rescue from oblivion whatever truth the earlier doctrine contained. If the concept of equality is to continue in the fundamental place it has held in our political, religious, and social assumptions, it must certainly be restated in terms more applicable to current situations. "Perhaps men are not actually equal," writes Mr. Smith, "but even so, they ought to be treated more equally than they now are, for in that way they really can be made more equal."

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

VOLUME XXXVIII APRIL 1928 NUMBER 3

ETHICS AND TELEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

OLAF STAPLEDON

SIX ETHICAL THEORIES

THERE seem to be at least six possible types of theory as to the status of the character that we call "good." (1) It may be held that the word is used in such conflicting manners that the only sane conclusion is that there is no one character which is the essential meaning of the word. (2) Or it may be claimed that in the last resort what we mean by saying that anything is good is that it gives someone pleasure, or at least that it is capable of doing so. (3) At the opposite pole from this theory is the view that good is simply a certain unanalyzable character of objects, and is absolutely independent of anyone's awareness of it. (4) It is possible, however, to take a middle course between these two incompatible positions. It may be held, on the one hand, that good is meaningless apart altogether from consciousness, that it necessarily involves awareness on the part of someone; yet on the other hand that the goodness of anything is absolutely independent of anyone's judgment as to its goodness. In this view a distinction is made between the awareness which is the value-judgment, and is simply a case of cognition, and the awareness which is constitutive of goodness, and is said to be a case of feeling. Thus in this view the goodness of a thing is constituted by the pleasant feeling that it affords or might af-

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ford, but not constituted by anyone's judgment that it does afford the feeling.

I shall not here discuss any of these four views. The first three appear to me to be inadequate to deal with the facts of ethical experience, and the fourth, I believe, can be reduced to the second.

There are two other theories, however, and these I propose to discuss. It is possible to effect a compromise between the second and third theories in manners different from that of the fourth. (5) In the first place it may be claimed that though good is meaningless apart from mind, it is not to be derived from the feeling-aspect of mind, but from the striving-aspect. Feeling, it may be said, is an abstraction from the concrete fact of the felt success or failure of mind's conscious striving. Pleasure and pain presuppose activity or tendency to activity. We feel pleased or displeased *about* the success or failure of the activity on which we are engaged. This is in accord with that "hormic" psychology which finds conation more fundamental than affection. From this position it seems to follow that *what* we value is primarily not feelings but the success of our enterprises. And in this view the essence of what we mean by "good" is not the abstraction, pleasure, but the more concrete "achievement of willed ends," of those ends which are indicated by the hormic nature of mind. On the other hand, it is insisted that what we value is the success of *mind's* enterprises, the success of conscious conations. In this view, as in the fourth, it is meaningless to call the achievement of a process good unless that achievement is directly or indirectly related to consciousness. But whereas in the fourth theory good derives ultimately from affection, in this fifth theory it derives ultimately from conation.

I shall try to show that this fifth view, in spite of obvious advantages, leads on to a superficially less plausible but actually more satisfactory view, which may be briefly stated as follows. (6) What we call good is in the last resort the attain-

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ment of an end posited in the nature of some teleological process; but it is not essential to the goodness of such attainment that it should be related, either directly or indirectly, to consciousness. In very many cases, of course, consciousness *is* a constituent of events that we should call good, just because in very many cases the teleological process in question is a process in which consciousness is a factor, or the teleological end is an end in which consciousness is a factor. But essentially what we *mean* by good is the fulfilment of teleological activity, whether or not consciousness plays a part in that activity, and whether or not there is awareness of its fulfilment.

In this view, then, good is entirely independent of consciousness; but on the other hand it is not simply a static character of certain objects in the sense that yellow is a character of certain objects. It presupposes teleological activity on the part of the object, and is essentially and in general the fulfilment of teleological activity.

Whether we should say that in this view good involves the activity of *mind* depends on our definition of mind. If by "mind" we mean just that which is capable of spontaneous teleological activity, then clearly good involves mind. But if by "mind" we mean more than this, if in fact mind necessarily involves *awareness* of teleological activity, or if it involves conscious conation, then in the theory under discussion good does not necessarily involve mind. For my part I find the use of the words "mind" and "mental" without reference to consciousness very confusing and unnecessary.

TELEOLOGICAL ACTIVITY

Clearly the view which I have been describing demands a discussion of the meaning of "teleological." Can a process be teleological if it is not derived directly or indirectly from conscious purpose? If teleology involves consciousness, clearly a theory which relates good to teleological activity, yet

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denies that it is related to consciousness, is inconsistent. In this case we should have to revert to the fifth ethical theory. But from this position we should, I think, be driven step by step through the fourth to the second theory, namely, to hedonism. This would not matter if we could stay there. But we should soon be harried thence into the third theory, namely, that good is an unanalyzable objective character. And thence we should once more be chivvied into the fourth and fifth. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire into the nature of teleology so as to discover whether there is any initial impossibility in the sixth theory.

Professor Broad defines teleology by means of a hypothetical reference to design.[1] A system, he says, is teleological "provided it acts *as if* it were designed for a purpose." But it still "remains a question of fact whether the system was actually the result of a design in someone's mind." Artificial machines do result from design in some mind; but organisms "are teleological systems which seem nevertheless to arise without design." The machine is a case of "external teleology"; the organism, a case of "internal teleology."

How must a system act so as to fulfil the description that "it acts *as if* it were designed for a conscious purpose"? Superficial examination of its form and behavior, and detailed examination of its minute structure, says Professor Broad, must both suggest conscious purpose such as "a rational being might be likely to entertain." Now this definition is perhaps not very satisfactory, for it entails a purely subjective reference. How are we to say *what* purposes a rational being is likely to entertain? But a more objective definition of teleological behavior may be devised. The sort of activity which we are tempted to ascribe to conscious purpose is, in the first place, activity which, in varying circumstances, varies in such a manner as to attain an identical result. Now a purely physical system may behave in this way. All the water that rains

[1] C. D. Broad, *The Mind and Its Place in Nature*, pp. 81 ff.

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on the hills may find its way by one route or another to sea-level. This, we should say, is not teleological activity. But if we saw the water jumping over obstacles "to attain its end," we might *suspect* teleological activity. The jump, of course, *might* be due to hidden mechanical laws; and then it would not be teleological. The activity of an artificial machine, certainly, is purely mechanical; yet it is a case of "external teleology"; but this simply means that the *form* of the machine is to be explained by reference to another and internally teleological system, namely, the engineer. We may then define teleological activity as activity which, varying in such a manner as to attain an identical result in varying circumstances, cannot even in theory be fully described in terms of purely physical laws. Or better, so as to avoid the negative form, we may say that an adequate description of teleological activity involves, over and above physical laws, reference to an end; or more precisely that the activity does not invariably follow the course described by physical laws, but sometimes definitely departs from it in such a manner that some special kind of result will be attained.

There may be in the world no activity which accords with this description. On the other hand many persons suspect very strongly that the activity of living organisms is partly of this kind. Some would account for it in terms of an "entelechy" or vital principle interfering with the course of mechanical events. Others would say that at the level of organization which characterizes living things this new way of behaving "emerges." For my part I much prefer the latter view; but this is not the place to discuss emergence. Here I am only concerned to urge that activity of this kind, defined as teleological, does not necessarily involve any reference (direct or indirect) to consciousness, that it no more involves consciousness than the concept of mechanism involves consciousness. We have become so familiar with the concept of mechanism (as Professor Whitehead has pointed out) that we often re-

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gard it as self-evident that things *must* interact mechanically; and when we suspect that things are not acting purely mechanically, we feel impelled to introduce conscious purpose to "explain" their irregularity. We do not think it necessary to say that atoms and electrons move as they do because they consciously want to get away from their preceding unpleasant conditions. We merely record the fact that they do act in certain manners, and that their actions can only be adequately described by reference to preceding conditions. Similarly, then, with teleological activity, we are not compelled to suppose that an internally teleological system behaves as it does because some mind has conceived a conscious purpose with regard to it. We must merely record the fact that such an entity behaves (in certain respects) in such manners that certain results will be attained. We have to take into account, in describing its behavior, not merely physical laws, but also certain teleological laws.

This point may be illustrated by an analogy. In Newtonian physics it was assumed that bodies left to themselves would continue in uniform motion in a straight line. Gravitating bodies do not do so; therefore it was necessary to postulate a "force" of gravitation pulling them from the straight course. In Einstein's theory of gravitation, however, no force is needed. In a gravitational field a moving body follows a geodesic, i.e., the shortest possible course in space-time; but in the neighborhood of matter geodesics are different from geodesics remote from matter. Similarly, then, with teleology. If we assume that matter "left to itself" must always act mechanically, we must postulate some special extraneous "force," in this case a hidden consciousness, to account for cases in which it observably acts teleologically. But apart from the initial assumption of pure mechanism there is no need to postulate consciousness to account for teleological behavior. Rather we should simply say that, in certain configurations or organizations, matter assumes new ways of act-

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ing, namely, teleological ways. Metaphorically we might say that the geodesic is different where matter attains certain kinds of organization. Of course this is not to deny that, where consciousness observably *does* occur, it may influence the course of activity.

Before returning to the discussion of the types of ethical theory we may note one other point with regard to teleological activity. A full discussion of the relation of teleological activity to physical activity might lead to any one of three conclusions. (*a*) The defined difference between the two might continue to appear a fundamental difference. In this case good, according to our sixth kind of ethical theory, would involve a particular kind of activity, namely, teleological activity, and not the other. On the other hand, (*b*) full discussion might enable us to "reduce" non-conscious teleological activity to the laws of physical activity. In this case good would involve a particular kind of physical activity, namely, the teleological kind. But finally we might perhaps find in obviously teleological activity a key to the hidden nature of all activity, concluding that even physical activity is at heart teleological, and that the very concept of activity necessarily involves teleology. Such a conclusion would not justify a panpsychic view of physical nature, but it would force us to hold (within the terms of our sixth ethical theory) that *every* kind of "fulfilment of activity," or of tendency to activity, is in its degree good. This view would have been necessitated by our inquiry into the essential meaning of the word "good," together with our inquiry into the essential nature of activity.[2]

A THEORY OF CONATION

If the foregoing account of teleology is correct, we may briefly describe the psychology of conation as follows: The

[2] In *The Journal of Philosophical Studies* (June, 1927), I have argued that good is relative to the activity of dynamic objects (i.e., active substances), without solving the question as to whether this activity must be teleological or not. I shall here argue that, to be the ground of good, activity must be teleological.

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presupposition of every act of conation, whether "blind" impulse or desire or fully self-conscious will, is a teleological activity or tendency distinct from the conative act itself. At the lowest level the activity is purely physiological; the impulse, in so far as it is mental at all, is an act of acceptance of, or active espousal of, some activity of the body itself. Desire may set as its goal the realization of some such purely physical activity of the body. At higher levels the teleological activity may be psychical. The goal of desire, or of considered will, may be the fulfilment of some psychical capacity of the individual. But in this case, no less than in the others, the activity or tendency which is desired or willed is strictly objective to, and logically prior to, the mental act of willing its fulfilment. For there to be any conscious conation at all there must be awareness of a hormic drive or tendency, awareness vague or precise, true or erroneous. For there to be not merely "blind" impulse but explicit desire or will, there must be prevision, true or false, of the supposed goal of the activity, prevision sometimes merely of an immediate goal, at other times of a goal more remote. Every conative act, then, consists in the acceptance or espousal of some hormic tendency; every case of feeling (pleasant or unpleasant) is consequent on the cognized success or failure of the hormic tendency.

It is obvious that this account of conation is derived from Professor W. McDougall, though I fear he would not approve of my contention that conation presupposes cognition of tendency. Yet I venture to hold to this point. It seems, indeed, to be implied in any theory in which conscious conation is derived from hormic processes prior to consciousness. The simplest illustration of the principle is perhaps the case of desiring to sneeze. I desire to sneeze when I am aware that my body is tending to sneeze, and without awareness of the tendency the desire is inconceivable. And the psychological presupposition of a "blind" impulse unaccompanied by desire is

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that the subject must be aware of his body as tending to *some* activity or other without his foreseeing the activity's goal.

If this analysis is correct, then a conscious conative act presupposes cognition of some objective teleological process, just as feeling presupposes conation. And further, the cognition presupposes in the last resort *some* actual teleological activity, however erroneously cognized. At every level there must be (for there to be conation at all), (*a*) a hormic tendency on the part of a body, a personality, a society, or of *something or other* capable of teleological activity, and (*b*) a situation cognized in relation to that tendency. This act of cognition constitutes a value-judgment, an act of valuation. It does not create the value; it merely *registers* the value of the situation in relation to the hormic tendency.

Now this cognitive act of valuation is distinct from, and logically prior to, the conative act which consciously wills the fulfilment of the hormic activity. The conative act is something over and above the act of valuation. It is an unanalyzable mental fiat. But on the other hand it is inconceivable save as a *consequence* of an act of valuation. In fact the cognitive act of valuation is the motive source and *raison d'être* of the conative act. And in its turn the cognitive act of valuation is only a *value*-judgment in that it cognizes a teleological process objective to itself.

We may conclude this psychological description by saying that: we feel because we espouse a cause; we espouse the cause because we cognize it *as* a cause, i.e., as a teleological process on the part of something within our ken; and finally, we cognize the teleological process *as* such because (apart from errors of cognition) it really is so.

If it be asked how we come to espouse some teleological processes and not others, the answer in brief must be that we espouse more readily those teleological processes which are more familiar, and that when there is conflict between the less and the more familiar we all too often accept the latter

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even when objectively they are minor processes. We have habits and inherited conative tendencies of espousing the familiar, central, and objectively minor teleological processes, such as those of our body, even at the expense of others which we cognize as objectively major. But even these various automatic conational tendencies are themselves derived in the last resort from cognition of teleological processes. The whole moral progress of the race seems to consist in the advance from this "automatism" by which we espouse the familiar and minor processes even when we *know* them to be minor and to be in conflict with major processes. And this advance is apparently due to the exercise of the unique mental fiat or "act of will" which, after a value-judgment has been made, can, for the sake of an espoused cause, transcend the automatism that would otherwise come into action.

With regard to the objectivity of telelogical tendencies the following objection might be raised: It might be admitted that in human and animal psychology every conscious act of conation involves a teleological tendency objective to the act itself; but, it might be argued, such teleological tendencies themselves presuppose conscious conation in the mind of God. We, in fact, are teleological by virtue of God's conscious purpose; for, it may be said, teleological activity is inconceivable apart from the purpose of *some* mind. Thus biological teleology becomes evidence for theism.

To this argument we must reply as follows: The premise is that teleological activity is inconceivable save as a result of conscious conation. But we have seen that in human and animal psychology conscious conation itself presupposes objective teleological tendencies. We have then no reason to assume that in divine psychology the situation is reversed. If there be a God with conscious purposes, his divine acts of conation themselves presuppose teleological tendencies on the part of an active substance objective to the divine acts of conation.

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The same argument may be used against Professor McDougall's animism. For him our conscious conation involves prior teleological tendencies outside our consciousness, but these tendencies inhere in something psychic. The only reason, however, for holding that this something is psychic is that it is teleological. And if we once grant that for us teleological activity is prior to *our* consciousness, we have no right to assume that it is ever essentially dependent upon consciousness.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS

I will now try to state the implications of the fifth and sixth ethical theories in relation to the foregoing account of conation.

The claim of the fifth theory is that it accepts from each of the previous three theories (mentioned at the outset) all that is true, while rejecting all that is false. It claims to state the facts of ethical experience in such a way that good appears as necessarily related to consciousness, yet as more fundamental than, and not dependent on, feeling. It asserts that pleasure, though a *criterion* of goodness, is not itself an essential constituent of everything that is intrinsically good. What *is* essential to the intrinsic goodness of anything is, according to the theory, that it should consist in the achievement of mind's conscious activity.

In relation to the view of conation stated before the theory may therefore be described as follows: For value to emerge, it is not sufficient that there should be teleological activity. That activity must also be consciously willed. Thus, to use a phrase of Professor G. E. Moore's, in this theory anything that is intrinsically good must be an "organic whole" consisting of (*a*) a teleological process, (*b*) conscious espousal of that process, and (*c*) consciousness of the fulfilment of the process. No one of these factors is good by itself; for goodness is a characteristic of wholes composed of all these three elements. It may be questioned whether *consciousness*

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of the fulfilment of mental activity is essential to goodness. The reason for including it is that fulfilment of activity that is *mental* seems to entail consciousness of fulfilment. Here I think we come upon a real inconsistency in the theory. For in insisting that the activity that is the ground of goodness must be mental activity, and that good is relative to consciousness, the theory does seem to imply that consciousness of fulfilment is essential to goodness. But consciousness *of* fulfilment is a case of cognition, and is in fact a value-judgment which asserts a value, but does not create it.

In the sixth theory, on the other hand, it is claimed that the possibility of value emerges wherever there is a teleological process, whether or not there is conscious espousal of the process; and that, whether or not there is *awareness* of the fulfilment of the process, the fulfilment itself is good.

Now the difference between the theories might be regarded as merely a verbal difference, arising out of the ambiguity of the word "good." There is no doubt that we do as a matter of fact often use the word "good" in each of the senses implied in the theories, and of course in other senses also. Sometimes people say that to be thrown upon his own resources would be good for a certain boy whether he wills it or not. In saying this they sometimes mean merely that the boy would get more *pleasure* out of life in the long run if he learned to stand by himself. With this use we are not concerned, for in both theories it is held that pleasure is not constitutive of goodness. In both theories feeling is regarded as consequent on a value-judgment; and in both it is held that a value-judgment cannot itself be constitutive of the value which it values.

Sometimes, however, people mean (by such a statement as we are considering) something in accord with the fifth theory, namely, that the boy would attain in the long run consciousness of fulfilment of more complex and diverse willed-teleological-activities. He would in fact become a richer,

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more developed, personality, and consciously so. Thus it is insisted that his being thrown out into the world is only to be justified in the last resort by his *consciousness* of rich and successful willed activity. (Of course it may be meant sometimes that he may become a more useful member of society, whatever happens within his own consciousness. But it is still assumed that consciousness is the essential ground of goodness, though in this case the consciousness of others.)

Sometimes, however, people mean (by such a statement as we are considering) something more in accord with the sixth theory. They regard the boy as a being having certain capacities of development, and as in fact tending to develop teleologically into a greater being. And they judge that, just because he is of this nature, it is good that he should fulfil his potentiality. It is good, they would say, whether he ever, in all his life, consciously wills to do so or not. In fact, for them the goodness of his development is not relative to his consciousness at all, but relative to his hormic nature. If, *per impossibile,* he were to attain a high degree of development, yet always consciously to will to have remained in his childish state of undevelopment, yet his development would be intrinsically good. We may, indeed, imagine the case of a man who at the end of his life should look back on his career and say, "I have known much, and I have done much. Few could have lived with the intensity and breadth that I have achieved. Yet I have ever longed to be quit of it all. For the only blessed state is the insensitivity and passivity of a stone." Of such a case some would maintain that, apart altogether from any service which he might have rendered to his fellows, and also in spite of his own perverse will, this man's life would have been intrinsically good. And further, it would be maintained that this would be so not essentially because his life consisted in rich activity of a *conscious* kind, but just because it consisted in the fulfilment of his nature's capacity. From this view it would follow that in the case of plants, even

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if they have no consciousness whatever, their free development would be an intrinsic good just because it constituted the fulfilment of a teleological nature. The fulfilment of merely mechanical processes, however, would not, in this view, be good unless indeed it were to be found that mechanical activity itself ultimately involved teleology.

Clearly the difference between these views about the boy might be regarded as merely verbal; and indeed the two ethical theories under discussion seem but to reflect two common and incompatible uses of the word "good." For in our daily thoughts we do, as a matter of fact, often regard good as both relative to consciousness and as independent of consciousness. That we often regard good as relative to pleasure or to the achievement of purpose is obvious. Perhaps less obvious today, but no less common, is the assumption that certain kinds of conduct are intrinsically good quite apart from anyone's will, even apart from God's will. Now so long as we are aware of the various factors of the value situation, it does not perhaps greatly matter which of them we dignify with the word "good." On the other hand, perhaps one usage of the word is more significant and more coherent than the other, and should alone be accepted in philosophy.

I believe this to be the case, and that this most significant meaning of the word "good" is that which is involved in our sixth theory, for the following reasons. It is generally agreed to call "good" that state of affairs which *ought to be*. Within any limited sphere, or universe of discourse, to say that anything is "good" implies always that it ought to be. This means essentially that, apart altogether from anyone's desire for it, the thing is in some sense needed for the fulfilment of the capacities of the sphere itself, whether that sphere be a limited region of existence or the universe. Now the concept of "need" seems to imply a teleological activity working toward some end. But it does not, so far as I can see, imply consciousness of that activity or conscious espousal of that

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activity. An upholder of the fifth theory would of course object that the word "need" and the phrase "ought to be" can only be used significantly in reference to the conscious will of someone or other; in fact, that what is good must be good *for someone,* for some conscious mind, and that good is a character of organic wholes in which consciousness is a member. But this view seems arbitrary if once we admit that, for conscious conation to occur at all, there must be some objective teleological tendency; in fact that what we desire is neither states of pleasure nor states of fulfilled will, but the fulfilment of objective activities.

The intuitive apprehension that a certain state of affairs "ought to be" is crucial for the understanding of what we really mean by "good" when we are using the word seriously. To say that a thing ought to be is to imply (*a*) that there is a need for it, and (*b*) that there is no objectively greater need in conflict with it. The apprehension that a thing ought to be may fittingly be described as an apprehension that the thing is "desirable," within the sphere under consideration, whether that sphere be a limited universe of discourse, such as the needs of one's own body, or whether it be the needs of the universe as a whole. The thing that is called "desirable" is said to be so because of its own nature, and not because we, or any other persons, or the ideally developed mind, do or might desire it. When it is desired, *it* itself creates the desire for it by its own intrinsic character; though obviously it can only create desire in a mind capable of desiring something or other.

Since the time of Aristotle it has been commonly objected to this view of the desirable that it is inconceivable that mere cognition should ever cause desire. There must, it is said, be something "in our own nature" by virtue of which we desire, even when what we desire is "the desirable." Now this is true merely in the sense that only beings capable of desiring can desire at all; it does not, or should not, deny that *what* we

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desire is determined by activities objective to the act of desire, by needs whose fulfilment we cannot desire unless first we are aware of them as needs inherent in some object or other within our mental horizon.

In the sphere of moral desire it is fairly easy to see that the moral choice is determined by the intrinsic character, the desirability, of the moral end itself. But in this sphere, though choice is seen to be determined by something objective to the moral agent, we are too apt to suppose that this objective determinant, though independent of our own consciousness, is essentially relative to the conscious will of *other* individuals or of God, and that apart from this there would be no obligation. On the other hand, in a more humble sphere, namely, the desire for the fulfilment of one's own bodily processes, it is clear (according to the principles of a hormic psychology) that the relative desirability of the end is derived, not from consciousness at all, but from something more fundamental, namely, the teleological nature of the organism. But in this sphere it is less easy to see that this determination of conscious desire is psychologically just as strictly objective as in the case of moral choice. We are aware of the body's needs as in fact needs of one object (the central object) within our mental content, and *therefore* we desire their fulfilment.

The truth is that in each sphere we intuitively apprehend that a certain end is desirable, that (within the particular sphere) this end *ought to be achieved.* And upon the ground of this cognitive judgment we may proceed to desire, or will, the end. Many no doubt would deride the notion that the desire for food or sexual activity is essentially moral in the sense that it is objectively determined. But a strict discrimination between the subjective mental activity and the psychologically objective environment, which includes the body, forces us to this conclusion. Why should I will my body's free activity rather than the reverse? To say that something in my

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nature as a psychical subject makes me do so is no real answer. The fact is simply that I intuitively apprehend the teleological tendency of my body, and intuitively apprehend its free activity as good, as being, at least within a limited universe of discourse, desirable.

SUMMARY

Assuming on the one hand that good is not dependent on feeling, and on the other that it is not simply a unique character of certain objects, I have tried to show that essentially what we mean by good is the fulfilment, or progressive fulfilling, of the activities of teleologically active substances. This view is suggested both by our intuitive experience of moral obligation as objective, and by a psychological theory in which conscious conation presupposes teleological tendencies objective to the act of conation.

WEST KIRBY, ENGLAND

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THE FUNCTION OF THE PROPAGANDIST

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

THE ORTHODOX democrat holds that every man has a duty correlative with a right to his own opinion; a duty to share in the common quest for sound social policy. The man in the street phrases the idea pithily enough when he says that everyone ought to stand up for the right as he sees it. This means that the citizens of a democratic polity should disclose any facts known to them which would aid the community in reaching a wise decision, and that they should be outspoken in praise and blame, criticism and suggestion, admonition and warning. In the dictum of Burke which appealed so strongly to Woodrow Wilson, "Public duty demands and requires that what is right should not only be made known, but made prevalent; that what is evil should not only be detected, but defeated." Government by discussion, which dissolves the cake of custom, fosters originality, and nourishes animated moderation requires, according to Bagehot, the setting out of "the arguments required to determine political action with such force and effect that they really should determine it."

An obvious corollary of the major proposition is that men who desist from political discussion, or who, refusing to speak their own minds, give currency to the views of others with whom they do not concur, have transgressed against democracy.

It is true that the community has tacitly acquiesced in certain limitations upon this principle. Reticence is sometimes condoned, and, indeed, constrained. Facts which are come by within the preserves of intimacy are respected, and the friend, the medical and legal adviser, and the agent are

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supposed to commit no breach of confidence, apart from the most unusual circumstances.[1]

For those who live, not by reticence, but by the affirmative propagation of opinions in which they do not privately concur, society has granted very grudging exemptions from its ruling principle. The diplomat and the lawyer are conspicuous and even honorable members of society; yet there are many detractors who murmur against them. Sir Henry Wotton's famous "merriment," defining the diplomat as "an honest man who is sent to lie abroad for the good of his country," is perennially popular. And who has not sympathized occasionally with Sandburg's horses who nicker when the hearse goes by with a lawyer?

Since the professional propagandist is engaged in spreading convictions which bear no necessary relation to his private beliefs, he joins the diplomat and the lawyer in flouting certain conventions of democracy, but he is an object of more intense distrust than they, since his goings and comings are still mysterious and therefore particularly ominous to the general public.

When one stops to consider the antiquity in which his origins are shrouded, public ignorance of the propagandist is truly remarkable. Wherever the chains of automatic fealty have been burst asunder, collective action depends upon coercion or persuasion. It is safer for even the tyrant to depend upon persuasion, since he cannot perpetually remain upon the alert. ("Even the tyrant must sleep.") For the few who would rule the many under democratic conditions, there is no choice but persuasion. Resort may be had to the archaeologist to testify to the antiquity and the universality of propaganda, and he is able to point to the plastered walls of Pompeii upon which were painted the vivid red posters of the election which was in progress when Vesuvius erupted. Indeed, it has been

[1] A remarkable gap in the literature of social science is the analysis of the zones of privacy in different communities and classes.

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facetiously suggested—an unrecognized contribution to the science of vulcanism—that the impulsive volcano must have been exasperated beyond all endurance by campaign rhetoric.

However trite the fact of propaganda may be to the student, the contemporary public shows a lively interest in finding out about it. In the United States it is still news to write about the four hundred associations, representing every shade of sentiment and interest, which nestle near the Capitol at Washington, and mediate between Congress, the president, the departments, the commissions, and the public, spending more than ten million dollars annually in the process. Almost anywhere in post-war Europe it is possible to assemble an inquisitive audience to hear about the technique of propaganda which was employed in the late war. During the war itself every government tried to immunize itself against criticism by leading its nationals to believe that a prodigious enemy propaganda was behind every uncomplimentary reference to the administration. In democratic countries the official propaganda bureau was looked upon with genuine alarm, for fear that it might be suborned to party and personal ends. The outcry in the United States against Mr. Creel's famous Bureau of Public Information (or "Inflammation") helped to din into the public mind the fact that propaganda existed. In those countries which experienced military disaster the officer class has discovered an alibi in foreign propaganda. German generals have said, in effect, that their armies were never really beaten; they merely collapsed when the civilians became totally demoralized by foreign lies. Capitalistic countries have been stridently worked up over "bolshevist propaganda" since the Revolution in Russia, and the Communists themselves talk incessantly about their own propaganda abroad and about capitalistic propaganda against them.

The public's discovery of propaganda has led to a great deal of lamentation over it. Propaganda has become an epithet of contempt and hate, and the propagandists have sought

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protective coloration in such names as "public relations council," "specialist in public education," "public relations adviser." Those who admit that the College of Propaganda at Rome once carried the light of the Gospel to the heathen say that the modern publicity department scatters darkness among the civilized. Propaganda, christened though not begotten, and certainly not forgotten, by the church, would appear to have fallen upon evil days.

But these expostulatory outbursts have produced precisely nothing in the nature of social action in respect of propaganda. Such a state of affairs suggests that there must be something in the structure of our modern society which renders the propaganda function peculiarly indispensable, and that an ethical system which is consonant with present practices must be capable of restatement in a form which sanctions propaganda. Ethical judgments of one sort may kick against the pricks of the unmodifiable; but their probable fate will be to lose out to another set of ethical rationalizations which harmonize with the facts. It is within the scope of this paper to undertake to forecast a manner of thinking about the propagandist which will produce in all probability his ethical rehabilitation in democratic society.

The propagandist is a species of advocate, and there are many ways to justify the function of advocacy. As an advocate the propagandist falls within the class of the lawyer, though he is subject to fewer restrictions. The propagandist operates upon the public; the lawyer is more commonly restricted to the judge and jury. The propagandist does not necessarily appear in public connection with his cause, nor does he stand liable to contempt of court. He is bound by no special traditions of presenting his material (such as the rules of evidence), and he is subject to no umpire who exercises a continuous censorship over the formal validity of his contentions.

In common with the lawyer, he is a specialized advocate,

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and it is possible to argue that the specialized advocate contributes to social harmony by satisfying various individuals and groups that they have had a fair chance to put their views before the community, and that it is no disgrace for them to abide by the result. Reduced to elementary terms, both litigation and legislation may be interpreted as substitutes for private violence, and those who give expert help in the process are performing a valuable social function. Regardless of how the legal or propaganda action terminates, the initiating parties can usually be made to feel that they have had a run for their money, and can accept a face-saving solution which would seriously humiliate them in direct bargaining with opponents and competitors. From this point of view technical obscurities are a positive advantage, for they add to the circumambient prestige of the procedure. One heir who wants to beat out another for possession of an estate, or one competitor who wants to overreach another by possessing a certain franchise, is able to take his case to the bar of the court or the legislature and accept possible defeat with equanimity. He has had a chance to put his views before the accredited agents of the community, and perhaps before the community itself. The opportunity of creating a considerable commotion —with the experienced assistance of the lawyer or propagandist—pacifies the vanity of individuals and satisfies the requirements of permanent social solidarity by reducing provocation to private violence.

The expert advocate more often than not contributes to social harmony by cultivating an attitude of social realism in the minds of those who consult him. Most lawyers have kept cases out of court by convincing irate people that the community could not possibly see eye to eye with them, and that a direct solution of the specific difficulty ought to be accepted. The publicity expert, if consulted by the phantastical reformer or the revolutionist, may deflate exorbitant demands on society by calmly presenting the total picture of vested

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inertia and hostility, and by calculating the outlay of money, time, and energy requisite to the production of so much as a fractional result.

Propaganda, if vigorously used on all sides, makes for the maintenance of public interest in political affairs. The propagandist who is retained for political purposes has to compete with the rising competition of many other forms of social activity: sport, amusement, crime. That it is desirable to stimulate public attention to political matters is an axiom to every democrat.

It is therefore possible to make out a case for the idea that the long-run interests of society may be served by adjudicators and propagandists at the sacrifice of conformity between private and public convictions on their part.

The suggestion that propaganda in politics increases public interest in politics is frequently assumed to be tantamount to claiming that the chances for the emergence of truth are vastly improved. This proposition is open to serious question. In respect of those matters about which the public is continually making overt decisions of preference among competitors, error can in some measure be corrected by competitive publicity. The public is absorbing vast quantities of tooth-paste each year. Some advertisers have claimed that their product kills germs, and this has brought out a campaign financed by one advertiser to show that the function of paste is only to *clean* teeth. Whether this "publicity of truth" will eventually influence the buying public is unpredictable; in any case the prospects are brighter than in political life, where so much discontinuity of public-decision prevails. Part of the publicity of the late war was made up of outright lies, and it is by no means certain that the post-war exposure of some of these fabrications will make it any the less easy to lie in the next one. Those who feel sure that propaganda creates immunity against its own excesses in the long run are indulging in a wish-phantasy, for the technical devices which are necessary to measure pub-

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lic opinion itself are in a rudimentary state, and until they are brought to a proper precision, exact statements will be impossible.[2]

Propaganda, considered as the technique of controlling attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols, is no more moral or immoral than a pump handle. Whether specialization in the technique can be justified in one's mind depends upon the conviction that the long-run interest of society in social harmony will be served by expert mobilization of opinion as they have been served by expert litigation. My prediction is that the view of the matter favorable to the propagandist will be incorporated into our culture as information about him becomes more abundant and as his function of advocacy becomes assimilated to that of existing advocates.

Whether propagandists receive this ethical laying-on of hands or not, propaganda will doubtless facilitate that rather large-scale reconstruction of democratic philosophy which has recently begun. Eulogistic democracy was the residuary legatee of absolutism, and surrounded the "will of the people" with the aura of sacred inscrutability which had hedged about the king. The practice of propaganda secularizes the attitude of the propagandist toward the public will. He approaches it, not necessarily with contempt, and certainly not with reverence, but with assurance that within limits it is capable of being manipulated. The "will of the people" is removed from sanctimonious taboo and reduced to the matter of fact.

No one who has achieved this secular attitude can fail to discover that the ideal of the outspoken man, alluded to at the outset of this discussion, is wholly inapplicable to modern society. The social setting in which the outspoken man flourishes is the sectarian village. There the good citizen is expected to unite himself monogamously to a single opinion

[2] The most serious attempts to measure public opinion accurately are those of H. T. Moore, Floyd Allport, and L. L. Thurstone.

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upon each single issue, and openly to cleave thereunto until death or derision do him part. The nature of this opinion is dictated by a consistent pattern of action which defines the gestures and activities appropriate to the sectarian in every conceivable circumstance. The consistency within the pattern is due to the predominant element within it, public loyalty to God in word and deed, as interpreted by the God-fearing. Silent acquiescence in any activity which appears to comfort the unbeliever is disloyalty to God.

In non-sectarian environments each individual is brought into situations which involve people whose background is drastically different from his own. If John McGrath is a Catholic, he must keep religion out of the discussion in his union meeting or disrupt the organization. Each social situation furnishes a context in which a single functional dominant can prevail, and the individual is entangled in a variety of separate contexts. The price of permanence is reticence and socialization in the non-sectarian environment means violating the formal ideal of outspokenness. Non-sectarian life proceeds upon the assumption of the divisibility of man, not upon his indivisibility. The rise of the propaganda specialist is the most extreme case in which disparity between public and private beliefs is unavoidable.

If the practice of propaganda may be expected to contribute something to the restatement of democratic philosophy, it should not be supposed that it will be without influence upon social science. The practitioner and the student of propaganda perceive the inadequacy of the conflict metaphor as an explanation of social change. Political events are today interpreted by social writers in terms of nation versus nation, class versus class, leader versus leader, party versus party. The supposition is that politics can be treated as a special case of mechanics, and that the parallelogram of forces is the fundamental pattern of social interpretation.

This survival from the nineteenth century is not difficult

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to connect with the social context in which it originated. Democracy transformed cliques at court into parties in the field. Nations arose to supplant or suffuse states. Industrialism drove a wedge between workers and employers. Physical science continued its overmastering progress, and mechanics reached a remarkable state of elaboration. Biologists popularized the unfortunate phrase, "survival of the fittest," and in so doing gave the evolutionary process a distorted significance in the public mind. Everywhere the notion of conflicting forces seemed to hold, and social scientists were not independent of the *Zeitgeist*.

Now the working propagandist finds very little use for the notion of conflict, for it quickly degenerates into an idle and rather misleading metaphor. Let us assume that the propagandist is commissioned to create a sentiment favorable to the candidacy of John S. for president. His first operation is to survey the prevalent distribution of attitudes toward his candidate, classifying them by direction and intensity. The public falls into five rough categories: Those who are actively favorable, those who are inactive but who require the matter to be but brought to their attention to become active, those who are actively hostile, those who are inactive but whose hostility will become active when the matter is brought to their attention, and those who are neutral or indifferent. The propagandist next decides upon whom he wishes to concentrate, a decision which depends upon whether he needs a narrow or a sweeping majority. Those whom he wishes to influence are next analyzed according to the culture-patterns in which they participate. What do they regard as assets? What symbols are there in terms of which a menace to these assets or a protector of these assets can be identified? What do they regard as desirable means of increasing their assets? What symbols are there in terms of which an obstacle or a helper can be identified? What are the mores and tastes of the group? What are the symbols in terms of which a conformer

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or a violator of these standards can be identified? The propagandist is now in a position to define his problem more explicitly. In general, it takes this form: How may existing culture-patterns be used to redefine the objects in which I am interested?[8]

Thus the propagandist is constrained to think of society as a process of defining and affirming meaning. His chief preoccupation is with the modes of presentation which redefine meanings.

The persistence of the conflict metaphor is due to the approximately accurate picture it gives of one way in which events may be conceived at a moment of acute crisis. At an election it is possible to say that certain group combinations won and certain others lost. But this static version of events at one phase is no explanation of how they came to pass. How did the groups come to reach the definition of the situation which they possessed in the crisis? At once we are led to the processes involved in the dynamics of social meaning.

Further reflection shows that the apparently simple crisis situation is not explicable in terms of the conflict metaphor. Quite often a dispute between A and B leads neither to the acceptance of A's demands or B's demands, nor to a compromise of their demands in which they can identify their respective contributions; what emerges is a new and unanticipated solution which neither can regard as a victory or as a defeat. What has happened is that the redefinition of the situation has brought about an "integration" rather than a "compromise," a "victory," or a "defeat." The distinction of having first caught the true implication of the psychological analysis of society belongs to Mary Follett. Practicing psychologists or propagandists are able to confirm and expand her work from their daily experience.

[8] These technical issues are dealt with in some detail in the writer's *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (London and New York, 1927), and "The Theory of Political Propaganda," *American Political Science Review*, August, 1927.

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In this age we think in terms of extending man's conscious control over his future. What are the possibilities and the limitations of various forms of conscious control, such as bribery, non-violent coercion, violence, propaganda, and the rest? No one is better able to assemble a mass of relevant data for the determination of this question than the practicing propagandist, for he must keep the whole picture constantly in front of him. This may, indeed, be his most significant contribution to a stable body of social theory.

It should not be overlooked that the engineering frame of mind reacts upon social policy. The social engineer, such as the propagandist, at once asks, when an objective is proposed, how much effort will be necessary to achieve a certain portion of the desired result. This habit of incessantly thinking of ways and means in immediate juxtaposition to objectives introduces a certain temperate realism in social programs which is notoriously lacking in many quarters.

The considerations proposed in this discussion may be reviewed at this point: The propagandist is here to stay in modern society. A democratic philosophy which has no sanction for his activities will probably lose out to one which has. The propagandist will probably be assimilated to the advocate. The redefinition of democratic philosophy will be hastened by the secular attitude assumed by the propagandist toward the "public will." The future of social science will be influenced by students and practitioners of propaganda, for they will favor the use of other categories than those furnished by the conflict metaphor, and they will contrbiute to an understanding of the possibilities and limitations of conscious social control.

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HABIT AS AN EXPLANATORY CONCEPT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

CHARNER M. PERRY

INSTINCT as category is now become suspect, and habit seems to be its heir. Motor habits, language habits, implicit habits, habits of mind, unverbalized habits—these and their like are called in by social scientists to explain all human behavior. Habits seem more empirical than instincts. Instincts are denied by some; habits are admitted by all. The difficulty lies, not in proving that we have habits, but in defining the concept of habit and in determining to what extent it may validly be used. In recent literature the expression "nothing but habit" frequently occurs; for instance, that thinking is nothing but language habits. In such expressions "nothing but" is obviously the questionable phrase; and consequently our problem might be stated in a different way by asking what the emphasis upon habit excludes.

Habit may be applied to conduct in a general sense to indicate that in conduct the time element is relevant, that, in other words, our conduct at the present time is not what it would have been if our past conduct had been different. In this sense, to say that conduct may be explained as habitual means that present conduct is intelligibly related to past conduct and may be explained by showing its relation to past conduct. This much seems to be true, but not particularly significant. The problem would still remain of indicating the precise nature of the relation between present and past conduct. In a more specific meaning habit may be used to designate the repetition of conduct. If two responses occur together or if a certain stimulus is followed by a certain response, this may often be explained by reference to the fact that previously the two responses, or the stimulus and the response,

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occurred together. No explanation has been given as to why responses are repeated or as to why the two responses occurred together the first time. Nevertheless, we do give a partial explanation when we show that a particular linking of two responses is an instance of the general rule that conduct tends to be repeated.

However useful the concept of habit may be when defined in this fashion, it is obvious that it cannot be applied to the whole of human conduct. It is relevant only when the two responses are identical with two previous responses, or when a stimulus and a response are identical with a preceding stimulus and response; but an exact identity of present conduct with previous conduct is perhaps the exception rather than the rule. President Coolidge has never before been in exactly the same situation that he is in now, and never before has he responded in precisely the same way. Consequently, his behavior cannot be interpreted as habit in the simple sense of repetition of conduct.

There is, however, an obvious extension of the meaning of habit. Present stimuli, while not identical with previous stimuli, are often made up of elements which were formerly stimuli, or they may be parts of former stimuli, or they may be made up of parts of former stimuli. In the same way, a response may be a part of a former response, or a whole including several former responses, or a whole made up of parts of several previous responses. The concept of habit may be applied to such cases on the assumption that by analysis we find repetition. This broadening of the meaning of habit seems both valid and useful. It permits us to show repetitions in apparently new conduct, and to explain such conduct by means of these repetitions. The broadened concept of habit is so useful indeed that it tempts us to neglect or exclude other explanations and to disregard relations among responses other than the relation of identity of element. The result is the assertion that this or that is "nothing but" habit.

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This assertion is by no means new. At the present time, however, it occurs frequently and is made with great vigor. Moreover, it has become associated with behaviorism, and, like behaviorism, with considerable complacency and assurance claims to be the representative and protégé of science and scientific method and to stand for objectivity and hard-headed sticking to facts. Such claims, however, though effective as slogans, are not valid as arguments, since anyone can make them. Consequently it is not so presumptuous as it seems to subject this assertion to critical scrutiny.

As an illustration we may take the views of Watson. According to Watson[1] any definite mode of acting not hereditary is a habit. Habit formation is the result of random movement and fixation of the successful movement. That is to say, before a habit is formed conduct is random movement. Apparently random modes of acting are to be contrasted with definite modes of acting; and consequently conduct is either definite or random, and, if definite, either hereditary or habitual. Random and definite are not precise terms; but the general meaning that Watson gives them is not hard to see. Definite modes of conduct apparently are made up of responses occurring in a more or less fixed and definite pattern or order. Random conduct, on the contrary, has no pattern or order. When a given stimulus is presented, within the limits of the individual's repertoire of responses any response may be tried first, followed by any other. We may infer that so far as conduct is random it does not require any explanation, and that consequently explanation is concerned, or at least concerned primarily, with the patterns in conduct, or with the presence of definite modes of conduct. Since all patterns are hereditary or else are habitual, all acquired patterns are habits. That is to say, if we find in human conduct any concomitance of responses that is not hereditary and is not random then it must

[1] All statements here criticized are based on his *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, 2d ed., chaps. viii, ix.

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be explained as habit. Stating this in a positive fashion we may say that all acquired definite conduct is nothing but habit.

Moreover, Watson says that where there are no identical elements in functions there is no transfer of training. In other words, if we find definite conduct that seems to be new, it really has a definite pattern because it is made up of elements of previous conduct. These statements apply not merely to such things as golf and tennis. On the contrary, language and thought processes are not different from other overt activity, and man's verbal responses are similar to those of a rat in a maze.

Before we attempt to analyze these contentions it should be said that they are not given as peculiar to Watson. Substantially similar doctrines are stated by numerous other people. Though such doctrines are usually stated in such a way as to give them the prestige of modernity, they represent, as was indicated before, an old and even distinguished tradition.

Perhaps the first question to be asked in regard to the assertion that all acquired conduct that has a definite pattern is habit is, What are the reasons for this assertion? This question is more easily asked than answered. So far as I know, the statement is usually made as being self-evident, or as being obviously demanded by scientific method, and the burden of proof is thrown on the critic. This procedure, however, is obscured by the presentation of various kinds of conduct that can be explained as habit, and by the assertion that if the conduct is really definite this must be because it has elements in common with previous conduct. To take these one at a time:

Experiment and empirical investigation do make it evident that some conduct that does not look like habit can be explained as habit. But it should be noticed that the original assertion is essentially negative; there cannot be any definite patterns of conduct which are not habit. Of course this is not proved by showing that there are many definite patterns of conduct which are habit, or which can be explained as habit.

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Moreover, the sweeping assertion that there cannot be any definite patterns of conduct which are not habit can be disproved by the demonstration of a single definite mode of conduct which cannot be explained as habit. Here, however, the other assertion is made use of. Here you have reasoning, Watson would say, which you think is not explainable as habit; but if you carry your analysis far enough, you will find identical elements which make it possible to explain reasoning as habit. Evidently this statement is very difficult either to prove or to disprove. It is hard to disprove because it is indeed true that at any time you can find similarities between present conduct and past conduct. It is hard to prove because it is difficult to show how these similarities do explain the specific conduct. In other words, similarities that you can always find do not seem very significant in explanation of peculiar kinds of actions. If there are identical elements whether an individual does this or that, how do the identical elements explain why he does this rather than that?

This amounts to saying that a statement that is not proved is supported by a statement that is not disproved. On such a dark night all cats are black; and dogmatic statements other than this darksome one are evidently not in order. Perhaps the only solution is to examine certain kinds of conduct that do not seem to be habits and attempt to see whether explaining them as habits is the simplest and most enlightening procedure. Perhaps the evidence is not conclusive, but there do seem to be responses which are not evidently explainable simply and convincingly as habits.

Suppose we consider first responses that seem to be given a pattern by recognition of the logical relation of implication. If I say A is B implies that C is D, and ask myself what I can infer from that, then I say that I can infer that C is not D implies that A is not B. Or I may say that A implies B, B implies C, and therefore A implies C. Perhaps such inferences can be explained as the result of habit; but it seems much

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simpler to say that the two statements A implies B and B implies C really do imply that A implies C; that, in other words, the two responses A implies B and B implies C determine a third response A implies C because the first two responses really do imply the third. A reverse illustration may be given. If I assert that it is inconsistent for anyone to say that only men should smoke and that nevertheless it is permissible for women to smoke if they wish, then is my statement the result of habit, or is it really true that I have pointed out an inconsistency?

It is an obvious fact that it is possible to take a few statements to begin with—postulates or axioms—and from these to infer an almost infinite number of other propositions. And the inferences are not made arbitrarily. Something of this sort is done in mathematics, in symbolic logic, and to a smaller degree in other fields. Habits are rubbed together, if we may use the expression; and the result is a long string of logically determined propositions that are not habits.

Such a procedure, of course, is not merely a mental affair. It is conduct and involves responses. On the face of it, the responses seem to be neither random nor habitual. Certain responses seem to determine other responses. Such facts, however, might be dismissed as insignificant because our inferences and the propositions we start with are merely various ways of saying the same thing. In other words, inference is concerned with purely verbal distinctions. It should be noticed, however, that we do not know that our inferences are merely different ways of saying the same thing until we have inferred them. Inferences are not merely learned as synonyms may be learned.

Other objections may be considered in connection with the next type of response in which apparently we find a pattern. Inference or the discovery of implications is only a part of the larger process by which we discover facts and estab-

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lish theories. Is this process always either random or else habitual? A good bit of knowledge is clearly habit, and the acquisition of knowledge is in part the acquisition of habits. On the other hand, our attempts to acquire knowledge, to solve problems, are often random behavior. Various studies of problem-solving have indicated that in reasoning we seldom leap directly to correct conclusions. But to expect this would be to expect not merely a pattern, but a pattern teleologically arranged, to expect, in other words, that our responses would always fall into a pattern that fits into the nature of the external world. The logical and the teleological have often been confused, but clearly there is a vast difference between asserting that one response determines another and asserting that one response determines a correct response. The point is that in our attempt to solve problems our responses are at least sometimes consistent with each other, and one response implies and thereby determines another.

That this much is true is evident from the fact that various people agree upon the same results. The question still remains, however, whether agreement and conviction of truth can be explained as the result of habit. It is not impossible of course that we should all have similar habits; and it is not impossible that conviction of the truth of an apparently new proposition should be the result of a combination of elements of established habits. Suppose we assume this. Then it seems to follow that Watson's assertion that language and thought-processes are similar to those of a rat in a maze is ultimately explainable as a habit. That is to say, he has in some fashion or another said the same thing before, or else the statement represents a transfer by means of identical elements from other responses which have in the past occurred together. This seems very likely; but is it really what Watson would have us believe? When he makes the assertion he seems to imply that we should believe his assertion, and, moreover, that it is true. If it is true merely because it is a habit, then

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seemingly our own habits would be just as true, and surely nothing but a bad habit would cause him to interfere with our true beliefs.

The subtleties of the arguments pro and con might be gone into indefinitely; but perhaps the point is sufficiently plain. The making of inferences, the acquisition of knowledge, the discovery of truth seem to indicate a transition which is neither random nor habitual from one set of responses to another. But even if this be admitted, we might contend that such facts fall within the province of logic and have nothing to do with psychology and the other social sciences. For instance, a common way of distinguishing between the psychology of thinking and logic is to say that psychology deals with thinking without regard to whether it is true or false, consistent or inconsistent, valid or invalid, while logic is concerned with the distinction between consistent and inconsistent, valid and invalid thinking. Such a distinction sounds reasonable on the face of it. But if it be true that sometimes we go from one thought to another because the passage represents a valid inference, how can psychology possibly explain thinking if it neglects the distinction between valid and invalid? I am not really intending to suggest that psychology become logic; and I am using psychology merely as typical of the sciences that deal with human behavior. If logic has any significance and if the facts with which logic deals are really facts, then all sciences which attempt to explain human behavior must sometimes use in their explanations the relations found in inference and in the formation of knowledge, must, in other words, recognize other patterns in human behavior than those which result from habit.

The argument has still wider application. If it be true that in inference we have an instance of a limited set of responses determining other responses, then is it not possible that we may find other cases in which responses in other ways determine further responses? In recent thought, especially in

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sociology, there seems a marked tendency to emphasize the influence of certain forms of activity in building up attitudes and activity complexes wider than the activity itself. To begin with, suppose we take a few examples that are not particularly recent. According to Veblen, "that body of habits of thought which makes up the character of any individual is in some sense an organic whole. A marked variation in a given direction at any one point carries with it, as its correlative, a concomitant variation in the habitual expression of life in other directions or other groups of activities."[2] Not a little of Veblen's work consists of attempts to indicate the effect of the machine process upon men's non-industrial attitudes and beliefs, or to indicate the logic of the complex of attitudes resulting from barbarian, predatory culture or from savage, pre-predatory culture. Turner's *The Frontier in American History,* Sombard's *Quintessence of Capitalism,* and a good part of Simmel's work also attempt to show how certain activities or situations have a widespread influence upon the character and beliefs of the individuals involved.

Giddings argues that there are various contradictions between ideas and beliefs other than the specific ones we call logical incompatibility, and that such contradictions are more extensive and more varied than mere logical duels, less definite and less precise.[3] More extreme is the contention of W. D. Wallis that mental patterns are found in every culture area, that no knowledge of separate parts of an individual mind is adequate without an understanding of the whole integrated pattern, and that the parts are interconnected and interdependent, so that any change in one part reflects a corresponding change in the whole pattern.[4]

The same problem is brought up in connection with the

[2] *The Theory of the Leisure Class,* pp. 288–89.

[3] "Are Contradictions of Ideas and Beliefs Likely to Play an Important Group-making Rôle in the Future?" *American Journal of Sociology,* XIII, 784–91.

[4] "Mental Patterns in Relation to Culture," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology,* XIX, 179.

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psychology of individual differences by attempts to classify individuals according to types, as in the case of Jung's classification as intraverts or extraverts. If the psychological type is determined, at least in part, by the psychological history of the individual, then clearly a limited number of actions of an individual exercise a determining influence upon all the behavior of the individual concerned. Recent study of groups of salesmen and groups of engineering and mechanics students apparently shows striking differences between groups as wholes in social ability, suggestibility, adaptability, self-confidence, talkativeness, good nature, reticence, absent-mindedness, etc.[5]

The various instances presented are probably subject to considerable criticism, and it is clear than no unambiguous conclusions can be drawn from them; but they do suggest a possible correlation of traits greater than would result if each trait were an independent variable. They indicate an actual correlation, positive or negative, between responses. Perhaps such correlations may be explained as a result of transfer due to identical elements. Is there any reason, however, why we should at the beginning rule out the possibility that the correlation is due to the fact that some responses imply others, though the implication involved is not the strict implication of logic? To rule out this possibility is to insist that so far as causality is concerned there are no relations among responses except the spatial-temporal relation of juxtaposition. Empirically there are many other relations; empirically some of these other relations are causally effective. The recognition of them is not new. William James, for instance, insists that various relations which we empirically find are really real. What theoretical necessity, what finely spun logic, what subtle habit, makes it essential to exclude them?

Suppose we take another example, that of culture com-

[5] Freyd, *Personalities of the Socially and Mechanically Inclined, Psychological Monograph*, XXXIII, No. 4.

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plexes. For convenience we may take the simple discussion contained in Wissler, *Man and Culture*. According to Wissler, when one scrutinizes a culture trait he finds, not a clear-cut unit, but a kind of complex. The wild-rice complex, for instance, is made up of many processes, requiring techniques of various complexities and special appliances, also property rights, labor obligations, etiquette, methods of keeping time, and special religious observances, prohibitions, and taboos. Variations of course are found from tribe to tribe and from individual to individual in the same culture complex; "but these will be easily recognized as mere deviations around a central idea." According to Wissler, some of the best-known trait complexes are head-hunting, totemism, couvade, tobacco, maize, wheat, dog traction, the horse, use of milk, the wheel, exogamy, sun worship, and blood sacrifice.[6]

Hobhouse, in collaboration with two other men, made a statistical study of the correlation of complexes, the conclusion being that the world over certain trait complexes tend to adhere to hunting complexes, others to pastoral, and others to agricultural complexes.[7] This study is criticized by Wissler. To quote, "We could, if necessary, take up the other adhesions noted and account for them now as mere logical, necessary relations, or again, as historic coincidences. But something yet remains: why do so many trait-complexes occur in agricultural areas and not among hunters?"[8] At this point it is necessary to notice in the criticism only the statement that many of the complexes and traits can be accounted for as logical relations. That "logical relations" is a broad term must be stressed. Certainly we should assume that all the adhesions can be accounted for in some way; but it seems rash to assert that they can all be accounted for as being log-

[6] See pp. 52 ff.

[7] L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg, *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples.*

[8] *Op. cit.*, p. 70.

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ical in the sense of being essential to the survival of each of the traits. Why, for instance, should certain technical traits tend to be accompanied by peculiar religious observances and beliefs? The conclusion obviously is that in some way men's actions and beliefs "hang together." The question is whether this "hanging together" is always the result of identical elements making possible a transfer of habits, or whether there is sometimes a real consistency or inconsistency in conduct. Stated in another form, Is a previous spatial-temporal juxtaposition the only determining relation among responses?

We have suggested that the logical relation of implication is one relation which seems sometimes to determine our responses. Perhaps it is now time to mention other possible relations. An obvious example would be the relation of betterness. Is a recognition that one response is better than another sometimes the cause of the first response? Certainly we do sometimes assert that we do this or that because it seems better; but possibly judgments of betterness should be interpreted as habits, and ultimately a feeling that a response is better than another means simply that the first response is a stronger habit. Certainly we usually like our habits, whether they are good or bad. But to say that our judgments of betterness are always simply nothing but habit is to invite a paradox. If in case of a genuine conflict between habits the question of which is better is raised—and obviously this question is often raised—we are told that there is no way of choosing except to let the stronger habit exercise itself, this is equivalent to saying that it is impossible to choose. But if the question is once raised, then we must at least choose not to choose. That is, we must decide that it is better not to try to decide which habit is better. We might conceivably say that the stronger habit is really better; but this raises another difficulty. In a genuine conflict between habits we do not know which is stronger until we have decided which we think is better. That is, our decision as to betterness is a factor in the

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strength of habits. While it may be difficult to decide which response is really better, our actual attempts to choose seem to presuppose that some responses are better than others, and to indicate that sometimes our responses are determined by a judgment, whether correct or mistaken, in regard to betterness.

If the foregoing conclusions are valid, again a conclusion follows in regard to the traditional division of labor between philosophy and the social sciences. Concern with goodness and badness, right and wrong—in short, with value—has been regarded as the duty of ethics. Psychology, sociology, economics, and the other social sciences, it is said, are descriptive and should not deal with so-called "norms." But if recognition of values really plays a part in human behavior, how can the social sciences really describe and explain human conduct unless they make use of the distinctions between better and worse, good and bad? If such distinctions are valid, then recognition of them sometimes determines the order of responses. Consequently, such responses cannot be either explained or adequately described if such recognitions are neglected.

Other relations among responses might be of the type indicated by the terms beautiful, harmonious, aesthetically pleasing. When the poet writes, for instance, are his responses determined solely by habit, or, in some cases at least, is it true that his responses are determined by the fact that certain responses aesthetically imply others, that from an aesthetic point of view some responses are consistent while others are inconsistent? It should be noticed, and emphasized, that our argument does not imply that the poetry really is beautiful or that all people must have the same opinions in regard to it. The contention is simply that some responses determine other responses in a way that is neither random or habitual. Though the expression is perhaps misleading, we may say that there is a logic of poetry, whether or not such logic has

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any place in the external world, and whether or not the logic would be the same for everyone.

In the same way there seems to be a logic of wit. People do not always agree as to what is funny: a fat lady sliding on a banana peel usually does not see the joke. Nevertheless, it hardly seems the simplest explanation of wit to say that it is the result of habit. There are various explanations of wit; but most of them, even Watson's explanation, seem to imply that in wit we have a subtle relation between responses which is not merely habit, but is real in its own right.

Whatever may be the faults of the Freudian psychology, and doubtless its faults are many, a redeeming virtue is its recognition of various types of interaction within conduct. It would, I think, be a mistake to conceive of the Freudian concepts of conflict, repression, substitution, and sublimation as expressing merely spatial-temporal relations among responses. The Freudian conflict, for instance, does not seem to be of the kind that results when two habits demand at the same time opposite use of the same muscles. On the contrary, Freudian conflicts are inconsistencies more like logical inconsistencies; and on the whole it seems fair to say that Freud's work is most significant as an attempted contribution to what we may in a rather misleading fashion call the logic of conduct.

The examples given of correlations which are not obviously determined by habits—that is, such correlations as are found in culture complexes—suggest that there are various other determining relations among responses than the specific relations dealt with in logic, ethics, and aesthetics. Whether there really are such relations must, I suppose, be determined empirically. The indubitable fact is that past activities in large part determine the activities that will occur in a new situation, even though in many cases the future responses are different from the old ones. When a man who has lived in the country comes to the city, his old habits, cut off from the situ-

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ations in which they were formed and in which they functioned, certainly do not appear in the identical form or with the completeness that characterized them in their original setting. To use the wide term "habit" to explain the influence of experience in the country upon the way in which adjustment to the city environment is made leaves unsolved the problem of the specific manner in which the rearrangement and reconstruction of habits takes place. To explain what happens as a transfer of training due to identical elements in habits is at best to make a highly speculative assumption.

If so far as explanation of conduct is concerned the only significant relation between responses is the relation of coexistence, then we never really make inferences, discover inconsistencies, and recognize implications. In short, our statements are habits, and the only way to argue is to turn our habits loose and see which wins the field. If our responses are sometimes determined by the relation of implication, then there seems no a priori reason why there should not be other significant relations of the same general type.

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DOES THE OBJECTIVE SYSTEM OF VALUES IMPLY A COSMIC INTELLIGENCE

H. W. WRIGHT

THE QUESTION whether belief in the existence of a Supreme Spirit, a Universal Purpose, a personal God is essential to genuine religion has been discussed by many writers on the philosophy and psychology of religion. The answer usually (and, I think, rightly) given is in the negative. We cannot doubt that many individuals have responded to the existing universe with genuinely religious attitudes of reverence and personal confidence who saw no evidence in it of the controlling influence of a cosmic purpose or divine personality. Great religions of the Orient have refused to ascribe anything like self-conscious intelligence or personal character to the Universal Reality.

What is indispensable to religion is belief in the reality of the principal values of human experience and social life. This is equivalent to believing that Universal Reality possesses moral and spiritual value, since the highest values we know are those of social intelligence and personal association. So even when religious faith is limited to the vaguest cosmic emotion it never fails, I imagine, to ascribe to the Cosmos attributes of spiritual value like inherent order and majesty, trustworthiness, and ultimate intelligibility. And religions like Buddhism which refuse to attribute to reality any definite characteristics such as those of moral and social value seem to signify quite otherwise in their underlying import. For by depreciating separate individuality, condemning individual desire, and representing the acquisition of altruistic virtues as the only path to the attainment of eternal reality, they practically assign highest reality to these spiritual values.

It is a fact, however, that belief in God or gods has held a

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central place in the religion of mankind. Indeed, more, it has seemed to the vast majority of men a necessary implication of belief in the conservation of values, scarcely distinguishable in matter of fact from this latter belief. Proof of this is found in the historic fact that man's conception of God has kept fairly even pace in its development with his understanding of the values realized through rational insight and social conduct. Primitive man attributes to the gods superhuman power and little else, although this power differs from the power of purely natural forces in being responsive to human appeal. Then, as social evolution proceeded and man gained a fuller understanding of the values of social intelligence and personal co-operation, to power was added justice, and to justice wisdom and the "beauty of holiness," and to wisdom and holiness has been finally added universal benevolence.

The question which I wish to raise in this paper is not whether "true religion" involves belief in God. It is the not-unrelated question of whether the real or objective system of values implies the existence of a Universal or Cosmic Intelligence. Before beginning the discussion of this question let me make clear, if I can, what is meant by the *real or objective system of values*.

The real world possesses, I take it, an aspect of value as well as of existence. External existence presents itself primarily in the so-called "physical" properties of things, in the space-time-mass relationships of the physical order. Objects possess value, on the other hand, in virtue of the different qualities which in various blends and patterns give them their distinctive character. For these diverse but interrelated qualities which characterize the objects of the real world offer to our common intelligence a limitless field for expansion and development in activities of selection, exploration, and immediate experience.

Some values are admittedly subjective. While they undoubtedly exist, they exist only for the individuals who expe-

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rience them. If a kind of food agrees with my taste and digestion it has value for me. But if you find it distasteful and disturbing, it lacks this value for you. Other values are social in the narrower sense of the word. While they do, so far as experienced, enlarge and enrich the conscious experiences of a social group, this is because of special conditions and circumstances which have influenced the organization and activities of that special group.

But there are still other values which in contrast with these deserve to be regarded as universal and objective. The real world possesses certain characteristics by virtue of which it affords satisfaction and fulfilment to conscious intelligence under any and all conditions of its exercise. These values have the same claim to objectivity that the laws of physical existence have. They are open to empirical verification by all individuals who can take the trouble to experiment and observe.

What are these values? The real world because of its uniformities of character and relationship (many of them, of course, physical) possesses a *coherence of meaning* which renders it capable of co-operative investigation and common insight on the part of a limitless number of individual thinkers. The objects of the real world, non-living and living, because of their permanent characters and systematic interrelations, possess a *practical adaptability* to the continuing life of social intelligence in virtue of which they furnish unlimited material for co-operative endeavor and constructive enterprise. The objects of the real world, because of intrinsic harmonies of constituent qualities, possess *aesthetic significance* and thus are capable of symbolizing or suggesting through their effect on human feeling and imagination the larger reality of which they are a part.

It is obvious that so far as human experience of them is concerned, the real values of objects disclose themselves to the community of intelligent individuals, each one having his own

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unique point of view, but all sharing in a common understanding; each one possessing powers of original invention, but all engaging in a common task; each one with his own angle of aesthetic perception, but all appreciating and enjoying the same or similar beauties in nature or in art. The existence of these values is experimentally verified, furthermore, by three psycho-physical activities at once socially conditioned yet under the control of individual intelligence: articulate speech, practical invention and social organization, and aesthetic perception.

The system of values really exists. This will now be treated as established fact and taken as the starting-point of further reflection. What have we found it to mean? That the objects of the existing world, so far as their value is intelligently appreciated, prove to be related in ways other than, and different from, that of physical causation. They reveal coherence of meaning, potencies of adaptation and transformation, and intrinsic harmonies which are significantly expressive. This does not mean that objects in their aspect of value necessarily constitute one perfectly organized system, one complete and self-contained whole. The system of values brought to light in our experience is essentially a developing system, and there is no reason to doubt that human intelligence and invention really assist in its development. But while it is a developing system and is developed (in part, at least) by human instrumentality, it is nevertheless a system and a metaphysical system.

Now is such a system conceivable without an immanent, organizing intelligence? It is true, to be sure, that values are in a sense created by our own rational insight, practical contrivance, and aesthetic perception. But they are also and at the same time discovered. For if existing objects were not intelligible they would disclose no identities and differences of meaning; if they did not possess a certain order and fitness they would not be adaptable to rational uses; if the qualities

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of some of them were not intrinsically harmonious, they would not reflect the nature and system of the whole. So the question returns: Is the intelligibility, the order and adaptability, the expressive unity, of actual objects conceivable apart from an intelligence which knows and contrives and perceives?

One reply would be: Certainly not, the system of objective values implies the community of creative human intelligence; but there is no reason to go farther. Still, there are difficulties which this solution does not wholly remove. Let us consider these difficulties as they first present themselves, in their more obvious, and, if you wish, more superficial, aspect.

The human individuals who share the life of intelligent community have each a brief existence and a fragmentary experience. If they alone constitute the community of intelligence, can it be said to possess any real unity and continuity? Suppose that some stellar collision extinguished all life on this planet. Would the system of personal and social values then be destroyed? Or that some earthly influence hostile to man, such as an insect-carried plague, destroyed civilization and reduced mankind to a few bands of roving savages. Would the community of intelligence be correspondingly shrunk near to the vanishing-point? If such is the case, the existence of the system of values is, despite all its coherence and organization and potencies of development, at the mercy of the circumstances and vicissitudes of life on this planet. If, on the other hand, we are convinced that the system of values does possess real organization and inherent potencies of continuous and consistent development, must we not rather assume that conscious intelligence and rational purpose exist in some more comprehensive and enduring form than we are able to observe in the case of human individuals?

Supposing the objection to be maintained, however, that we have already attributed a common reason to mankind and

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thus have already provided, or allowed, for a comprehensive principle of intelligent community, the answer will merely put the argument in another form. Human nature has two sides: man is both a natural being and a self-conscious person. He is linked by his organism with the succession of physical events to which as stimuli he must respond with appropriate movements in order to preserve his natural existence. But man as an intelligent person is capable of taking the comprehensive, the universal, point of view. His world is a world of objects possessing identity of character and permanent possibilities of development and reorganization, the world as it must reveal itself to intelligent individuals in all times and places. This comprehensive and universal outlook makes the intelligent man a spectator of universal evolution, including, of course, the incidents, the progress, and the approaching end of his own organic existence as well as the natural life and death of generations of his fellows. No view of man or of his destiny deserves serious consideration which does not give due weight to the fact that man is unique among all the forms of life we know in being intelligently aware of the fact that he is a living being with a limited span of life, and therefore capable of effectually relating his own brief period of bodily life and activity to the larger issues of human progress and world-history which far transcend it in past and future. Of all the characteristics of man, this is perhaps the most remarkable and significant, and if contemporary naturalistic theories are constrained by the logic of their viewpoint to ignore it, they convict themselves of a one-sidedness which is certain to be paid for by a reaction to an equally one-sided idealism.

Now we grant that the succession of physical events with which man's organic existence connects him requires for its explanation a physical universe or order of events in space-time. Does not the universality of man's rational outlook which associates him with others in the community of intelli-

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gence equally require for its explanation the conception of an all-comprehensive intelligence which embraces within its permanent unity all intelligent individuals?

Are we not then bound to agree that the system of values implies the existence of a developing social consciousness which endures and embraces the consciousness of human individuals so far as they realize in their own conscious experience the universal values? I think that we are, that this is a reasonable inference. But what are we to think of the scope and limits of this consciousness? Did it emerge when human intelligence first appeared in the process of organic evolution? Has the natural universe come to consciousness of its own immanent values, come to consciousness of itself, so to speak, in the insights and ideals of human society and civilization?

This conclusion would doubtless meet the assent of many today who, while accepting the facts of science, wish to give due recognition to the idealistic factor in evolution. Perhaps it is as far as we can go. Yet there are certain considerations which force themselves upon our notice. If the system of values exists objectively, how are we to understand its existence before human intelligence appeared on the scene of cosmic evolution? Man did not put in his appearance until comparatively late in our earth's history, say a half-million years ago. What are we to think of the period, the millions of years, when the earth existed without intelligent life and without any life at all? And what of the vast stretches of stellar evolution antecedent to the origin of the earth? Did the system of values exist at all? If it did not, what ground is there for asserting that values are inherent in the real nature of things? But if, on the other hand, we are convinced that the system of values, *qua* real, did exist through the long courses of cosmic evolution, does not its existence imply as a necessary correlate a comprehensive and equally enduring intelligence?

We are, to be sure, quite familiar with the answer which the naturalistic evolutionism of our day is prepared to give to

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such a question as this. Yes, we shall be told, the values which man discovers and appreciates in the actual world, along with all the other functions and manifestations of life, existed in the period previous to man's advent, and, for that matter, to the origin of life itself. But they existed *potentially;* they were latent in the simpler forms of life, and, still earlier, in matter itself.

There is an assumption present in such reasoning, however, which is generally overlooked. And this assumption, when explicitly stated and impartially examined, proves to be somewhat questionable, to say the least. It is assumed that the order of physical events which is not a fact of direct experience, but an inference based upon the facts of common perception, existed throughout the whole course of evolution and furnished the real framework within which the total process in all of its phases, of value as well as of physical occurrence, took place. But the attributes of value, the permanent correlations of diverse qualities, the capacities for reorganization and adaptation, the intrinsic and expressive harmonies, are features of existence no less actual and important than their strictly physical attributes. And these attributes of value, as we have also seen, require for their explanation the community of intelligence. This latter, the unity of associative or communal intelligence, is therefore on an equal footing with the order of physical events; both are inferences based upon the facts of everyday experience; both may with equal right claim to signify the truth of the world of everyday fact, the reality inherent in existing things. But why, then, suppose that the earlier stages of evolution, when many of the features of the non-existing world were not in evidence, proceeded within the space-time frame exclusively, and not within the organizing, associating unity of intelligence as well?

This latter point need not be pressed to the limit, however; a case can hardly be made out on this ground alone. For it will be open, I suppose, to the naturalistic evolutionist

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to reply that so far as scientifically verifiable fact is concerned, there is convincing proof that the physical forces we can observe to be now working in the natural world were also operative in all earlier stages of its evolution, while there is no empirical evidence of the influence of intelligence or rational purpose upon the course of cosmic affairs before the time when the products of human art and the relics of man's social culture begin to appear. This brings us back to the underlying question upon which the whole argument turns. What meaning can we give to the existence of the system of values as *latent* or *potential* in the natural world during the earlier stages of its evolution? Existence in some sense these values must have had, else their appearance at a later stage would have been a break in the continuity of the evolutionary process. Yet there is no empirical evidence, it is said, of their influence or effect upon the course of events at particular times and places. So we must content ourselves with saying that they existed potentially, they were latent in the natural world.

How, we still seek to know, are we to conceive of the potential existence of the system of values in the physical universe? Physical forces determine the effect of particle on particle, of event on event, in the space-time system. But the presence in the natural world of the system of values even potentially means the existence of another type of relation besides that of external or physical influence as determining the motion of material particles. It means the existence of a relation between particular objects or events as parts or members of a system and the organizing unity or whole which includes them, not as the space-time system includes the succession of physical events in sequence of external determination, but organically, by virtue of their intrinsic adaptability and their distinctive possibilities of functional contribution. If this relation exists, then existence, *real* existence of some sort, must be granted to the "whole," to those enduring unities and forms which determine the progressive organization of the natural

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world and the explicit realization of its immanent values. In what sense can the "whole" exist, potentially if you will, but nevertheless really and effectively? I find it difficult if not impossible to understand it except as an anticipatory selection of objects, of existing materials, on the basis of their intrinsic character and fitness. One hesitates to mention purpose in this connection because purpose suggests to so many minds a power which arbitrarily interferes with, and sets aside, the regular order of nature in pursuit of some aim of its own. But purpose need not be given this external and narrowly human meaning. It may mean simply the immanent order in nature, or, more definitely, the effective ordering which proceeds in the natural world. Only, in so far as it involves, as it seems to me it must involve, an anticipatory selection, it implies the influence at all stages of evolution of an inclusive and organizing intelligence.

The argument may be put in a different way, but the reasoning is substantially the same. The problem is that of explaining the origin of the objective system of values. Now if we desire to explain the occurrence of any physical event we try to discover the physical events or configuration of physical events which invariably precedes it, and when we have found this we are satisfied that we have discovered the cause of the occurrence which required explanation. If, however, it is the system of values or one of its constituent members which we have to explain, the explanation must necessarily take a different form. For the system of values is not a physical event or a configuration of physical events. It can only originate as the incipient realization of the possibilities of mutual implication, functional adaptation, and expressive harmony inherent in the nature of existing things. But these possibilities are, as far as we can see, infinite, or at least indefinitely many and varied. Consequently, in order to explain the origin of the actual system of values we must postulate some creative agency which selects from the infinite range

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of possibilities just these for realization. And this creative agency is the Cosmic Intelligence which we call God.

"The religious insight," says Professor Whitehead, "is the grasp of this truth: That the order of the world, the depth of the reality of the world, the value of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound up together—not accidentally, but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony which is God."[1]

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[1] Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, p. 119.

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RELIGION AND MORALITY

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES

MORALITY may be defined as a type of conduct which is conscious of the ends it seeks in comparison with other competing ends. Deliberation and choice are involved. Morality is criticized, enlightened conduct. Ethics is the science of such conduct, and its function is to review all phases of moral behavior, inquiring into the conditions, motives, ends, and values of action. Morality will be considered in this way as the active, practical, enlightened form of human living, while ethics is the science concerned with the process of this enlightenment. In this sense ethics is a branch of philosophy, and morality is life as lived in the light of ethical criticism. Such criticism, of course, varies from one individual or country to another, both as to thoroughness and as to conclusions. But wherever customs have come to consciousness, are compared and evaluated, there ethics and morality emerge. They are, respectively, the theory and practice of rational living. It is clear, therefore, that morality and religion both belong to practical life. But there are certain contrasts which should be noted.

Religion is older than morality. Religion flourished in the stage of custom, and its ceremonials were elaborated by preliterate and savage men long before there was any systematic reflection upon the ends sought or the means employed to realize them. Moral philosophy arose in the days of the Sophists in Greece, and particularly in the mind of Socrates. Religion had already been developed in many forms, and its gods were ancient. Its forms pervaded the life of the people and surrounded the child in infancy and youth before the age of reason and self-criticism. The vast majority went to their graves without interest in, or knowledge of, such critical re-

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flection. The same has been true of all peoples in the world. Only gradually and in varying degree has distinctly moral conduct been achieved in any societies even to the present time.

Religion is usually ceremonialized conduct, and this ceremonialization continues after criticism has become effective. Hebrew religion did not cease its ritual when it discarded animal sacrifices. It put stress upon the "sacrifices of a broken and a contrite heart." To this day public assemblies continue to celebrate the great days of fasting and feasting and the ceremonies attending birth, marriage, and death. Religion takes up the moral attitudes and embodies them in its forms and rites. The great prophets effected radical changes in the conception of God and of man's relation to him and to the world, and the priests slowly included them in the cultus. But religion continues to employ ceremonials. They are the vivid and moving expressions of the enlarging ideals. Morality does not use processions, hymns, architecture, and the various symbols of art, but religion maintains them in ever changing and idealized forms. In some sects they are greatly reduced and minimized, but they are not wholly abandoned. At the present time in the most enlightened religious societies there is a marked tendency toward "the enrichment of worship." Never were the functions of the prophet and the priest so closely allied. Moralists may regard ceremonies as superfluous, but religionists do not renounce morality, but welcome it and remake their ceremonies to express it more fully. Whether in the future morality may entirely displace religion no one is able positively to say. There are some grounds for believing that human nature is such that it will continue to cherish the ceremonial arts and utilize them to advantage in making the moral life more prevalent and accessible. Recent psychology has discovered a greater response to the forms of art in human beings than "the age of reason" could appreciate. Man is far more a creature of feeling, of passion, of will, and of imagina-

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tion than the older psychology realized, and these are the qualities which make ceremonials effective.

Other contrasts are made. Religionists often contend that religion is above morality. This has been a favorite contention of the mystics. They are so impressed by the cold calculations of morality and by the warmth and passion of religion that they feel that religion is much deeper and farther reaching. They hold that the experience of forgiveness and the recovery of status for the sinful soul is quite beyond the scope of the moral law with its balances and restitutions, its hard justice, and its methods of expiation. They cling to the conviction that God takes the will for the deed more generously than does the law, and that the religionist transcends, in his passionate quest for the spiritual life, the codes of humanly devised and rationalized conceptions of the good. To the mystics the standards are secured through revelation and illumination rather than from fallible human experience. Their contention at least illustrates the more emotional and passionate character of religion as compared with the more critical and judicial nature of morality. It might readily be answered, in the light of human history, that as yet the greater emotional intensity does thus far belong to the religious experience, but that with greater maturity and insight morality may take on this richer and deeper aspect.

The same problem pertains to another contrast, that which regards morality as a matter of human relations while religion includes man's relation to God. Religion, with difficulty, regards goodness as natural to man. So long human nature has been conceived as inherently sinful and unable of itself to think any good thought or perform any good deed. Christian theology has taught the total depravity of the heart of man. Only by a miracle of divine grace could a child of Adam do any good thing. The "merely moral man" has therefore been a profound puzzle to ministers of religion. Often it is said by them that the merely moral man, one who is a kind

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father and a just neighbor, who pays his debts, is sober and abstemious, but who has not been converted and does not belong to the church is the worst enemy of religion. His goodness must be spurious. It cannot be genuine because he did not achieve it in the prescribed way. His example is most dangerous for other people may easily believe that if one can attain such a praiseworthy life without religion, then others may, and religion is obviously unnecessary. Besides, morality quite frankly confesses that it moves upon the plane of distinctly human relations. Its attention and interest lie horizontally between man and man. Religion, on the other hand, has a perpendicular plane, taking account also of man's relation to God. Morality is of time; religion includes eternity; morality ends with the horizon; religion extends to infinity.

Some of these difficulties may be resolved by a consideration of the development of morality in the light of modern systems of ethics. One of these, largely the work of English philosophers, has emphasized the idea that conduct is controlled fundamentally by desire for pleasure or happiness. In its fuller and most influential form it was worked out by John Stuart Mill. He accepted the general position of hedonism and recast it into the doctrine of utilitarianism, the doctrine of "the greatest good of the greatest number." He believed the good is satisfaction of wants and the avoidance of pain. He recognized that human happiness involves the satisfaction of the higher nature of man, as well as the securing of creature comforts. A noble character like Socrates cannot be content with the pleasures of the fool. We should strive, therefore, to realize the satisfactions which are sought by "the best people." Only the educated, cultivated person is worthy to be considered in determining the kind of happiness which should be cultivated. Mill was therefore an apostle of popular education, of legislative reforms looking to the amelioration of the conditions of the masses. He believed that morality would be greatly advanced if the general conditions of welfare could

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be improved. Education, health, temperance, woman's rights, and many other social boons engaged his labors. His moral idealism centered upon the enhancement of the values belonging to the existing social order. He believed that the sense of duty toward our fellow-men could be created in us in spite of the fact that we are originally individualistic and selfish. These higher satisfactions are so much more appealing when once experienced that they generate their own sanctions and give rise to the sense of duty and obligation to fulfil them. Mill was critical of the traditional religion for not concerning itself more with these practical and immediate problems of human amelioration and social progress. Religion seemed to him to divert attention from the practical sphere of poignant suffering to a fruitless devotion to the supernatural and to a wasteful absorption in doctrines and forms which produced small returns in present happiness and welfare. Utilitarianism under various names has continued to emphasize the difference between morality and religion, often holding religion to be an enemy of man rather than a benefactor. Naturally both the doctrine and the attitude of these moralists have aroused the opposition of religionists and widened the chasm between morality and religion in popular thought.

The other conspicuous system of ethics in modern thought is that of Immanuel Kant. It is known as intuitionism, or duty ethics. In some respects it lies closer to the traditional doctrines of religion. It regards morality as a matter of the rational will, of obedience to conscience, of a right disposition of heart. Goodness consists in the attitude of the will. The crucial question is what the agent intends, not what he accomplishes. He may be kindly and generous in disposition, but unable through poverty or misfortune to carry out his will. His outward ineffectiveness does not detract in the least from his worth.

Kant was also close to the prevailing religious view of the "natural man." He distrusted the "inclinations." The emo-

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tions and affections are sensuous and capricious. They do not afford any consistent or authoritative standards for conduct. Only in the moral will, the practical reason, as he calls it, is there found a guide which is superior to the bribes and persuasions of the lower impulses. But this supreme law of right is conceived in moral, and not in religious, terms. This voice of duty, sense of obligation, categorical imperative, or Ought, is the object of the greatest reverence, and obedience to it is the ground of all moral goodness. Submission to it is the test of all virtue and the measure of all spiritual value. The need for God, in Kant's system, and therefore the guaranty of the reality of the Divine Being, are found in the necessity of administering this law with perfect assurance and justice.

Religious observances are means of moving and directing the will in the fulfilment of the moral law. Religious history is the story of man's endeavor to realize the moral life. It is figurative and symbolical, and not factual. Theological doctrines, like the atonement, have significance in so far as they represent and elicit moral conduct. The importance of religious personages, such as Christ, lie not in their unique metaphysical nature, but in their illustration of obedience to conscience and duty. Religion is accordingly superfluous for those wise, strong souls who are able to discern the moral law through reason and to follow it consistently. Ritual, ceremonial, public observances are merely scaffoldings for the weaker and less rational people. They are temporary devices in the childhood of the race, and tend to disappear as men reflect and mature.

It is impossible to justify through reason any of the central ideas of religion. The traditional proofs for the existence of God are all fallacious and incapable of achieving what they undertake. Neither is it possible to support on any scientific ground the existence of the soul, much less its immortality. Knowledge can deal only with the world of phenomena which

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it sees woven in a complete mesh of laws, determining all events of the sensuous sphere in the rigid lines of cause and effect, precluding all freedom. Therefore the three main ideas —God, freedom, and immortality—which religion employs are not valid in reason's eye. Nor are they given in revelation. They are merely "demands" which human nature makes. Such confirmation as they have is found in morals, and morality does not require religion.

The Kantian philosophy, in this way, separates the two interests and leaves religion at last on one side, minimized and outgrown. It is a natural consequence that the great influence of this impressive system of ethics magnifies the difference between morality and religion. The defenders of religion have accepted this conclusion of the separation, but have chosen to regard religion as the more important. The systems of Mill and Kant were worked out while religion was still conceived in terms of revelation and authority. The views and processes of higher criticism and the evolutionary interpretation of cultures were not current. Psychology was still engulfed in metaphysics. Laboratories for the study of human nature were established only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and social psychology did not begin until later. The tap root of the most effective criticisms of both Mill and Kant springs from the new genetic conceptions of human life and behavior. Both of them, especially Kant, belonged to a static order. Neither was able to conceive or develop an evolutionary account of moral conduct, although Mill made some attempt to do so. His idea of the possibility of disciplining naturally egoistic, selfish, hedonistic beings into sympathetic, altruistic patriots and philanthropists now appears illogical and artificial. Psychology was then under the departmental, faculty theory. Morality was just beginning to be thought of as belonging to the natural man, but as yet merely to his "intelligible" nature for Kant, and to his "acquired" nature for Mill. Scarcely anyone dared to think of

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religion in any other than supernatural terms; to do so was practically equivalent to rejecting its claims to authority or to significant value.

Kant died in 1804, and Mill in 1873. Since that time the developments of the physical and the social sciences have revolutionized the thought of mankind and displaced the traditional systems of philosophy and ethics by new methods and conceptions. All cultures and institutions are seen to have had histories and to have evolved through different stages. They have had varying fortunes, sometimes retrograding from higher to lower levels, sometimes arrested or exfoliating into bewildering growths of customs and folkways. Morals in evolution and the evolution of religion have become favorite subjects of scholarly research. Both are now seen to have had a natural history and to be closely related in the growth of general culture—arts, language, industry—which includes them both.

The newer conception of morality is often designated as the doctrine of self-realization. It keeps close to the facts which psychology makes clear. Human organisms start below the threshold of moral responsibility. They are impulsive, unco-ordinated organisms with only a few elemental reflexes and emotional reactions. Habits develop rapidly and in great variety, including the very complex and important ones of walking and talking and manipulating objects and utensils. Attitudes toward people and animals and things appear along with this process of locomotion and communication. After some years these habits and attitudes become more or less conscious, especially as conflicts arise between them and the interests which accompany them. At this point, where selection between different ends and the means to them has to be made, there begins the truly human nature, the self-conscious, reflective, individual personality. That which he desires and which satisfies when obtained he considers "good"; the bitter, disappointing, unrewarding things are "bad." What the peo-

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ple around him permit is "right"; and what they forbid is "wrong." On through the world he goes under the influence of these trial-and-error methods of finding his way. Always he lives in a world of many people who also have interests and "rights" which he must consider. At times these coincide with his own, and again they are in sharp conflict. He learns the rules of many games, and engages in many enterprises. Everywhere he hears and sees that certain qualities are approved and are efficient, while others are decried and are defeating. These are the virtues and the vices as judged by the world of men and women: industry, integrity, courage, justice, wisdom, sympathy, candor, humility, patience, temperance, and so forth. That which makes these good and right is the fact that they contribute to the expansion, the harmony, and the joy of life. They are characteristics which imply a life shared with others and a life interacting with others so intimately and spontaneously that there is no hard-and-fast line between the self and others. Selfishness means a small self in a small group; unselfishness means a generous self participating in a larger world.

Morality in this view is the criticized life, developing continally broader and finer ideals and finding means to their fuller realization. It is primarily the work of individuals in reflection upon their own problems of conduct in relation to their place in the social institutions to which they belong. Morality, as such, builds no institutions of its own. It is a way of thoughtfully evaluating and modifying personal conduct, and consequently effecting changes within the social order itself.

Religion, in the stages of society which have attained this reflective analysis and direction of life, is responsive to the ideals thus generated and tends to embody them in its conception of the good life. Religion can never be effective without taking up into itself the highest moral ideals of its age; but it employs means of its own to make them vivid and com-

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manding. By translating moral judgments into forms of art, through public rituals, and by dramatizing these judgments by means of impressive and appealing personalities, religion makes them appreciable for those who could not grasp them in their theoretical, critical formulation. Society is thus able to impart to children through its religious institutions moral attitudes, and to develop in them habits which make the rational ideas vital and productive. It is not merely what people know theoretically and abstractly which impels them to realization of the best in life, but what is wrought into their emotional and practical experience.

Religious societies have this function. Churches are groups of people banded together for the cultivation and enjoyment of the best life they can discover. Synagogues and mosques and temples spring from the same impulse of like-minded persons to associate themselves in organizations and institutions to rehearse and express and communicate to one another their standards, their hopes, their aspirations, and thereby to obtain encouragement, comfort, and guidance in a perplexing and precarious world. But they not only present them to one another. Religion extends the stage upon which the drama is enacted so that it becomes cosmic. The values which it cherishes are magnified beyond the scale of the immediate scene of time and place and are represented as belonging to the widest ranges of life. There is always a tradition of the long experience of generations of people and a conceivable future of vast extent where the implications and consequences of conduct are revealed.

The religious drama also puts these moral ideals into intimate and impressive personal terms. It conceives them as the will of God and as the demands of the Universe. It speaks in parables which identify the moral order with the soil of the husbandman, with the light shining into darkness, with the love of a father's heart, forgiving and merciful beyond all measure or calculation. Sages and heroes, saints and martyrs,

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prophets and apostles, warriors and pilgrims, fishermen and tax-gatherers are marshaled in the action of the drama. And there are thieves, traitors, fallen angels, demons, and all the powers of darkness mingled in the scenes. Religion is the dramatization on a cosmic scale of the moral and spiritual warfare of man struggling to possess his soul.

The question is often asked, But are churches necessary? What does "necessary" mean here? Certainly they are not necessary to man's existence. Many persons live without them. But this question is not one which should be directed at religious organizations alone. Suppose we ask whether it is necessary to have lodges, fraternities, associations of lawyers, school teachers, physicians, carpenters, plumbers, and engineers. The answer would be that these are voluntary associations which the members find useful and valuable. This is also an observation which religionists should learn to make concerning their societies. Membership in them has no longer any magical significance. Neither has membership in schools and business firms any magical power. Churches are the means of cultivating regard for the highest ideals, not only for the young, but for all who may profit as much by being reminded as by being informed. They provide a warm, intimate group life, like an enlarged and idealized family where all share the burdens and the hopes of the common lot. Churches also have an important function in the celebration of the victories won on behalf of the good against the obstacles and oppositions which beset them. Where else are the moral and spiritual triumphs held in memory more faithfully? Other institutions keep records of selected interests. Historical societies, art institutes, libraries preserve the facts and the details of past experiences, but churches embody in their scriptures, in their symbols, and in their prayers and appeals the central events in the upward struggle of the race in a way which is intended to make their spiritual qualities clear and appealing.

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The stirring hymns embody the emotional power of deeds and dreams and radiate this power to all participants.

In this dramatization of spiritual acts and values, religion often presents the process which is still partial and in doubt as if it were completed and perfected. Or it magnifies the scale of it to such proportions that the implications are commanding and unmistakable. The individual is set amidst a cloud of witnesses and his whole life reviewed and evaluated. He joins the choir invisible. Or he suffers endlessly the torturing consequences of his own deliberate deeds. The effect is much the same as giving each person an opportunity to grasp in imagination the total effect of his own personality for better or worse. His soul is made the pawn in a desperate game between God and the Devil, and the importance of his own decisions is the high point in the game. Man's perfidy may kill God, as in the tragedy on Golgotha; or man's love, devotion, and suffering may change the order of the world, as in the regaining of paradise. If this is art, it is nevertheless first of all religion, and it is the use of the forms of art in the interest of religion.

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UGLINESS AND EVIL

HERBERT ELLSWORTH CORY

FOR MUSICIANS "discords" no longer exist. Their new word, "dissonances," may to the vulgar and the cynical seem but a sentimental subterfuge like the word "error" when used as a placidly hypnotic usurper in the grim kingdom of evil. But well-trained, broadly cultivated musicians face facts. And brute facts have forced them to recognize that no sounds are invincibly unmusical. Relatively confusing sounds stimulate restlessness. Relatively consonant sounds lull to a repose that cannot endure. Monteverdi and his successors in and after the Renaissance found that relatively confusing sounds, dissonances, if well prepared for and well resolved into consonance, were dramatic. Later composers found it more dramatic to leave out the preparation. Dissonances are now declared to be the verbs of music. And today Arnold Schönberg or some other "stout Cortez" may ignore even the resolution leaving the Copernically minded exultantly adrift in the infinity of a universe wherein men, animals, plants and stars, atoms and galaxies are all forever evolving, often, perhaps, retrogressively, yet often, perhaps, progressively.

In the literary arts the "realist" or "naturalist" has long delighted in venturing beyond the facile beauties of the garden close of the timorous. The Zolas and the Dostoyevskys have sometimes been content to say: "If the beautiful and the true conflict, be an honest man and cleave to the true." But more and more they have been able to add: "Behold, we were loyal to the truth and in our devotion we have found that which you shrank from as ugly proved to be undiscovered beauty with the savor and sting of the open sea."

Watch a sculptor modeling the face of a comely girl. Do

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not be astounded if, when he finds the mass of clay assuming under his caresses a spiral form, he pushes the chin out of all semblance to the original. In his reverence for the formal possibilities of his medium he may forget the girl and follow its sinuous beckonings. More and more the painters and sculptors are asking: "Why should we laboriously shape a servile representation of a face which the camera can reproduce more precisely with one soulless click? Why should we not distort lines in response to the push of our own personalities, the nature of our medium, and the suggestion of a design never before incarnate in matter?" And for many generations they have defied us to tell them why they should paint a sweet girl graduate in preference to an old woman paring her nails, or why the media of sculptors should be expected to respond more attractively to a replica of the full limbs of an indolently exposed and conquering Cleopatra than to the shrunken breasts and divinely humble crouching of an aged courtesan remembering warm assignations long past and quietly awaiting the cold assignation with death.

Kipling's devil and his beloved son the philistine in whom he is well pleased have sought in vain to paralyze free souls with a pseudo-Socratic query, "Is it art?" but the true philosopher, from the days of Goethe on, has generally been found in the company of the iconoclastic artist. And today Benedetto Croce, as sweeping in his way as Stravinsky or James Joyce, declares that nothing is ugly save "unsuccessful expression."[1] It is true that his dialetic seems not only an apologia for modernistic artists, but also a mild imitation of the content of the most disillusioned and nonsensical of the rebels, the dadaists. For he tells us that ugliness is "unsuccessful expression" immediately after he has held that "expression when it is not successful is not expression." And lest you presume that all this means that ugliness is nothing, he goes on to tell you that ugliness is at least measurable

[1] *Aesthetic*, translation by Ainslee (2d ed., London, 1923), pp. 79 ff.

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enough to "possess degrees," whereas the beautiful does not, "for there is no conceiving a more beautiful, that is, an expressive which is more expressive, an adequate that is more than adequate."

The devil, the philistine, and perchance a few others might now conclude that after the twentieth-century artist ate of the laurel and went mad he bit the philosopher. But the truths which really lurk in Croce may be found more cleanly cut in the aesthetic theory of Bernard Bosanquet.[2] After an interesting distinction between beauty of the simpler more obvious type and "difficult beauty" which, because of "intricacy" or "tension" or "width" is often mistaken for ugliness by those who run and read, Bosanquet challenges us to conceive how "any appearance" can possibly "be inexpressive." There is no other alternative for him but to conclude that ugliness "is a form of expression whose intention can be detected . . . . but which in the execution violates its own intention. . . . . The suggestion of beauty is baffled by an expression which consists of the interruption and positive undoing or negation of that in which significance for the suggestion consisted. A simple asymmetry, quite unprovoked, is . . . . a typical case."

Conflict of intentions or of intention and execution, asymmetry or incongruity, here are clues. But we must proceed warily. Musicians with their dissonances, painters with their distortions, have shown us that interesting art may be ugly or that what many an everyday person would call an incongruity is a constituent of what Bosanquet calls "difficult beauty." Well, Bosanquet does realize the need of sharpening the points of his differentiae. For he goes on to say "the principal region to look for insuperable ugliness is that of . . . . insincere and affected art." In nature, so he believes, "the ugly

[2] *A History of Aesthetic* (London, 1892), *passim*, but especially pp. 394–97, 401–8, 429–36. *Three Lectures on Aesthetic* (London, 1915), pp. 76 ff., especially pp. 95–108. "Croce's Aesthetic," *Proceedings of the British Academy, 1919–20* (London), pp. 275–76.

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effect must . . . . be in some degree imputable to our own mis-selection." For "in her infinite wealth of contexts and appearances there is always ample opportunity for the selection of beautiful form."

Here we strike bed rock, though some of us are not so sure that man is the only *seeker* of beauty. Should we leave out God, even the plausible God "in trouble" of recent liberal theology? And are there not signs of a groping toward beauty in birds and spiders? One also can conceive a certain sort of pan-psychist who could, without regressing to ancient animism, find in twentieth-century astrophysics and physical chemistry some evidence of a drift toward the realization of beauty in those suns which attain to globular clusters in the midst of the more confused colonies of the galaxies. Antique mythologies and recent materialisms might seem equally naïve to him who fully knew the versatile designing of that amazing craftsman, the atom of carbon. But whatever reservations we make concerning Bosanquet's view of nature, we must accept his emphasis on insincerity as at least a partial unmasking of ugliness.

So far it is clear that at least two distinguished philosophers of our day have maintained toward ugliness an attitude that shares a good deal of the liberalism which we have found in contemporary artists. Nor is this attitude confined to philosophers of the idealistic school who are always under suspicion of exorcizing too easily with their supple dialectic all negative values like evil and ugliness. Everybody will agree that there is no realist among us more distinguished and disillusioned than George Santayana. But he would be the last to ascribe to either ugliness or beauty an absolute and stubborn objectivity.[3] "Nothing," he assures us, "is intrinsically ugly."

So we come to Katherine Gilbert, the latest contributor to

[3] *The Sense of Beauty* (New York, 1896), pp. 25, 92, 116, 126–31, 220, 231, 243.

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the philosophy of ugliness,[4] who, building well on her predecessors, especially Bosanquet, has, I think, surpassed them all. Mrs. Gilbert defines two types of ugliness. In the first kind, "one thing is aimed at and announced, another is achieved." For example, she cites a Sunday-school hymn, "'Let a Little Sunshine in,' trying to be religious music and failing in the effort," giving us a "suggestion of solemnity without dignity, and of gaiety without sprightliness." We immediately recall Bosanquet's emphasis on asymmetry and insincerity. The second kind, continues Mrs. Gilbert, is "caused by the self-conscious cleverness of the artist obtruding between spectator and object." We all think, as she does, of the virtuoso parading his dexterity. Some of us remember Rosenthal, before he became a true artist, blasphemously re-writing a fragile and nimble waltz of Chopin's "contrapuntally in thirds" to display in a piece which he made extremely ugly an almost incredible technique. But we know also that the maker as well as the interpreter can himself produce the same sort of ugliness by the unscrupulous and irreverent exploitation of his medium. Mrs. Gilbert's instances are specimens of what the rhetoricians call "fine writing." She quotes from a contemporary novel two sentences in which "the metaphors get out of hand and call attention to the ingenuity of the author." Mrs. Gilbert has some appreciation of the desirability of defining a value in terms both of the object valued and of the subject who values it, for she attempts to "synthesize these two types of ugliness under the common idea of presumption, the presumption either of a sense-element or sense-complex or the presumption of a maker of artistic forms." And she suggests as an alternative what it seems to me she ought to suggest as a second part of one definition, the possibility that "you may root" both kinds of ugliness "in the formal principle of incoherence."

Out of this provocative evolution of recent theories of the

[4] *Studies in Recent Aesthetic* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1927), pp. 162–67.

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ugly I venture to construct a formal definition. An object is ugly if some of its contents stand in mutually destructive incongruity and if it arouses in the mind of its maker, interpreter, or appreciator a divided attention, a sentiment of possessiveness, and conflicting conations of self-preservation and of aversion for it.[5]

Among the sixteen definitions of beauty which C. K. Ogden, I. A. Richards, and James Wood enumerate as the epitome of the history of aesthetic theory, number four gives us all unwittingly a clue to certain relations which bind ugliness far more closely to evil than any which draw goodness and beauty into their occasional rapport.[6] This definition avers that "anything is beautiful which results from successful exploitation of a medium." The word "exploitation" has a sinister significance, especially in contrast with a happier phrase used later by these same authors when they rephrase the definition as a commandment that "the artist . . . . must respect the character of his medium." To respect the medium is to treat bronze as if it were bronze, as Donatello did when he fashioned the lithe, youthful muscles of his "David." That was inspiration born for smooth bronze, not for stone with its import of massiveness and ruggedness. Contrast with this respect for the medium the ruthlessly insincere exploitation of iron by those industrialists anathematized by John Ruskin at the opening of *The Crown of Wild Olives*. To respect the medium is to love it; to recognize its autonomy as in the ethical life we must treat the individual as an end in itself. Although goodness and beauty are not the same, they must occasionally be allies. For if either permanently ignores the other it will wither. And the reverent manipulation of a me-

[5] I have described an incongruity in the object which is not destructive and a conflict in the subject far less ruinous in my definition of the sublime in an article on "The Sublime, the Beautiful, and the Good," *The International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVII, No. 2 (January, 1927), pp. 159–72.

[6] *The Foundations of Aesthetics* (London, 1922), p. 21 and pp. 28 ff. Cf. also Bosanquet, *Three Lectures*, pp. 38–75, his "Croce's Aesthetic," pp. 270–74, and Katherine Gilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 40–61.

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dium, having inviolate its native qualities, is one of the points of contact between the artist and the devotee of the good life.[7] But the artist, interpreter, or appreciator who exploits a medium makes of the work which he claims to be art a means to an end, an instrument for the indulgence of his own egoism (greed and pride), and so destroys its beauty. He rends his form with contents or implications which destroy the organic effects of other parts. He tries to possess the materials. As one who professes to make a work of art he becomes insincere, a divided personality. He imperils and ultimately he may destroy the integrity of his own soul.

When a man ceases to *contemplate* nature and *uses* it as a legitimate means of subsistence the object which he makes is neither beautiful nor ugly, but when he uses it as an instrument of his greed and pride he so defiles it that he has made a part of nature ugly for himself and for the innocent bystander. The jeremiads launched against our mechanistic industrialism by Ruskin and Morris are almost as pertinent today as they were a generation ago.[8] These defilers of nature are at once makers of ugliness and doers of evil. For, as we shall see more clearly anon, though ugliness and evil are not identical, yet the making of ugliness is *one* type of evil deed.

Our drift here will illumine for the literary critic the troublous problem of propaganda. Why do artists say that sermons are ugly? Why is the reformer attacked at times on ethical grounds? Why is the teacher often scorned as a pedant or muckraker crouching with eyes averted from the celestial poet whom he professes to comprehend, or the scientific or philosophic truth which he endeavors to broaden or deepen? There is as much truth as error in these gibes. Some of the sermons of a John Donne or a Jeremy Taylor are beautiful.

[7] I have developed this point in a different context in "Beauty and Goodness; Art and Morality," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXXVI, No. 4 (July, 1926), pp. 394–402.

[8] *The Atlantic Monthly* (August, 1927) contains an article, "Beauty the New Business Tool," by Ernest Elmo Calkins, which, despite its dubious title, does something to justify the use above of "almost" instead of "fully."

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But when a sermon is propaganda it is ugly. For propaganda makes of its medium a tool for the release of the egoism of the preacher or the coercion, the possession, of his auditors. It is thus not only ugly, but an evil deed in so far as it deprives the individual auditor of his autonomy. Similarly, the unscientific sadistic reformer who seeks not the truth but drives unscrupulously toward a luxurious stripping and whipping of others is a perverter of beauty and a sinner. But the reformer who seeks the truth and tells it uncoercively to those who seek it is a good man and a wise psychologist. The teacher who as pedant idolizes facts and ignores their significance is certainly neither an artist nor a doer of good deeds, and the teacher who as propagandist strives to make of his pupils servile copies and thus inevitably arouses an internecine war within their souls is a maker of ugliness and a doer of evil deeds. The good teacher states the truth and leaves it to justify itself. When problems are unsolved it is his duty to offer in due time his own hypothesis, not as gospel, but frankly, humbly, as one alternative. Such a teacher does good deeds. And sometimes he is also an artist. The so-called artist who creates for propaganda is no artist, and he is at best a venial sinner.

But ugliness is less often the manifestation of venial than of deadly sin. Mrs. Gilbert's use of the word "presumption" in her definition of ugliness has more significance than she chooses to reveal. I should not hesitate to use a stronger word, pride. Pride *(superbia)*, we were rightly told by the old Christian moralists, is the most deadly of the seven deadly sins. It is the evil which cast Lucifer out of heaven.

Modern industrialism is still actuated largely by greed and superbia. The buccaneers of the market place have planted machinery beside the sweetly garrulous and hitherto unsullied streams. And now they rape our boulevards of their maternal trees in order to make room for verminous swarms of automobiles full of people made nervous and purposeless by dull palls of smoke, irritating stenches of gases, and the

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implacable monotony of their standardized jobs. All this is supposed to be justified by a Gargantuan vomit of shoddy goods in which quality is sacrificed to quantity. And we are insulted with the slogan "scientific progress." But this is not science. It is applied science. Pure science forgets utilities and seeks the truth though the heavens fall. Minds of the barnacle type suck what they want and no more from these truths to use in the production of some homely utility or even some hideous pseudo-utility which places creature comforts above spiritual ecstasies.

But the futuristic artists, who have recently challenged Ruskin's condemnation of machinery with an idolatry of it, have unearthed their own share of truth. When industrial applied science clings closely enough to pure science to hold the truth steadfastly above utility, and when it is understood that to "control nature" is not so fundamental as to conform joyously to the deepest of "natural laws," then our factories will rise like sumptuously terraced gardens and soaring cathedrals. For nature's material particles, energies, and mind are all engaged far more fundamentally in that form-making which an artist carries but a step farther than in mutual repulsions. If radioactive disintegration reveals on earth a civil war within an atom, the recently discovered cosmic rays from distant nebulae hint of atomic construction and the making of a new cosmos. As applied science is purified of its unnecessary greed, arrogance, and insincerity the products of the new era will follow the laws which account for the vast operations observed by astronomers. Man's works will be fashioned more congruously by minds which have become sincere. Society will rise in justice. Ugliness will more and more give way to beauty. And a genuine religious faith will replace the self-deceptive polemic of those who seek to buttress their own unacknowledged doubts by coercing the minds of reasonable men into the acceptance of the superstitions of the barbarians.

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NIETZSCHE ON IDEALS

E. T. MITCHELL

IF IDEALISM is the theory that spiritual values operate on a cosmic scale, then Nietzsche is no idealist. "The general character of the world," he says, "is to all eternity chaos."[1] If naturalism is the theory that mind and consciousness are very late products of evolution, and very rare species of existence at that, then Nietzsche is a naturalist. If, on the other hand, idealism means, as some of us would like it to mean, the theory that values and ideals have played a very important rôle in social evolution, and can be made to play a still more important part, then Nietzsche is one of the most daring and militant of idealists. He is one of the few who believe that the destiny of the race can be changed by a change of values, and that a change of values can be effected by individuals. "Where have we to fix our hopes?" he asks; "In *new philosophers*—there is no other alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate opposite estimates of value, to transvaluate and invert 'eternal valuations'."[2]

It is this "evolutionary idealism," then, which I wish to use in opposition to "historical materialism," "economic determinism," and "evolutionary naturalism." My interest in examining Nietzsche's works lies in the challenging nature of this problem itself, for to Nietzsche this was the central problem of philosophy. Casting aside the dull, heavy, and atrocious style of German philosophic literature, along with the heavy-footed and cumbersome historical approach to philosophic problems, Nietzsche attacked the problems of the hour with a freshness of insight that is invigorating, a wealth of

[1] *The Joyful Wisdom*, pp. 151–52. All references are to the *Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1924).

[2] *Beyond Good and Evil*, pp. 128–29.

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detail which he never allows to obtrude itself, and a literary charm which only the poets can equal. Free from pedantry of all kinds, he combines scholarship with inspiration, as did he whom he regarded as the model for Germany's future educational institutions, Schopenhauer.

Nietzsche's method was unique, however, not so much for its dynamic and prophetic utterance, or the quixotic courage of his radicalism, as for the peculiar tackle which he developed. His conspicuous scholarship in philology and comparative literature made him familiar with the life and soul of many peoples, ancient and modern, and made him master of what was then new, the genetic and comparative method. "Many people saw Zarathustra," and he saw them with the penetrating eye of one who understands the soul of their very words. "The Birth of Tragedy," "The Natural History of Morals," "The Genealogy of Morals" are titles suggestive of this new approach to the problems of ethics.

But he was also a psychologist of no mean ability, looking upon language as one, and only one, means of reading the soul of a people. Perhaps he misread the soul of the Englishman; certainly he misunderstood the mind of woman. But at least he realized the importance of a psychological approach to the problems of motivation and valuation, and his psychoanalysis of "inverted values" is the keenest thing yet accomplished in that field. "Psychology," he asserts, "is once more the path to the fundamental problems"; and "psychology shall once more be recognized as the Queen of the Sciences."[8] I would suggest that no problem lends itself more readily to a psychological technique than this problem of values.

But for Nietzsche the problem of valuation begins far below the conscious level and involves such obscure topics as digestion, organic salts, and perhaps, if he had heard of them, ductless glands. Realizing how inadequate for the task must be the learning and training of any one man, he suggests call-

[8] *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 34.

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ing in the assistance of all other departments and making a co-operative undertaking of it. He seriously considers the possibility of founding research fellowships in the field, and perhaps prize-essay competitions on the subject. He says: "*All* the sciences have now to pave the way for the future task of the philosopher; this task being understood to mean, that he must solve the problem of *value,* that he has to *fix the hierarchy of values.*"[4] I submit that Nietzsche's project of research fellowships and endowed publications in the problem of values might be at least as worthy of a million endowment as, say, an astronomical observatory. Dewey has made a similar suggestion in his recent book, *The Public and Its Problems.*

A third field in which Nietzsche was competent, and which played an important rôle in his philosophy of ideals, was art. A lover of poetry, of music, and of the plastic arts, his outlook on life is that of the artist, the creator, the energist, as opposed to the outlook of the contemplative or scientific philosopher. Certainly such an outlook is more vital, more engaging, and richer than the more colorless and disinterested scientific vista. Havelock Ellis' *Dance of Life* was suggested by Nietzsche's *Joyful Wisdom,* "The Dancers," in *Zarathustra,* and "Ye Creative Ones" to whom he appeals in all his works. Life to him is an art, a creation, a self-realization of artistic instincts, not a sober and somber accumulation of knowledge. The Pied Cow which industriously chews its cud and gives milk is symbolic of this age-old accumulative type of philosopher.

Valuing is the most important thing that a man or a people ever does, for creation itself is an expression of values. The very word "man" or *mensch* means measurer. Perhaps the first savage who learned to weigh a piece of venison by balancing it against a weight hung on the other end of a stick laid across a crotch was the originator of valuing. Measuring

[4] *Genealogy of Morals,* pp. 57–58.

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created such admiration that they named the race after its most important invention.[5] The measuring animal continues to be the most appropriate definition of man.

Man had his origin, and continues to find his fullest realization in group life. The group as a whole marched to power, or to the last man was annihilated and subdued by its neighbor. Wherever there is life you will find will to power; every organism seeks to discharge its strength, and man is no exception. Every race has aimed at power; every race has had its peculiar dangers and stresses. "A *species* originates, and a type becomes established and strong, in the long struggle with essentially constant *unfavorable* conditions."[6] Constantly unfavorable conditions, persistent recurrence of the same struggles and dangers, begets an habitual mode of evaluating. The thing that is hard, but absolutely necessary for conquest and power, is the thing that comes to be appreciated and called *good*. The leader, the creator of a people, is the man who, in advance of the tribe, sees the points of danger and enforces on his people the code of goods and bads which leads them to triumph. Hence the importance of valuing; it is the instrument by which the conscious processes lead life to sovereign power. "Many lands saw Zarathustra, and many peoples: thus he discovered the good and the bad of many people. No greater power did Zarathustra find on earth than good and bad." "No people could live without first valuing," because recognition of points of greatest stress and remembering the means for overcoming them are the conditions of survival and power. For this reason, too, it is obvious that "if a people will maintain itself it must not value as its neighbor valueth." The problems and dangers of different peoples are entirely different, and each must work out its own table of values. The whole principle is so admirably set forth in the "Thousand and One Goals" in *Zarathustra* that quotation at length is warranted.

[5] *Human All Too Human*, I, 200.

[6] *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 234.

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A table of excellencies hangeth over every people. Lo! it is the table of their triumphs; lo! it is the voice of their Will to Power.

It is laudable what they think hard; what is indispensable and hard they call good; and what relieveth in direct distress, the unique and hardest of all, they extol as holy.

Whatever maketh them rule and conquer and shine, to the dismay and envy of their neighbors, they regard as the high and foremost thing, the test and meaning of all else.

Verily, my brother, if thou knewest but a people's need, its land, its sky, and its neighbor, then wouldst thou divine the law of its surmountings, and why it climbeth up that ladder to its hope.

"Always shalt thou be foremost and prominent above others: no one shall thy jealous soul love, except a friend"—that made the soul of a Greek thrill; thereby went he his way to greatness.

"To speak the truth, and be skilful with bow and arrow," so seemed it alike pleasing and hard to the people from whom cometh my name—the name which is alike pleasing and hard to me.

"To honor father and mother, and from the root of the soul to do their will"—this table of surmounting hung another people over them, and became powerful and permanent thereby.[1]

Note how sweeping, yet how powerful and condensed, is this account of the racial origin and function of ideals. Land, sky, sea, and neighbor—in short, the anthropo-geographic environment—determine the problems which a people must face, the constantly unfavorable conditions which is destined to mold the type and determine the general character of the morals and religion. A disinterested spectator might well predict the general character of their values. Out of their needs will grow habits of outward behavior and inward evaluation. But no one can predict whether or not a dominating and successful people will emerge. This is where anthropo-geography meets the limits of its ability to explain. The welding of the group into a people under a conquering code is the work of great individuals who may or may not arise to meet the needs. It is they, the heroes of whom Carlyle sings the praises, who finish the work of creation which non-human nature com-

[1] *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 66.

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mences. It is they who frame the moral codes and establish the religion and lead the battles. The effect is to center attention upon points of danger and difficulty, to converge energy to the point where it is needed, to raise the tonic passions to fever heat, till the difficulty is overcome, the barrier burst, and the victory won. This is the function in battle, as everyone knows, of the impassioned address of the general, the war dance of the braves, the songs of the prophetess, the drum and bagpipes and marching songs, the slogans which the soldiers repeat to themselves. All these forms of art and religion remind the warriors of their ideals, focus and elevate their energies, and unite them under a purpose which it were a libel to call "struggle for existence" or chance selection, but which can only be called "will to power." Such fire and directed energy and invincible power as an embattled army exhibits symbolize for Nietzsche the meaning of life.

Racially, then, the economic law holds: Value is proportional to scarcity and demand. What is hard, but necessary to power, is what is called good and holy. But what is thus true of the group is not necessarily true of the individual. In fact, according to Nietzsche, the reverse is true. A long racial history with a tradition and a religion stands behind the group code, but a strong and creative individual is unhampered by these, or is even unaware of them. "Generally speaking, everything *is worth no more and no less than one has paid for it.* This, of course, does not hold of the isolated individual: the great capacities of the individual have no relation whatsoever to that which he has done, sacrificed, and suffered for them. But if one should examine the previous history of the race one should be sure to find the record of an extraordinary storing up and capitalizing of power by means of all kinds of abstinence, struggle, industry, and determination. . . . . A man's ancestors have always paid the price of what he is."[8]

The relation of the group to great individuals is a recipro-

[8] *Will to Power*, II, 371.

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cal one. The group ideals represent the growing-point, the point of stress and effort and struggle; the accumulated energy which struggle engenders becomes focused by the accidents of heredity in some individual or individuals. To them the necessary virtues are therefore easy, natural, and free. The old and stereotyped values are by them surpassed; they create new values, and force on the public an altered taste and improved code.

What the individual values, then, bears no relation to his own sacrifices and struggles. On the contrary, his values are more apt to express his own overflowing powers and talents. The strong man always values what he finds in himself. Courage, honor, self-control, high-mindedness he calls good, because they are his. It is always a type of man, not a "big word" like liberty or justice, that is his standard of goodness; it is always a type of man, not an abstract vice, that he calls ignoble, slavish, mean, or weak. "He knows that it is he himself who confers honor on things; he is the *creator of values*. He honors whatever he recognizes in himself; such morality is self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow."[9] Egoism, as he says elsewhere, belongs to the essence of the noble soul.

There are other factors in valuation, but I have set forth the important thesis. Nietzsche notes, for example: (1) the influence of language habits. "The spell of certain grammatical functions is ultimately also the spell of physiological valuations and racial conditions."[10] (2) Inheritance. "It cannot be effaced from a man's soul what his ancestors have preferably and most continuously done."[11] (3) Geographical conditions, such as earth, air, sea, and sky, since these determine his needs and the obstacles to his Will to Power. (4) Physio-

[9] *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 228.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 29. [11] *Ibid.*, p. 239.

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logical constitution, "perhaps some surplus or deficiency of organic salts," since these account for altered taste, and altered taste means altered preferences and values. (5) Imitation, prestige and compulsion, since in some way the strong man "lays a constraint" upon others and "molds them to his image."

The striking thesis, however, which I wish clearly to set forth is that racially the economic law holds; individually, the reverse law. Racially what is called good is that which the group finds hardest, though necessary to power; individually what is called good is what the individual finds in himself in superabundance, though to be sure it was paid for by his ancestors. Racially values function; they are pathways to power. Individually they merely shine, revealing the great man's soul and perhaps guiding or forcing the group to a higher level. Racially you look for the sources of value in the environment and in the struggle of the group to master it, plus, of course, the controlling influence of its master-geniuses. Individually you look for the immediate source of values in the man himself, in his accumulated store of energy, in his biological preferences and tastes. The herd type of valuation is one phenomenon; the master type of valuation is quite a different phenomenon.

Now I am inclined to think that a careful study of typical group life, especially at a primitive level, will show examples of Nietzsche's "herd morality." It seems to me also that the various studies which have been made of genius substantiate in a large measure what Nietzsche says of the master type of valuation. At best, however, these are the rare extremes between which fall the valuing processes of the great bulk of mankind. That is, most men inherit many of their values along with their religion and silver plate and insurance; other values they find by conversation, by reading, and by observing the lives of those about them; others they find in themselves, as do Nietzsche's master-men. A man may appre-

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ciate Shakespeare because he is taught to; Shakespeare has prestige value. He may appreciate music because he observes the enjoyment others derive from it. He may appreciate athletics because he is competent in sports, and experiences the elation and happiness of high tension and keen competition. My own studies in the relation between a man's values and his abilities reveals at least these three factors at work in the valuation of the university students. Do they value or depreciate what they find in themselves—their own abilities? Generally speaking, they value them. If they are competent in music they value music highly; if they have ability in athletics they place athletics high in their value scale. Do they value what they do not find in themselves, what is hard and difficult for them? Generally speaking, they do not, but the better student will frequently rank his ability in music, art, or athletics very low, whereas he places these things high in his set of values. Why? Perhaps because he has observed the effects in the lives of those who have ability in these lines; perhaps because what little competence and attainment he has achieved has cost him much in labor and time. After all, why should not a man, as well as a group, appreciate that for which he has paid a high price? And is this not a common observation, almost a commonplace of human observation? Again, why should not an intelligent man, though a genius, appreciate what he himself lacks if he notes the enjoyment which others experience who do possess it. The philosopher Hume, for example, might well be ranked as a genius even in the Nietzschean sense, and, like most geniuses, he had the serene confidence in, and appreciation of, his own magnificent powers; yet how natural the following conversation sounds. The pious La Roche is addressing him: "You regret," said La Roche, "when my daughter and I talk of the exquisite pleasure of music, you regret your want of musical powers and musical feelings; it is a department of soul, you say, which nature has almost denied you, which from the effects you see it

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have in others, you are sure must be highly delightful. Why should not the same thing be said of religion? Trust me, I feel it in the same way, an energy, an inspiration, which I would not lose for all the blessings of sense or enjoyment of the world."[12] The foregoing conversation is probably fictitious, but thoroughly representative of human nature, nevertheless.

While I would criticise Nietzsche's conclusions as to the nature of valuation, especially the division of human values into two main types, the herd type and the master type, I would call attention to the fact that Nietzsche formulated the problem of values, of the origins of values, of the rank sequence of values, and of the types of values, and this alone would place him among the most original thinkers of his time. Contemporary philosophy differs from previous philosophy mainly in two things: (1) the separating off of the problem of value (or axiology, to use the technical term) as a distinct branch of ethics and religion; and (2) the extension of logic into the hitherto undeveloped field of "relations," and its reduction to symbolic form. Nietzsche, so far as I can discover, was the first to mark off clearly and emphasize the field of axiology or valuation as the future task of philosophy. Secondly, while we cannot agree with all his conclusions as to the origins and types of valuation, it is fair to say that Nietzsche had not the slightest notion that his conclusions were final. Far from it. He realized that an enormous amount of careful investigation would be required for the task, and looked upon it as the future field of philosophy, not a completed piece of work. Much since Nietzsche's time has been written on the theory of value, but almost nothing has yet been done on the facts of valuation. Nietzsche, I am afraid, would be disappointed in the meager additions that have been made to his own contributions.

So far we have been discussing mainly the normal types

[12] Burton, *Life and Correspondence of David Hume*, I, 58.

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of valuation. We have been considering the groups which have been able to dominate and conquer, and within those groups the master-men who have been able to arise and shine. But what of the others, the races who have been cursed with the curse of Ham, the individuals who have known the bitterness of impotence? They, too, have had their Will to Power, but it has been forced to take a different turn. Hence arises a third type of valuation, not always clearly distinguished in Nietzsche's writings from the normal group type, but which is really entirely different. This is the slave type of valuation which Nietzsche identifies with Hebrew and Christian morality. The Jews, as all the ancients believed, were a people born for slavery, yet their values dominate all civilized nations today.

The thing which slaves and subjugated peoples have found hard, but absolutely necessary for any measure of success in life, is to endure the driver's goad without kicking against the pricks; to labor without reward and without repose for the benefit of the masters; to make bricks without straw for the towers and battlements of the enslavers. What is hard—meekness, humility, usefulness—they must learn to call good. What effectually blocks their will to power—the courage, prudence, and strength of the master-race—they call evil, under the names of pride, worldly wisdom, carnality.

In servitude the natural instincts must be concealed, and thus arise pseudo-values and substitute values. Slaves *will* vengeance, and this is natural, but they have not the power, or the courage, or the brain necessary. So they "heap coals of fire," trying to make a virtue out of a subtle vengeance (and forgetting that the other man is also searching about for coals); they invent "hell fire," taking pleasure in the thought of eternal vengeance. Divine justice, righteous indignation, good for evil are Freudian substitutes for the strong man's open and courageous revenge. So, too, all other slave values are born out of envy and impotence.[18]

[18] *Genealogy of Morals*, pp. 47–50.

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Nietzsche also notes the prevalence of compensatory values in the slave type of morality. Repose and comfort and riches are lacking in their lot; they get only fleeting glimpses of them at rare times. The strong do not value these things; they despise them; for the soft things are the enemies of activity, vitality, and conquest. The strong races are hard and hardy; sympathy has little place in their constitution, for sympathy acts depressively, lowering vitality and spreading weakness by sharing unhealth. But the weak and heavy-laden long for repose and passivity and happiness as a contrast to servitude and labor. All hedonistic and utilitarian values are related to slave morality and frustrated instincts. The strong and active do not value happiness for itself, but they value the high tension of the adventure, the feeling of power which attends creation, the elation which accompanies the discharge of strength. Let slaves dream of happiness; the free man shows his strength and hardly notes the fact that he has experienced the happiness of increased power.

Now the fact is, in Nietzsche's startling view, that the world over the slave morality has prevailed; the Nazarite has conquered. Under the guiding dominance of decadent values the human race has settled into rapid decline, and he who wishes to stem the fall must work quickly, for "soon the soil will be poor and no lofty tree will grow thereon." He says,

> My assertion is that all the values in which mankind now comprise their desirability are decadence values. . . . . I call an animal, a species, an individual depraved when it loses its instincts, when it selects, when it prefers what is injurious to it. A history of the higher sentiments, of ideals of mankind . . . . would be almost the explanation of why man is so depraved. Life itself I regard as instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for *power;* where the will to power is wanting there is decline. My assertion is that this will *is lacking* in all the highest values of mankind, that values of decline, nihilistic values, bear rule under the holiest of names.[14]

How has this come about? How is it that the weak have conquered the strong? How is it that decadence has gained

[14] *Antichrist*, p. 241.

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the mastery? Every group aims at power and wills to annihilate that which stands in its way. The strong are the few, the weak are the many; the strong are the innovators, the enemies of the people, and the weak are in time able to destroy them. Christian values, base utilitarian ethics, democratic and parliametary governments have been the means by which the inversion of values has been accomplished. "I am opposed to parliamentary governments and freedom of the press because they are the means by which cattle become masters."[15] Far from the strong and the fittest surviving in the struggle for power, it is always the weak and the mediocre that most easily survive, and the strong outstanding ones who perish. Everywhere the herd has won over nature's captains, priests, and kings. For progress to be rapid we would have to see the paradox of the masses acquiescing, even co-operating, in the increasing power of their natural enemies, the classes. Just how Nietzsche would accomplish this miracle we shall not pause to inquire.

Whether or not we agree with Nietzsche when he identifies the Christian virtues with slave values, and whether or not we agree with him when he asserts that all mankind's highest values are at present decadent values, we must give him credit for a powerful and penetratingly radical criticism of contemporary Christian ideals. No such thorough criticism had ever before been attempted. Darwinism had made it possible to doubt the creation story and had set biology free from a binding tradition. Strauss and higher criticism had made it possible to doubt the historicity of the Gospels and had set theology free from a binding tradition. But neither of these had touched the heart of Christianity. A religion has its life in its values and ideals. Nietzsche, so far as I know, was the first to subject these ideals to a searching and hostile criticism. Hobbes, Hume, J. S. Mill had been radical, but they had been careful to show that their ethical principles did not conflict

[15] *Will to Power*, II, 206.

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with the prevailing religion. This, I venture to assert, has been positively harmful. To paraphrase an oft-quoted saying of Plato: An unexamined moral code is not worthy of a man. The refining and elaborating of any ideal depends upon criticism. "Storms and doubts and worms and wickedness are necessary for that tree, that it may manifest its species and the strength of the germ; let it perish if it is not strong enough."[16] So says Nietzsche of his own ideal, inviting the same criticism which he did not stint on others. Lack of criticism means stagnation and intellectual, as well as moral, decline. The fact that Christian ideals as well as those of the other great religions have undergone rapid reinterpretation within the last few years is due in no small measure to the keenness of the criticism which they have had to meet.

The objection to Nietzsche's criticism is that, in spite of its virulence, it is not a general criticism. He realizes that after all there must be a base to the pyramid of human society, and so there must be the many for whom his master-values are not intended. Amongst the mass there must be usefulness, mutual aid, and the softer virtues. Amongst them the Christian and utilitarian values have their use. Indeed, these values are necessary in order to reconcile the masses to their life of comparative servitude. Had Nietzsche's criticism of the prevailing values rested with the few for whom it was intended its value would have been negligible. To condemn a thing for one person but admit its desirability for thousands hardly constitutes the sort of critcism which leads to revision and growth. Fortunately Nietzsche has been generally misunderstood in this connection, and his criticism has been accepted as general.

It seems to me that Nietzsche has done scant justice to the hard school of experience and struggle by which the "slave insurrection" has been won. The long struggle for liberty has taught mankind the values of equality, fraternity, mutual aid,

[16] *The Joyful Wisdom*, p. 145.

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and utility. Individually man is one of the weaker of the animals, but united he has won supremacy. The tender emotions, the democratic values have been at least as important in raising the average level of the type man as the more aggressive and acquisitive virtues. Now if all value is in terms of energy, and if equality, utility, benevolence, and fraternity increase the power of the masses to such an extent that they can eliminate or conquer the lords of creation, why should Nietzsche not praise them as he praises courage, strength, brain, and art?

The answer brings us to his definition of value. So long as Nietzsche is investigating the problem as to how values originate and function his study is purely descriptive, as matter of sociology and psychology. But he also has his theory as to how men *ought* to value, and this involves a theory of the ends or ideal of all life. Assuming that all life aims at increased power, then it is only necessary that "the individual should, *according to his kind,* be so placed as to *perform the highest* that is compatible with his powers."[17] At the same time the human species as a whole must be raised to ever higher power. The social ideal is simply an organization of mankind such that each shall have complete opportunity for the realization of his individual powers and capacities. Nietzsche is even inclined to praise democracy as an intermediate step toward this end, for it has at least destroyed certain decaying institutions, such as French aristocracy, and in doing this it has freed man for individual development. He is inclined to think that in the healthy, natural, and unspoiled peasantry Europe has its best material for its future. But democracy cannot be the final social ideal, for it believes in equality and discourages genius. The progress of the human species must come through individuals, and the social order must be such that genius is developed and encouraged. "Every elevation of the type 'man' has hitherto been the work

[17] *Will to Power,* II, 208–9.

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of an aristocratic society—and so will it always be—a society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences of worth of human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or another."[18] It is fair to qualify the foregoing statement by the explanation that by slavery Nietzsche did not mean the heartless exploitation of one class by another; he had far too great a soul for that; but had in mind the natural condition of those not capable of high development; and by aristocracy he did not mean a fixed and unflexible caste system. Such a system restrains rather than encourages development. The virtue of a natural aristocracy is that it recognizes and encourages genius, creation, and mastery. Hence aristocracy is the social order in which racial growth is possible.

The final definition of value, therefore, must be in terms of the individual. "According to what standard is the objective value measured? According to the quantity of *increased and more organized power* alone."[19] And "value is the highest amount of power that a man can assimilate—a man, not mankind."[20] Note in the first place the objective standard. Value is to be measured quantitatively, and in terms of biological energy. So far as I know this is the only objective measure of value that has ever been proposed. The utilitarians suggest a quantitative standard: The greatest happiness of the greatest number, each to count as one. But this quantitative measure is in terms of happiness, a purely subjective state which defies measurement. Energy, power, on the other hand lends itself to physical measurement and is as objective as anything can be in the realm of physics and biology. Two other points stand out in this striking definition: First, value is the *highest amount,* not the *greatest quantity,* of power; in other words, potential, not gross quantity, is the measure. One year of high potential is worth many years of slow output, and a short life is often to be preferred to a long one. Why? Because life

[18] *Beyond Good and Evil,* p. 223.

[19] *Will to Power,* II, 146. [20] *Ibid.,* 181.

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must be raised to high potential in order to break through resistance and overcome inertia, just as water must be raised to the boiling-point to drive an engine, rather than kept for months at average temperature. Secondly, value is the highest amount of power that *a man* can assimilate, not *mankind*. Why not mankind? Because mankind must be surpassed. One man of outstanding power is for this purpose worth many cities of mediocre men. The chain of existence is measured by its strongest link. Evolution is sporadic; it sends out filaments and shoots; it moves by leaps here while it falls back there. The longest shoot, the most unusual individual, may be the one which marks a permanent achievement, a new high level. Millions of average men would leave the race at the same average level, whereas the hope of any woman may be: May I give birth to the superman.

The type of individual whom Nietzsche had in mind has often been misunderstood. He is frequently pictured as a heartless bully, as a Bismarck, or even as a spoilt child. R. B. Perry pictures him as looking down from his balcony in disdain upon the downtrodden wretched and clamorous multitude at his gates.[21] Now in the first place there would be no downtrodden and clamorous multitude in Nietzsche's social order. Universal health and sound breeding are at the basis of his society, and each is engaged in the activity for which his nature fits him. Moreover, the highest rank bears the responsibility, not only of self-mastery, but of the leadership of the people.

The social order functions perfectly only when there is a division of functions according to ability and a due subordination of parts under proper leadership. Similarly, the individual reaches his highest only when there is perfect co-ordination of functions under a guiding and controlling principle. There must be not only abundance of energy and power, but there must be harmonized and directed energy. Otherwise

[21] Perry, *Present Conflict of Ideals*, p. 171.

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there will be inner conflicts, waste power, and utter futility. The highest man, therefore, is not only the man of superior powers, but he who is master of his own powers and who directs and co-ordinates them with perfect precision. He is symbolized by the rope-dancer, who, though raised aloft, solitary, and in danger, nevertheless has perfect mastery over himself, perfect co-ordination of brain, sense, and muscle, perfect grace of movement, and artistry in execution. Such a man is an artist, a creator, confident, spontaneous, and joyous, master of himself, of his environment, and of less gifted men. All science and knowledge is to him a means to the dance of life, not a cumbersome load to cramp and impede.

Nietzsche felt that he had a mission which he must accomplish at all cost. Broken in health, with eyesight almost gone, living in isolation, misunderstood and neglected, he worked feverishly to formulate his philosophy and make himself understood. The problem which he had on his mind was how to save Europe from the mediocrity and decline which he saw setting in. The human race was not a problem to Nietzsche; to him there was no such problem. Men were too diverse to be comprehended in one group. But Europe—there was a real problem. Napoleon had almost unified that little peninsula of Asia called Europe, so the vision of a European civilization was no idle dream. What Nietzsche wanted was not a European state but a European people, a European culture. "Where there is still a people, there the state is not understood, but hated as an evil eye, as a sin against laws and customs."[22] In spite of a youthful ardent patriotism he saw very plainly where his own country was headed with its inflated pride and top-heavy militarism. If something of the warmth and joyousness and genius of the south could be fused with the rude health and strength of the north, Europe might regain the lost glory of Greece, and again be the home of art and science and heroism. It was Nie-

[22] *Zarathustra*, p. 54.

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tzsche's aim to raise up a group of leaders who could lead Europe out of the shadow. They need not be many. "It is the business of the very few to be independent; it is the business of the strong." Crude war lords or dull business men could not do the task; it must be the work of a much more fundamental nature. "Where have we to fix our hope?" he asks. "In *new philosophers*—there is no other alternative: in minds strong and original enough to initiate opposite estimates of value, to transvaluate and invert eternal valuations." He thought he saw signs of philosophers of the kind he had in mind, not mere teachers, but *commanders*, able to mold others to their ideals and to determine the direction of events. But the work must be done quickly, if at all. "Still is the soil rich enough for it. But the soil will one day be poor and exhausted, and no lofty tree will any longer grow thereon."

Nietzsche has gone, and his bizarre superman with him. Nationalism, unchecked by any new philosophy, led to a far greater catastrophe than any which Nietzsche with all his prophetic vision could have forseen. The World War has given men more experience, if not more wisdom. Out of the horrors of war and economic necessities has grown the notion of a European federation vaguely formulating itself and struggling for expression. Still is the leadership of which Nietzsche dreamed lacking. Nationalism may decay, tariff barriers may disappear, populations may become still more hopelessly mixed. Will any philosopher arise to lead Europe—and America—to greater power and more noble life? Will something more noble than chivalry, more virile than war, more glorious than patriotism, arise on the ruins of the old? Peace may come, prosperity may spread to every corner, class distinctions may disappear, but with it will there come what Nietzsche foresaw and dreaded—uniformity, mediocrity, utility—and happiness?

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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THE PRESENT-DAY PROBLEM OF OVERWORK

EDWARD LYTTLETON

IT MUST have been nearly fifty years ago that Lord Balfour made a characteristic comment on the notable increase of energy put into public service which marked that time, in words roughly as follows: "It would be rather a humorous thing if the whole machine of our social life, civil, military and ecclesiastical, were to break down from nothing but overwork." If the state of things in the early eighties could have suggested any such remark, what may be said today? That there has been a vast insurgence of "work" during this half-century, a stirring of manifold activities on the widest possible scale, no observer of English life could be found to dispute. Nor is it England alone which betrays the symptom. It is often supposed that the Americans have been the pioneers in the general restlessness and feverishness of effort to better the world in which we live. Nor is there reason to suppose that any European people has been exempt from the prevailing perplexities to which the rapid transformation of society has given rise.

Hence an abundant crop of ethical problems due to the simple fact that an enormous number of patriotic and philanthropic people find themselves assailed by demands upon their energies the like of which on such a scale has never been known in the world before. How are these demands to be met? In very many cases it is plain they cannot all be met; that is to say, some must be ignored; and even so there is danger that any attempt to deal fairly with the residuum will lead to collapse, or premature senility, or worse than either, to scamped work. Can any guiding principle be discerned?

The commonest suggestion that is made is that every worker knowing he is near the limit of his powers should

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quietly but firmly say no to any overture pointing to the far side of the line of prudence. In practice, however, the adoption of this device is fraught with difficulties, and is in fact infrequent. If a firm of producers declines orders or postpones the execution of them to a season convenient for themselves but awkward for customers, the fact gets to be known and custom rapidly declines. Lawyers again, we are told, very seldom refuse a brief, no matter how "full up" they may be. A town parson, too, finds it sorely against the grain to forego visiting in his parish, and if other activities get in his way he will either fret against obstacles he cannot remove or sink into lukewarmness; and the story of his efficiency comes to a melancholy close.

But, at this point, an observation has to be made which will hardly be disputed. It is that a great deal of the work which has been most permanent in its effect has been done by men on the brink of breaking down. From an old and very beautiful hymn we recall the words "They that sow in tears shall reap in joy." The efforts that are made in the heyday of manhood's prime attract more attention, more recognition, more applause. But there is something strangely deceptive about the output, the real influence of any energizing for the betterment of society, which wins at once the approval of contemporary public opinion. For it is generally a token that the worker—be he artist or philanthropist or teacher—is no whit in advance of public opinion. If he were, his aims, his appeal to his generation would be for a time misunderstood and thwarted by conscientious but slow-witted onlookers.

Now that is the kind of experience which breaks a man down. When he finds his aspirations, true and certain for himself, are meaningless for others, and the harder he works the more evident and distressing the failure becomes, that man, unless he is of the rarest metal, is bound to collapse or to say to himself "the struggle nought availeth; the labour and the wounds are vain." But if he has the grand gift of persever-

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ance and "faith's transcendent dower," he presses on, and in time—generally after his death—he is known to have been, in the main, right all the time. So it has been with many an artist, many a poet, many a prophet. The giants among them, the real pioneers, the heralds of the higher life, have had to enter into some sort of defeat before they could transmute it into victory, into some sort of despair before they could kindle for others a fresh hope. Very often the defeat through which they have to pass is plainly the essential condition of the victory which is to come. They have recognized, as has been said, that "every real disability is a true opportunity," and the commonest type of disability is apparently failure of physical powers which induces depression of spirits and the abandonment of hope. Above this the very best men are able to soar; and they triumph over infirmity by ignoring it.

If this were all, *caderet quaestio,* there would be nothing more to be said. But there is another side to the matter. Occasionally a warning of an unforgettable kind checks a strenuous worker in mid-career. Some thirty-five years ago a man whose health had been utterly shattered by remorseless overstraining, adjured a younger friend, as he lay helpless on his couch, never to think of bringing himself to the same pitiable condition. No man in his senses could hear such words uttered with such authority and then treat them as negligible.

Yet is it not undeniable that granting, as we all do, that we ought not to injure our health, and at the same time think it wrong to refuse any fresh demand as long as we are able-bodied, we must continually be brought up against insoluble dilemmas, especially in times of stress and acute anxiety when business is bad, or an epidemic increases the demand and diminishes the available resources. Work cannot be refused, though the limits of energy have been reached.

One or two popular palliatives of the difficulty may be considered. It has been noticed that people who work continuously for many years at high pressure are mostly of serene

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temperaments; they seem to fend off worries, though their work is often in a critical plight. So elders enjoin their younger friends not to worry. If this advice is followed, as it very seldom is, it tends to fatalism, and very few Europeans can tolerate a fatalistic view of life. But in general the exhortation, like all moral homilies, is likely to be altogether bootless. Not much better, though more positive, is the counsel to adopt a Coué attitude when there is any fresh demand upon the vital powers. This means self-persuasion that however formidable the increase of burden may be, the worker should say to himself "I can do it: it will not tire me—not a bit." But the success of this device depends upon the power of the applicant to believe unhesitatingly what he more than suspects to be untrue. Children and peasants have profited enormously from M. Coué's methods, but educated Englishmen with a sense of humor proved the most recalcitrant of all his patients. The numerous cases of failure were of those who were neither children nor peasants, but who sadly asked "How am I to profit by telling myself a lie twenty times a day?"

Much more might be said to show that we have in this matter an illustration of the inference drawn by Sidgwick in his well-known *Methods of Ethics:* that there is no clear principle which can indicate the right mean between reckless excess of zeal in social service and a cold egoistic prudence which invariably tends to barrenness, or anyhow leanness of result.

We are no nearer success in our quest than was the Stagyrite of old. Yet it must be admitted that there are instances —not a few—where some remarkable approximation to the ideal is to be observed. These may be roughly divided into two groups, as follows:

a) There are men and women in every country who seem to have been born with a genius for altruism. Very early in their childhood they rise above the natural desire for self-gratification and find pleasure in identifying themselves with the wishes and needs of others. The result is a very beautiful

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type of character which fulfils the primal law of self-forgetfulness. In them native egoism seems never to have developed; as the years go on it withers away, dislodged and inhibited by something living, growing, and astonishingly helpful to fellow-creatures in distress; which moreover, apparently gives a singular power of endurance and tranquil constancy in presence of failure. The beauty of the spell of such natures depends upon the absence of self-consciousness and of strain; but it must be admitted that in this very fact lies a serious disability. These choice spirits cannot tell to others what is the source of their quickening. Ordinary folk, clogged and shackled with all kinds of infirmity, doubt, and disorder of mind, can wistfully look up to these radiant exemplars of a higher life, but, unable to catch their secret, can only ask with the poet what has prompted the melody? "What love of thine own kind: what ignorance of pain?"

b) But when we pass from those happy but heavily taxed helpers of their fellow-men to the most arresting group of all, we contemplate—from without, and as far as possible without prejudice or partiality—those who differ from their compeers chiefly in articulateness; that is to say, while they exhibit the same tranquillity of spirit and immunity from egoism, they are able to state whence their constancy of spirit is drawn. It is true that this very quality detracts, in all but a very few cases, from their charm; they lack as a rule the untroubled shining light of guilelessness and utter simplicity; there is in their faces and their demeanor marks of the track of a storm; and the self-conquest which they have achieved has meant for them much inward wrestling, much mortifying of those desires which onlookers are unable to put away. The picture is not always attractive, but as a rule engenders something of what used to be called awe, a feeling which modern society has managed to dispel, but now wishes to recover. If people of this kind are asked about their singular power of equanimity in presence of such a problem as overwork, their

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reply as given in many writings is something as follows. We must remember always that they are speaking of their experience, and strange though some of it has been, and undecipherable by those who stand aloof, no one has a right to think of it as fictitious. They are anyhow the best witnesses available for our quest.

They testify, then, that the injunction so often heard, "don't worry," is unquestionably sound, but wholly impossible to act upon as long as it is conceived of as a counsel of human prudence. If, however, it is taken as an objective command from God, it may be realized as containing in itself a promise. This realization is based on the assumption, not to be learned from any system of ethics, that our Creator in laying upon us burdensome and seemingly excessive duties is schooling us through temporal perplexities for a state of being which is called eternal life.

This conviction as it is acted on, they tell us, leads to another, viz., that though they thus set to work on tasks so given them with a buoyant and joyous hope, they are well aware that they are to expect a great deal of failure, which indeed was distinctly foretold to Christians by Christ himself. Their hope springs from an assurance warranted by all experience that the permanent good wrought by steadfast heroic men and women is wrought not by them but through them. Hence when they are confronted by problems to be solved in five minutes to which they would like to give five hours, instead of being harassed, they know that their limitations are ordained of God and may be acknowledged and observed not with repining but with gratitude. Yet with all this in the back of their minds they do what is before them "with all their might."

That is their secret; and they agree, one and all, that there is no other.

LONDON, ENGLAND

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SOME NEW FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE OLD VALUES OF THE CHINESE FAMILY

LIEN CHAO TZU

IN AN article in *The New Orient,* Bertrand Russell says, "The family is a much stronger institution in the East than in the West, but hardly stronger than it was in the West in the Middle Ages."[1] No doubt this is entirely true. I do not intend to seek out any excuse for the large families Chinese people have. The European people once had them also. The large-family system in China is going to be broken down. No Chinese people who have Western education are still proud of their large families. Social institutions change from time to time. The family has lasted for a long time. Although families are compelled to undergo readjustment now, even in the West, no one can imagine that the family system will in the future have no existence. No matter how far society becomes specialized, certain functions will remain for the family. It is not our business to inquire how future families will be organized, but it is our business to inquire how families can be transformed from one stage to another stage. The family evolves just as other social institutions have evolved, each of them being affected by many factors.

A family does not grow large by itself. Its development is determined by certain necessities. When the European peoples were at the stage of household economy, a stage dominating in medieval times, their families had not only to be large, but the larger families also afforded more comfort to their individual members. At the stage of household economy the family itself was a society, and it carried all the functions of a society. The members of the family were at the same time producers and consumers. There was no independent indus-

[1] *Future Cultural Relations of East and West,* II, 2.

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try. Even tools and implements were made by the family. Within the family, the division of labor was determined according to age, sex, and natural abilities. Labor and co-operation both were very important. The economist writing upon the industrial evolution says,

> To neither [labor and co-operation], however, would the family have been able to give much scope had it been organized like our modern family, that is, limited to father and mother with children and possibly servants. It would also have had very little stability or capacity for development if each individual in the family had been free to lead the independent existence of the present day.
>
> Significant is it, then, that when the present civilized nations of Europe appear on the horizon of history the tribal constitution prevails among them. The tribes (families, gentes, clans, house communities) are moderately large groups consisting of several generations of blood relations, which, at first organized according to maternal, and later according to paternal, succession, have common ownership of the soil, maintain a common household, and constitute a union for mutual protection.[3]

At the stage of town economy, there began to be independent industries, such as shoe-making and the production of wares. The family organization was not greatly affected by the towns. In England,

> at the end of the thirteenth century half the inhabitants of Colchester had no other occupation than tillage, and everywhere the ordinary pursuits of urban life were made secondary to the more important needs of agriculture. At London the holding of the husting court was suspended in the harvest, and a statute of 1388 laid down that all artificers of whose craft "a man hath no great need in harvest-time shall be compelled to serve in harvest, to cut, gather and bring in corn." As late as the sixteenth century the weavers of Norwich were forbidden to work at their craft during the harvest month "for the relief and help of husbandry," since tillage was said to be "much decayed for want of labourers." The sharp cleavage between town and country, in some respects the most striking feature of modern economic conditions, is in fact the product of industrial forces which exerted but slight pressure in earlier times.[4]

[3] Carl Bücher, *Industrial Evolution*, translated from the 3d German edition by S. Morley Wickett, p. 92.

[4] E. Lipson, *The Economic History of England: The Middle Ages*, p. 163.

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The difference between town economy and household economy is that the town supported the manufacture of articles outside the families, while the household supplied them only for its own use. The medieval towns were very small, each controlling a limited district. Industries were carried on in the individual families. There was not much need of capital. An individual might engage in an enterprise only by furnishing money to buy the tools and implements. Capital for materials was required in certain industries. Sometimes the customers brought their own materials for the finished products. There was no wage-earning class. Everyone could rise to the master-artisanship if he was proved to possess capacity.

Not until capitalism came in did the old family organization begin gradually to disintegrate. Capitalism brought in two great factors that were unfavorable to the large family system. One factor was that individuals could secure work outside their own families. The old family bondage was then broken down by capitalism. Another factor, which is very closely related to this one, was that the number of the population engaged in farming was reduced. The decrease of farming population may transform large into small families. In England such a situation occurred in the eighteenth century. Large farms can be cultivated by scientific method. The family division of labor and co-operation which proved to be very important at the stage of household economy suddenly became unnecessary. With the factory system developed, the family organization was transformed into the class organization. The laborers who worked in the factories organized themselves as an exclusive class that could have had no possibility of existence in the medieval times.

When we come to the family system in China, the conditions are not so simple. Of course, American families as well as European families have been affected very much by industrial conditions. In China there are also other conditions that have bound the large family together. In Western countries

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families do not hold a very important position among social organizations. The Greeks had little to say about families. Plato insisted upon a species of communism in which individuals should live for the state. Certainly Aristotle disagreed with Plato; but in one respect they were the same: both neglected to consider families as political units. The Christian religion joins everybody with one personal God. The family might be large or small; Christianity has not attempted to do anything with it. In the West, families seem to have been affected only by the economic conditions. So far as we know, there has been nothing else to affect the family organizations.

The Chinese family system was already well developed at the time of Confucius. Far back of Confucius Chinese people were well adapted to agriculture. We do not know whether large families were encouraged before Confucius. At least we know that large families did not encounter any social objections. The dynasties before Confucius all lasted very long in peace. All the people were engaged in farming. Family division of labor and family co-operation had to be very great. Agriculture is most permanent. Nothing else can so effectively hold the large families. Confucius combined empiricism and Kantianism. His philosophy resulted from past historical events, and in addition he insisted upon moral imperatives. He did not necessarily encourage large families, but he set up a strict relationship between father and son. The father should be kind to his son, and the son should be dutiful to his father. There should be no separation of the father from the son or of the son from the father. Mencius,[4] a great successor of Confucius, developed the principle that the greatest of the three evils of a disobedient son was for him to die without posterity. Since then the Chinese family has been strongly consolidated on philosophical and ethical grounds.

[4] He lived about one hundred years after Confucius (Confucius, 551–479 B.C.; Mencius, 372–? B.C.—*Chinese Encyclopedia*, Appendix, pp. 9–11), but his philosophy is a further development of that of Confucius.

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Confucius was not very dominant in his time. He had many rivals. But after his death his philosophy came gradually into predominance. The state took over his philosophy as the ground of politics, and encouraged the individuals to have as large families as possible. Large families received honors from the state. A family of nine generations was considered the most honorable family. A family of five generations secured small distinction. Families of less than five generations were very common. The members of the family lived together on the co-operative basis. The villages were differentiated by the families in most cases. The family and the village did not disintegrate, partly because economic conditions did not permit, and partly because the old teachings and traditions favored their existence. The family did not become a conscious problem in China until very recent years.

At the present time, there are many problems that have centered upon the old family system in China, but they are different from those arising in Western families. In America, the problem of the family is how to adjust families to industrial conditions. Families in this country have been affected tremendously by industries. Both man and woman can get work, and they can support themselves. One of the most important conditions that can hold the family together has been broken down by industries. Therefore, the so-called "family problem," as it does exist in this country, is a problem of husband and wife, including children. Professor J. H. Tufts has done much toward suggesting solutions of the problem of the American family. All his solutions rest upon the rearing of the young and the improvement of social conditions that directly bear upon family happiness. He says, "I do not think children can dispense with parents. Still less do I think parents can afford to lose the responsibility, the direct education, and the joy of association with children."[5] According to him, under industrial conditions the family system can be main-

[5] J. H. Tufts, "The Ethics of the Family," this *Journal*, XXVI, 239.

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tained with satisfaction only by increasing wages of the working people, by affording them more leisure, and by improving the educational system. Child labor must cease. Professor Tufts has disagreed with Ellen Key on the problem of family love. Ellen Key insisted upon the personality of woman, but Professor Tufts insisted upon love by voluntary choice and intelligence.

The Chinese families have not been so much concerned with these problems. Industries in China are just at the beginning of development. Our ideals have gone much ahead of us. Large families are going to be broken down very rapidly, but our economic conditions remain still almost the same. There is much danger inherent in the sudden change of the old Chinese family system. China is an agricultural country, and almost all of its population now are still engaging in farming. The Chinese farmers are unlike the English and the American farmers. The English and the American farmers are large holders. Each farmer holds sufficient land for large-scale cultivation. Except in a few places, Chinese farmers are small holders. One family can hold only a very small amount of land. The cultivation of the land is largely or entirely dependent upon family co-operation. While a large family can live very comfortably together, they cannot maintain themselves after separation. Just as small industries cannot compete with large industries, so the small families have as yet disadvantages when compared to large families.

The cultivation of the land is one kind of family co-operation in China. There is still larger co-operation than that. Not all the members of the family have to engage in farming; some go to schools for higher education. In the past, China held a free private educational system. The expenses for education were very small. On the average, most families could support their children at school. The government held only periodical examinations. Since Western influence came into China the old educational system has been replaced by the

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new. Today, in China as well as in this country, college education is a great burden. If the family is large enough, it perhaps can afford to support one by the co-operation of its members; but if it separates itself into small units, it can support none. I do not mean that this is the universal condition in China now. Certainly higher education in China has been enormously affected by this factor. Of course there is a remedy for such a situation through political expedients. Under present conditions the large families are still a help to the same end.

I do not insist that the large-family system in China should be continuously maintained. Indeed, I think the large-family system will not last much longer. But there is great danger in a sudden change from the large-family system in China. When industries are developed in China and individuals can be free to secure jobs outside of their own families, the present large-family system will be broken down as a natural process. Such disintegration of the large-family system does not mean the destruction of the old family values; it means only the continuation of the old family values by the new. Family value is, according to Professor Tufts, a kind of co-operation.[6] When one kind of co-operation is not needed, another kind of co-operation can be substituted. As a matter of fact, industrial life and agricultural life are entirely different at the present time. Individuals who go out to seek employment in the industries cannot at the same time give their attention to agriculture. Large families may be transformed into small families by the industrial process, but the transformation will not result in any bad effect upon family life and agriculture. On the contrary, a great gain may be the outcome when most people change from agricultural life to industrial life. People who continue their agricultural life may hold more land. They can improve their agricultural management and economize cultivation by scientific process.

[6] J. H. Tufts, "War-time Gains in American Family," this *Journal*, XXX, 99.

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Now, the cultivation of land in China is unscientific. Except in Manchuria, where lands were recently cultivated, Mongolia, where there are now still uncultivated lands, and a few other places, scientific cultivation cannot be applied in China. Not only can the landholders not afford to buy machines, but their lands are unadapted to scientific farming. The lands they own are too small, and what everybody can have is not all in one piece. If Chinese agriculture can be improved, there must be part of the population going to industry. Today more people are living on land than is necessary or desirable.

I think I have made my point very clear that the large-family system in China will be broken down in the near future by industrialization. My conclusion may not be applicable to other countries where old conditions still remain. For example, in India, the more of industrial civilization they witness, the firmer is their resistence to it. In China, traditions and customs are not so strong as the economic conditions that have bound the large family together. In China, there is no caste system. Although Confucius insisted upon strict human relationships, he did not favor class distinctions. Human nature is universally regarded as good. There is no superior man and slave by nature. Everybody can be taught what is wise and good, and thus educated to become a desirable member of the society. This is why there are so many movements in China now for social reformation. During the last seven or eight years, since Professor Dewey went to China, there have been many students' movements. The students have struggled for national integrity and independence. They have facilitated the establishment of evening schools for the poor. They have contributed their service to teaching free of charge. Public speeches have been delivered on the streets to acquaint the common people with new ideas. I need not mention the present civil war, with almost all the Western returned students on the side of the nationalist government. The common people are beginning now to seek for new life.

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The old values of the large-family system will soon be replaced by the new values. Ancestor worship will be limited in its influence. Even now it is not very dominant. Beyond ancestor worship the common people still have other beliefs. All the human relationships will be gradually rebuilt. It will not continue possible for an ancestor group to live together uninterruptedly. I have observed, even several years ago, that people whom I knew were being compelled by economic conditions to seek new conditions of life. Modern communication encourages them to leave their homes and seek new experiences elsewhere. Although the value of the large-family co-operation will be broken down, the increasing comfort of every individual can be built up. With the growth of the nationalistic movement the importance of the family as a political unit grows less. In the past the family was responsible for everything. In the future it will be, not the family and the state, but the state and the individual.

To summarize this whole paper, I have insisted that the economic conditions are the important factors in the origin and development of any family system. I do not overlook sexual desires, but mere sexual desires are not strong enough to create a family system. Not only human beings have sexual desires; other animals have them also. Not all animals that have sexual desires constitute a family system. We do not need to separate sexual desires from family life, but we cannot suppose that the sexual desires lead to the constitution of the family system. After the family system has been developed, many other factors play their parts: traditions, customs, political situations, and so forth. It is difficult to say that one factor is more important than the other when the family has got into definite shape. But the economic factor plays the most important part at the beginning of the family system. After the beginning of the family system, how large a part the economic factor plays is dependent upon various other factors. I have shown that the European fam-

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ily system has been tremendously modified by the industrial conditions. When European peoples were in the agricultural stage they had their large families. Agricultural life is more permanent than the industrial life, and it also needs more of family co-operation. The large family is the result. The family system of the Chinese people has been conditioned more by their agricultural life than by their own traditions. It is, of course, true that they have a large body of old traditions; but their traditions were brought out as the direct consequence of their agricultural life, rather than otherwise. This is the line of thought that has brought me to the conclusion that the large families in China will not continue much longer. When industries affect the agricultural organization the transformation of a large family into a small one is inevitable. Now industries in China have not been tremendously developed. Communication is still backward. Change of social conditions must go on very slowly. The most important thing we should understand is that the old traditions are not the reason why the Chinese people resist any change in their family system, but the real reason is to be found in the condition of their agricultural life.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE SOCIAL GOOD. By E. J. Urwick, Professor of Political Science in the University of Toronto. London: Methuen & Co., 1927. Pp. 246; index. Price, 10*s*. net.

Professor Urwick was formerly the professor of Social Philosophy in the University of London, at the London School of Economics, and while there he published a *Philosophy of Social Progress* in which he maintained a form of spiritual individualism, with Platonic connections. In this new book he works out more fully the same theory. The first part deals with the fundamental problem of the nature of variety and of the individual. Professor Urwick refutes McDougall's theory of the group mind, although he admits that that is less absurd than the simpler and cruder theories of a separate crowd spirit. The connections of any one man with his fellows are known to be "external" to the man; and therefore Professor Urwick argues that the case of individuality cannot be dwindled away in any varied life. This is indeed in the Platonic tradition; for modern idealists who overrate the importance of torial institutions misrepresent Plato when they suppose him to preach a complete absorption of the individual in his community. However, Professor Urwick has not quite cleared up the nature of that case of individuality of which he speaks. That it is not a new relation within a social abode may be true; but there is no "equality" at all which can be found in individuality which is not social. The second part of the book deals with methods by which the conditions for the life of the individual have been, and can be, improved. We have, therefore, an ethical and philosophical discussion of political and economic organization and some very cogent criticism of the hopes which some reformers have in education. Indeed, this part of the work will be found essential for beginners in the study of social life, whether they are studying economics or government or education. Professor Urwick has the great merit of feeling deeply the issues of which he writes. This is not a mere bookish book. It has been "lived"; and whether we agree with the conclusions or not, they have far more ethical quality about them than any treatise or ethics have. Indeed, Professor Urwick has contrived to retain, in his discussion of practical problems, just that Platonic touch which Aristotle omitted in his *Ethics* and *Politics*. Therefore the book is valuable as an instance of the close rela-

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tion between theory and practice in the study of moral problems. It is also an advantage that Professor Urwick seeks his conceptions of the ideal life in the experience of saints and seers, and not merely in the simple hopes of the man in the street. The book is interestingly written and is not burdened with references to the literature of social theory which so often obscure the main issues in modern treatises. The experience of a teacher has evidently been used in the method adopted by Professor Urwick for making this subject real to the reader. The result is a book which is essential for all students of the social sciences.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

CHANGING BACKGROUNDS IN RELIGION AND ETHICS. By Herbert Wildon Carr. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. 224.

Professor Carr apparently regards the theory of evolution as responsible for most of the accomplished or required changes in contemporary philosophy; and in this book he attempts to indicate what implications the theory of evolution has for religion, for ethics, for epistemology, and for metaphysics. Evolution, of course, is to be conceived as the Bergsonian creative evolution, and so conceived seems to furnish a basis for an inclusive system. Pre-evolutionary cosmologies fall, according to Professor Carr, into two main types: those which stress the materiality of the universe, and those which take life and mind to be primordial. Perhaps both idealism and materialism are defective, and we have a third choice. The third possibility, which Professor Carr proposes as the view of creative evolution, is the concept of life as the world-principle. Matter, then, would be a derivative of life; and the universe would be conceived after the analogy of a fountain, the upward-rushing water being life and the same water on its lifeless, impeding return being matter. Instead of being an irrational dualism, our conception would grasp the universe as one process or as the expression of one principle, both life and matter being aspects of the larger life of the universe.

To harmonize religion with this conception of the universe we shall apparently have to give up "the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob." In other words, omniscience, benevolence, and the other attributes of a personal God are either denied or made meaningless by the theory of evolution. Nevertheless, there is still something left for us to reverence. "If evolution is fact, a force is working in and through our individual lives which unites us with all the living, and which specializes in us the mode of our individual existence. We must be reverent toward

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this vague yet clearly apprehended source of our being, for we have come to consciousness of it, though we cannot personalize it, or discern its origin, or fathom its nature, or conceive its goal." As the author correctly observes, this is essentially the religion of Spinoza put into modern form.

Certain ethical views are corollary. The moral law is to be regarded, not as a source of awe and amazement, but as "the expression in the individual of the universal life-principle which is working through and by means of the individual for an end beyond the individual." We put ourselves in accord with evolution by working for an ideal humanity; and the attempt in our purposes and conduct to put ourselves in accord with the evolutionary process constitutes and expresses the "mind's intellectual love towards God." The theory of evolution determines also an interpretation of knowledge. "Evolution shows the dependence of theory of knowledge on theory of life. The sciences are not imposed on us by the brute forces of indifferent fact; they arise out of the practical necessity of action. They are schematizations of our activity."

In addition to the views summarily outlined here, Professor Carr presents interesting discussions of the nature of freedom and of the problem of evil. For reasons to be given below the subsidiary discussions are on the whole more enlightening than the main contentions of the book. Professor Carr's analyses and arguments are presented with such clarity and acuteness that it is unlikely that anyone will read the book without learning something from it. Nevertheless one is tempted to ask whether or not Professor Carr's clarity in detail is not contrasted with obscurity in the large. It is difficult not to be baffled by the conception of the ongoings of the universe as a process analogous to life, a process in which what we call matter is a part of the larger life. Doubtless this view expresses a feeling that we sometimes have in our mystic, Emersonian moments, a feeling, indeed, that we should dislike to abandon; but instead of being expressed by putting ink marks on prosaic paper in a metaphysical treatise, should it not rather be set to music?

It seems to be true that in the universe something is going on, and presumably we may say that somehow the universe is the source of our being. But why need we feel that what is going on in the universe is the expression of a force toward which we should be reverent? Especially since we do not know whether or not this force has honorable intentions, why should we feel obliged to put ourselves in accord with it and evolution? One suspects that after all backgrounds in religion and ethics are not changing very rapidly.

CHARNER M. PERRY

THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS

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NATIONAL CHARACTER AND THE FACTORS IN ITS FORMATION. By Ernest Barker, Principal of King's College. London: Methuen & Co., 1927. Large 8vo. Pp. 288; index. Price, 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

This book contains the work which Professor Barker has based upon his Stevenson Lectures on Citizenship in the University of Glasgow. Professor Barker has now taken a new chair in the University of Cambridge where he will be able to develop further the argument which is so excellently rendered here. The book is divided into two parts, the subject of the first part being race, territory, and economic conditions, and of the second part, government, religion, and education. The argument briefly is that some of the conditions in the formation of any national character are not in our control, but that the others are more important and significant. Historical evidence is given for all the author's conclusions: and although the main theme is the formation of a British nation, the examples are taken from all European nations. The nation as a "spiritual superstructure upon a material basis" was first clearly apprehended in the nineteenth century. National unity is "not that of a mind, but of a mental substance." The political forms give it structure, permanence, and power; but the force that molded national character in earlier times was in the churches, and the formative force of the present is education. Perversions, however, occur, as for example the "nationalization of God" from which all nations suffer. The experience of the character of a nation can be felt or that of an individual. The crisis we now face is the development of our own national character in its inevitable contacts with other nations. The book thus ends with a suggestion that the formative forces in national character are not less strong than in earlier times, and that there is a practical moral task to be performed by politicians, individualists, and educators in the development of a firm type of national character.

Clearly, then, this book is of the first importance to teachers and students of ethics in the more practical applications. The fundamental problem of the moral standard and of the criterion by which to estimate the quality of any national character—these are not discussed. But Professor Barker has certainly covered a large enough field and his illuminative examples and suggestive criticism make his book valuable for political philosophy in general. He has used modern psychology, but if a criticism may be made, he has not sufficiently drawn upon the suggestions of abnormal psychology in the analysis of national life. The crises and panics in national life are certainly significant, and the mind-groups

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of political parties and of national certainly suffer from "complexes" as much as individuals do. Again, if the forces that are not material are largely amendable to guidance the distinction between the guides and those who are guided is important, and so is the problem as to the competence of the guides; but these are hardly discussed by Professor Barker. Such criticism, however, may be held to show that the book is successful in suggesting more than it actually discusses, and that means a good book. The continual reference to detail and to daily practice made it, no doubt, impossible to include discussion of fundamental issues, but this very detail and practical reference make the book interesting to read and clear in its meaning. There is also a pleasing absence of appeal to the instincts and primitive passions which are the stock-in-trade of some psychologists when they deal with political and social life.

C. DELISLE BURNS

LONDON, ENGLAND

SHORTER NOTICES

MAN'S QUEST FOR SOCIAL GUIDANCE. By Howard W. Odum. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xxi+643. Price, $4.50; student's edition, $3.60.

This is a volume in the American Social Science Series by the general editor of the series. The *Introduction to Social Psychology*, by L. L. Bernard, has already appeared. Professor Odum aims to give a general survey of the various social problems, several of which will be further developed in later volumes of the series.

The text takes up a large number of concrete problems, examining not merely certain general concepts, such as society and the good life, the individual and society, social change, social incidents and emergencies, but specific international, national, and regional problems, race, Negro, immigration, the family, youth, education, city and country life, business, labor, social work, etc. The method of treatment is objective. The style and manner of presentation are clear. In addition to specific topics for study and selected bibliographies, there is a list of recent books which will be found convenient.

THE SCIENCE OF SOCIAL RELATIONS. By Hornell Hart. New York: Henry Holt & Co., May, 1927. Pp. xix+664. Price $4.50.

This is another volume in the American Social Science Series. Alike in the material of the chapters and in the topics for study suggested at the close of chapters, emphasis is placed upon the source material and upon its use for stimulating original thought and discussion. Some of the chief topics are personality, social conflict, freedom of laissez faire, equality and justice, parent and child, men and women, race conflicts, industrial conflicts. Judging from the chapter upon the system of arbitration in the clothing industry, the facts are

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carefully gathered and fairly presented. Numerous questions for class discussion are adapted to call out active thinking. The whole organization and presentation has evidently been studied with great care.

THE SANCTITY OF LAW. WHEREIN DOES IT CONSIST? By John W. Burgess. Boston and New York: Ginn & Co., 1927. Pp. vii+335. Price, $3.00.

The period that has elapsed since the appearance of the author's *Political Science and Constitutional Law* marks almost the birth and life of this field of study in the United States. The school which Professor Burgess organized at Columbia University was notable for its productivity in this and related fields. The present volume attempts to trace in outline the sanction of law from early times, showing how the Roman and ecclesiastical interpretations gave place to modern national conceptions of sovereignty. The chapter on the World War repeats a view previously presented; that on the League of Nations expresses the hope that the League may be a means for a more genuine nationalization, instead of the present Balkanization. If it will suspend its present activities and operate as a world-constitutional convention functioning only as an institute for free investigation and suggestion, then the United States may safely join.

JESUS. By Shirley Jackson Case. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. ix+453. Price, $3.00.

Nothing could illustrate more conclusively the rapidly changing religious consciousness of the day than this study of Jesus as he actually lived and Jesus as he came to be conceived. There is not the slightest suggestion of a life so remote from ordinary conditions and experiences as to constitute a world inaccessible to scientific study and comprehension. The author does not attempt a study of the inner life of Jesus in any such fashion as Renan attempted the problem. But in contrast with any previous life, it presents in simple form the conclusions of modern scholarship, as to what one might have seen if he had been present in Palestine in the days of Jesus' life, and further, how this relatively simple story became the basis for the imposing system of tradition or interpretation. The volume represents the best scholarship of the day. It leaves with the reader an insistent demand for a further effort to make credible the influence upon world-history and in simple hearts of the man of Galilee.

THE STATESMAN'S BOOK OF JOHN OF SALISBURY. BEING THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH BOOKS, AND SELECTIONS FROM THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH BOOK OF THE POLYCRATICUS. By John Dickinson. Translated into English with an Introduction. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927.

Dr. Dickinson's admirable and fascinating volume is one of the "Political Science Classics" issued under the general editorship of Professor Lindsay Rogers, of Columbia. The general plan of the series has regrettably necessitated the omission from the present translation of approximately half of the entire material (including, as Dr. Dickinson remarks, "some of the finest parts") comprised within the *Polycraticus*. On the other hand "it has been possible to bring to-

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gether in their entirety all the directly political sections without doing violence to the integrity or consecutiveness of the treatment. The result is a practically self-contained treatise." The work thus gains in unity what it loses in scope. And this "earliest elaborate medieval treatise on politics," completed in 1159, is really one of extraordinary interest, not only for the student of political science, but also for all who are concerned in any degree with medieval thought. It notably exemplifies, in the domain of political theory, the richness and complexity—all too often, indeed, to the point of confusion—of medieval speculation, now so increasingly evident to the student of any of its phases. The mythical representation of a thought fast-bound to a narrow and rigidly unified system of simple and universally accepted dogma vanishes, here as elsewhere, upon confrontation with the documents. Dr. Dickinson's introduction is thoroughly competent and scholarly.

R. M. BLAKE

THE NATURE OF DEITY. A SEQUEL TO "PERSONALITY AND REALITY." By J. E. Turner. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1927. Price, 10s.

The present volume is the latest of a series in which Dr. Turner has been developing a system of philosophy, culminating in a natural theology of the theistic type. The conclusions of the earlier volumes are here taken for granted and frequently referred to. Assuming that "the real existence of the Supreme Self or Deity can be logically established from the *data* presented by those outstanding characteristics of the universe which have been discovered by natural science," Dr. Turner proceeds to inquire what further indications can be derived, from a consideration of similar data, concerning "not the existence, but the character of the Supreme Self."

Among the topics discussed are the relation of God to the universe (God is "the Supreme Self in the Whole," both immanent and transcendent), "His Infinity and Perfection," "His Omniscience and Omnipotence," "His Fatherhood, Love and Holiness," the problem of evil and the nature of the divine atonement, the method of creation by "emergent evolution," and on the whole, the progress of mankind onward and upward forever.

As Dr. Turner remarks in the Preface, his final position, "taken as a whole, presents little that is in any sense new." It is none the less worthy of remark, and not a little heartening, that a consideration of the "new universe" of modern science should be found to guide us, and with such unfaltering directness, to the acceptance of a quite orthodox theism, "until, in the end, the pure in heart see God."

R. M. BLAKE

THE STANDARDIZATION OF ERROR. By Vilhajalmur Stefansson. New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1927. Pp. 84. Price, $1.00.

This brilliant little work is a plea for "truth by definition" or, what amounts to the same think, "standardized error." For all practical purposes, the author argues, it is better that most people should not believe the truth. It

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is too complicated, too precarious, in many cases positively immoral. What we want is uplifting and convenient fiction. The literary ostrich has obvious didactic advantages over his "real" counterpart; the Eskimo of popular belief is much more entertaining than those with whom the explorer is acquainted; and so on. To consider the consequences of medical truth invading the "standardized error" of conventional ideas on cleanliness is to realize that such things must not be. Through these and other entertaining instances the case for error as more valuable than truth is developed. The book closes with the pious hope that Fundamentalists, American Legion, and Anti-Saloon League will give this matter their most careful attention.

That all this is to be taken with several grains of salt the author leaves no doubt. Yet the problem is perfectly genuine. There *is* a sense in which approximation, elimination, and even positive fabrication are social necessities in the dissemination of truth. But all this presupposes (*a*) a sense in which the alleged fiction is actually "true," namely, the truth that this is really best for popular consumption, and (*b*) a group of favored individuals, the author among them, who can attain such truth quite independently of "standardized error." With such further issues the book does not deal. But it does raise the problem in a very vivid and stimulating fashion.

A. E. MURPHY

ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE METHODS OF REASONING. By Daniel Sommer Robinson. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1927. Pp. xiii+346. Price, $2.00.

This useful compilation is in some sense a companion volume to the author's "Principles of Reasoning," but is so arranged as to supplement any one of the standard texts in logic. The material is drawn from a wide and authoritative range of sources, and, what is more unusual, the illustrations are such as to be comprehensible to the student apart from any special knowledge of their context. The chapters on "Classification" and "The Historical Method" are particularly well chosen. Mill's statement of the "methods of experimental inquiry" and Tyndall's lecture on "The Scientific Use of the Imagination" are appended.

A. E. MURPHY

THE SCIENTIFIC HABIT OF THOUGHT. By Frederick Barry. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. xiii+358. Price, $3.50.

The approach to the human significance of physical science through its method and history is bearing fruit. Instead of the usual pictorial presentation of the more startling conclusions of physics, apart from all suggestion of context and qualification, Professor Barry offers an account of "scientific humanism"—of the habit of thought involved in a scientific approach to reality. The advantages of such a treatment are obvious. The sort of world that the scientist presupposes in his method is described, rather than the imaginative "meaning" of his results as these are normally purveyed in "popularized" science. That the scientific attitude is skeptical and pragmatic, that it carries through the interest of common sense in "conditions of occurrence" to a more precise

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and consistent statement, that its "facts" are never absolute and its theories always mere approximations to the complexity of events, are central theses of the author. After a somewhat discursive approach to the subject, in which the continuity of common sense and science is rather too strongly emphasized, Professor Barry develops and illustrates his position in two chapters on "The Nature of Fact" and "The Elements of Theory" which constitute the best introduction to a philosophy of science now available in English.

Philosophers fare only moderately well in Professor Barry's analysis. Mysticism and "constructive imagination" as embodied in metaphysics are legitimate, since they deal with regions of experience quite distinct from that of science. Only the pragmatists have been right, however, on the philosophy of science. The rest, no matter how intelligent, suffer from a lack of elementary knowledge of scientific problems. Most dangerous are the mathematical logicians, for here we find a "scientific method" coupled with claims to absolute certainty which are quite incompatible with a scientific "philosophy of caution." The pages devoted to the criticism of such claims are of genuine philosophical importance. The work ends with a lengthy and moderately cheerful estimate of the possibilities for the dissemination of "scientific humanism" in our universities. Certainly "The Scientific Habit of Thought" is a worthy contribution to such an enterprise.

A. E. MURPHY

ETHICAL STUDIES (2d ed., revised, with additional notes by the author). By F. H. Bradley. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1927. Pp. 344. Price, $5.00.

At last we have a second edition of Bradley's splendid essays. The first edition was published in 1876, and the book has affected the tradition so deeply that perhaps the author was right to hesitate in preparing a second edition. But he was at work on this edition in 1924 when he died. The notes added, largely for his own use, are slight and do not amount to more than occasional modification in place of direct statement of views. The clear and vigorous original text, however, has been for too long difficult to obtain. To re-read it is to receive invigoration, in spite of all that has been written since; and although some of the positions which Bradley attacked are no longer held by any reputable philosopher, the student of ethics cannot do better than follow the course of Bradley's argument. For scholars it will be useful to have Bradley's text at their elbows, for the copies of the earlier edition have been for many years difficult to obtain even for libraries.

C. D. B.

A SURVEY OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF ENGLAND AND WALES, AS ILLUSTRATED BY STATISTICS. By A. M. Carr-Saunders and D. Caradog Jones. London: Oxford University Press, 1927. Pp. 246. Price, 10s. net.

Professor Carr-Saunders of the University of Liverpool is already well known for his books on the population question, and Mr. Caradog Jones is a statistician. The book now under notice is a summary of writing statistical evi-

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dence on population in England and Wales, housing, occupations, trade-unions, religious bodies, the national income, education, health and unemployment insurance, etc. It is therefore an advisable basis for the study of contemporary England. There are many tables and figures, and the comments and explanations of the authors provide the necessary guidance through the mass of material. The chief material comes from the official census of 1921, although in regard to incomes the material is of the year 1924. In that year there were in Great Britain 138 persons who had more than £100,000 a year income; and in 1926 in England and Wales only there were about 1,440 persons who had not enough to live a barely human life.

C. D. B.

LA PHILOSOPHIE MORALE DE JOSIAH ROYCE, ESSAI SUR L'IDEALISME SOCIAL AUX ÉTATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE. Par R. J. Aronson. Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan. Price, Fr. 28.

This book will not be found to contain anything new to American readers, so far as the facts go; but American readers will gain much from the admirable interpretation of the social idealism of the United States. They may see themselves in a new light and Europeans are so often "condescending" to the civilization of the States when they write about it that it is a relief to find a French scholar who is sympathetic enough to understand the moral value of the American tradition. Royce's social philosophy does not fill a prominent place in Dr. Aronson's book; but is made the culminating point of the New England tradition. The conception of the community is well said to be prominent in America, and the effect of this upon individualism is interestingly discussed. It is a book well worth reading as a correction to some recent attacks on American civilization; and it includes some valuable ethical theory.

C. D. B.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MURDER. By Andreas Bijerre. Trans. from Swedish by E. Classen. London: Longmans Green. Large 8vo. Pp. 164. Price, 9s. net.

Psychology is illuminating the nature of crime without in the least diminishing our moral disgust at it. Indeed, if any effect on the moral judgment has resulted from psychology, it is the clearer distinction between the crime and the criminal. This book is a first-rate contribution to the psychology of moral life because it is not a vague generalization, but a vivid account of actual observations in the Stockholm prison. The author died in 1925 at the age of forty-six. The book before us has great international value. The author has in mind throughout the likeness between the psychic life of the criminal and that of the average man. The phenomena outstanding in the criminal are self-deception, anguished fear and shamming. Clearly the psychologist cannot accept the statements of murderers at their face value: but by the skill of the author we are in this book given a very good insight into the mind of the criminal.

C. D. B.

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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By E. Roy Calvert. Preface by Lord Buckmaster. London: G. P. Putnam & Sons. 8vo. Pp. 204, bibliography, and index. Price, 5s. net.

With some evidence of earlier times the author shows how futile is the plea that capital punishment is deterrent. Most of the facts used in the book are English, but a chapter reviews the position in other countries. This shows that even in states in which capital punishment is not abolished it is becoming rare. In the United States it has been abolished by eight states; but in the years 1890–1917 as many as 1,013 persons were lynched. The evil effects of capital punishment upon the general public are described and the terrible danger is shown that innocent men may be executed, in which case no error of justice can be corrected. In the case of Adolf Beck it took nine years to prove him innocent; but happily he was not executed at the end of seven. There is a final chapter on "Capital Punishment and Ethics." The book is popular and picturesque in its method; it is frankly a plea for the abolition of capital punishment; but it is none the less valuable for students of moral philosophy.

C. D. B.

BENEDETTO CROCE: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. Trans. by R. G. Collingwood, with a Preface by Professor J. A. Smith. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 8vo. Pp. 116. Price, 5s. net.

This is a small and expensive book, of which the actual autobiography fills less than one hundred pages. Croce wrote it when he was just fifty. By his own account he was a perfectly normal little boy with a passion for books evidently acquired from his parents. He says he was among the best in his class at school. He passes through a study of the "economic interpretation of history," according to Marx, into pure philosophy. Then through literary criticism he comes to a solution of his internal struggle in his well-known "Philosophy of the Spirit." This autobiography will, no doubt, be interesting to many as the analysis of a spiritual life, and certainly to all who need explanations of Croce's philosophy.

C. D. B.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION. By J. J. Findlay, Honorary Professor of Education in the University of Manchester. London: University of London Press, 1927. 2 vols. Vol. I, AIMS AND ORGANIZATION. Large 8vo. Pp. 274. Price, 8s. 6d. Vol. II, THE PRACTICE OF EDUCATION. Large 8vo. Pp. 382; index. Price, 10s. 6d.

The system and aim discussed in these volumes are mainly English, although reference is made to others. The aim of education is stated in the traditional terms, but very clearly and cogently. The organization discussed includes the family and other social institutions besides the school. There follows a full description of the English school system; then an account of the English system of training teachers and of the English education authorities. Indeed, there is no better account of the present system of education in England; and Professor Findlay has given us something more than a bare statement, for he inter-

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prets according to general principles the functions of the different parts in the English system. In the second volume he deals with the curriculum, books, etc., coeducation, reformed methods of teaching, and secondary schools.

As for Professor Findlay's own experience, a very interesting passage in Volume II gives the indication of his revolt from the tradition of Arnold of Rugby, in which he himself was educated. The corporate life of English public schools is very acutely criticized by Professor Findlay, who notes the tendency of Englishmen to remain "Old Boys." The crudity of the social standard among undeveloped boys in a boarding school is well analyzed; but what is most valuable is not the general theory, but the indications of daily practice in the forming of a better kind of corporate life. With regard to coeducation, the author very well shows that it is an aspect of the relation of the sexes. So long as the relation of the sexes throughout ordinary life is what it now is, the problems arising out of coeducation cannot be solved. These two volumes are full of common sense, a wide experience, and a sane idealism. They will be useful to teachers in all countries, although they are specially relevant to English conditions and will appeal most to the English mind.

C. D. B.

THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL CONSPIRACY. By Robert L. Owen. New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1927. Pp. x+212. Price, $2.00.

For several years the mills of the historians have been grinding out grist in revision of our war-time conceptions of the causes of the World War. Consequently we should not expect in this book by a non-historian any hitherto undisclosed facts, nor even an inclusive, scholarly analysis of the antecedents of the war. Nevertheless, the book is well worth reading. It is valuable for people who are not acquainted with the work of the technical historians because, despite its sensational title, it presents with moderation and good sense facts which are deeply significant, surprising to the layman, and on the whole fairly representative of our present knowledge. Moreover, it is interesting because it is written by a former United States senator and contains evidence and conclusions which the author presented to the Senate in 1923. Finally, the author's surprise at the facts he found, his moral indignation, his tolerance even of the men he seeks to indict, and his earnest feeling that men could and should learn a lesson from the tragedy of the war set an example which we cannot afford to neglect.

The purpose of the author is "to show the Common People of all the nations that they have been the victims of imperial intrigue and unwise leadership, and that they should, by democratic processes, defend themselves in future against the secret diplomacy and intrigue of unintelligent officials." More specifically, the author attempts to show that ultimately the war was due to the spirit of excessive nationalism, militarism, and imperialism built up in Europe through centuries, but that immediately the war was due to the plans and intrigues of a few men in Russia, France, and England, of whom the Russians were the most important.

C. M. PERRY

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FEDERAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES. By Robert D. Leigh. New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1927. Pp. 687. Price, $5.00.

This is a judicious survey of the organization and administration of public health by federal agencies in the United States. It is a factual study with here and there remedial suggestions. The author is a highly competent observer in the field of political science, and he has had first-hand experience with the United States Public Health Service. He thinks of the public health organization as serving a vital function in our national life, and so he studies its administration rather than merely its organization. His last chapter, "The Public Health Personnel Problem," rises to the level of social statesmanship through preoccupation with the problem of recruiting for this highly important service. But the study rests constantly upon concrete data and is likely to remain a standard treatise up to the year 1927 of this rapidly growing interest of our government.

T. V. S.

PROFESSIONAL CODES: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE APPLICATIONS TO THE EDUCATIONAL PROFESSION. By Benson Y. Landis. New York: Columbia University Teachers College Bureau of Publications, 1927. Pp. xii+108. Price, $1.50.

Twelve professional and business organizations, considered as representative of many others that have codes, constitute the data of this study. Regarding the codes as an important factor in the organizations and looking for light upon the problem of codes in educational organizations, the author considers the structure of the organizations, the situations out of which the codes arise, the methods of defining these situations, and the nature of the codes themselves. In the descriptive and analytic part of the study the machinery of sociological research is conspicuous. There is an excellent one-page summary of the analyses of the twelve organizations and a selected annotated bibliography, though no index. The final chapter presents the lessons that are thought to be of value for educators and for educational organizations. T. V. S.

ETHICS OF ACHIEVEMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO CHARACTER EDUCATION. By Herbert Patterson. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1927. Pp. 482.

This is a textbook on ethics that is meant to make its readers more ethical. It begins with an affirmation of freedom and closes with a sympathetic exposition of the teachings of Jesus. All in all, the book asks, and answers, 629 questions. Moreover, it has, besides the chapter on Jesus, a chapter each devoted to eleven other moral teachers: Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Spinoza, Kant, Schopenhauer, Spencer, and Nietzsche. These chapters have a large element of quotations in them, but no pains are spared to make constructive the impressions gained from even the pessimistic sages. The task is clearly conceived, and the book is very simply and not uninterestingly written. Presumably it is intended more for secondary schools than for colleges. The treatment is hortatory to a maximum degree and critical to a minimum. T. V. S.

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RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE LAST QUARTER-CENTURY. Edited by Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. 239. Price, $3.00.

During 1926–27 the *Journal of Religion* under the editorship of Professor G. B. Smith published a series of articles relating to the character and progress of theological scholarship within the period of the first quarter of the twentieth century. The present volume is a collation of these papers written by competent authorities and representing eleven distinct phases of religious interest and research. An enumeration of the subjects treated, together with the names of the contributors, should be sufficient to suggest the significance and value of this survey: "Old Testament Interpretation," J. M. P. Smith; "The Life of Jesus," S. J. Case; "The Study of Early Christianity," H. R. Willoughby; "The Interpretation of Protestantism," J. T. McNeill; "Theological Thinking in America," G. B. Smith; "The Psychology of Religion in America," E. L. Schaub; "History of Religions," A. E. Haydon; "Religious Education," T. G. Soares; "American Preaching," O. S. Davis; "Thought Concerning Protestant Foreign Missions," A. G. Baker; "The Development of Social Christianity in America," Shailer Mathews.

While neither the papers nor the volume aim to be exhaustive, the treatment affords an excellent summary of some of the most significant achievements in this field as well as an index to "the important questions and tasks which lie before the next generation of scholars." The reader will not fail to note the growing emphasis of the social approach to the study of religion to which these papers direct attention.

VERGILIUS FERM

ECONOMICS AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR. "The New Science Series." By P. Sargant Florence. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1927. Pp. 95. Price, $1.00.

There are three parts to this brief undertaking: first to present, as far as possible in the words of authorities themselves, the view of human nature that orthodox economics has held; second, to summarize, again as far as possible by constant reference to the authorities, the criticism that has been lodged against this view of human nature by psychologists and others; and third, "to assess the degree of damage inflicted and the amount of salvage that can be definitely retrieved." The latter purpose constitutes the burden of the book. Palms are awarded to both the defenders and the attackers of economic orthodoxy. If the hedonistic attachment of orthodoxy be given up and if the facts of economic life be patiently gathered and statistically presented, then orthodox economic theory may prove a useful hypothesis to interpret the facts. Not the least valuable thing about this brisk and unusually lucid book is the attempt to formulate definitions of certain basic economic concepts which are meant to standardize verbal usage.

T. V. S.

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NOTES

AN ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE NEW JOURNAL OF ABSTRACTS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE SOCIAL Science Research Council announces plans to establish a Journal of Abstracts in the Social Sciences. These plans are the result of five years' study by a committee of the Council which has canvassed the situation with respect to the needs, resources, and purposes to be served by a comprehensive abstract service in the social sciences.

A substantial subsidy has been provided for a period of ten years until the journal has become self-supporting through subscriptions.

In its report to the Council at Hanover, New Hampshire, in August, 1927, the Committee on Social Science Abstracts stated the need for abstracts in the following paragraphs:

The founding of the Social Science Research Council is itself a recognition of the fact that leaders in the social sciences are convinced that research in these disciplines is greatly in need of stimulation and direction, and farther, that the scholars in these fields should be brought closer together for the consideration and solution of common problems. On the other hand, the deliberations of the Committee on Social Science Abstracts, and much of the information gathered by it, clearly bring out the fact that one great obstacle to the doing of truly scientific research in these fields lies in the tremendous mass of the materials to be considered and in the relative, if not quite complete, lack of appropriate tools for attacking it. There are so many books, pamphlets and reports constantly being published and so many periodicals both scientific and semi-scientific steadily pouring from printing houses both here and abroad, that it is physically impossible for any one to keep abreast of all the literature even in his own special field of work. For this reason also, and in making a courageous effort to read what he should, he is likely to take first the publications obviously in his own special field, and for lack of time to do more, to become increasingly obvious of what is being done in other disciplines upon the same subjects. Thus artificial departmental lines tend to become sharper, and in his mind the social sciences stand as distinct and separate fields.

To overcome these difficulties, a journal is proposed which will save an almost infinite amount of time and labor on the part of research workers, by giving them in one journal complete citations and short but objective abstracts of all important new materials, and will at the same time draw together the several disciplines by serving them all through one journal based upon some

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systematic classification and improved by numerous cross-references to the materials in other fields. Other important advantages of such a publication could easily be stated. It will save much duplication and waste of effort, it will apprise the worker of the existence of other specialists working on his problems and stimulate correspondence between them, it will call attention to new methods of research, it will serve as a permanent record of the work already accomplished, and will in many other ways promote the healthy development of the sciences to which it relates.

The Social Science Research Council has appointed an Organizing Committee consisting of the following scholars, and charged with the responsibility of organizing and establishing *Social Science Abstracts:* Dr. Isaiah Bowman, American Geographical Society; Dr. Davis R. Dewey, editor of the *American Economic Review;* Dr. Carlton Hayes, professor of History, Columbia University; Dr. Frederic A. Ogg, editor of the *American Political Science Review;* Dr. Frank A. Ross, editor of the *Journal of the American Statistical Association;* Dr. Clark Wissler, professor of Anthropology, Yale University; and Dr. F. Stuart Chapin, chairman, professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota.

To assist the Organizing Committee, a number of advisory committees have been appointed in the fields of cultural anthropology, economics, history, human geography, political science, sociology, and statistics. These advisory committees have been asked to suggest: (1) the names of scholars who may be considered for the position of salaried editors and unsalaried consulting editors; (2) to draw up a scheme of classification adequate to the needs of the systematic grouping of materials from their respective fields of specialization within the social sciences.

Since the Council is made up of delegates from the national learned societies in the fields of anthropology, economics, history, political science, psychology, sociology, and statistics, the purposes of the Council in its efforts to further co-operative scientific research in the social sciences is best served by devoting *Social Science Abstracts* to the fields of cultural anthropology, history, human geography, political science, and statistics, broadly construed.

Social Science Abstracts will be issued monthly during the year and in each issue will appear systematic abstracts of new information published in the fields indicated for the preceding month or months. *Social Science Abstracts* will be printed in English in this country, but it will attempt to cover the social science literature of the world as originally published in all languages.

Negotiations are under way to establish a satisfactory basis of co-operation with the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation of the League

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of Nations in working out a *modus operandi* with the arrangements for economic abstracts undertaken by this international organization.

The test of published materials to be abstracted will in general be the criterion of *new information,* in the sense of important factual studies and contributions to theory and opinion, in the fields of the social sciences indicated. This will require the careful scrutiny of articles in periodicals, pamphlets, bulletins, monographs, and new books. It is conservatively estimated that the annual number of abstracts will run to fifteen or twenty thousand titles the first year. The abstracts will be cross-referenced and annual indexes published. It is hoped that the first number of *Social Science Abstracts* may be published within the present calendar year.

F. STUART CHAPIN, *Chairman of the Organizing Committee*

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS

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SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES[1]

FLOYD H. ALLPORT

I

THE history of modern science is a tale of human ingenuity embarked upon two opposite but closely related quests. The first is the goal of understanding the laws of the universe, and the second, the manipulation of nature for human ends. Though dealing with the same natural materials, the attitude taken and the problems envisaged by the devotees of "pure" science are widely different from those of the applied scientist. To the latter, as to the man on the street, the word "science" is likely to mean our present marvels of radio communication, aeroplane travel, machines to supplant human labor, and startling medical and surgical cures. The man in the laboratory, however, regards all these as the mere trappings of science. They are to him interesting conveniences; but they are pale and trivial in comparison with that majestic realm which, through his ceaseless toil, is slowly opening to human understanding. Although possessing mighty opportunities for controlling natural processes and for making humanly useful predictions, the pure scientist rarely predicts or controls events except for the purpose of extending his knowledge of their nature. The applied scientist, on the other hand, the industrial chemist, the engineer, the agriculturalist, and the physician, are ceaselessly at work to perfect a tech-

[1] A chapter in one volume of the forthcoming "New World Series," edited by Baker Brownell and published by D. Van Nostrand Co., New York.

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nique of prediction and control. Depending for their cues upon the work of the pure, or disinterested, scientist, their attention is not upon the universe but upon immediate human adjustment to nature, upon economic production, transportation of human goods, the safeguarding of health, and the multiplying of devices for material and cultural enjoyments.

At every level or class of natural objects we find this twofold adventure in progress. The physicist explores the properties of matter in its minutest organization, viz., the mass, magnitude, and motion of the hypothetical electron and the ether. His discoveries within these subtle media have led, through applied physics, to the marvelous uses of electric currents and the inventions of the X-ray and radio telephony. Working with larger hypothetical units, such as atoms and molecules, the pure scientist has formulated laws of fluidity, crystallization, and the kinetic properties of gases. Such discoveries in turn have aided in the harnessing of waterfalls for human uses, the manufacture of strong building materials, and the development of internal and external combustion engines. The pure scientist has studied the laws of combination of the atomic elements, with wonderful effect upon the practical phases of industrial and physiological chemistry. Upon a still more complex plane of nature we find the biologist watching the behavior of the smallest living creatures, and exploring the laws of growth, movement, reproduction, and decay throughout the realm of plant and animal life. From these discoveries emerge new principles for the elimination of disease and the invention of appropriate techniques by the bacteriologist, the agriculturalist, and the pathologist. In this way even the lower organisms are brought within the ever widening circle of control for human purposes.

It may appear to the casual observer that the recital of our scientific achievements is now complete. There seem to be no more realms to conquer. Such a conclusion, however, would be erroneous; for there is still another sphere through

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which human beings fulfil their needs and derive pleasure and satisfaction. This sphere consists of *other* human beings. Popular philosophizing tends to separate the universe into two great orders: man, and the rest of nature. We often personify the human race, and think of it as a single being whom we call Man. The progress of science is then thought to be concerned with the adaptation of this great "humanity" to the remainder of the natural order. When viewed realistically, however, this struggle for adaptation is not that of a mystical "race," but of specific men and women. For each man, woman, and child the world consists not only of minerals, plants, and animals, but of *other persons* and of the numerous buildings, tools, and cultural equipment which they have created. Dominion over the conditions which affect his life means for the individual understanding and mastery, not only of the lower orders of nature, but of human beings as well.

Let us first consider the process of getting what one wants through some of the simplest social contacts, namely, those exhibited by the lower animals. If two dogs, a large and a small one, are quarreling over a bone, the smaller dog may be severely bitten and may run away, leaving the prize to the other. During the encounter the larger dog may have bared his teeth and emitted loud snarls. According to the principle of conditioned response, not many repetitions of this experience should be required before the small dog will run away from food in the presence of any larger dog when that dog shows his teeth or growls. Furthermore, a normally intelligent larger dog will soon learn to use this kind of a "social stimulus" as a means of intimidating any intruder, thus safeguarding his own supply of food without the inconvenience of physical combat. The control of a fellow-creature thus becomes a method for securing the satisfaction of the individual's biological needs.

The family circle also is a laboratory for the observation

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of social control. Babies learn to control their parents by cries and gestures which evoke responses based upon fundamental habits in the parent. The mastery of the adult environment becomes one of the strongest incentives of the child in learning to speak, and later to read and write. Parents, on the other hand, dominate their children through fixating in them habits either of affectionate dependence or of fear. Wives control husbands through tears and the play upon habits of sympathy, through appeals to pride or other qualities possessed by their mates, or through sex appeal. Husbands control wives largely through the same means, though often by substituting fear of loss of economic support (food and protection) in place of a resort to sympathy. From a broader viewpoint we may observe how the entire pattern of personality in the child or the mate may be molded by living in continual contact with a dominant individual. In many cases, of course, family life is so organized as to fulfil the purposes of all its participants, and each attains through his contacts with others the fullest expression of his personality. But even in such cases familial behavior may be truly regarded as a means of attaining the satisfaction we want through our intercourse with those about us.

Leaving the family group, we find a similar control exerted over attitudes and opinions in community life. It is through the co-operation of others in civic enterprises that the individual is able economically to obtain his material and cultural satisfactions. The existence of a means for so educating, persuading, or controlling others as to secure such co-operation is a first essential of community organization. Widespread social movements are based upon techniques for the creation of public opinion, that is, for the universal control of the attitudes of individuals. Campaigns to secure labor legislation, public health activities, the elimination of bad housing conditions, the regulation of the use of alcohol and drugs, the struggle for self-expression in special-interest groups, such as or-

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ganized workmen, feminists, and religious fundamentalists—all these are examples of the universal tendency to achieve our goal through controlling the thinking, voting, and acting of others. Whether narrowly or broadly conceived, whether humanitarian or selfish, organization for concerted effort means acquiring power to influence human behavior both within and outside the movement concerned.

We use others also in the more standardized and permanent relationships of life. By specialization and exchange of labor in the economic field we satisfy our needs through others while rendering service ourselves to their wants. In education we mold the habits of children, both in skill and general disposition, so that they will conform to the civilization of the older generation, to a system, that is, which now supplies our needs and affords us interesting occupations. Religious leadership is a means of securing behavior useful to other human beings, as well as satisfying to the individual himself, through the appeal of personal relationship to a diety. Government or law itself consists of a set of common habits in one's fellowmen regarding persons and property, upon which the individual can rely and through which he can command security in his day's occupations and his plans for the future. Broadly speaking, the technique and operation of all our institutions are but variations of the common theme: our habit of so using the objects of our environment (including human beings) as best to satisfy our needs and realize our possibilities.

Returning now to our distinction between pure and applied science, let us inquire what are the sciences dealing with the study and control of human beings as a part of the environment. From the applied standpoint we may mention such studies as practical sociology, social ethics, the science of political organization, public administration, law, and applied economics. These disciplines, as pursued by many of their students, are normative. They comprise techniques for the invention of more useful patterns to be followed in the shap-

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ing and control of human behavior and the perfecting of our political, economic, and religious institutions. But may we not logically look for a corresponding *pure* science, one whose workers are concerned with human behavior, not as a tool for attaining human purposes, but simply as a natural process, exhibiting, like other phenomena, that orderly sequence we call natural law? This science is to be found in modern psychology. Through an understanding of its principles those who would effectively control behavior for human ends may receive useful guidance.

Psychologists and social scientists thus merely continue our double quest for knowledge and power over nature, when, leaving the inorganic and biological realms, they enter the sphere of humanity itself. As we enter the social field, however, we find, in contrast with subhuman phenomena, one important difference. In dealing with minerals, plants, and the lower animals, human beings with their purposes have stood at one end of the process and have adopted an entirely foreign set of materials to their needs. In the social field, however, men and women are not only the purposive agents but also the tools through which the purposes are achieved. One man may seek through others a satisfaction of his own needs and be at the same time an instrument for fulfilling the needs of others. The means and the ends of human welfare, always clearly distinguished in the inorganic and lower organic world, become hopelessly entangled in the human realm of psychology and the social sciences. It is not enough, therefore, to adopt a program of adjusting means to ends; we must study what happens to the purposes themselves when the behavior of the individuals who possess them is used in part as a tool for fulfilling the purposes of others. The control of society over the individual is merely a metaphor. We find upon inspection only control by individuals. Power may be exerted in the "name" of society or the public good; but it is still exerted by individuals, not by the public. There is, therefore, nothing

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in the nature of social control to insure its exercise in a truly democratic way.

It is clear, then, that a broader and more critical approach than that of the applied social sciences is needed if the purposes of all individuals, rather than those merely of the administrator or social strategist, are to be realized. We must know, not only the principles of human psychology and how they can be applied in regulating action, but *the origin, process, and human significance of such regulation as it is being exercised.* We must observe the drives or motives of the controlling agents, the stimuli (words, gestures, official acts) through which they control the behavior of others, the responses made by those controlled, and the effect of the whole process upon the needs, habits, and personalities of those concerned. We need a science which shows us the individual, not as isolated in the psychologist's laboratory, but as stimulating and responding to others, as influencing and being influenced by others in the give and take of daily life—a science, in other words, of social behavior. Such a science is social psychology.

II

To make our meaning a little clearer let us consider the following illustration. The other day two of my children, a boy of eight and a girl of five, were taken by their grandmother to a movie. The next day, as I sat writing in my study, my glance fell upon a neat row of boxes at the left of my desk bearing inscriptions in the handwriting of my small son. At the head of the row stood a piece of cardboard upon which the initials "U.S.A." were printed conspicuously about ten times. The labels upon the boxes, evidently spelled out phonetically, read, respectively, "guns," "cannon balls," "bullets," and "dangerous torpedoes." Upon lifting the covers I found under them a quantity of paper rifles, nails, paper clips, and other appropriate missiles. At the foot of the row was an aeroplane-landing constructed out of paper. As I

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came down to dinner I was accosted by my little daughter, who took me to task as follows, shaking her finger: "Daddy, the Germans *are too* terrible people. They *did* come over and try to steal our country. I saw them do it—so there!"

It is evident that there are here at work processes of social control which, if multiplied, as we may suppose they are, by approximately the number of boys and girls in the country, present gigantic possibilities. For it is of popular attitudes of this sort that wars are largely made. The psychology of the situation is vague and is entangled with the purposes of the various persons responsible for it. To attempt a brief analysis, however, we may refer to a feeling of patriotism which exists, not only in children, but also in motion-picture producers, governmental officials, professional military men, entrepreneurs, and, in fact, in the public generally. Patriotism is considered to be a noble and righteous feeling, the very spirit of America. Hence it is natural that we should desire to instil in our children a love of our national symbols, a belief in the righteousness of our national cause, and a hatred of the turpitude of our enemies. In all this, patriotism and patriotic teaching are assumed to be both the purpose of the controls exerted and the human values to be defended.

But there is another way to look at the matter. It is possible that there are other, scarcely recognized, objects to be achieved, purposes, not of every human being in the situation, but only of certain ones. It is not unlikely, for example, that motion-picture directors and producers are looking for themes which will have the widest appeal and will play upon the deep and universal emotions aroused by warlike situations. To give the people that which interests them is to control them in the direction of increasing ticket-office receipts. It is also possible that among leaders who use these passions for their war-time propaganda, motivation is not so simple as the naïve patriot might imagine. We have to consider not only the habit of professional militarists who think of safeguarding "national in-

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terests" in terms of armies and navies, but also the foreign investments of capital which may constitute such national interests. Then too, there are certain nationalist-patriots who crave the feeling of power and moral exaltation which rise through an identification of one's self with the embattled righteousness of the nation. In so far as these possibilities are true, patriotic feeling per se is not the *true* purpose of nationalistic teaching, but only a disguise of more powerful motives lying beneath. To say that the movie director is expressing the patriotic purpose of the nation may be merely to conceal the fact that he is using human beings who have such a purpose as tools for his personal advantage. Patriotism may thus be regarded not as an end but as the means to an end.

The only solution of this tangle is to abstract one's self temporarily from the alleged "purpose of the nation" and watch the process with the detachment of a disinterested observer. As a social psychologist, I thrust to one side the strong emotional appeal of my country's symbols and my patriotic impulse to obey the "will of my country." I cease to be interested in psychology as a means of making my children loyal and patriotic. I am concerned only with finding out just how and why my children have acquired their interest in warfare and their hatred of Germans. When in such a mood certain significant and guiding questions come to my mind, questions which are very different from those asked by the defenders of national morale. Who, I ask, were the persons directly or ultimately responsible for screening and exhibiting the picture which has so impressed my children, and what were their motives? Why should the scenes presented have taken such a hold upon childish fancy—upon what earlier experiences of childhood did they build? Why has this influence been more potent than my own parental example along anti-nationalistic lines? How long will it persist, and what is the likelihood of its being modified by a more critical attitude toward one's country? What is the probable effect of this influence upon

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the future personalities of my children? Will it cause them later to participate in cruel or thoughtless acts in the name of their country? How general is this condition among other children, and what are the social results?

We have selected nationalism merely as one field in which the approach of social psychology could be profitably followed. Nearly every piece of propaganda used in social movements presents similar problems. The members of the Ku Klux Klan have felt themselves imbued with the purpose of maintaining racial purity and freedom from foreign religious control within the United States. These motives, though possessed for many years before the organization of the modern Klan, were in the main dormant. But when Clarke and Tyler came upon the scene with an entirely different set of purposes of their own, these millions of substantial citizens were pulled, by clever manipulation, into the ranks of a new crusade. Their purposes, which they thought were receiving entirely spontaneous expression, were being used for the ends of a select group of promoters and officials who knew the psychology of racial and religious prejudice and how it could be profitably applied. Here again the task of the social psychologist is to survey the process as a whole in the attempt to distinguish the means from the ends. Not only must he know that such widespread prejudices exist; he must study their origin and their operation. He must observe the technique of suggestion, the personalities of the organizers and leaders, the value of Klan membership to the self-assertive cravings of the members, and the impression that the "Invisible Empire" is universal and therefore irresistible.

A few further examples may be briefly cited. The sensational newspaper editor knows his "psychology" well enough to be a good judge of potential news value, whether the occasion be the transatlantic flight of a handsome aviator or the brutal murder of a child. For social psychology, however, he has little use; for this shows him the reverse side of his own

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technique. It exposes the psychology of his own motivation and his play upon the susceptibility of people to what he represents as "public opinion." In the religious field the ordinary human psychology, as practiced by Aimee McPherson, enables her to bring many a sinner to repentance. But *social* psychology shows us Aimee McPherson as she is doing it. The labor agitator holds up to scorn the psychology of the mill owners and exploits freely the habits of thinking and feeling which he knows so well among the workers. The capitalistic publicity agents are quick to discover mental twists of the strikers and to work upon the neutral public through insidious suggestions concerning the "reds." Each is an adept at the psychology of the other fellow, but cheerfully ignorant of his own. It is the business of the social psychologist, on the other hand, to point out motivation upon all sides of the conflict.

The situation in crowds and social movements is not different from the intimate, face-to-face contacts of social life. Within the home, ordinary parental efficiency consists, when the children are small, in knowing enough of their natures to subdue them and make them behave according to conventional standards. Some parents do this through dark threats concerning bears, policemen, and doctors. Some, who think they are wiser, indulge and lavish affection upon a child in some directions, and then appeal to his "love" to gain control over him in others. Some decry all attempts to control their children and adapt themselves, like the weaker dog, to the whims of the *infant terrible*. A few, of course, appeal to reason, and try with greater or less success to build up habits of self-control within the child. Social psychology in each case is concerned with the longer view. Its problem is, not how to make children mind, but to discover what is happening day by day in their life-habits as parents are making them mind. It inquires to what extent the purposes of one are being used as a means of gratification and convenience to the other, and

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what is the final result of giving up continually to the tyranny of the younger generation. In each instance the social psychologist's interest is somewhat different from the immediate concern of the average parent. Or, from another standpoint, the greatest success in parenthood may arise through detaching one's self occasionally from the mêlée of family life and becoming a social psychologist.

Not only the family, but other institutions—the school, the state, the economic system, and the church—are fields for the study of the processes of control. Here, however, it is more difficult to determine who is actually the controlling agent. There seem to be invisible influences acting upon individuals, impelling them to behave in a uniform and conventional manner, so that one sometimes imagines there is a societal pattern, more enduring and powerful than human beings, which impresses itself upon them as if from without. Such a view, however, overlooks the important rôle of the educational process. It is in the social, civic, and religious instruction of the younger by the older generations that we must look for the origins of institutional control. In addition to the common branches and the science, lore, and handicrafts of his people, the school child receives careful discipline in respect toward the constituted authorities, the law, and Constitution, and in lip-service to the so-called "national ideals." Subservience to the divine authority of the ritual and the clergy is inculcated through the church school. Within the family are developed common attitudes of honesty and conventional morality. Home, school, and playground, moreover, are places where the prevailing spirit of the national civilization is fostered, attitudes, for example, such as the Prussian or Fascist subordination of the individual to the state, the English tradition of individual liberty, or the American urge toward competitive business enterprise.

In pedagogy, as elsewhere, those concerned in the direction of human behavior rely upon psychology, the science of

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human nature, for their most effective methods. The content of the teaching, however, as distinguished from the technique, is determined by the particular values of those who shape the curricula. And here the social psychologist enters to observe how the student is controlled through the choice of stimuli, the selection of facts, theories, and viewpoints presented for his assimilation. Detached from the institutional objectives and the spirit of the times, the social psychologist watches the process as a whole. He sees the control of society over the individual through education only as a subtle form of the control of one individual over another, a control often exercised in blind ignorance of the direction in which we are going. His absorbing interest is to observe what happens to the individual when caught up in this network of custom and convention through which he is made to serve the purposes of everyone else.

Let us take, for example, the industrial and economic system. We have been trained by our culture and the attitudes of those about us from infancy to regard our technical era as the culmination of human civilization. Our watchword tends to be production and sales efficiency rather than human values as expressed in work. Business management becomes the art of so controlling men as to bring their drives into alignment rather than cross-purposes with commercial objectives. The personnel psychologist must fit the individual into the scheme of specialized machine labor, rather than adapt the methods of production to the individual as a personality. Psychology is applied, not to human welfare, but to business and industry. The social psychologist, however, looks at the matter from a very different angle. For maintaining the standard output of factories and keeping up our high level of American prosperity he has not the slightest concern. He is interested only in the motivation, technique of control, and human consequences of the industrial process. The large volume and high activity of business are not necessarily, as Presi-

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dent Coolidge supposes, an indication of widespread prosperity in the fullest sense. The institution of "business" is often personified and considered as a being having a purpose of its own which is directly aligned with the purpose of national welfare. But this is a fallacious use of the term, one which serves only as a respectable camouflage. The purpose of "Business" is merely the purpose of *business men*. In spite of an apparent rise in the standard of American living, the social psychologist still sees business as a system in which certain individuals attain their satisfactions by manipulating others and by using the life-purposes of others as a means of fulfilling their own.

A similar institutional fallacy pervades popular education and thinking respecting the church. Loyal members are accustomed to "support their church" as a reality existing apart from themselves. They regard it also as a mentor of ethical standard and practice whose commandments they must obey or, at least, treat with verbal respect. Ecclesiastical officials, by playing upon the religious emotions, and sometimes the fears, of the people, strengthen and solidify the acceptance of the church as a transcendental reality. Whether or not there is deliberate abuse of this tendency, it is certainly true that when parishioners believe in the church as transcendent reality divinely established above their heads, the words of the clergyman will have more force and sanction than when it is considered merely as a habit which the parishioners have of meeting and worshipping together. While the institutional fallacy is thus a powerful instrument for clerical control, its power is, no doubt, seldom *consciously* exercised; and when it is used, it is not necessarily employed as a tool for selfish interests. Nevertheless, the social psychologist is inclined to reject such unprecise expressions as the "purpose" or "mission of the church," and to substitute a statement of the specific individuals whose purposes are included by this phrase. For it is here possible, as in the case of nationalism, to use the al-

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leged purpose of the institution to cover the action of a few strategic individuals. The real processes of control are thus concealed; for people believe that the controlling agency is not specific individuals, but some higher, metaphysical entity, such as society, the church, or the state. And since this higher being is supposed to be mysteriously endowed either with the common human purpose or with divine wisdom, it is regarded as a safe regulator of human conduct.

In the political, as in the religious, field the concern of the social psychologist is clear thinking about the nature of institutions themselves and the concealment of controls and confusion of means with ends which are carried on in their name. The administrator and the jurist try continually to build up a popular respect for "law" as a transcendent reality. Their aim, in part, is to foster a veneration of courts and high executives and a morale for civic participation. For the social psychologist, however, there remains the task of discovering how such fictions as a superhuman law, infallible courts, and sacrosanct presidents have come to be a part of the social heritage. He must inquire what errors and abuses of power are sometimes committed under the cover of these doctrines. In every field of institutional behavior the social psychologist finds material for studying, from a disinterested standpoint, the processes of control over individuals. He is ever on the alert to observe, not how human beings can best be adapted to serve human purposes, but what happens in the process through which such an adaptation takes place. When we speak of the interests of groups and institutions, whose interests are really being satisfied, whose purpose dictates the ends to be achieved, and whose behavior furnishes the means?

III

When once we grasp the problem of a pure science of social behavior, important and somewhat novel values appear. For through such a science we can illuminate the task of dis-

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tinguishing means from ends in social living. Human beings, like plants and animals, are subject to use for the purposes of other human beings. But, unlike the lower forms of life, they are capable of observing and understanding the processes by which they are used. And this knowledge may eventually make a difference both in the nature of the controls employed and the degree to which individuals will submit to them. If the little dog who scurries off at the faintest growl of another dog could really understand something of how his emotions had been conditioned by such rumblings, he might be able to restrain his precipitate flight long enough to treat each case upon its own merits. He might learn to distinguish the instances in which the bark is likely to be worse than the bite. We have found that this is true in emotional conflicts growing out of family life. At least one branch of modern psychiatry proceeds by getting the individual to look back objectively upon the early memories of his parents and associates so as to understand the controls which have been built from infancy upon his natural impulses. To gain such a perspective is one of the first steps toward a re-education which will liberate the personality from its nesting habits.

Within the field of popular suggestion the science of social behavior offers the same values. In many ways it is a countercheck or antidote to the use of psychology for practical social control. Thus if psychology enables the sensational journalist and politician to capture attention and stampede audiences, social psychology, through its insight into the process, may help us to fortify ourselves against such appeals. Although there is growing up a powerful psychology of advertising, we have also a *social* psychology of how to resist the advertiser. The writer has a witty friend who floors the high-powered salesman by analyzing with him the probable motives behind his arguments and commenting appreciatively upon his skilful use of psychological principles. Public discussions of the social psychology of nationalism and propaganda, carried on

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during a period of war hysteria, would go far toward the reduction of the warlike impulse. The very intolerance of such discussions in war time, as manifested by governmental officials and crowd leaders, is evidence of their devastating power against the propagandist.

In our institutional life a popular interest in social psychology might lead toward a reconsideration of the ends toward which we seem to be striving. From the psychology of fitting workers to machines, or human behavior generally to the skyscraper and the traffic signal, we might turn to social psychology and inquire in whose interests all this machinery is operating. We might consider whether for the purposes of individuals, such gigantic machine production and such confusion are necessary. We might even speculate a little upon what the worker's purposes would really be could he be released from the domination of a commercial and technological age. Instead of inquiring how to use human motives to increase profits, attention could be turned to the nature of the profit motive itself and how its possession by some individuals is affecting the lives of others. Loud insistence upon respect for law and the solemnity of the courts might give way to studies of the psychology of judges and jurors, the efficacy of our penal methods, and the meaning of law in human life. Schools and colleges would not be merely places of apprenticeship for entrepreneurs and seekers of special advantage. Education would gradually come to mean the gaining of insight into human values and the understanding of contemporary forces in their bearing upon self-realization. Social psychologists would thus join other agencies in opening the way for a continual challenge and criticism of our institutions.

"An ambitious program indeed!" the ultra-conservative thinker may retort. We are not, however, prophesying a millenium of popular intelligence, but merely stating a hope of what may be done if social psychology, like other pure sciences, can be put to the service of human welfare. The proc-

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ess must be slow. Negative criticism and exposure may clear the air for a new approach, but they cannot of themselves build up a successful method of social living. The sudden shuffling off of one form of control only to submit unthinkingly to another will accomplish no good. Large portions, moreover, of our present institutional pattern may be of enduring value in the light of newer insights. The application of our knowledge must therefore be gradual, an adventure fraught with the vicissitudes of trial and error. A certain truth also must be accredited to Barnum's sage remark about the predilection of human beings for being deceived. But in spite of these qualifications the faith of the social psychologist points toward a gradual increase of popular insight and a revival of individual purpose as the basis of the social order.

If, therefore, pursuing man's twofold quest of knowledge and its application, one should inquire the objective to which social psychology is to be applied, we would reply that its goal is the releasing of individual values from their unseen control by other individuals. The older psychology, dealing with human beings as reacting apart from their group, affords many principles by which we may direct action. But since it shows us no picture of social processes, it does not help us to understand or reflect upon the controls to which we are subjected. Hence there is no opportunity to acquire free moral responsibility and control over one's self. Insight into the psychology of social relations, on the other hand, reveals the subtle processes through which one individual dominates others and gives to each, so long as liberty does not extend to license, a greater freedom to arrange his life according to his own pattern. The potential service of social psychology, therefore, lies in its bestowal of power, not over human nature, but over the agencies which exercise power. It gives control over control.

An issue now emerges which is fundamental to our whole discussion and must be squarely faced. If insight into public

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opinion, family coercion, and all our institutions decreases the power exerted through these agencies, it decreases this power not only for evil, but also for good. And there are many who believe that this control, even such as is based upon popular credulity and lack of insight, is necessary for the maintenance of social order. A cry of atheism and anarchism is raised. Those who renounce their belief in government and deity are regarded as baser than those who commit unlawful or ungodly acts. Pope Pius XI, in a recent encyclical, has declared it a dangerous procedure to intrust to the masses of people the responsibility for their own moral and religious views. The institutions are often pictured by their high authorities as being something more than the attitudes and feelings of those who conform to them. They are thought to be the repositories of the righteousness and wisdom of the race, patterns worked out under divine guidance, through which society is to mold and guide the individual.

To this view the social psychologist is vigorously opposed, on the ground that it fosters special privilege and is based upon ignorance and superstition. The common man may not know at all times just what is best for him. But in general, and touching all the needs of his personality, he is likely to know more about it than anyone else. The real truths and the more enduring values of life are simple, or can at least be stated in simple terms. Only error is persistently complex and raises dilemmas which require generations of philosophers and theologians to solve. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a hegemony either of the true or the good is possible; and certainly those who have a stake in the maintenance of institutional power should not be the final arbiters of this important question. Just as the welfare of the state consists in the welfare of individuals, so the good which is *in* the state must be present in the acts of the citizens, and not merely in the purposes of the rulers. The righteousness of the church is not safeguarded by the purity of priests so much as by the virtu-

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ous impulses of the worshipers. The task, therefore, of the social psychologist is to teach individuals to examine the ends for which they submit themselves to regulation. For the aims and ideals ascribed by officials to the family, or to business, industry, the church, or the nation, he would have them substitute the purposes of actual men and women, purposes such as each sees expressed in himself and in those about him. In this way the ends of social regulation can be truly distinguished from the means, and human values brought down from "society" and restored to the individual. The control of man over nature, though an intelligible expression as applied to the lower sciences, becomes a fiction in the field of social relationships. For men are controlled, not by man in the abstract, but by men. And the full realization of human values is possible only when the individual places above such control the freedom of his own intellectual and moral judgment.

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G. E. MOORE AND INTRINSIC GOODNESS

EDWARD F. METTRICK

THE present lack of interest in ethics is well illustrated by the small amount of criticism that has been expended on Dr. G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. At any rate between the first edition in 1903 and the second in 1922 the author saw no reason to do other than "reprint without any alteration whatever." The book is doubtless a very important part of the work of one of the most influential of modern philosophers, yet its ethical affiliations with the past, which are far more numerous than the author's words would have one believe, have not been traced out, and his central view of the nature of the good has not been at all adequately examined. It may be that a vigorous logic of the true Johnsonian barrel and butt-end type, and that terrible naturalistic fallacy frighten off many would-be critics, or there may possibly have been in some quarters a reluctance to tamper with a system of ethics that, above everything else, sought to establish an intrinsic good beyond the sphere of dispute. But it is hardly good for ethics as a serious branch of philosophy, or for the vitality which the study of ethics infuses into the activity of the daily life, that any view should pass even relatively unquestioned; and when a treatise raises profound and widespread dissatisfaction and its inclusiveness becomes patent, criticism must no longer tarry.

Dr. Moore plunges into the heart of his subject by asserting that good is the unique subject of ethics, and that good may be conceived either as means or as ends. We all know how Aristotle opens his *Ethics* with the statement that all things aim at some good, but that the several "faculties and activities" which have some good as their end are not complete. Bridle-making comes under horsemanship, and horsemanship under generalship, and this in turn under the statesman's art which regards the happiness of the state. Here we

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stop, for were there no end, no final cause, we should be landed in an infinite and (as we see from the *Physics*) an irrational regress. So there is a right state, a maturity, a proper condition and functioning of life which, if we clearly cognize it, will be the guiding light of all our political endeavors. And Mr. Moore, in like manner, seizes upon intrinsic good as the lode star of ethics. Many are the things we do in daily life which are not good in this supreme sense, but all is well if our actions but lead thereto.

But what is this supreme good, this intrinsic and absolute value that alone is worthy of our efforts and that alone justifies our actions in so far as they aim at and comprehend it? For Plato there was a good, knowledge of which informed moral action. The many good things of life could all be shown on some occasion or other to prove not good, and so, if goodness were to be knowledge at all, it could be no other than knowledge of absolute moral values. And if we can pick out such a knowledge, moral action could surely not fail us, unless it were, as Aristotle urged, liable to be turned aside by passion. Perhaps a more serious objection than this is the difficulty we have in believing that Plato even indicated these absolute moral values. For Mr. Moore, on the other hand, intrinsic goodness appears to be simple and ready to hand, though the resultant moral action halts with a strange lameness. At any rate the opening pages of the *Principia Ethica* give a bold impression that intrinsic goodness is a simple matter.

Goodness, we are told, is a simple and unique quality which neither can be nor needs to be explained. It is too simple and too obvious. Just as we cannot explain yellow to a blind man and are not so foolish as to try on a man who can see for himself, so this simple, ultimate quality of goodness cannot, presumably, be explained to a moral idiot, but is sufficiently familiar to all else. "If I am asked," runs the famous

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phrase, "what is good, my answer is that the good is good, and that is the end of the matter."

From such a downright beginning follows that criticism of the various schools which has made the *Principia Ethica* famous. If the good, the quality good, is simple, unique, and ultimately indefinable, it follows that it is prior and not reducible to pleasure, conduciveness to life, duty, being willed, reality, or any other object, natural or metaphysical, by which moralists have sought to explain it. There is no equivalent, and against any and every attempt to explain the good we can, urges Mr. Moore, always ask if this proposed equivalent, or this proposed prius, is itself good; and, since our question is a significant one, it conclusively disproves the proposed explanation. There are bad pleasures; we can ask if "the direction of evolution" is after all good; reality and duty may not be good, at any rate their goodness would be our only ethical warrant for approving of them, and the goodness of things is not the same as our preference of them. The moralists have fallaciously endeavored to expound the meaning of good when all the time there were no terms into which such a simple ultimate could be divided. Good is just good, and all things else have ethical quality in so far as, and alone in so far as, they are good—as means or ends.

Now it is precisely here, in the apparently impregnable claim that no account can be given, or even asked, of the good, that Mr. Moore's doctrine must be controverted. It can be done, because Mr. Moore's flashing logic has not exterminated all the fallacies of his own work: certainly if we do not fasten here we may have to accept later views which, for one reason or another, are somewhat distasteful to not a few readers of the book. But first we had better see where this view leads us. We can, he urges, adduce no valid evidence for the kinds of things that ought to exist for their own sakes. Our thought has no binding on reality; we can but recognize this and that

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of our experience as good. But for the kinds of actions that we ought to perform, i.e., if we ask what is our duty, we see we require knowledge of the intrinsically good and also of causal connections between intrinsically good things and actions. Duty is simple; intrinsic goodness is a simple, ultimate quality; and actions are right in so far as they lead to this or to things which have it. But wait; we should have said that the *formula* of duty is simple. We cannot so easily abridge that infinity of time that Kant demanded. "Our duty can only be defined as that action which will cause more good to exist in the universe than any possible alternative." And from this we are quickly brought to the old conclusion of Butler that our views are too short. Although we see what things are good and in what degrees (by which one would think the argument to mean, if it means anything, that we see [*a*] what things are intrinsically good, and in what degrees, and [*b*] what things are good as means, and in what degrees), the causal chain is too intricate, too variously ramified, even if we limit our view from the universe to a considerable span of human terrestrial life, for us to see *any* causal connection adequately, and, therefore, for us to be sure of any duty. Such a conclusion might of itself throw grave doubts on the existence of the gap between mediate and final goods; but let us see what follows.

Butler, convinced that our views were too short and that the happiness of the world is the concern of him who is the Lord and Proprietor of it, fell back on a conscience which was consistent with both justice and (ultimate) self-interest; and Kant, apprised of the instability of all the good things of experience and doubting our ability to comprehend the ends of life, fixed us to a formal duty which he held was clear enough for any honest man; but Mr. Moore, with intrinsic goodness in his grasp, so to speak, tells us that ethics is totally unable to give any list of duties. We are to follow a probability which brings us to the Hobbesian conclusion that the legal penalties

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attached to actions are the chief reasons why those actions should not be performed. The end of all our anxious searching is a non-resistance equal to that of any of the eighteenth-century theologians. Butler preached before the House of Lords that "it is the strongest objection against attempting to put into practice the most perfect theory that it is impractical or too dangerous to be attempted." Mr. Moore would deny that we could even know that it was a perfect theory. And yet intrinsic goodness is so near.

It is strange that from a beginning so fair, from the gift of intrinsic goodness on such simple terms, we have come to this; "It seems doubtful whether ethics can establish the utility of any other rules than those generally practised," and this, "There is a strong probability for adhering to an existing custom even if it is a bad one." There is surely some ghastly futility about an intrinsic goodness that would have us adhere to the known bad. At any rate it is some consolation that men do not in history act so. Even Mr. Gladstone could tell us that "had the people of England obeyed the precept to eschew violence and maintain order, the liberties of this country would never have been obtained." It is strange to set up a utilitarian criterion of duty and then to deny it any utility. It is strange that duty should be bound to a good at once so simple and so obvious, and yet be so flatly denied.

The result in itself may not be so strange; its strangeness lies in its intimacy with a present intrinsic good, for the difficulty of constructing a hedonic calculus (from which the method is not dissimilar) has been underrated by a few utilitarians, and perhaps Mr. Moore's conclusion may direct us to his cardinal error. I do not hold that there is anything inherently absurd in the notion that we cannot reach an absolute duty, that we can never be sure that just this is eternally right; but it does seem so to maintain that the justification of all our actions is patently before our eyes and that still we cannot be sure that one thing is more or less senseless than another. For

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after all, an absolute duty rests on a definite and immediate basis, such as a "thus saith the Lord," a categorical imperative, a conscience endowed with right and authority, a sovereign law of right and might, and if we once get away from these and rest morality on an intellectual or ratiocinative process, we do thereby renounce the possibility of ever reaching a duty that is final. But if, on the other hand, we place morality in the keeping of any sort of moral sense or intuition, we are at the mercy of any whim and fancy that arises, and we have also closed the eyes to the possibility of there being conditions to these fickle fancies, and we have foregone the possibility of comprehending their causes. But if, realizing that there is no common sense save on a basis of knowledge, we take courage in our hands, we might see that to place our goodness and our duty and our morality, i.e., their ultimate justification as distinct from their immediate springs, in the keeping of knowledge is to occupy the only possible ground for a critical morality. But we must not expect greater certainty than knowledge can give. We must be content to see that after all the immediate springs of action and of duty are not ill cared for; they are in nearer and more intimate keeping than if they were in the hands of syllogism, although in recognizing this we must never forget that these immediate springs have but an immediate source and an immediate justification, and that these are not identical with ultimate justification. We have no trepidation these days about the nature of truth; and if we can allow that truth is ever on the march and never absolutely final, and still not despair in the search for it, why should we despair of our duty? Rather is it the case that this dynamic view, instead of the despair of the *Principia Ethica,* gives us hope and infuses vitality into ethics. We still have to live, and it is this practical necessity that drives men to find their justification in the process of life itself and that assures others (however faultily) that no man who honestly tries to know

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and do the best he can will wholly fail of that moral goodness which is so different from Mr. Moore's.

It is, of course, the burden of the *Principia Ethica* that only something final—in this case, intrinsic good—can ultimately justify or ground morals. Our quarrel is not there, but simply as to the necessity of that long, perplexing chain between us and an intrinsic good that is so near at hand. Are we to be told that there is a vast number of intrinsically good things, that these are the absolute end of conduct, and then, in an age that has not a few patent evils, that the considered judgment of the philosopher, after sitting down for a cool hour, is that we must act μετὰ τῆς πόλεως? I do not suggest that we should not; in most ways the majority of us would be quite unable to think of an alternative, and, moreover, it may be after all, as Carveth Read argued, that the business of the moralist was to find reasons to support the moral practice of the time. But we can and must say this, that it is flatly at variance with the changing practices of men in history, and that were it logically followed it would never have got us out of the garden of Eden—if it had got us so far! After all, is our knowledge so utterly weak that there is no indication in the past to guide the anxious moralist and statesman in his own day and generation? The older utilitarians, at any rate, maintained that there was in history a lesson book, and a book, too, of increasing value, such that if it were not perfect, gave us sufficient grounds for action. If it is not an absolute guidance, at any rate it leaves us no worse in kind than the essential relativity of truth leaves the seeker after physical or metaphysical truth; were it otherwise, Aristotle might have written the final encyclopedia.

But, as I have already said, it is not the failure of our duty, but the failure of that duty when coupled with the immediacy of its ultimate ground that is erroneous in Mr. Moore and that points us to his cardinal error in that concept of an intuitively

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apprehended intrinsic good. If that good were as near as the early part of the *Principia Ethica* suggests, it should justify our actions; but if it is so far remote as to lie at the end of an infinitely involved causal chain, it has plainly missed the actual life of men. Perhaps it is not without significance that from the infinite number of intrinsic good things at the beginning of the work, at the end we seem almost limited to the aesthetic atmosphere of a roomful of cultured men.

It is distinctly unfortunate that brilliant writers who with a wealth of logic reduce error to oxymoron and evil to bad taste are often so faintly led by their own logic. For, we might ask, if we intuitively perceive an intrinsic yellow, how can yellow be yellower? How can intrinsic goodness have degrees? And what happens to an intrinsic yellow when others see it not as we do? What happens to an intrinsic good in the presence of the morally blind? Mr. Moore cannot have it every way. He declares that goodness is intuitively apprehended and that there are degrees of it, and yet that it is absolute. He will have nothing to do with a Protagorean relativity. The good things of existence are such that, were our experience wide enough, they might be catalogued, and that in their several degrees of intrinsic goodness; and such, too, that were once the list, or any part of it, made, it would hold valid for all men and all time. "Judgments," he tells us, "which state that certain kinds of things are themselves good . . . . are all of them universally true." But who is to judge, who to draw up the list? For unless he can tell us that, we shall, every Protagorean individual of us, be, as Plato commented in the *Theaetetus*, infallible. It might be the end of intrinsic goodness. But wait: let us look at that "vast number." "Unmixed goods may all be said to consist in the love of beautiful things and of good persons." Now, since beautiful is defined as "that which to the admiring contemplation is good in itself," and since the goodness of good persons is, I suppose, good, truly "that is the end of the matter."

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We had better see how Mr. Moore establishes the existence of the intrinsic good. The whole point is that he doesn't establish it at all. He declared with Mill that there is no proof of ultimates, and that all he can do is to give reasons that might, peradventure, convince us. To do this he relies on that petrifying head of Medusa, the naturalistic fallacy. We can always ask if pleasure, duty, happiness, or what not are after all good; and since this question is a significant one, it proves of itself that goodness is not identical with, nor can be explained by, any other object or quality; i.e., it is unique; and since Sidgwick was definitely in error in limiting the good to human experience, it is also absolute or intrinsic.

Let us consider the polemic against Sidgwick first. Sidgwick held "that nothing appears to possess this quality of goodness out of relation to human experience, or at least to some consciousness or feeling." Mr. Moore quotes the *Philebus* to convince us that a bare, isolated pleasure is not what we want, which was not Sidgwick's point at all, and then comes to the crux of his argument thus: Sidgwick asserted as a corollary to the previous statement that "no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature apart from any possible contemplation by human beings." Mr. Moore disagrees, since, of course, if there is an intrinsic good or beauty, it will still be such whether men are there or not. Imagine, he tells us, a world of beauty, and "then imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive; imagine it simply one heap of filth." What is the result? "Quite apart from any possible contemplation by human beings" we should prefer the world of beauty. And this proves that beauty is itself, i.e., intrinsically, better than ugliness. There is, however, just one thing lacking to complete the proof. Mr. Moore has omitted to tell us how we are going to imagine a world of beauty or of ugliness *quite apart* from any possible contemplation by human beings. We—the human beings—are there all the time; we are already there in the

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imagining, and Mr. Moore's logic is simply fallacious. He begged the whole question in the naïve appeal to *our* feelings of liking and disgust as the judge. The judge was corrupt, and Sidgwick's argument still holds—at least so far as Mr. Moore is concerned. And so it were superfluous to ask Mr. Moore what would happen to the intrinsic good—or should we say to that universally valid judgment of it were his world of beauty, or filth, or any part of it confronted at once by a man and by a coprophagous beetle.

But if Mr. Moore's intuition will not suffice to guarantee us an absolute or an intrinsic good, will it suffice to maintain us a good of any sort anywhere? A complete refutation of Mr. Moore on this point would require nothing less than a critique of any possible intuitionism, and this could only be outlined here. We all know how Butler urged, as against Shaftesbury, that in the absence, or indeed in the variation of, a moral sense he would be left without remedy. But does the case stand any different with regard to Butler himself? Although he assures us that any man honestly interrogating his conscience will be answered consistently with truth and justice, when he himself, preaching before the House of Lords, thought of men whose consciences had answered them very differently from his, he could only think that they—the Puritans—were guilty of deceiving themselves. His conscience has failed; he is as much without remedy as Shaftesbury. Nor will the case stand differently with regard to intuition set up as a final arbiter. It may be in a way, as Aristotle taught, that all our knowledge comes ultimately to a self-evidence on mere inspection. But what are these ultimate points of reference? It is significant that in morals, at any rate, Aristotle demanded a trained man to inspect! In short, are these self-evident points *absolutely* ultimate points? Are they a priori principles of synthesis inherent in all our knowing, or are they postulates that are slowly adopted and ever subject to modification? The whole dispute between the utilitarians and the

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intuitionists lay here; and if it can be maintained, with the evolutionary utilitarians, that our moral principles start from the appetites and desires of men and are but themselves examples of utility establishing and transmitting themselves in the longer history of man, and if it can be maintained with regard to both conceptual and perceptual intuitions, the claims of intuitionism will be undermined, if not completely overthrown.

The attack on conceptual intuitionism is made easier, if not superfluous, by the removal of its ancient bulwark—I mean the absolute character of mathematics. For a long line of mathematicians has shown us that there are several mathematics, each as plausible and as self-consistent as the rest, such that it becomes doubtful nowadays if the very meaning of the phrase truth-reference in mathematics has not completely vanished.

Against perceptual intuitionism it is sufficient to compare the declarations of intuitionist philosophers at different times and places and to see how hopelessly inconsistent and contradictory they are. The whole school must quail before the evidence of Westermarck's *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*. After all, what degree of absoluteness did Aristotle's φρόνιμος possess? Take him away from his training and habituation, away from that little Greek state of which he was so essentially a part, and what validity have his judgments? Consider an art: in music a novice learns from a musician whose rules are "final." He is told the licit and the illicit, and when he has mastered these and has become proficient in his art he, too, is an authority; his word, too, proceeds *proprio ore* from a musician, and, as Mr. Stephen Ward has told us, is accepted as such. But only so long as the tradition holds. Thus, from Handel's enthronement of it, the diatonic scale reigned supreme till Mussorgski (Eaglefield-Hull), but since then . . . . !!! Who will now, i.e., until a fresh tradition be-

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comes established, lay down absolute intuitional laws when every musician does that which is right in his own ears?

So we might dispute Moore's prime position. He declared that "the fundamental principles of ethics must be self-evident." Just as the Idealist declared that knowledge presupposes a permanent self, but forgot to ask what degree of permanence for such knowledge as we possess, so Mr. Moore has overlooked the fact that what is self-evident to one generation is not necessarily so to another. Our principles are after all but the instrument of our living, and this much Mr. Moore might have learnt from Spencer and Guyau had he not been so intent on their verbal inaccuracies and incomplete statements. From Sidgwick he might have learnt that good is ever our good, and from Spencer and Guyau that what we can and do perceive as good is not remote from the background of life which nurtures us. And so, having disposed of his intrinsic good, we might take courage against that fearsome naturalistic fallacy to seek into the conditions of, and therefore to ask what is, the meaning of good.

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SHOULD THE DOCTOR TESTIFY?

C. F. TAEUSCH

I

THE recent appointment of a joint committee by two of our most powerful professional organizations, the American Medical Association and the American Bar Association, to consider the question gives promise of a much-needed change in the method of securing "expert" testimony and calls for a complete reconsideration of the status of "confidential communications." The anomaly of groups of "experts" advancing opinions diametrically opposed to each other, each in accordance with the claims and interests of combating litigants in a courtroom, should be at once a matter of professional chagrin and of social concern. No less disturbing to the physician and to his patient are the frequent demands of prosecuting attorneys and judges that communications given in strictest professional confidence be unduly aired in the courtroom.

State medical associations have during the last century and in most of the states in this country succeeded in their demands for statutory legislation relieving them of such embarrassments. But the privilege thus granted has been abused, not enough perhaps to warrant a condemnation of the statutory provisions, but sufficiently at least to justify modifications in their application to concrete situations. The difficulty runs deeper than the particular problem of medical testimony; it calls into question the whole legal procedure in reference to confidential information and expert testimony, matters in which the physician and the public are no less interested than the lawyer and the judge.

Nor is the difficulty confined to this country alone. Just recently in England, in the Birmingham assizes, the physicians of a hospital protested against the request of the justice

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for records which the medical profession regards as confidential. The supremacy of the law in England has not been modified by the granting of statutory privilege, as was evidenced by the laconic conclusion of the report, that the judge repeated his demand and that "the physicians thereupon produced the required documents." But the significant fact in this case is the registering of the protest of the physicians against a legal requirement because of its flagrant violation of the best traditions of the medical profession.

The precedent to which the doctors appeal goes back to the code of the ancient Greek physicians, and has ever been regarded as the essence of the professional spirit. The formulation of the rule is contained in the Oath of Hippocrates, which adorns practically every doctor's office: "Whatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not in connection with it, I may see or hear in the lives of men which ought not to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all such should be kept secret." This ethical principle has persisted for 2,000 years, and is still effective among medical practitioners. In Scotland, in conformity with the Promissory Oaths Act of 1868, the graduates of medical schools make the following declaration: ". . . . And I further declare that I will keep silence as to everything I have seen or heard, while visiting the sick, which it would be improper to divulge." And the land of John Knox has insisted as strenuously on its professional prerogatives as it has on its religious freedom.

This fundamental rule of medical ethics—a rule which operates also in the legal profession and in the priesthood—generates difficulties whenever a court calls for the testimony of a physician as to facts he has learned in the pursuit of his professional duties. For the law has, during the last three hundred years, established this fundamental maxim, that "the public," in the words of Lord Hardwick, "has a right to every man's evidence." Two powerful social streams are evidently in confluence: a broad, intangible, ethical flow, thousands of

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years old, meeting with a vigorous, clean-cut legal current measuring its age by centuries. What the final resultant will be, only succeeding centuries can disclose, but important modifications are constantly diverting the stream slightly one way or another.

II

A pertinent test case occurred in 1900 in Nottingham, England, in which the plaintiff tried to have set aside an order to maintain his wife, on the ground that she was guilty of adultery. The woman's physician, a Scottish university graduate, held that the requested disclosures would be not only a breach of professional secrecy but also an infringement of his academic declaration, for either of which he might be liable to pains and penalties by the General Medical Council. Inasmuch as the Council may "strike off the register" any practitioner guilty of gross unethical conduct, the predicament of the doctor was real and evident. His situation could be relieved only by a yielding on the part of the law or by compromising the medical profession. Strangely enough, the judge did not press the doctor for an answer, an exhibition of judical restraint that was probably as penetrating and subtle as it was seemingly gracious.

The problem of safeguarding confidential communications to professional men arose in England during the period of religious persecutions and became the object alike of canon and statutory law. In succeeding years these regulations were absorbed by the common law in the form of rules which governed the admission of testimony. Thus lawyers were held to be "incompetent" to testify in a client's cause. In 1833 Lord Brougham held that this privilege was accorded, "not on account of any particular importance which the law attributes to the business of legal professors," but "out of regard to the interests of justice; if the privilege did not exist at all, a man would not venture to consult any skilful person, or would only

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dare to tell his counselor half his case"; an argument which applies equally well to all professional confidences. But as early as 1792 Lord Kenyon had asserted that "the privilege is allowed only in the case of attorney and client," a common-law rule which has ever since been accepted by English judges, with the exception of "an occasional and proper dispensation by courtesy" to other professions.

But this legal basis for denying or granting the privilege must not be confused with the ethical ground for maintaining the inviolability of confidential communications between doctor and patient. The relative strength of the ethical ground can be tested by a hypothetical situation in which the compunctions of the professional man would be opposed to the legal requirements. Suppose a doctor to be asked in court to divulge information given in strictest confidence. There is always the expedient of a justifiable lie; he can at least make a pretense of ignorance. It is probably due to the recognition of this possibility that the courts refrain from trying to make priests disclose the confessions of penitents, for the church could absolve such a priest from the taint of "sin," however "criminal" his act might be. But there is also the moral alternative of challenging the justice of questions which jeopardize the client's or the patient's interests and those of the profession. This attitude of defiance can be carried even to the extent of facing the consequences of "contempt of court," an attitude beautifully represented by Socrates in Plato's *Apology* and justified by Aristotle as the supreme function of the "good man" as opposed to the "good citizen." It has recently been illustrated by Judge Ben Lindsey, of the Denver juvenile court, in his refusal to divulge the confidences of boys and girls in the face of a court order.

Either of these alternatives, of evasion or defiance of the law, is ethically justifiable, partly on the ground of the moral rights of the individual whose confidences are being kept, and partly on the ground of conserving the dignity and self-respect

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of the professions and of facilitating the affectiveness of their functioning. For the freedom with which a patient will disclose facts to his doctor depends partly on the confidence he has in the inviolability of his communications. The situation as thus far developed may be regarded as the present status of professional confidences in England, where the common law has exhibited its proclivity to swallow up and absorb all forms of social administration.

III

In the United States, however, the history of "privileged communications" has, at least during the past century, run a different course. Although the "common law rule," denying the privilege to doctors, still prevails in New England and in the South, the exercise of the privilege has elsewhere been permitted and even defined in mandatory terms by statutory legislation. Exceptional situations modify this generalization. The Pennsylvania statute confines the privilege to civil actions and excludes "such testimony as shall tend to blacken the character of the patient." The North Carolina statute similarly gives the judge a considerable amount of discretionary power. In a number of states where the privilege is statutory it applies only to civil actions, criminal cases falling within the common-law rule; e.g., in New York, where the first statute granting the privilege to medical practitioners was adopted.

The New York statute, passed in 1828, became the model for much subsequent legislation. It appears in the Code of Civil Procedure in the following words: "A person duly authorized to practice physic or surgery shall not be allowed to disclose any information which he acquired in attending a patient, in a professional capacity, and which was necessary for him to act in that capacity." The commissioners who in 1836 considered embodying this statute in the Code recognized considerations of public policy that have later been overlooked

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by judges: the "struggle between legal duty and professional honor" would "in most cases furnish a temptation to the perversion or concealment of truth too strong for human resistance." The New York courts long ago admitted that the statute was intended to remove from the law "a reproach which had been long felt and often expressed by judges," and have as recently as 1921 held that the good accomplished by the statute has outweighed particular cases of injustice caused by the exclusion of the physician's testimony.

The cases which formerly and most frequently called into question the common law or statutory rules were those involving venereal diseases and attempts at abortion. As a Wisconsin judge once whimsically observed, "It is not the saints of the world that seek the lawyer's advice," and such socially pathological cases unfortunately must be relied upon to discover legal rules or social tendencies. An attempted self-abortion is a crime and its discovery by a physician would not therefore be privileged in many states. And yet Mr. Justice Hawkins in an English case in 1896 expressed a doubt whether a doctor would be justified in divulging such information to a public prosecutor, especially if the unfortunate woman "had attempted to save her character, her reputation, and perhaps her very means of livelihood." The law has done little enough to remedy the situation, especially in connection with the fixing of responsibility on the man involved, to become over-indignant at the affront offered to society by the refusal of a discreet or stubborn doctor to disclose the facts. Nor should we optimistically expect an early solution of the problem through the prevalent use of contraceptive devices. The situation warrants the confidential relationship, and it should be a matter of social interest to define and control that relationship in ways other than by abolition or mere condemnation. The law and medicine, acting jointly and with concerted efforts, are in a position to deal with the matter properly and adequately.

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The law, again, has done little to prevent the spread of venereal diseases, and that little has been done largely after others have been harmed. It takes cognizance of these diseases in various ways: a man charged with rape is further accused of having inflicted a loathsome disease on a woman; a railway company, defendant in a suit for damages, claims that the effects of the accident are due largely to the plaintiff's previous physical condition; or an insurance company declares that premature death was due to syphilis or some other disease not admitted by the insured. One may sympathize with the peroration of a judge in a recent case, that "he who has acquired such disease by clandestine *liaison* has scant claim upon legislative considerations for protection from the shame which he has deliberately invited," but the emotional satisfaction derived from such castigations too often crowd out intelligent methods of social control. Tests are available for determining the presence of these diseases, and they are available alike to insurance companies to prevent gross fraud at the time a policy is issued, as well as to the courts to establish the facts pertinent to the issue. Certainly this would reduce to a minimum the necessity of airing such matters unduly in a courtroom and in the spirit of controversial litigation. Furthermore, medical science has developed for syphilis a fairly effective preventive and cure, the resort to and employment of which is a matter of public interest. In the army and navy, stringent regulations make it expedient for all men suspecting infection to apply for medical attention. The general public cannot, however, be so rigorously controlled. Voluntary application must be relied upon, and the prevalence of this practice increases with the sense of security a person has in the inviolability of the necessary confidences.

These confidences may be violated by the doctor in two ways, aside from indiscriminate "tattling" which is clearly reprehensible. He may be forced to disclose them in a court of law, or he may be asked concerning the matter by an in-

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terested person, e.g., a prospective spouse. The latter, more strictly ethical, situation is one of the few specifically dealt with in the *Principles of Medical Ethics,* the doctors' code, but unfortunately is not there given a categorical solution. A physician is advised in such a case to act "as he would desire another to act toward one of his own family under the circumstances"; but he is immediately warned to acquaint himself with the statutory regulations concerning privilege, a warning which is indicative of the amenability of the medical profession to legal control. In both of these situations, ethical as well as legal, a breach of professional confidence may be required by an obligation to the broader social good. The weighing and balancing of these two values is a matter of delicate judgment, the final resolution of which is probably determined largely by predilections and temperament.

IV

In spite of the fact that the purpose of legislation regarding privileged communications was to supplant the common-law rules, it has become necessary at times to supplement the former with the latter. Thus, it devolves upon the discretion of the court to determine whether the physician-patient relationship exists. A physician who, while collecting his bill, had made observations detrimental to a plaintiff's claim was allowed to testify; but where a railway physician visited the hospital "merely to see that the patient was properly cared for," his testimony was excluded. Sometimes, however, the courts refuse thus to dissociate the business activities of the physician from the professional. Even when a physician is employed by a person who later becomes an opposing litigant he "transfers his allegiance" to the patient he examines or treats.

The burden of proof rests, of course, with the party seeking to exclude the physician's testimony. But an unfavorable inference cannot be drawn by the jury simply because a party

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resorts to the privilege. The privilege, furthermore, may be waived by the patient, although some states have refused to recognize the written waivers attached to insurance policies. There is considerable difference of opinion among judges as to whether the voluntary disclosure of evidence by the patient in the courtroom removes the ban of privilege from the physician. Also, where two or more physicians are engaged in the same operation, should a waiver as to one make them all competent witnesses? Consider a case in which a railway physician "had removed the dressing which the other physician had applied and had then redressed the wound"! Even the death of the patient or the dismissal of the doctor does not remove the seal of silence from the latter's lips. Otherwise the following may happen: "After John McGinty had died, the physician who had examined him and certified to his health on his application for an insurance policy wrote to the company that Michael, the father, had died of cancer; and that John himself had had syphilis."

Whenever a statute purports to codify the law, it has been the custom of the courts to interpret it broadly and liberally. Where, however, a statute definitely sets aside the common law, the courts have as a rule interpreted it strictly. One would presume the latter procedure in regard to the privilege accorded doctors. Such has not, however, deterred the courts from holding a "communication" to be not only by word of mouth, but also "by exhibiting the body or any part thereof to the physician for his opinion, examination, or diagnosis." Of course, there is considerable diversity in court decisions due to the fact that the various states have different statutes—practitioners licensed in one state not being incompetent to testify in others—but the exceptional situations cannot be dealt with in a treatment of this scope.

One might dwell at length on some of the anomalies of the situation. A doctor in New York could testify that a child was born to the defendant, but the testimony as to what the

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defendant was treated for was inadmissible. A statement as to the duration of a disease was privileged in a Utah case because that knowledge was necessary to the treatment. Not so, however, the testimony of a physician as to how soon a patient under an anaesthetic recovered sufficiently to know what he was doing when he admitted negligence in a statement prepared by the railway company's physician. In certain far-western states, X-ray photographs have been excluded, especially when the physician who took them had been consulted as to the injury. The courts are wholly at odds in regard to admitting the doctor's testimony as to the mental capacity of deceased persons just previous to death. In a Wisconsin case involving the payment of inheritance taxes the evidence of a physician contributed to the conclusion of the court that a deed of gift, made shortly before death, was made in contemplation of death and was therefore subject to tax.

The most vexatious problems involving professional communications in recent years have been brought about by industrial conditions, especially those connected with industrial accidents and insurance. The statutes usually confine the privilege to such communications as are "necessary" to the proper treatment of a disease or injury. They do not, e.g., apply where a girl tells an attendant physician that she had gotten her hand into a mangle through carelessness or where a workman admits that he thoughtlessly "kicked a jack." Sometimes a judge expostulates against the kind of professional treatment which includes "plying the patient with questions, while suffering, to elicit some statement advantageous to an employer." Statutes conferring privilege have secured more immediately the rights which "workmen's compensation" and "insurance" acts should have provided for or would have secured earlier but for the opposition of the courts. On the other hand there are obvious abuses of the statutory privilege: a physician in Michigan could not testify that he had previously treated the injured person for alcoholism; in simi-

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lar cases in Indiana and Missouri, the physician could not testify that he had smelled alcohol on the patient's breath; while in a Nebraska case involving the charge of drunkenness, the physician's testimony that the defendant's breath smelled of beer was excluded.

V

Mr. Wigmore has been most vigorous in his condemnation of the extension of "privilege" to physicians. The practical consequences have been, as he says, to exclude from the knowledge of the court facts which are absolutely necessary to a just decision; often these facts are common knowledge to all but the very man who should have it, the judge himself. But this is only one-half of the story; the abuses of "privilege" are not unilateral. In a Colorado case, sixteen persons filed affidavits denying the testimony of six doctors as to the previous illness of the litigant, whose own physician was charged with demanding a percentage of the amount recovered. It has become a matter of annoyance and chagrin to the reputable members of the medical profession that doctors so often govern their testimony according to the dictates of their employers. In a personal-injury case in New York the two attending physicians admitted that they had gone from the clinic to the railway company's office and had offered to testify as "medical experts" against the injured person. Life insurance agents have been known to be so eager to write policies that they have not only perverted the facts as to a person's physical condition, but have played upon his ignorance of the English language in eliciting false or ambiguous statements in jeopardy of his claims.

The situation calls for a complete re-examination of the whole matter of "privilege" in its application to the legal as well as to the medical profession. Indeed, if "knowledge of the facts" is the prime consideration in the trial of a case, the lawyer-client privilege would have little to support it. It is true that "the absence of the privilege would convert an attor-

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ney into a mere informer for the benefit of his opponent," but in most cases only in unjustifiable causes. Just what rights or social values would be jeopardized by denying the privilege? Obviously the right of the client to professional confidence, and the value of this confidence to the professions and to society at large. But these rights and values are no whit less in the doctor-patient than in the lawyer-client relationship. The brutal fact is that lawyers demand a violation of confidences from other professions which they would not tolerate in their own, and the sad result is that doctors have submitted to this state of affairs.

The difficulty is due to a situation more fundamental than any we have yet touched upon. Cases are constantly arising in which the facts pertinent to a just decision are known only to the physician, and cases in which an attempt is made by the opposing litigant to introduce physicians in his own employ as "expert" witnesses. Not only is litigation itself, it must be remembered, symptomatic of a social failure to adjust difficulties by informal compromise; but the courts, accepting the "combative" view of litigation, attempt to adjudicate between two sets of what virtually amount to *ex parte* presentations. For these reasons lawyers have a perverted or inadequate social perspective, which is shared by the bench as well. The very device of privilege, for which the lawyer himself is largely responsible and which was intended to give the litigant a "shield" for his personal rights, has often equipped the latter with a "sword" by which he can delete pertinent and vital testimony that ought to be available to the court. And the combative view, held alike by bench and bar, encourages the litigant to engage in these "tactical maneuvers" that so frequently disgust the public.

The remedy which occurs most frequently to the legal profession, and especially to the bench, is the abrogation of the statutory privilege and a return to the common-law rules. This attitude, however, directs attention to a superficial part of the difficulty and throws the onus of the argument to the

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medical profession, a method familiarly known as "passing the buck." The plea that the courts need to know the facts could well be met by a more fundamental modification of procedure than the legal profession has been wont to suggest. An examination of the English practice will disclose the fact that, although the common law prevails there, other differences are to be noted. The judicial restraint of the judges in the Nottingham case and others compare favorably, in respect to conserving justifiable professional secrecy, with the decisions of judges in those of the United States which have the statutory privilege. But, in addition, the English judge is more inclined to the exercise of administrative, rather than merely adjudicative, functions. He does not rely so much upon the initiative of the contending parties to present the facts, but "hales" the latter into court himself. In most of the American cases the judge could have better served justice by insisting on a full presentation of pertinent facts by competent witnesses, irrespective of their employment by one of the opposing litigants, and by directly supervising the examination of the evidence.

The practice is not without precedent even in states having the statutory privilege. In *People* v. *Furlong*, a New York murder case (187 N.Y. 198. 1907), the defendant pleading insanity, the court ordered him to be examined, neither at his own request nor at that of the district attorney, and neither the latter nor the defendant's counsel knew that the examination was to be held. A similar case occurred in Michigan in 1888 (*People* v. *Glover*, 71 Mich. 303). In *State* v. *Height*, an Iowa case involving rape (117 Ia. 650. 1902), the prosecuting attorney, without Height's consent—indeed, even against his protest—ordered a physician, not Height's, to examine him for syphilis, and this was allowed by the court. In a Nebraska case involving the personal injury of an employee (*Stapleton* v. *Burlington and Quincy Ry. Co.*, 162 N. W. 644. 1917), the court stated that the defendant company could have applied to the court for the appointment of a commission to examine the person of the plaintiff. This procedure

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was employed in California as long ago as 1870 (*Grigsby* v. *Clear Lake Water Co.*, 40 Cal. 396), and is a much more effective way of avoiding the abuses of privilege than is an adherence to the combative view of justice. The American courts, however, seem to be averse to enlarging their adjudicative into administrative functions. Their failure to do so provides a justification for statutory privilege which might not otherwise hold.

VI

The broader justification for privilege is, it must be remembered, not confined to the benefit accruing either to the patient or to the individual doctor. It involves in addition the interest of a social group, the medical profession, in the inviolability of its confidences. This interest is in part economic, but it is largely a matter of professional dignity and self-respect, matters of absolute, as well as of instrumental, value to society. That the courts have denied such considerations of public policy to be the basis of the privilege does not eliminate these considerations from motivating legislation or from determining social-ethical programs.

The assertion of professional and business autonomy has been one of the conspicuous facts in recent social development. The reasons for this are partly discoverable in the inability of political government and law to maintain control over the intricacies of modern heterogeneous society. There are, however, also the desires of specialists and of social groups to regulate the technique and policies of their own peculiar activities. Where the endeavor to assert such professional and group prerogatives has been accompanied by an adequate sense of the responsibilities involved, the ethical values of society are conserved. Witness the statement of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States: "Business should render restrictive legislation unnecessary through so conducting itself as to deserve and inspire public confidence." Such an attitude must precede the insistence on professional prerogatives, and the latter are to be regarded as symptoms of

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autonomous regulation rather than as means for its accomplishment.

But no social interest, such as that in professional prerogatives, can justifiably be asserted apart from its relations to other social values; even if it be supreme, which is not here asserted to be the case. All social interests must be adjusted one to another, a necessity which denies the right either of medicine to control its own interests exclusively or of another profession, such as the law, arbitrarily to dictate the limits of such prerogatives. Hence the hope that something may be accomplished by a joint committee of these two powerful professions.

What, it may be asked, becomes of the absolute rights of the patient or of the doctor, and of the interest of society in the medical profession, once these concessions have been made to the general social good? The point is that such rights and interests should not be preserved intact, especially when they are opposed to the social good. So it is always when an individual or particular group enjoys benefits all out of proportion to the value derived by society or at the expense of considerable social sacrifices. On the other hand, one should view with suspicion any absolute claims of society which are seriously detrimental to any part of it, for the welfare of society is largely dependent on the welfare of its parts. Society can well afford to sacrifice a part of its vigorous claim to the full testimony of every man, if such a claim seriously jeopardizes individual rights and professional prerogatives. At least the instrument for asserting that claim and the manner in which that testimony is obtained can be adjusted to the interests involved rather than be made subject to questionable precedents or theories of the legal profession. Indeed, it would seem the part of social wisdom to accord a measurable degree of privilege, not only to medical and legal practitioners, but to other professions and to business men as well.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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SOCIAL PROGRESS AND THE GOOD MAN

BOLLING SOMERVILLE

I

TO ENDEAVOR to see through the ever changing body of social ways, concerning which so many contradictory conclusions are perennially drawn, and arrive at some idea as to whether society is really progressing, and at what rate, makes it easy to sympathize with those who declare vehemently that social progress is altogether illusory. Social progress of an inclusive sort, as against that in various special directions, indeed seems baffling. Excellent progress has often been made in the forms of social organization all the while the heart of social life, the phrase which is primarily moral, has shown decay so great as to be almost universally admitted. As Treitschke said, "the pressure of conscience towards its own self-fulfilment" can alone be rightly taken as fundamental progress. Then the world would be getting better, a better place to live in, a better place for the better men to live in. Only when this seems the case should we have the face to speak as if we were making real headway. At any rate, this indicates that there is after all a way to arrive at a conclusion which is true enough to guide us truly, true enough to throw much real light upon the many social problems of the day. We would seem to have a compass with us at all times, even though so far we have been well content to leave it boxed.

II

Shall we point out our compass a little more clearly? According as there is comparative progress in well-being on the part of the more socially useful, there is progress on the part of all society. When we look for the well-being of any men we should of course remember that well-being of the basic sort must be economic. Social progress means progress in material welfare on the part of the socially good and useful men—who

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may well be said to constitute the very heart and head of humanity, the highest living values. In so far as the "head" keeps as far ahead as possible in the things which compel most respect and exercise most undeniable influence in the world at large—a world now growing ever more material-minded—conditions are bound to improve for man as a whole, improving in the deeper ways, which matter most. As long as the "head" keeps ahead in influence and power, it influences the human whole to move ever forward, like a spear, properly thrown head forward and not sideways.

The chief reason why we have not already recognized this fully is that we have stubbornly refused to believe there should be real welfare—basic, material welfare—for the good and useful. Theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven *only!* As Professor Dewey says, virtue has been too greatly identified with weakness and impotence, which being the case, any worship of strength, even if it be Nietzschean and suggestive of worship of the mere crude sort of strength, is a healthful sign. It puts us back on our base.

Half-truths relating to this whole matter of virtue, or duty, and reward are so very much abroad that it might be well here in mentioning the thing at all to examine it briefly. On the whole all virtues make for survival. In the self-centered man they make for survival of the man himself. The self-centered man who is at the same time temperate, able, reasonably fearless, well balanced in all things, stands a fine chance for health, wealth, worldly wisdom, and success. In the socially minded man, on the other hand, it is easy to believe that every virtue is a handicap. The courageous man who fights for his country or whatever else he may think duty demands that he fight for is the great risk-bearer of his race. If he has the virtue of good physique and health his risks are all the greater, since he is then the surer to be accepted for service in fighting, and furthermore is the surer to be selected for the "picked fighters." If he is dutiful and skilful and shows

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a good average of all-round excellence he is by so much the surer to become an officer and to suffer all the added hazards of officers. We here speak in terms of war because war brings out the essentials of the thing so very clearly; yet peaceful pursuits all show the same fundamental trait, the same general tendency on the part of all virtues to bring loss to the socially minded man. Although less intense during peace, and in somewhat changed form, the same general struggle and conflict goes on; society endures by virtue of the virtuous, who endure losses. The dutiful individual sacrifices his own individual self in order that society, or what some call the social self, shall benefit. Virtue does remain its own reward, but that reward is then reaped by society only. In this sense —in its immediate effects—it is ever true, as is commonly held, that virtue is to be more or less identified with weakness and impotence.

In the more ultimate effects—say when society awakens to its own duty, its duty to the dutiful themselves—virtue, duty, will bring much of their proper reward around at last to the dutiful. We might say that it is only when virtue is permitted to swing full circle that it can bring reward to the individual. Only when the sense of duty in men as a whole refuses to sanction their allowing the dutiful man to remain isolated from the profit which his duty brings mankind, is it possible for duty to bring the man well-being.

Of course, where the individual has perished in performance of duty, reward can no more reach him than can the mind of man reach absolute truth. Yet just as truth is ever approximated, even so reward can approximate the man, reaching his family, friends and general interests—the things most properly to be "identified" with him. If, following Dean Inge, we take the individual himself as being but the smallest circle of a vast series of concentric circles—circles of interest, love, and obligation—we see that the loss of the smallest circle does not involve the loss of all; it does not relieve society of the obliga-

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tion to hand on full reward to those remaining circles. Reward should *concentrate about* the individual. In fact reward can at best but approximate duty, even when the individual survives. For it only follows duty, always allowing an interval, and the individual following his sense of duty today is never quite the same individual tomorrow, when perhaps reward may come his way.

The thing is that realization of the fact that virtue on the whole should mean strength and well-being to virtuous men, as a group at least, is still so vague and feeble that for a good while part of our task must be to work for such realization to grow more fully, to take more shape. We must work for the ending of that artificial opposition, and in fact conflict, in our minds and habitudes between virtue and reward. In a broad sense it might even be said that we make progress according as we recognize, in thought and deed, that reward is part of virtue, the duty-to-reward being part of duty. For this proves but another way of saying that we believe the "head" should keep ahead economically as well as otherwise.

III

Before endeavoring to read our present social progress by this compass it would seem well to understand the compass somewhat more fully. First of all, who may be taken to constitute the "head"? Who are the more useful persons socially, or as some would say morally? Who are they whose welfare as a group should be of surpassing interest to all socially minded persons? In this no less than in all other things we must bear in mind that all human judgments are fallible, even though on the whole they are good and indispensable. Furthermore, all human judgments are but the judgments of individuals. This is a pluralistic world, at least in that the judgments of even a group are but the judgments of those who go to make up that group. Even when the already formed judgments of the group are respected in full, each of us has need of his own individual judgment; each has his own viewpoint

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and office in tempering the judgments of his group. Exercising our own individual judgment, while retaining a varying degree of respect for the judgment of our group—varying according to many factors, such as the wisdom and experience of the group, beliefs of the group which we feel are in need of reconstruction, and the circumstances of the case—makes on the whole for real good; it guides truly in all things.

In order to arrive at individual judgments of our own in the thing in which we are here chiefly interested, namely the present welfare of the men who are most useful to society, morality, culture, each of us has but to do this: He has but to narrow his gaze upon the actual material welfare of such persons as may seem in his own eyes to be of more than average value. Some of us cover all of these persons by the simple term good people, using the plain, original word, good, in its plain, original meaning. The good people are those who are good for society. The word good is probably good enough; for all of us fall back upon it at length. We are constantly summing up our acquaintances as being "good" or "no good" or somewhere in between.

It is true that in summing up our fellows as being good, no good, and so on, we think and act only too often as if they were of one piece, the "good" being nearly perfect and the "no good" nearly the opposite. Nevertheless we cannot fail to note many well-defined cases of goodness, as of evil, among men everywhere. In some men the subordination of individual interest to the interest of the whole (one way to express goodness) is so outstanding that the man becomes for us a picture of what we ourselves should be. For a certain time, at least, he becomes our ideal man. We think of him only to yearn to become like him, to lift ourselves above narrow individualism, to break the cramping circle of our lives and free the divine within our natures. We long to serve, those of us who have no definite plan of living and serving. And those who are already serving and feeling the immediate strain of

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sacrifice take heart again, and for a time are not aware of that strain, feeling instead that virtue is, in every sense, somehow its own reward.

The persons who thus inspire us may well be taken as constituting the heart of any conception of a useful group or a good group, socially or morally. Outside this heart the good group extends of course through many gradations until, even assuming we could see into the heart of the person, it could hardly be said whether he be for the most part good or bad. White has shaded into many tones of gray, truth into many degrees of probability; and nowhere can be found anything like a distinct outline for the good group. Yet this absence of outline is vastly more than compensated for by the fact that the group has a heart of almost pure gold, so to speak. In the giants of moral, or let us say social, courage, we have the thing we need above all, a real point of focus, a real bull's-eye to our solicitude for things which are human and therefore nearest divine. The nearer we approach these most truly great among men, in narrowing the circle of what we may choose at any particular time under any particular circumstances to recognize as the good group, the more certain we may be that within those chosen limits resides a rare average of goodness, dutifulness, social sensibility. How needless, how foolish, in the light of this, is any seeking for a set outline of the good!

Using some arbitrary standard in "selecting" the good at times remains just as necessary as is using some arbitrary standard in selecting men who are "fit" for certain kinds of work, or for the army. The rest, in all such cases, must await the lowering of the requirements. That is to say, whenever we deal with reward of what might be called a standardized sort, such as a medal or admission into this or that order or organization, it is obvious that we cannot fit the reward to the exact degree of merit. Who thinks seriously of doing so! Instead, we bow to circumstances and draw this line and that, so that our pyramid of rewards is not smooth but is broken up

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by many rather irregular steps. It is a natural pyramid rather than an ideal one. At heart of course we know that no line we draw has an objective reality; the ideal system of rewarding would not go by lines at all but would reward each exactly according to his desert. We know that the infinite variety of life and truth and justice at last breaks through all deadening letters and laws and forms, defying and slaying every Procrustes who dwells for a time within every bone of convention. And in order to work for the interest of the world, of life, man must work against every form of Procrustes. At the same time we know that futility must mark all our effort unless we recognize certain Procrustean tricks, certain formalities of life, as being necessary for the time of our working. We cannot avoid grading, classifying, men; we must have "orders" in order to have order, in the army and as well in all phases of our lives.

Here some of us hesitate. Although we are always more or less engaged in appraising our fellows, working for or against them accordingly (and to that extent we are in effect rewarding or punishing them), nevertheless many there are who have erected an immense "problem" for themselves and for those who come under their influence and separate their theories from their activities. That is the problem of how to "discover" the good man. That so-called problem is in reality nothing but a caricature of the fact that nothing in life is absolutely certain. It reminds one of the student who knows his subject extremely well and yet trembles when the hour of actual examination comes with its ever so small possibility that after all he may just miss a passing mark, and can write not a word until he has taken a sedative.

Let us take note, then, that in so far as we make a question of how to pick out the good man, we can always find the very greatest simplicity and effectiveness in declaring in favor of a purely behavioristic standpoint from the very start. In a world in which influencing human behavior is the great prob-

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lem eternally confronting us, anything which ignores the behavioristic standpoint is accordingly to be considered only on the aloof Olympian plane of things ideal. For the practical standpoint recognizes that although uncertainty is ever with us in all things, yet by sticking to that age-tested method of judging trees by their fruit we are enabled to grow more and more certain in each growing judgment as time passes and the fruit approaches maturity. In our naïve everyday life this is just the method we always apply; this is the thing we believe, indeed. We do not seriously question that we grow steadily in knowledge of one another. (To help prove the rule by exceptions, there are a certain number of young couples who rush into marriage in their too great trust of love at first sight. Again there are a certain number of quarrels among the married, which would not occur if only they kept themselves more conscious of the fact that no amount of love can bring two persons at once to a full understanding of each other and to an appreciation of each other's ways of responding to the various situations and stimuli of life.) That is to say, in spite of many mistakes, we have all found it to work that the more we see of a person, the better we are likely to know him, his abilities and weaknesses, social, business, and so on; indeed even his "uncertain spots," his changeable ways, become understood more and more. This is the reason why we are so constantly being asked how long we have known Mr. This and Mrs. That. Even those who, in their practically blind theory, can see no possible *modus operandi* for selecting the good men are ready enough, when the inevitable time comes, to ask the question and on the other hand to give their opinions, their appraisals, of their fellows. We know we are taking a great chance in intrusting much to that Mr. Brown whom we have only recently met and concerning whom we can gather so little real information from those we have found to be trustworthy. But that Mr. Jones with whom we have been thrown so much has perhaps proved about as trustworthy as we could

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wish. In many things we may trust him far more than we trust even ourselves. Clearly, the problem of discovering the good man, of appraising our fellows, in which all of us are at all times more or less engaged, should not be dismissed as insoluable when we come to the realm of theory—unless some great end can somehow be served by bringing theory into yet greater disrepute!

IV

Let us remember once more that however much we may disdain to show interest in the moral qualities of our fellows rather than in their aesthetic qualities, abilities, breeding, culture, and so on, in the end we are brought to admit that the most important, and for that matter most interesting, thing about any man is his character, his goodness. In the business world many an executive comes to realize this keenly enough. Many do not mind telling us that their really great trouble lies in finding men who are not only capable and generally satisfactory in their immediate work, but also honest, full of proper loyalty to the firm, in short, morally trustworthy.

While we are speaking of this, let us keep in mind the problem of the progress in material welfare of the good taken as a group—the thing which we have taken as the true index to the world's integrity, its progress on the whole. How is the civilized world treating its good men?

By failing to be frank about the need for placing character foremost in appraising our fellows, not only have we made the way to their appraisal far slower and more circuitous than it need be, but we have permitted them as a group to become actually less and less independent. Combined with the mischievous belief in automatic progress and automatic reward, this is the more completely the case: by our tacit consent, our failure to will otherwise, good deeds make the man, not the more free, but decidedly the less free. The economic results of the good life on the whole tie down the man with those innumerable considerations, cautions, in short burdens, which

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ever go with small income and lack of fruitful appreciation and effective gratitude on the part of the world.

Thus, even outside the fact that the honest poor who wind up in the almshouses receive markedly less sympathy than the crooks who enjoy the accommodations of our up-to-date jail resorts—a condition which may or may not improve in a radical and permanent way within the next two or three centuries —the crook's chances are declared by a number of authorities to be greater than those in many an honest and honored profession—and this in spite of the increasing attention which increasing crime draws from us.

Among those who believe honesty to be getting rarer, which is a way of saying more difficult, harder on the individual, which is a way of saying less rewarded on the whole, is John B. Watson, our outstanding exponent of the behaviorist school of psychology. In business, especially, it is getting more difficult to be honest, says he. And Edward A. Ross, the eminent sociologist, warns us that where competition is keen (we realize it is getting keener all the time) the plane of practice is determined by the least scrupulous man who succeeds in the business. Sooner or later the others are forced out of business, or else are enabled to remain in only by approximating his plane. It seems certain that reward for moral services, in business as well as outside of it, cannot be intrusted to the nature of things. It does not come of laissez faire, but comes only according as definite attention and effort is directed toward that end.

Thus it becomes increasingly clear that the thing we need above all to do is to work for a better and more widespread understanding of the nature of reward and its office in all human affairs. We need to work for a fully broad application of that principle which all capitalism claims as its very foundation, "reward for service rendered." We need to work for an application not limited to the laborer, by acclaim so worthy of his hire, nor to the business man, ever claiming title to his re-

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ward on the grounds of service rendered. In short we need to work for an application of reward which covers the most important of all service, all labor, which sort happens to be least surely or directly connected with reward, and covers it just as thoroughly as it covers the most physical, tangible, self-evident sort, which sort happens to be most directly connected with reward. Since the most important service is that which is primarily social, moral, it follows that we must work for the interest of all things—institutions, customs, habit systems—which make for good men's receiving in one way or another the good things of the world which an unhindered justice would have them receive.

And as we work we will win. Slowly, perhaps, but surely enough, love will find a way, the love of the good, useful, and deserving among us for their good, useful, and deserving fellows. Its way will be greatly enlightened by the knowledge that there is no conspiracy on the part of nature itself to uphold the good, and that progress is far from automatic. Then co-operation will become ever closer on the part of the good and useful among men. Loyalty to all things which make for the abiding interest of morality and society will grow ever stronger as it feeds itself through loyalty to one another on the part of men whose loyalty is high. The good men—and they are most truly men—will accordingly be treated more and more by one another in true Kantian fashion, that is, as ends and not merely as means. More effort will be given to seeing that the deserving man is actually rewarded, and less effort to surmising beforehand just how the man will use his well-deserved reward. Good men will learn to show faith in one another—active faith. They will wring from one another the least possible amount of freedom-destroying pledges and commitments. The good, the true, the beautiful friendship will be found most fully.

NORWOOD, VIRGINIA.

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THE FAMILY IN MODERN LIFE

L. L. BERNARD

FOR some time it has been easily apparent that the family is now undergoing a process of disorganization, or possibly reorganization, which is either permanent or transitional. This is not in itself necessarily so unique a situation, for the family has always and everywhere been in process of transformation, sometimes rapidly and sometimes slowly. Cultural history reveals to us at least two major transformations in family life which apparently have been as nearly universal as the material culture conditions with which they have been associated. Whether the present signs of domestic unrest represent another major transformation of an analogous kind can be determined only by an adequate study of the facts. The present paper is an attempt to present in brief and schematic form some of the underlying data and principles which must be taken into consideration if the present processes of family reorganization and disorganization are to be understood and controlled—if they can be controlled. It is based on the assumption that an understanding of social processes is as dependent upon scientific analysis as is the understanding of any other set of phenomena.

I

First, we may consider the causes of family disorganization. If we consider that all social problems are the result of the advance or the lag of one phase of a cultural complex with respect to another phase,[1] we shall find ample evidence of this

[1] W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (New York, 1922), and Davis, Barnes, and Others, *Introduction to Sociology* (New York, 1927), p. 580, have stated the case of cultural lag. However, the negative theory of cultural lag seems to me to be inadequate in and of itself to explain social disorganization. It may bring the strain incident to social maladjustment into consciousness and thus produce the recognition of a problem, but it does not create the problem. The problem is primarily the result of a cultural advance, and only secondarily of a cultural lag. It is the indication that the maladjustment following cultural advance on the material side is in

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sort of unadjusted relationship between the family and the industrial and general social practices of our present-day civilization. Considering, therefore, present family disorganization as a case of lag of the domestic institutions behind other more dynamic phases of our culture—especially behind the material or industrial, which generally takes the lead—we may divide the resulting causes of disorganization into two general types of factors: (1) the fundamental, or indirectly operating, and (2) the incidental and derivative, or directly operating. The significance of these types of factors will become sufficiently apparent as we proceed with our analysis.

We should also, for our purposes of analysis of causes of disorganization due to cultural advance and cultural lag, separate the types of culture into three categories instead of the usual dichotomy, material and non-material. This tripartite division of culture is rendered necessary because, in the first place, institutionalized culture is not always non-material, and secondly, there is frequently a wide distinction in the social import of formal and non-formal culture. Therefore we may, for the present purposes, classify culture under the three following categories: (1) Material culture, including the material inventions and physical aspects of industry generally, as they appear especially in the so-called industrial revolution; (2) institutionalized or formal culture, which tends to adapt to the new material processes in a self-conscious society such as ours; (3) the non-institutionalized culture of personal reactions and habits, which tends to make informal adjustments of individuals to the other two cultural environments.

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process. It is the cultural advance or change in the material and closely related institutional environments which brings about the necessity of new institutional and personal adjustments. However, it is true, perhaps, that there would be less consciousness of strain, less recognition of problems, if one phase of the culture did not lag behind the other. It is, of course, the non-material culture which usually lags behind the material culture in a general cultural advance, although this is not always the case. Social problems appear because it is necessary to bring the non-material culture into conformity with the advancing material culture.

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II

The material culture, or the physico-social environment,[2] especially as it has developed through the industrial revolution, is in process of producing a new world institutionally, and especially in the non-institutional culture. The new material culture, because of its economic significance, or, as Sumner would say, its maintenance function, appeared first. The necessity of bringing the institutional and non-institutional or informal aspects of our social environments or culture into line with the material aspects is the explanation of the strain upon the family organization. But the development of a new material culture is, in the last analysis, the fundamental and indirect cause of the transformation of the family, for the family is itself a part of this non-material and institutional culture which is arising in conformity to the new material culture. The material culture is the indirect cause, because ordinarily it transforms the institutions by first transforming the informal or non-institutional contacts and directly operating social processes. This fact is illustrated in what follows.

1. The advance of the material culture has broken up what Professor Cooley indicates as the primary group organization of society,[3] and has substituted a derivative group organization as determinative in its stead. Consequently people's lives are no longer dominated chiefly by primary groups, at least in their late childhood and adult years, but by large impersonal groups, such as industrial and political units, through which we have not yet learned adequately to place responsibility or to maintain control in society. The primary groups remain, but they themselves have come under the dominance and shaping influence of the overhead impersonal or derivative groups. While they still do much to shape hu-

[2] For a discussion of the social environments, as the sociological equivalent of the anthropological term "culture," and especially of the physico-social environment, see L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, chap. vi, and "A Classification of Environments," *American Journal of Sociology* (November, 1925).

[3] C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, chaps. iii and iv.

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man nature directly, their character is increasingly determined by factors and processes that are often far removed from the direct and simple expression of human nature. Life becomes, as a consequence, increasingly regimented with respect to impersonal and non-spontaneous social and economic processes. This new overhead, abstract, group organization frequently changes the allegiance of the individual to the primary group or removes him from it altogether. Thus the family is being increasingly disrupted by the demands and rewards of modern industry, and the new civic organization of the world has all but destroyed the old localism by which men were born, lived, and died in a single community, and, frequently under the same roof.

2. With the breaking down of the dominance of primary group organization and control has passed also the dominance of the primary attitudes and ideals which primary or face-to-face organizations sponsored. In the old social order, before the coming of the new cultures, these primary attitudes and contacts determined our loyalties and gave emotional sanction to our principles, or even determined them for us. All of this made for an emotional continuity of our culture which rendered social control fairly easy. The absence of such determination and guidance of our loyalties and principles under the new social order has brought us dangerously near to social chaos.

3. These changes in group organization and attitudinal control have been brought about in two ways:

a) The new material culture of the industrial system has fostered a new institutional organization in law and in business practice, especially as respects the rights and privileges of women and children, which permits a new alignment of individuals to society as a whole or in larger units to supplant the old alignment and loyalty to the small family and neighborhood groups and to individuals. These new social organizations we call derivative groups. They differ from primary

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groups in that their contacts are not face to face, but are indirect, and their organization is abstract rather than concrete and personal. For example, the legal right of women to work for wages outside of the home and to retain the wages of their labor has dissolved their primary economic dependence upon the home group and has transferred it to the derivative industrial group and the derivative political group, the state. The obvious social result here is that the primary home group becomes secondary in power of control to industry and to other derivative groups of which the worker becomes a member. If the home retains its dominance in control under such conditions it will be because of the voluntary decision of the members; and this voluntary loyalty may snap under the strain of conflict with loyalties to wider and more derivative and compelling groups. Likewise, in case of a conflict of interests between members of the same primary group, such as the home, the revolting member may easily secede, because in most cases ready protection can be had from the derivative groups.

b) The new material culture in part calls the members of the primary groups away from their close contacts within the primary groups into wider and more abstract relationships in the fulfilment of their duties, and in part it makes such a transference of association possible through the fact that it has made feasible the establishment and economic support of numerous aesthetic, reactional, civic, religious, and other derivative cultural activities which are constantly clamoring for, and stimulating to, membership. Thus we observe that in cities especially there is no longer any appreciable continuity to, or permanency of, neighborhood life, and along with the new and growing tenant system on our farms the same transitoriness of neighborhood life is appearing there also. Likewise the city home, at least for large classes of our population, has come to be perhaps more nominal than real after the period of infancy and early childhood has passed. The farm

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family still remains fairly intact because the economic interests of the members of the farm family are likely to be concentrated upon the farm itself, until the sons and daughters go away to the city. Here, as in the preceding types of cases, the individuals in the primary groups are constantly building up new interest alignments and new loyalties to the derivative groups with which they become associated. These new interests and loyalties work in many cases to the permanent hurt of the primary group allegiances with which they are in functional conflict.

4. As yet we have not worked out a new philosophy of loyalties to the derivative group contacts which are as consistent and as highly socialized and moralized as were the old primary attitudes and ideals. The new relationship is too abstract and too difficult to grasp for the average mind. The old primary ideals and attitudes could be formulated in the folk mind itself in the actual process of living, of day-to-day adjustments. The new loyalties or principles of moral and social relationships on an abstract or derivative contact basis will have to be formulated by social science as the joint product of the social theorist and of the social technologist or social worker. The individual cannot do it for himself. We must build around this new body of social principles adapted to the needs of our derivative social organization a new religious and moral sanction if it is to be effective. We must also find some way of making it preserve the good and the indispensable in the old primary group loyalties and ideals. But this is not easy to do.

III

If we apply these general facts of social analysis to the problem of the family disorganization which is so patent today we reach the following conclusions:

1 and 2. Family organization and loyalties are disrupted. There is a lack of unity within the home; divorce continues to increase; domestic co-operation is less effective. Also, as a

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training place for attitudes and ideals of the future generation, we find that there are many things to disquiet us. We hear much more of juvenile delinquency and immorality than we did formerly. The family, in certain districts at least, has lost much of its hold upon the young. They also, like the adults, are finding their main associations outside of the home, even at a very tender age. Sometimes we have cause to wonder if the new generation, trained up or not trained as it is, will be very capable, as future fathers and mothers, of giving this training to their children. Thus we see that this new material culture and the new institutional culture which follows it are indirectly, through their effects upon the types of social organization, (1) damaging the unity of the family, (2) lessening materially its power to train the young in socialized attitudes and loyalties.

3. We have seen also that many more of the economic functions of the family are being removed and transferred to derivative group organizations by these material cultural and institutional organizations. The social worker, even, is busily engaged in building up organizations and legal institutions which will make easy the transfer of many of the economic and recreational and health and aesthetic activities from the home to derivative group organizations. Examples of this activity are the social workers' promotion of day nurseries, community recreation, visiting nursing, clinics, hospitals, orphanages, child-care programs, homes for the aged, the various forms of social insurance, outdoor relief, etc. I have no desire to criticize the social worker for these activities. She is not really engaged in breaking up the home; she is trying to supplement the home where the new types of derivative social organization of which I have spoken have already produced their inroads on the chief of our primary institutions, the family, and its attitudes and ideals.

4. Yet the family was not and is not wholly an economic and recreational and health and aesthetic group or institu-

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tion. If it were we might view with more complacency the passing of these functions under the dominance of derivative group control. But it has been also a biological institution, invented or established in part to give expression to certain biological capacities and interests, such as the normal release of the sex impulses, the birth of children, and the nurture of children.

5. At this point we observe a notable fact in regard to cultural revolution. We may have inferred from the preceding discussion that there is little lag between the informal and formal or institutional cultural activities and organizations on the one hand and the new material culture or the industrial system on the other, as respects the economic, recreational, and health and aesthetic functions which formerly belonged almost exclusively to the family. The social workers even are helping the lag to disappear with respect to these functions. But they are by no means as anxious to have it disappear on the biological side, and substitute informal sex relationships and non-familial nurture of children. In fact, one of the most serious complaints regarding the disorganization of the modern family is that it seems to be destroying sex morals and threatens to force an increasing number of children out of the more sympathetic character-forming influences of the home and into some sort of substitute homes or even into derivative controls where there is no adequate character-forming influence available. Many are mistrustful of the future of a society where this happens. And yet we find that the cultural lag grows ever less here as in other instances, although not so rapidly. When the traditional family breaks down as a biological organization these functions are transferred either to a wider and more derivative group control, or, in the absence of such organized and socially sanctioned control, they are thrown back upon individual initiative and choice for their exercise, which ordinarily means social chaos.

And this latter is what is being done in large measure

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today. Here, more than elsewhere perhaps, the social worker and the social theorist have not worked out adequate social principles for social control of the biological functions on a derivative basis. We prefer to keep these functions on a primary or family group basis, but every social worker knows that this is not being done with the degree of success that is generally desired. The younger generation—the very young one—no longer uniformly regard the establishment of a family relationship as the essential preliminary to sexual expression. Also there is a growing demand, on the part of certain types, for the privilege of motherhood, for those who desire it, outside of marriage. As distressing as these tendencies may be, it is difficult to see how they can be wholly prevented as long as the derivative group organization, functioning as the expression of our new industrial or material culture, continues to break down the old primary group organizations of the family and the neighborhood. Here again the social worker is helping to diminish the lag of the informal and institutional cultures when she secures legislation which makes the father responsible for the care of the illegitimate child, or which makes easier separate maintenance for the mother with her legitimate child. Again, I am not criticizing the social worker. It is not she who is breaking down the family organization. She is trying to repair the ravages of the material culture and the corresponding institutional organization upon the primary group organization and control. But it is of some importance that she see what results she causes as well as what she primarily desires to effect.

6. In the new generation, therefore, the lag of attitudes and of ideals has largely disappeared, and we do not regard it as altogether a matter for congratulation. Young men and young women are, though not very intelligently, and rather blindly on the whole, because of a lack of guiding social science, adapting their beliefs and practices to the changed and derivative organizations of society. The fixity of family re-

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lationships is largely passing for this generation in practice. It is passing likewise in their emotions. The city is the destroyer of family loyalties, except in the more protected circumstances. Even the desire for marriage on the part of many men and women is becoming largely a halting one, and its consummation is delayed by anticipated regrets for the loss of freedom and privileges which it involves. Is it strange, then, that the divorce rate continues to mount from year to year and from decade to decade in the face of all of the optimistic forecasts to the contrary?

IV

However, the problem of family disorganization is not made clear by a consideration of the fundamental and indirect causes only. The incidental or direct ones, although of less basic importance, are necessary to give the picture concreteness of content. The incidental causes are derived from the fundamental ones. Some of the more important of these will be mentioned briefly, without any attempt to offer a complete account of the matter.

1. The economic independence of women, which has resulted from the institutionalization of the new material culture, has had profound and far-reaching effects upon the disorganization of the family, both negatively and positively. Negatively, it has freed woman from some of the worst forms of oppression and repression. Positively, it has stimulated her to the development of a personality and an individuality analogous to, and independent of, that of the man, with the result that she not infrequently finds it difficult to merge herself in so communal an institution as the family.

2. More immediately effective in this connection is the development of an assertive personality by the modern woman. She thinks for herself, learns to make decisions, and insists upon planning her personal life, and claims for herself a large degree of freedom of movement and of choice. Since the family organization tends to become increasingly more

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incidental in modern social life, for the basic reasons dwelt upon before, and since its maintenance and perpetuation are largely the results of sacrifice and compromise by the contracting parties, it becomes increasingly difficult to harmonize the variant interests of two self-asserting personalities in the same limited institution of the family. Where there are children in whom the woman largely loses herself for a period of years (if she does) the sharpness of the conflict of personalities is at least temporarily mitigated. But even here the law, representing the derivative group control, may permit of disintegration by providing for separate maintenance of mother and child, on rather slender grounds, at the expense of the father. Perhaps the best sort of safeguard against this conflict of personalities within the family is to fuse the personalities in a common work or interest where this is possible. But as yet it is not generally feasible.

3. Where the woman has no regular occupation and the material culture has set her free from many of her household duties, she may develop society or other aesthetic and recreational interests as substitutes. These not infrequently constitute a heavy drain upon family finances and otherwise disintegrate home life. Not infrequently such social and recreational interests of the wife make such heavy demands upon the husband as to cause him to neglect his business or profession; or, if he will not do this, hard feelings may arise and a closer association with someone else may be formed by the "neglected" party. Such difficulties are possibly more frequent among the professional and business classes than among the manual working elements of the population.

4. A more serious cause of disintegration, possibly, for the average family is the fact that a woman who works before marriage is likely to acquire habits of expenditure and a plane of living, especially on the recreational and aesthetic sides, which cannot be maintained after marriage. Since the girl has been more protected than the boy in our civilization, she

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is usually expected to contribute less to her fundamental responsibilities, such as food and shelter, before marriage. Consequently her personal expenditures develop largely along the line of ornamental clothing and expensive amusements. Also, since it is not conventional for the woman to contribute to the founding of a family, she has no incentive to save, at least as long as she looks forward confidently to the ultimate refuge of marriage. The slender income of the average husband after marriage will not provide the accustomed luxuries, and the resulting dissatisfaction often eventuates in divorce. I am convinced that this situation as a whole is one of the most potent immediate causes of family instability in our modern industrial cities. Often the anticipation of such a hard struggle after marriage delays marriage for the girl until she becomes too sophisticated to become a contented wife and she has developed so much independence of personality that she does not easily make adjustments to her husband, which tradition still holds she, rather than he, should make. Often, also, she develops a mercenary attitude toward marriage which bodes ill for its success.

5. Not infrequently the mothers do much to encourage this mercenary attitude in their daughters by saying repeatedly to them that they hope that they will never have as hard a time as they (the mothers) have had. Frequently they neglect to train their daughters in household technique, as a negative method of preventing them from being "slaves to men." All of this might be very well from the family standpoint if there were enough good incomes earned by men to make every marriageable young woman a lady of leisure. From an individualistic standpoint, as distinguished from that of the family, it may possibly be entirely justifiable.

6. Outside work creates in a girl a love of excitement and of crowded places and a distaste for the quietness of home life. Outside work has its regular hours and definite tasks, while the never ending and disorganized duties of the home are

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nerve wearing by comparison. Also, the "tired" shop girl, who is going out at night, does not get much practice in home making. And besides, she remembers her mother as a domestic servant for all of the family, including herself, and she dreads such a finale to her present interesting experiences and freedom and play.

7. But the most disturbing of all of the disorganizing factors of the incidental sort is the fact that the young woman's interest in young men in our day has come to be one largely of entertainment rather than of marriage. In her early years of independence she is likely to dread and postpone marriage because it threatens to isolate her and to curtail her freedom. But this avoidance of marriage as an immediate end does not deter her from seeking the companionship of men. Since tradition and custom, which were fixed before women became economically independent, decree that the male shall be the entertainer outside of the home (the modern girl does not entertain her men friends very much in her home), she soon discovers that by remaining single she is better provided with the luxuries of life by a man than if she marries him. There has, it is to be feared, also grown up a practice on the part of the average girl of exploiting the young man financially. Many girls expect to be carried in an automobile, to have the best seats at the theater, to have suppers after the theater, and, not content with what the young man offers of his own initiative, the modern girl is accustomed to ask the man for whatever she wants. This is truly a long way from the mores of our grandmothers. The practical effect of such practices of exploitation is that the man is not permitted to save for future family life, and both he and the girl come to accept the status or relationship of friends, which increasingly involves favors of a different sort from her in return for his economic liberality—all of which decidedly disintegrates the idealism and loyalty which formerly attached to the idea of marriage.

One word of explanation and warning should be intro-

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duced here. It may seem as if I have thrown most of the burden of family disorganization upon the shoulders of women. Such has not been the intention. I am not seeking to blame either men or women. Social workers and sociologists should long ago have learned that retaliation has no place in social analysis and improvement. It is our business to unravel causes in order that effective correctives and preventives may be applied. The fundamental cause of family disorganization, it is argued here, lies back in the growth of new material and institutional cultures which have grown up as a cause and consequence of our highly dynamic industrial system. The family is being endangered by impersonal forces much more powerful than any one individual or class of individuals. It so happens that the new order of things is having its chief transforming effect through women, at least directly. This change in our material and institutional cultures has set women free from their traditional and customary allegiances and alliances much more generally and widely than it has set men free. It is because of this major transformation of the lives and rights and duties and personalities of women, rather than of men, that the direct and incidental causes of family disorganization operate primarily through women. They are the dynamic factors in our present changing social order. But when we come to consider remedies for the situation, we must consider men equally with women.

V

How can the problem of family disorganization be solved?

1. Some say there is no solution, except to remove the lag in personal or informal attitudes and practices behind our material and institutional cultures. They would allow the industrial and derivative order of our modern society to have its normal and calculated effect, perhaps regretfully, but nevertheless convinced that man cannot stem the tide of inevitable evolution. They feel that the great impersonal organizations of society are more powerful than individuals.

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2. Others would say that we must keep the family as it is, that we must find some new center of interest to which to attach the disintegrating loyalties. They would hold that what the family loses in breadth of function may possibly be compensated by intensity of service. But these seekers for a stable basis of family organization have not yet furnished us with a program.

3. Others still would force women out of industry and back into the home; they would return her to her old-time tutelage. But they perhaps forget that she must give her consent to this program. Also, she is now an integral part of our new derivative industrial and political system, and this system would itself have to be transformed in order to eliminate her from her present functioning in it. This cannot be done by resolutions or by wishing.

4. Some, on the other hand, take a cheerful view of the matter. They say that the family served useful functions in earlier stages of social evolution and it will continue to serve some of these functions for those who value them. But for others, perhaps a growing number, they would say, the family must be displaced by other and less primary agencies which will serve the new order more adequately. Of this many are not convinced. They do not yet see how other agencies can give the direction to character formation which the young of each generation must have if they are to develop into adequately socialized personalities.

VI

Without offering a final solution for the problem, I should like to broach three suggestions, which I believe are fundamental for the consideration of any group of persons who desire to study this problem otherwise than superficially.

1. It is not a problem that will solve itself, that is, work itself out and bring the traditional family back safe and sound to the place it started from, before the new cultures disturbed its functional equilibrium. Those who think this are mistak-

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en. Social evolution rarely repeats itself, and it has now embarked upon a new process or pathway. If the family is to be kept intact it will require the most diligent efforts and thought of the social scientists and social workers.

2. The old primary basis of social organization is largely destroyed. At least its self-direction and independent dominance are gone from modern life. The social workers must come to see that we live in a world of derivative groups and attitudes and ideals.[4] They will need all the help that the sociologist and the social psychologist can give them if they are to understand and make adjustment to the new order of things.

3. Social workers themselves, through their wider social and legislative programs, are doing more and more to hasten the disappearance of the lag of the informal and institutional cultures behind the demands of the material culture. That is, they are making easy through their social reforms the transference of social life to a derivative instead of a primary basis of organization. However, as said before, they are not creating the necessity for this transformation. They are merely making more humane the changes which are produced by causes which lie back of them and which they may deplore but cannot control.

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[4] See L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York: Holt, 1926), chaps. xxvi and xxvii.

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A SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND HEDONISM

ROY C. CAVE

AN EFFECTIVE criticism of an ethical system involves an examination of the metaphysical postulates or theories upon which it is based. Lately, metaphysical theories of any kind have been subjected to severe criticism. It is asserted that the study of metaphysics has resulted in nothing but mental calisthenics and barren conceptions. A further objection might be suggested, that it is quite impossible to have one final, metaphysical ethics when so many metaphysical systems are advocated at the same time. Under such conditions the attempt at one absolute ethical system seems futile from the very beginning.

The static aspect of any metaphysical formula has also been called to account. If the universe is so essentially tied up with change or process, any static interpretation of it must of necessity be inaccurate and temporary. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the character of the change-process generally conceded to be going on may itself be subject to change. New forms create new modes of behavior.[1] What, then, is the answer? Can we rely on Hedonism, or any other ethical system resting on an assumption of underlying changeless conditions when the universe as a drift with a drift within itself seems to be the ultra-modern view of the non-metaphysicians?

There is a marked need in the field of ethics for a different and more satisfactory method. And why should not that method be the one of science? It seems indeed peculiar that in spite of the present bias for scientific and pseudo-scientific methods in the social sciences, the field of ethics has remained almost unsullied from its touch. It has perhaps been looked upon as a thing apart, only to a minor degree amenable to close analysis and generalization. Recognition and proof of

[1] It is well known that in the so-called "exact" sciences natural laws are now looked at askance. Elaborate qualification and anticipation of new developments are now more in order.

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the relativity of morals have been undertaken by anthropologists and sociologists, rather than by specialists within the field of ethics. The double yoke of metaphysical and religious dogma seems to have lain heavily on the shoulders of these latter. As yet, no comprehensive attempt toward a scientific ethics has been undertaken. Ethicists have been content to cull over the data gathered incidentally by scientists in other fields, especially anthropology. The scientific method would involve, of course, a close study of ethical institutions as to origin, character, and function. It would require also a study of other institutions influencing those under survey.

This method of study would contribute no absolute ethical system. It would, however, give us some insight into actual types of moral adaptations to given situations. In other words, it would give us some idea of *existing* ethical systems, in contradistinction to *proposed* ideal systems which seldom relate up with the evolutionary process. Ethics would in this way be taken from the hands of the reformer and idealist and placed in those of the scientist and materialist.

Scientific methods are not the only ones which can be employed. Other civilizations than ours, existing now or at previous times, have been content with far different modes of investigation and remedial measures. Even as we are amused at the antics of the medicine man, witch-doctor, and astrologer, so may the activities of our scientists and pseudo-scientists titillate the risibilities of future generations. Who can say for certain which method is best? The resulting civilizations differ qualitatively; and there is no final standard for comparison. Our present predilection for the opaque methods of science, as Mr. Veblen would put it, rests on their seeming greater efficacy. Some of their acknowledged shortcomings are logical conclusions based upon arbitrary classifications, often with slight evidence, and a tendency on the whole

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toward too much rigidity.[2] There is also no settled opinion as to the extent to which the inductive method, as against the deductive, should be utilized. In spite of all these difficulties, and many more, the methods of science have taken the field and are not to be gainsaid. The "putative cumulative causal sequence of events" still is satisfactorily explanatory for most alleged scholars.[3]

One might possibly ask just what a science of ethics could contribute to the real values of life. To which this counter-question might be returned: Are there any "real values" in life? It has become a commonplace that what we see is one thing and what we think we see is quite another. So it is with what we do. Accordingly, our judgments on what is "best" conduct are not likely to be very reliable,—assuming for the moment that there is a best way of doing anything. Life itself may very well have no "real" meaning. To be sure, it has many *imputed* meanings; but these imputations may themselves have been "occasioned by forces or conditions which look to no end." It is certainly consistent with the materialistic position of science to look upon the human race and all its attributes as being an outcome of the objective forces of nature.

The same may be said of life-values. It would appear, then, that imputed meanings and values are decidedly no escape or solution. A lack of full knowledge, however, forbids

[2] Classes of things are not found in the world about us. They are created for purposes of analysis and generalization. The human race, for example, has no definite limits. From embryons, monkey-men, and monstrosities it ranges to what in terms of current standards is genius, and nowhere is there any definite line of demarcation. In the same way, scientific time intervals are arbitrary. Time gives evidence of being a continuous flow. At all events it is not a matter of hours, minutes, and seconds.

[3] It would be more accurate to speak of change in terms of a succession which is non-purposive than to treat it as teleological, or to impute to isolated objects (which are arbitrarily isolated) animate purposes of their own. Particular objects do not do things. A given situation is the outcome of complicated relationships. Change indicates that these relationships have no underlying stability.

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any definite conclusion on the question. In fact, it seems almost inane to dabble with a problem which is "absolute" in character. The relative nature of things, if accepted, seems to destroy the necessity of worrying about "real values" and "real meanings" of life. Obviously, in a relative world no one thing is any more real than another, except the fact of relativity itself.

Let us see how this train of thought affects such an ethical doctrine as Hedonism. Hedonism is still frequently confused with Utilitarianism. Nothing is so disgusting as to pick up a self-advertised refutation of Hedonism and to find it to consist of an orthodox list of arguments against Bentham's famous formula. The pleasure-pain formula is only a phase of Hedonism taken in the broader sense. It is therefore not enough to refute it, for other variants of the theory must be reckoned with. Ethical and universal Hedonists, for example, do not contend that most of us pursue pleasure and avoid pain whenever possible. They simply claim that pleasure is found by experience to be the highest value in life. Nor do they say that pain is the opposite of pleasure. They assert its opposite to be unpleasure, which includes pain. Ethical Hedonists believe that pleasure is the highest good for the individual. Universal Hedonists argue in terms of the group. The more pleasure enjoyed by the group, the greater the social good, i.e., the greater the average individual good. The position of the ethical Hedonists seems most impregnable. It can be argued against universal Hedonism that pleasures of different persons are qualitatively distinct; and that capacities to enjoy vary. But the former position can also be met. Pleasure as the highest value to the individual can be denied. In the first place, lack of sufficient knowledge weighs against the hedonic conclusion. We are not necessarily accurate judges of our experiences. Moreover, it is probable that the possibilities of human experience have only been tapped. And again, changes in human nature are gradually taking place.

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Finally, there is the historical argument, which is the most effective of all. We are part and parcel of a historical process, whether it be idealistic or materialistic, which has been going on in a sort of timeless way. It can therefore be plausibly argued that the conclusions which we draw about our position in the universe are merely an outcome of the process itself. Unless it is a God, or the mind of a God who is conscious of himself, the process can have no value in itself. It can only have value to conscious beings, who feel and compare and think. And, as was pointed out before, the values we assume to exist are brought about in our minds by the change-process of which we are a part.

Other more common arguments may be advanced against the general position of Hedonism on its own ground. (1) Hedonists may be unusual. Most other people may find duty, for example, to be more valuable than pleasure. (2) The capacities of individuals to enjoy pleasure may vary so greatly as to suggest that a few persons should get all the "gravy" in order that the greatest good be achieved. (3) Qualitative differences in the pleasures of different persons would suggest that pleasures are the goods, not pleasure is the good. Such would be a very untenable position. (4) The argument seems to fall to the ground if it is a particular pleasure and not pleasure in general that we desire and enjoy. (5) Finally, the old argument that the sum of pleasures is not a pleasure is still effective to some degree against the notions of social good and group pleasures. These will suffice to indicate the orthodox line of argument against what some propagandists call the "pig-trough philosophy of life."

The discussion has been much concerned with the idea of change or process, and its inaccurate expression in the static terms of metaphysics. The objection raised is not so much to the use of conceptions, which are necessarily static in their character; it is rather in opposition to the construction of final or absolute systems of thought concerning the world

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about us and our conduct within its confines. There can, of course, be no such thing as a purely dynamic ethics. The concepts employed even in describing changing moral institutions invariably assume a static character. It follows, as night the day, reform the church, and our flag the dollar, that an accurate expression of what is going on is quite impossible. Given a particular relative way of looking at the world, the problem is not which method of analysis will give us the truth; it is which method will give us the most accurate story. Scientific truth is not actual truth, though the logic of its generalizations and conclusions be faultless.[4] Contrary to the belief of many, there is no sharp break apparent between a static and a dynamic interpretation of any phase of social evolution. Any attempt at a dynamic system reveals the impossibility of escaping from concepts which assume at least a temporary cessation of change, as the ethico-economist, J. B. Clark, is said to have discovered. On the other hand, static systems have a way of breaking down under the pressure of new institutions which demand explanation and rationalization. Many leading writers have noted what appears to be a distinct institutional lag.[5] This is sometimes expressed by the saying, "the majority is always wrong."

On the whole, the move toward a quasi-dynamic interpretation of social institutions, such as is now taking place in the field of economics, seems most suitable and in more accord with scientific method. Regional and disciplined studies of actual changes are in this way required, and these often take the form of observing new norms which arise. It is unfortunate that the impersonal methods of science are so rarely employed without some lapse into moral issues. There is hardly a writer in the social sciences who does not make his work in part null and void by digressing at some length on the good

[4] Truth is here used in the relative sense, and on the basis of idea coinciding with fact.

[5] Bernard Shaw and Bertrand Russell, for example. This lag seems most marked in legal and religious circles.

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and bad effects of this or that condition.[6] Such questions more fittingly belong to religious minds and the numerous breeds of reformers than to social scientists, including those in the field of ethics.

In conclusion, it is suggested that the arguments which have been leveled against Hedonism might in the main have been applied with equal force against any other accepted ethical system, from Graeco-Christian ethics to Pragmatism. The refutation attempted in the preceding is merely an outline. A far more careful and comprehensive survey is needed. The same may be said concerning the specific matter of a more scientific method in ethics. It deserves a more able and elaborate justification than has been here undertaken.

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[6] This ethical coloring is usually quite serious, and has greatly impeded scientific research. In the field of economics, condemnation of monopoly and of instalment buying are good examples.

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MORALS, MORALITY, AND ETHICS: SUGGESTED TERMINOLOGY

HAROLD N. LEE

ARE THE terms "ethics" and "morals" interchangeable terms, wholly or partially synonymous? What is the relation between them: what do they mean? Is the term "ethics" used accurately in the naming of such subjects as "practical ethics," "Christian ethics," etc.? Are the studies of business ethics and legal ethics and journalistic ethics really studies of ethics, or are they studies of the accepted moral procedure of that particular profession? All these questions are pertinent in America today because the solution of many of the larger problems concerning the methods and objectives of the study of ethics depends in large measure upon the answer which we give to them.

One meets an uncertainty in America today concerning the study of ethics, and this uncertainty seems to be fostered in part by the dispute over the relation between ethics and current morality. There seems to be a sentiment, encouraged by many specialists in the social sciences, that the objectives of a study of ethics should be determined by their practical import. There is a widespread feeling that the function of a study of ethics should be to aid in the solution of the problems of current morality. This feeling even goes so far sometimes as to lead one to suppose that ethics and current morality are the same. Many textbooks of general ethics use the terms "ethics" and "morals" interchangeably, or else they do not distinguish between them with sufficient accuracy. Even in the case of those which do use the terms with discrimination, their accuracy is wholly unappreciated by the majority of students, even at the completion of their course. Specific attention needs to be called to the meaning of these terms and their relation to each other.

In the first place the term "morals" may be used in two

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very different senses. There is a broad meaning and a narrow meaning for the term "morals." In general, I shall endeavor to restrict the use of the word "morals" to the broad field and shall use the word "morality" to denote the narrow. This is in the interest of clear terminology and is in accordance with traditional usage. Both of these terms apply within the same broad field of discourse, although "morals" is applicable to the whole field, while "morality" has a more restricted meaning. Let us take up the meaning of the broader term first, taking as a point of departure the description of the broad field. Then the narrower term can be defined more easily as it is operative within the broad field.

This field is a field of values. When we are talking about morals we are talking about certain kinds of values. But there are many other kinds of values and evaluations other than those with which morals are concerned. An attempt must be made to determine the particular kind of values which we call moral values. The different evaluations of phenomena are different ways of looking at phenomena: the different values are different aspects which phenomena wear. Any particular phenomenon may lie in two or more of these different fields of value. It may be evaluated in one way, say aesthetically, or it may be evaluated in another way, say economically. There is, for example, a certain field of phenomena whose perceptual aspect is evaluated intrinsically according to the pleasure or displeasure which this perceptual aspect affords. Values of this kind are called beauty, and the broad field is the field of aesthetics. Human constructions within this field, constructed in order to call forth this specific evaluation, are called works of art.

The broad field for which we are searching may be reached in a similar way. If the phenomenon considered be a piece of conduct or human action, and if it be evaluated in terms of its aims or results, the value arrived at is called the good, and the aspect considered in this evaluation is the moral aspect.

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This field is traditionally called the broad field of morals. Systematic human constructions within this field, constructed in order to call forth this specific evaluation, may be called moralities, or systems of morality. This definition of the broad field of morals may be correct either upon a formalistic view of morals or upon an empirical view, for the difference between the formalistic and empirical theories is subsequent to the determination of the broad field in which they operate. The principles upon which a formalistic theory would base its evaluations deal with conduct, and they aim toward some "end of man," no matter what that end may be, and they have results which tend in the long run to influence their application.

First of all, then, the term "morals" refers to the broad field of conduct evaluated in terms of its aims, ends, or results. The word morals, when used in this sense, of course does not refer to any kind of a body of doctrine or imply any beliefs about how conduct should be regulated. It refers to a broad field of classification of phenomena. When any phenomenon is called moral, it is pointed out that it is, in that respect, different from the intellectual, the aesthetic, the scientific, etc. A moral evaluation of things aesthetic, intellectual, scientific, etc., can be made, as has been pointed out; but that means exactly what is stated in the definition of the broad field of morals: any kind of phenomenon, if evaluated as conduct, or with reference to its influence upon conduct, is evaluated morally.

The word "immoral" is not antithetical to "moral" when it is used in this way. Any phenomenon within the broad field just defined is a moral phenomenon; "immoral" has no application here at all, and is without meaning. The antithesis would be "a-moral" or "non-moral." Positive values within the broad field of morals are called good. Negative values are called bad. "Good" and "bad" are terms whose application here is entirely accurate. "Evil" is a term perhaps applicable

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to this field, but it should be used carefully and with discrimination because of its connotations within the field of religion. Systems of religion usually supply standards of morality, so the religious connotations of the term "evil" have tended to make it a term which implies a certain standard of morality. However, in the translations of the writings of Spinoza and in the writings of the English empiricists, "evil" is used merely as the antithesis of "good," i.e., as a synonym of "bad."

On taking up the difference between the broad field of morals and the narrower field which is better called morality, it must be first noted that morality denotes, not any kind of evaluated conduct, but a body of "accepted" conduct. Morality implies a standard of conduct. Morality is a more or less systematic sanction of conduct. As moralities are human constructions within the broad field of morals, that is, are systems of standardized evaluation of conduct, there have been and are many different kinds of moralities. Conventional morality is that body of conduct which is sanctioned by the custom or habit of the group of which the individual is a member. Christian morality is conduct sanctioned by the principles of Christianity. Confucian morality is conduct sanctioned by Confucius, etc. Of course, our Occidental conventional morality is akin in many respects to Christian morality, as the principles of Christianity have entered quite largely into the traditions of our civilization; but these two moralities are far from identical, because so many traditions other than the Christian tradition are potent in each larger community.

When we use the terms "right" and "wrong" we usually mean action which is right or wrong *according to some accepted standard.* Thus it would undoubtedly be in the interests of clear terminology always to use these terms as applicable only within the field of morality. "Right" and "wrong" are not wholly synonymous with "good" and "bad." "Good" and "bad" are much broader terms. Conduct which is good means

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conduct which can be given a positive evaluation. Conduct which is right means conduct which is accepted or sanctioned according to some particular system of morality. Of course, "right" has many uses outside the field of morality. When it is used as a concrete noun (plural, "rights," i.e., natural rights, etc.) it is a part of the terminology of political philosophy. When "right" and "wrong" are used merely as synonyms of "correct" and "incorrect," they are used incorrectly (not wrongly) and inaccurately. But these uses do not concern us in this paper. When used accurately with application within the scope of this paper, "right" and "wrong" refer to the sanctions of morality.

"Should," "ought," "obligation," etc., are terms which are particularly applicable to the field of morality also. When we say that a thing *should* be done, we are not talking about evaluated conduct in general, but about some sanction. The sanction is implied in the word "should." The word "duty" also denotes definitely sanctioned conduct, and therefore is particularly applicable only within the narrower field of morality, not to any phenomenon within the broad fields of morals. Morals in the broad sense does not necessarily imply any attempt to regulate conduct. A morality is such an attempt.

When we call a man a moralist, however, we may be referring to him in either of these two (the broad or the narrow) ways, because, unfortunately, we have no word built upon the term "morality" like, for example, "moralitist." A moralist, if he be called a moralist in the broad sense of the term, is one who habitually sees and judges phenomena as conduct, or according to their bearing on conduct, and the resultant evaluation. This kind of a moralist may not be concerned with any particular system of morality, least of all with conventional morality. He is one who makes a moral evaluation of all phenomena where this is at all possible. But if we would call one a moralist in the narrower sense of the term, we would mean that he is an originator, a teacher, a preacher, or an advocator

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of a certain system of morality. We would mean that he is vitally interested in a definite system of sanctions, that he is concerned with the regulation of conduct. Wordsworth and Bunyan were both moralists, but Wordsworth more in the broad sense and Bunyan more in the narrow sense. Wordsworth saw all nature in the light of its bearing upon man's life and actions; Bunyan saw and portrayed what bore directly upon the questions and problems of Puritan morality. Of course no man can be a moralist purely in only one sense without being so to some degree in the other sense also. The difference is a difference in degree, but further illustrates the relation between the two fields.

"Immoral" is a term which belongs in the field of morality. "Immoral" is a d[illegible]ption of conduct which is contrary to some certain sanction. As illustrated in the preceding paragraph, "moral" is an adjective which according to common usage applies both to morals in the broad sense and to morality. Similarly, the adjective "immoral" is commonly applied in either way; but as has been pointed out, it really has no application to the broad field, and to use it as if it had is to introduce ambiguity. I shall have no use whatsoever for the term "immoral." The adjectives derived from "morality" and "immorality," viz., "moralistic" and "immoralistic," are rather awkward, but in order to avoid all possible confusion I am going to use them, in spite of the danger of sounding pedantic. Otherwise I should have to say always, "moral in the narrow sense" or "moral in the broad sense."

Now morals and morality both refer to conduct. On the other hand, ethics is a branch of philosophy. Philosophy is not conduct, but reflection, so ethics and morals are not the same and the two terms are not at all on the same plane of definition. Their relation, however, is simple: we may philosophize about conduct, and that is exactly what we do in the study of ethics. This is the difference in meaning between the term "morals" and the term "ethics." Ethics is the philos-

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ophic investigation of the broad field of morals. Any phenomenon within this field is subject matter for the study of ethics. As all systems of morality lie within the broad field of morals, then, of course, any phenomenon of morality is included in the subject matter for the study of ethics.

Philosophy arises from reflection upon the phenomena offered by experience. When this reflection becomes systematized and ordered, critical, rational, scientific, then it *is* philosophy (in the Occidental sense). I do not wish to enter into any controversy over the ontological status or metaphysical bearing of such reflection. Any such argument would be wholly beside the point in this place. It makes no difference whether the reflection or "thought" is an epiphenomenon or a creative, energistic principle; whether it is subvocal speech or the substance of all reality; it is reflection, nevertheless, and it cannot be conjured away simply by calling it subvocal speech. Man acts; we have no theory to advance as yet why he acts or why he should act; but he does, and he also evaluates action. All this is non-reflective. But in his quieter moments he may reflect on his actions and his evaluations. This reflection is the basis of all ethics. When it becomes ordered, systematic, critical, rational investigation and reflection, then it *is* ethics. Ethics is the systematic (or scientific) attempt to understand rationally the evaluation of conduct. This is the consideration of first importance.

Ethics is the attempt to formulate the theoretic principles lying in or behind the evaluation of conduct. It attempts to find a rational basis for such evaluation. Perhaps this is a futile attempt. Perhaps it has no justification. Perhaps we shall find no rational basis; but this is no deterrent to the study of ethics. If we are to have any kind of reflection at all, surely it is better to have it ordered and systematic than haphazard. Ethics at least can aid materially in determining the strict and accurate meaning of the terms which are applicable within the field of morals; and of course, such a task is a task for

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reflection. We often hear an outcry against "armchair philosophy," but this phrase, if it means anything at all, obviously overlooks the reflective nature of philosophy. Similarly, if one raises a cry against "armchair ethics" (and I have heard such cries in philosophically respectable circles recently), I say, if one raises such a cry, if he criticizes ethics for being theoretic, he shows either that he has forgotten, or that he never knew, that ethics is primarily reflection. To want and to demand a "shirt-sleeve ethics" is to want and to demand the conjunction of incompatible terms. What the critic wants, of course, is not a "shirt-sleeve ethics," but a shirt-sleeve morality. He wants action, not reflection, and that is to say morality, not ethics.

The first task of any ethical study is to find the meaning of the terms with which it has to deal, the terms which are supplied to it by common usage in the field of morals and by moralities. This Socratic investigation must be thorough and critical. Popular speech is loose and vague, and this task of ethics is no mean task. It must clarify and make definite the terms as far as possible. If this is not possible, it must avoid the ambiguous terms and supply those which will not be ambiguous. Therefore its task is not merely to catalogue the terms, but is truly philosophical. Then, too, there is a question as to whether or not the terms point to some moral reality more than a purely individualistic relativism or nominalism. Socrates had a faith that the meanings for which he sought, but which he could never find, really existed as something more absolute than the individual. Are the evaluations which we find in morals and in morality individualistic, or are they not? The Socratic faith says that they are more than individual. It is the function of ethical study to find what principles are involved in this view, and to try to find a support or a refutation. At any rate it must investigate this question and all other questions inherent in the terms and terminology it finds and deals with.

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But the nature of ethical study does not stop with this. It searches for the theoretic principles of the evaluation of conduct. The immediate sources of all empirical knowledge are particulars. Thought or reflection seems to find universals involved in these particulars. For the present purposes we can disregard the deeper problems of the ontological status of these universals and the metaphysical connection between the universals and the particulars. It is evident, however, that they are never "given" in the *same sense* that the particulars are given. When compared to the particulars, their being seems to be conceptual; at any rate, the processes with which we deal with the universals are conceptual. When these processes become concerned with showing order, rigor, and consistency in the treatment of the universals, they are called rational. The systematic body of universals rationally found to be inherent in the action of large bodies of particulars is called theory. Ethical study investigates conduct and the evaluation of conduct (always starting from particulars, of course), and it endeavors to find and to state the general theoretic principles of this evaluation. The next step in a system of ethics is reached, then, when the theoretic principles of evaluation are found and the content of the study is arranged in systematic order.

But again, the task does not end with this systematization. Ethics is not only concerned with finding the principles of evaluation in different systems of conduct, but criticizes the rational adequacy of these principles. Here ethics is normative. Different moralities, of course, will be found to involve principles of evaluation which are different to a greater or less degree, and it is the business of ethics, as theoretic, to inquire into the rational adequacy of these principles of evaluation and sanction. It may find them rationally adequate, partially so, or altogether extraneous. For example, to determine and to evaluate conduct with reference to rewards and

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punishments in a future life is rationally irrelevant until the terms and conditions of that future life are known.

In fact, it is improbable that the principles of evaluation of any existing system of morality will be found to be rationally adequate, for moralities have not been built up from rational considerations. Reason has not been a very considerable factor in the growth of moralities. Most religions prescribe moral codes, and from the days of the taboo to those of the spiritual sanction both superstition and emotion have been more potent factors than reason in religious moralities. But moralities do not arise only in connection with religion. Perhaps the most pervasive of all moralities is merely convention, and in the growth of convention, again, reason is very largely disregarded.

Therefore the critical study of ethics is not liable to discover any existent principles of evaluation which are rationally adequate, and this consideration leads to the final function of ethical study, namely, ethical study must formulate theoretic principles which would be rationally adequate. Ethical *theory* implies *knowledge* of rationally adequate principles of evaluation. Now this task of ethics is bound to be more or less speculative, because we are now applying universals arrived at by our past investigation to new particulars, and we have changed and modified the universals somewhat in order to make them conform, in their system, to the dictates of reason. All theory tends toward this rather ideal modification. Inclusion within a system is very apt to demand a slight modification, and it is in this that theory seems to depart, sometimes, from practice. The departure, though, is only apparent, for if the modification is in the direction of distortion, it is unjustified; any theory which is at odds with the particulars it is intended to cover is to that extent false theory. And any ethical theory which would not include adequately all particulars of conduct and give the principles of

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evaluating them would be either an incomplete or a false theory.

Ethics formulates a doctrine, then, of what the highest good is; or, if it holds that there is no Good, but only goods, what these goods are, what they are good for, etc. It gives the theoretic principles for evaluating action, and states whether these principles are individualistic or absolute. In all this, ethics is concerned with particular action and moralities. It is concerned wth all phenomena which lie within the broad field of morals; but it is concerned with everything theoretically, reflectively, philosophically. Ethics is *not* an attempt to regulate conduct. Attempts to do so are moralities; and ethics is not morality. Ethics finishes its study with the conception of the good; morality begins with the assumption of what is right.

Ethics as a philosophic science is disinterested in any particular system of morality. It must be. It could not carry on its inquiry and criticisms impartially, and therefore completely and satisfactorily, if it were not. Ethics studies all and any material which lies within the broad field of morals; its study cannot be restricted to some particular system of morality, because then it would be arbitrarily restricting itself to only a part of the broad field of morals. Perhaps some morality as we know it may be rationally adequate. This is improbable, as has been pointed out; but even if it be true, ethics can discover it only at the end of its investigation, not assume it at the beginning. If ethics is especially interested in some particular system of morality, if it starts its inquiry with a presumption as to where it is to come out, or even a strong desire and predilection as to where it is to come out, then its inquiry is not critical, and to that extent is not philosophic. Therefore any ethics, to be philosophically adequate, must be disinterested.

The term "Christian ethics" would be used accurately to mean the reflective and critical study of the theoretic prin-

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ciples involved in the Christian system of morality. Christian ethics would involve an inquiry into the meaning of the terms used in Christian morality. Just what is held to be the highest good here? How do the Christian virtues lead to this good? Are the principles of evaluation found here rationally adequate? etc., etc. Any such Christian ethics, then, would be only a very partial and incomplete system of ethics; it would be perfectly legitimate, of course, but only as a specialized treatment of part of the subject of ethics. Of course, it must be disinterested, and it follows, then, that a person need not necessarily believe in or practice this system of morality in order to be a student of Christian ethics. In fact, it is probably unnecessary to point out that the treatment of the subject would be more adequate if the student were thoroughly acquainted with Christian morality but were not too vitally concerned in it.

The term "business ethics" has come into a very wide vogue recently to apply to codes of professional procedure which are morally acceptable. From the principles which have been pointed out in this paper it is apparent that the term "business ethics" could mean only a purely theoretic or philosophic study and investigation of the principles of business morality. This would be a legitimate use of the term, though it would indicate only a small and specialized branch of ethical study. But this is not the way that the term is usually used. Codes of ethics are spoken of. There can be no "code" of ethics. There can be "codes" only of morality, of procedure, of law, etc. The use of the term "ethics" to denote kinds of professional procedure (other professions beside business are included in this criticism) is philosophically deplorable.

The term "practical ethics," if used correctly, would mean the reflective and critical study of the theoretic principles lying in the evaluation of practical conduct. In this sense almost all ethics is practical ethics, and the term has not a great deal

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of distinctive use. However, it seems that the term is often used to mean an ethics which *is* a kind of practical conduct, or system of conduct, but this meaning would be incorrect and should be dropped; as has been pointed out, it is a contradiction of terms; ethics is philosophic reflection, morals is conduct, and a morality is a system of conduct. If the term "practical ethics" be used to denote an ethics which is practiced or put into practice, then it means no more than that our conduct should be consistent with, or should conform to, our system of ethics, which, remember, is theoretic. Now, note this "should." Ethics must inquire into what the "should" or the "ought" of morality means. Ethics must try to find the sanction which morality practices, but a student is under no obligation except a moralistic (moral in the narrower sense) obligation to obey this sanction. He might be a very good student of ethics and at the same time be a very bad man moralistically. Ethics formulates the theoretic principles of rational evaluation, but if it becomes concerned with putting these principles into practice it is overstepping its philosophic functon. Morality regulates conduct, so when the term is used in this sense, "practical ethics" is only a high-sounding title for another system of morality, but a system now whose sanction claims to be a rational sanction. This use of "practical ethics" as meaning a rational morality is a very common use (or rather misuse) of the term. It is often the case that the term "ethics" itself is defined as a rational morality, but no more need be said about this; ethics is a philosophic study.

It seems that in the beginning the term "casuistry" meant what this last kind of practical ethics is supposed to mean. Casuistry may be defined as the attempt to determine and control conduct according to the sanction of the theoretic principles rationally arrived at by the study of ethics. Casuistry is an attempt at a scientific morality. If this be accepted as the meaning, then casuistry is a legitimate and philosophically respectable procedure. It is the name of that system of mo-

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rality which is rationally most acceptable. But instead of this, casuistry might be taken to mean only the attempt to *judge,* to lay praise and blame according to the principles of ethics. If this be the meaning, then the use of the word must be greatly circumscribed, for it is possible that ethics may find no rational place for praise and blame. If casuistry is taken to mean, or bears the connotation of meaning, a certain historical attempt during the late Middle Ages to regulate and to judge conduct according to the principles and sanctions then accepted as ethics, the use of the word as applicable to any system of conduct sanctioned by ethical principles today had better be avoided.

Up to the present time we have assumed that it is possible to have a system of morality whose sanctions are based upon ethical principles; that is to say, that we can regulate our conduct according to ethical principles. But this assumption has often been challenged by certain schools in psychology and by philosophical thinkers as well. The ethical principles bear with them no sanctions to conduct. There are none other than the moralistic sanctions. Is it possible at all to regulate particular, individual conduct according to ethical principles? Can ethics have any real influence upon morality? Even if it can, that is aside from its philosophic function. The demand that it have some real influence is not a philosophic demand; it is a moralistic demand; yet as such it must be investigated. It is a part of the task of ethics to find the relation between ethical theory and moral procedure.

The ethical viewpoint is the viewpoint of reflection upon phenomena within the broad field of morals. Systems of morality in general have not been causally affected by ethical theory; they have been elaborated apart from the dictates of reason. It is certainly true that the most of human conduct is governed by impulse and habit, and these are hard to change. There is a slight part of man's conduct which seems to be what we call deliberative action. This can be directly influ-

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enced by rational ends in all probability, but even that which seems to be deliberative is more apt to be evaluated moralistically than rationally, simply from deep-seated habit, if from no other reason. But a man who has formed or adopted an adequate ethical theory is apt to become so familiar with this method of evaluating conduct that gradually these evaluations will make themselves felt in his habitual actions. Even then his impulsive actions are left uninfluenced by his ethical theory. But in influencing habitual conduct a long step will be made toward a rational sanction.

There is a dispute in ethics as to whether habitual conduct is to be evaluated as truly good and bad in the same sense as is so-called deliberative conduct. It is sometimes claimed that it is the intent lying behind the action which is to be evaluated in the truly moral judgment. But this would minimize the importance of habitual action, and this forms the large bulk of all conduct. Is the *good man* the one who wants and intends to do good, or the one who *does* good? Often the reason why the good intent is held to be of fundamental importance is because only one kind of morality has been taken to supply an ethical theory: the morality which stresses the good will. Such a morality is almost always based on a supernaturalistic sanction, because only a God can know adequately what the will is upon every occasion. But certainly it is not philosophically justifiable to take such a morality as equivalent to the whole field of morals and to center our ethical inquiry there. Such a morality stresses the will because that is supposed to be the source of all conduct. Therefore a good will will be the source only of good actions. But psychology has shown that the bulk of action cannot be immediately traced to the conscious will at all. Evaluations are made of all conduct, what a man does as well as what he intends to do, and so certainly ethics must take this into account. In fact, what a man intends to do never enters into his conduct at all unless he does it. This would seem to indicate that intents and mo-

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tives are not of such vital importance to ethics as has been often held. Ethics must not formulate its principles from one or only a few brands of morality.

It is highly improbable that ethical principles will make themselves felt to any considerable extent in the body of conventional morality until "philosophers become kings, and kings, philosophers." Conventional morality is group sanction, and the public is the great sophist now as truly as in the times of Plato. The public is interested in what appears to be persuasive, not in what is rigorously rational. And the most persuasive thing in the world is conventional morality, not "as it ought to be" according to the sanctions of reason, but as it is. Therefore the body of conventional morality changes but slowly, and not according to the dictates of reason.

We cannot look to ethical study for help in solving the problem of how to educate the youth in morals. Educating the youth in ethics will not necessarily educate it in morals. We have already elaborated the view that one's habitual evaluations may be influenced by his acquaintance with ethical principles, but there is no guaranty in any particular case that this will take place. However, ethics may incidentally have this practical value: Socrates might have been mistaken in identifying virtue and knowledge (if he ever did), but there is the truth in it that one does not act the *same* both before and after gaining knowledge relevant to his action. As this is the case, it is desirable that one act with knowledge rather than without it. And the study of ethics supplies knowledge relevant to action. It therefore may influence action to some degree.

Nor can we look to the philosophic science of ethics for help in solving the problems of current morality. It might say "Inject a little reason into current morality and the maladies will disappear," but this is just the remedy that current morality will not take. The problems of current morality are not philosophic problems, so how could ethics solve them? The

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moral problems of the individual also are not philosophic problems for the science of ethics to solve. But ethics cannot disregard the problems of morality, for these form part of the material of study, the subject matter of ethics. Does ethics have no bearing whatever on the solution of these individual problems? Yes, there is a bearing, for the knowledge and understanding of adequate and interconsistent ethical doctrines may suggest solutions for the individual problems; but this is not the prime function of the study of ethics; it is incidental. The function of ethics is to discover and to formulate theoretic backgrounds. The philosophic science of ethics is the rational, critical, and systematic study of the foundations, methods, and processes of that form of evaluation which we call moral evaluation. An adequate understanding clarifies the whole field of study—in this case, the whole field of morals; and the problems of the individual are in that field, so they are apt to be clarified, although there is no guaranty that they will be in any particular instance.

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PLATO'S THEORY OF SOCIAL PROGRESS

E. O. BASSETT

WITH a view to determining whether the now familiar concept of social progress may claim a classical genesis in the Platonic philosophy, let us collect such evidence as the *Dialogues* afford under an analysis of the idea of progress; and so, being careful not to require of the Greek conformity to more than the essential elements of the notion, at the same time allowing him incidental political theories and standards of evaluation possibly conflicting with our modern preconceptions, attempt to define Plato's position.

Plato treats the material growth of civilization in a quasi-historical manner;[1] describing the primitive condition of man, without skill or resource; the discovery of fire and the simple arts;[2] the evolution of occupations, herding, agriculture, and so on;[3] the concentration of population,[4] and the correlative development of a simple division of labor;[5] the institution of sea travel,[6] and foreign trade; the growth of population, colonization, war;[7] the increase of comforts;[8] and finally the appearance of leisure.[9] This evolution of civilization has consumed infinite ages.[10] Plato considers desirable a certain modicum of physical comfort attainable in an early stage of civilization;[11] economic development beyond this point is to be

[1] See H. E. Barnes, "Theories of the Origin of the State in Classical Political Philosophy," *Monist*, XXXIV, 29, 30.

[2] *Pol.*, p. 274 C, D; especially, ". . . . from these is derived all that has helped to frame human life."

[3] *Laws*, pp. 677 E, 680 E.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 681 A, E.

[5] *Rep.*, pp. 370 ff. I am aware that this is a logical discussion of the origin of the state, not a historical one; but I cannot see that the passage is thereby deprived of its significance as a recognition of certain changes occurring at a given stage in economic development. Also, according to Barnes, *op. cit.*, p. 30, ". . . . Plato . . . . stated a correct correlation between . . . . types of industrial and social development."

[6] *Laws*, p. 682 C.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 682 C; *Rep.*, pp. 373, 374 A.

[8] *Rep.*, pp. 372 E, 373 A.

[9] *Critias*, pp. 109 E, 110 A.

[10] *Laws*, p. 678 B.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 679 A.

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evaluated by the employment of the leisure which it provides.[12]

With regard to genetics and eugenics, Plato is clearly confined to "right opinion." He proposes eugenic measures, however, the acceptance of which would do credit to many sociologists of the present day. His doctrine of the mingling of natures,[13] though not strictly satisfying the modern geneticist, and his belief that children normally resemble their parents[14] indicate a sufficient comprehension of the principle of biological inheritance. Pursuing this principle, he proposes a eugenic improvement of the population through the execution of the incorrigibly wicked,[15] the exile of undesirables,[16] and the preferential mating of superior men and women.[17]

Plato not only recognizes the necessity of preserving the attained condition of society, but also indicates the means whereby social inheritance is secured. The agencies of social continuity discussed by Plato: the atmosphere of the home,[18] parental care and training,[19] the advice and authority of parents,[20] childhood amusements,[21] companions in youth,[22] education in gymnastics, music, literature,[23] science,[24] dialectic,[25] and

[12] *Pol.*, p. 272 C; *Laws*, p. 807.

[13] *Laws*, p. 773 A; *Pol.*, p. 310.

[14] Implied in the marriage regulations of the *Rep.* He clearly rejects a rigid interpretation of his generalization (or stumbles upon the principle of dominance and the law of segregation) in *Rep.*, p. 415 B.

[15] *Laws*, pp. 735 E, 854 C, E, 957 E; *Rep.*, p. 410 A; etc.

[16] *Laws*, pp. 865, 877, 881, etc.

[17] Principally in the *Rep.*, Bk. v.

[18] *Laws*, pp. 694 D, 695 D.

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 643 C, 717 C; *Rep.*, p. 377 B, C.

[20] *Laws*, pp. 701 C, 714 E.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 643 B, C, 793 E, 794 A; *Rep.*, p. 425 A.

[22] Harmful associates are several times discussed; for instance, in the *Rep.*, Bk. viii, and the beginning of Bk. ix.

[23] *Rep.*, Bks. ii and iii; *Laws*, Bk. vii. The fundamental importance of education is frequently stated; for ihstance, in *Laws*, p. 765 E. The fear of innovation in the curriculum undermining the state was ever present to Plato's mind.

[24] *Rep.*, pp. 522–31.

[25] *Ibid.*, pp. 532, 533.

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philosophy,[26] public approbation or disapproval,[27] contests for prizes,[28] advice of elders,[29] custom,[30] and law[31]—these agencies transmit to each succeeding generation the knowledge,[32] rationality,[33] and the individual and social moral qualities[34] of its predecessors. Certain of these factors require more detailed examination.

Continuance of the culture, justice, virtue, and general structure of society depends largely upon the law.[35] Nearly all changes in society, whether induced by,[36] anticipating, or causing[37] modification of the law, are correlated with legal enactments. That custom rules in certain fields of human conduct[38] and that elsewhere individual morality is relied upon to preserve desirable conditions[39] do not challenge the pre-eminence of the legal factor; the importance of which is equaled only by that of education.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 539 E.

[27] *Laws*, pp. 730 B, 822 D, E. [28] *Ibid.*, p. 829 C, etc.

[29] Numerous passages; for instance, *Laws*, pp. 951 E, 952 A, B.

[30] *Laws*, pp. 793 B, C, D, 836–41.

[31] *Rep.*, p. 572; *Laws*, p. 671 C, D, etc. In the *Crito*, Socrates argues that the law is the parent of every citizen—a Greek way of acknowledging the great influence of the state, church, school, etc., according to E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 122.

[32] The educational system of the *Rep.* certainly provides for the transmission of all forms of knowledge; excepting perhaps knowledge of the good. We have no business here to quarrel with Plato because he does not adopt democratic education (perhaps his education of the clearly able persons is really democratic after all).

[33] The characteristic of the just man, the sovereignty of the rational element.

[34] *Pol.*, pp. 308 D, E, 309 A; *Laws*, pp. 643 B, E, 653 A, B, C.

[35] Plato relies upon the law to preserve, no less than to produce, a desired condition of society. This principle is made especially clear in the *Pol.* and followed in the *Laws*. Of course he admits the need for a living authority (philosopher-king, intellectual aristocracy, or nocturnal council) or abiding reverence for the law. See notes 31 and 37 also.

[36] The question of legalistic reform will be discussed later.

[37] *Rep.*, Bks. viii and ix. Irrational law preserves an unjust condition of society, just as a rational and complete constitution, including a proper educational system, will preserve a just society. Plato recognizes the relativity of law (*Rep.*, p. 544 E); but there is always a certain lag of the law.

[38] *Laws*, p. 793 B, C, D. [39] *Ibid.*, pp. 773 E, 788, 789, 822 D, E.

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Education in gymnastic, music, and literature impresses the habits of balanced living and the notions of virtue upon the youth in preparation for citizenship; and in the case of the abler young men,[40] also for higher studies in science, dialectic, and philosophy; which last may be argued to compass, under the tutelage of the older men of intelligence, knowledge and philosophical experience,[41] the most advanced philosophical thought, even the Idea of the Good.[42]

Plato refers frequently to the decadence of society[43] and twice describes the process with some particularity.[44] He lauds the virtue of the ancient, simple life,[45] and disparages contemporary society for its disharmony and immorality.[46] Did Plato, therefore, subscribe to a theory of social regression? An affirmative conclusion could spring only from a misunderstanding of his attitude. Admitting its historical reality, he examines the logical sequence of changes involved in deterioration in order to discern its human conditions and causes.[47] He criticizes the present social order for the absence of praiseworthy virtues discoverable in an older condition of mankind,

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 537; *Laws*, p. 968 D.

[41] *Rep.*, p. 540 B, especially, ". . . . and when they have brought up in each generation others like themselves"; *Laws*, pp. 951 E, 952 A, B, 965 A.

[42] Plato has embodied such in his *Dialogues;* even the idea of the good vaguely, for instance, in the *Philebus*. There is no inherent difficulty in the idea of the good (as the universal principle of correct understanding, analysis and synthesis, or the application of the mechanism of the mean) which could have prevented Plato from explaining it in a dialogue. It would seem Plato believed all thought could be transmitted by education to suitable subjects, despite certain observations he may have introduced to produce a feeling of awe, perhaps, in some of his readers.

[43] *Laws*, pp. 685 A, 797, 798 C; *Rep.*, pp. 416 A, 423 A, etc.

[44] *Critias*, p. 121; *Rep.*, Bks. viii and ix.

[45] *Laws*, pp. 678 E, 679; *Rep.*, p. 372.

[46] A certain attitude toward contemporary legal contentiousness, self-interestedness, etc., underlies all Plato's political thought.

[47] (*a*) *Laws*, pp. 683 A, 686 B. (*b*) The logical analysis of regression from the ideal state in *Rep.*, Bks. viii and ix, besides throwing light upon decadence, may have been intended to indicate the stages and means of progress from the lower levels; arguing that the reform of individual characters must be correlated with the reform government. See Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 228, 229.

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to emphasize the desirability of recovering those virtues by a pseudo-Hegelian synthesis.[48]

The decadence of society results from the increasing demoralization of the citizens, successively ambitious, avaricious, debauched, fickle, addicted to vice.[49] The departure of the citizens from rational conduct, the loss of social consciousness, and the disrespect for law are due to harmful environmental influences, unwise home training,[50] ineffective education,[51] innovation in the curriculum,[52] degenerate companions,[53] and so on. All causes, however, are finally reducible to an irrationality or an insufficiency of the law.[54]

Decadence, being abhorrent to human society in the cosmos, since in all its aspects and degrees it is a qualitative

[48] Plato did not reject material well-being, life in cities, crafts, drama, and so on. He sought to revive what he thought were the old virtues. It may be emphasized that Plato does not mention philosophical intelligence as an ancient virtue. Leisure made this possible.

[49] *Rep.*, Bks. viii and ix. [50] See notes 18 and 19.

[51] One of the objects of the *Republic* is to outline an effective education, which is to impress upon the young the desired habits of harmonious living and the necessary notions of virtue, social consciousness, reverence for the law and the rulers, etc.; such an education, provided by the law, would insure society, the law, even the education itself against deterioration.

[52] *Laws*, pp. 657, 660 A, B, 797, 798 C. [53] *Rep.*, Bk. viii.

[54] *a*) I take it as a fundamental principle of Plato's political thought that all matters are to be covered by law, except some few left to custom and individual initiative (see notes 38 and 39). At least, the law is to concern itself with the character of the citizens, the ability of the governors, the expulsion or execution of all subversive elements, and any other matters which might leave the way open to decadence. Besides, the need for a living authority is admitted and provided for (*Laws*, pp. 758 A, 960, 961; *Rep.*, p. 497 C; cf. *Rep.*, pp. 520, 521).

b) Plato modified his analysis of the ills of society somewhat in the *Laws*, though rather by addition and new emphasis than by change of principles. In the *Rep.* his attention plays upon individual character and attitude. Later, in connection with his development of the governmental principle of limited monarchy (*Laws*, pp. 692 C, 693 D, 756 E, 757 A), he proposes a new cause of deterioration, an excess of democracy or despotism (*Laws*, pp. 691, 697 C, D, 701 E), which had perhaps been suggested earlier, though not clearly separated from individual character and found to exist as an active principle in the law (*Rep.*, Bk. viii, especially pp. 563 E, 564 A). The vital principle evolved by the later discussion is the perpetual sovereignty of law (*Pol.*, p. 300 A, B; see also *Laws*, p. 715 C, D). The law remains the final cause of all deterioration and the final means of social preservation.

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reversal of goodness or orderliness, is to be obviated. The perfect legal system not only defines and preserves a rational society, but provides as well for its own perpetuity. The imperfect legal system, however, must depend at the various stages of its evolution toward correctness and completeness upon its product for sustenance, especially upon reverence for law, which it must engender; it being not less a component than a mechanism of social inheritance,[55] except when under the hands of a true statesman or philosopher.[56]

Social change may be, in respect of its rapidity, either gradual or sudden; as involved in deterioration, only gradual;[57] while progressive change is of both types.[58] Disorder, lodging in a particle of the social structure, then, with slowly increasing scope for its pernicious influence, attacking successively more significant social elements, finally involves all society in catastrophe.[59] Enrichment of the transmissible content of culture[60] is an ageless process, the acquisitive intellects of each generation contributing some increment.[61] The correction of the political institutions,[62] the increase of social vital-

[55] The very functioning of the law insures its continued functioning; the process is circular. The more nearly complete and perfect, especially with regard to its effect on individual character and thought, the more secure a legal system is from deteriorating change.

[56] *Pol.*, pp. 295, 296. The statesman is essentially a philosopher interested in society. The legal system in the *Rep.* is subject to the constant improvement of the philosopher-king or the philosophical aristocracy, even though ideal.

[57] *Laws*, pp. 700 E, 701 A, B, C, 797, 798 C; *Rep.*, p. 424. Revolution is only the climax of a slow process (see *Laws*, pp. 709 A, 757 A, 945 D). See notes 43 and 44 also.

[58] *Laws*, pp. 678 B, 735 D, E, 736 D (especially), 836–41; *Rep.*, pp. 473 B, C, 501 (especially). See notes 65, 66, 67, 68, and 70.

[59] *Laws*, pp. 700 E, 701 A, B, C; *Rep.*, Bks. 8 and 9, p. 424, etc.

[60] See note 42. The increase of knowledge of government is gradual (*Laws*, beginning of Bk. iii). Wisdom is accumulated bit by bit (*Pol.*, p. 272 C).

[61] The philosophers principally. The principle of the good operates to increase thought infinitely. When secured, the increments are passed on (see note 42).

[62] This essentially is the process of improvement—improvement of the law, and thereby of the whole social structure. See notes 79, 80, 81, 82. Correction of institutions sometimes occurs suddenly (see succeeding paragraph).

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ity,[63] and the improvement of the moral quality of the population[64]—these progressive changes are mainly gradual; though certain described circumstances enable sudden transformations.

The conjunction of higher wisdom and supreme legal power, by an unselfish and enthusiastic tyrant submitting to the guidance of a true statesman or philosopher,[65] by a ruler being endowed with ability and philosophical insight,[66] by a philosopher succeeding to the seat of royal authority,[67] or by other means, would make unnecessary the slow evolution of a rational social order, the immaturity of a single generation sufficing for the transmutation;[68] which coincidents, it is admitted, occur very infrequently.[69] The transition, however, though sudden, measured by lapse of time, simulates the gradual in method, in that it affects radically the characters of the initiatory generation.[70] Moreover, the social continuity is not broken, to the extent that the wisdom and knowledge of the philosopher and his assistants transmit a selected intellectual, moral, and legal inheritance to the remodeled society.

Does Plato clearly envisage social progress? The cultural content of social inheritance is augmented by musical and

[63] This is one of the aims and accomplishments of progress toward the ideal society (see note 93).

[64] See references under note 81. [65] *Laws*, pp. 710 B, D, 711 C, 712 A.

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 711 B, C, D; *Rep.*, p. 520 A, B.

[67] *Rep.*, p. 473 D, 499 B, C, D, 501 A, E. Cf. *Laws*, p. 969 A, B.

[68] *Rep.*, p. 540 D. [69] *Pol.*, pp. 292 E, 293 A; *Laws*, p. 711 E.

[70] The children are to be separated from their parents and educated ideally from earliest years; all environmental influences are to be as ideal as if society had been perfect for generations; all antagonistic influences simply expire. It must be admitted, however, that these ideas of Plato's present difficulties, especially from the standpoint of the modern preconception of the organic growth of society. But I am inclined to the position that the concept of organic growth is not essential to a theory of social progress; though we may criticize Plato for failing to grasp what we think most important, if we choose to ignore the fact that Greeks generally were pre-eminently rationalistic. Many subsequent thinkers have assumed the rationalistic attitude toward reform. Furthermore, the possibility of such a transformation as Plato pictures is in strict conformity with his theory that progress is the product of reason, which in this hypothetical case is all-powerful (see Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 243).

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poetical composition of certain prescribed types.[71] The accumulation of experience and the analysis and synthesis of it by the philosopher[72] contribute to the social store of wisdom,[73] which becomes available to each person according to his ability to employ it in his intellectual and moral development.[74] This increase of knowledge is limitless, inasmuch as the human mind never perfectly comprehends the idea;[75] and, even should the intellect attain such understanding, its scope would yet remain unrestricted, by virtue of the infinitude of ideas.[76]

Under the guidance of a true statesman[77] or philosopher[78] the law approximates ever more closely to the perfect constitution.[79] By this progression education and the other agencies of social inheritance, especially those molding character, are advanced toward their archetypes;[80] the conduct, nature, and social relations of the citizens are similarly affected;[81] individually and collectively society approaches the ideal.[82]

[71] *Laws*, pp. 656, 657, 799 A, B. If we were to forbid all but epic poetry, poetical composition would not be prevented thereby. Preventing innovation does not prevent further production. Within the type there may be considerable variety (*Laws*, p. 665 C). Besides, the type prescribed may be changed, just as the law may change.

[72] I take this as the process of approaching the Ideas.

[73] *Pol.*, p. 272 C. [74] See note 40.

[75] Since experience is limitless, the ideas, or archetype of all experience, can never be fully comprehended. One can never know all possible chairs, hence can never know the idea of a chair. Whether experience be the basis of generalization or the means of recalling an idea seen before, the argument holds.

[76] An infinitude of ideas is an essential element of the cognitive principle of the good. Even allowing a limitation of ideas at a particular moment, the world-soul is ceaselessly increasing the order in the universe, which would provide the necessary infinitude.

[77] *Pol.*, pp. 293 D, 295 E, 296 A. [78] *Rep.*, pp. 497 C, 501 (especially), 590 A, B.

[79] *Laws*, pp. 643 E, 645 A, B, 660 A, B, 769 A, B, C, D (especially).

[80] *Rep.*, pp. 426 E, 427 A. The law must be correlated with every progressive change (see note 54*a*).

[81] *Pol.*, pp. 296 D, 309 B, C; *Rep.*, pp. 501 (especially), 590 B, 591 A, 592, 600 C; *Laws*, pp. 630 E, 684 C, 696 E, 697 A, B, 708 D, 718 B, 720 E, 721, 722, 723 A, B, 730 B, 770 C, D, E, 771 A, 853 B, C, D, 890 B, C.

[82] *Pol.*, pp. 293 D, 499 B, C, D, 592; *Laws*, pp. 710 E, 740 ff., 745 E, 746 A, B, C. See also *Laws*, p. 797 D ("any change whatever . . . ," etc.).

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Interaction of the formal and human elements in the social structure tends to preserve an existing condition; progress results from the interposition of rationality, whether embodied in statesman or philosopher, or merely somewhat operative among the citizens.[83] During the early history of mankind, reason, enslaved by the animal nature, increases material welfare, producing leisure as the last term of material growth to aid her in the conflict with the spirited and appetitive elements of human nature, over which the rational element triumphs, first in men of superior intelligence, who thereupon become philosophers, tardily and in small, though increasing, degree among the mass of the people. Partially correct social institutions, the product of hampered philosopher or statesman,[84] assist the emancipation of the reason; the liberated rationality of the mass, perhaps complemented by the wisdom of philosopher or statesman, improves institutions; which in turn further release the rational principle; thus, through the reciprocal action of characters and institutions, society progresses, impelled by reason.

The world-soul ceaselessly augments order in the chaos-tending universe.[85] Similarly, the human reason, a derivative of the world-soul,[86] by nature orders the material and social environment. Plato, therefore, considers social progress inevitable. Regression presents no fundamental difficulty. De-

[83] I recognize the danger I run in drawing in the masses. Plato did turn to government by partial consent in his later thought (*Laws*). Every man has a rational element in his soul which might operate toward some social betterment under such a government. But strictly Plato clung to the idea of the legislator. However, see *Laws*, p. 718 E. Logically I cannot see why the rational principle should not appear in ordinary citizens as well as in the philosopher.

[84] The legislator must be cautious and gradual in a more democratic state (*Laws*, p. 735 D, E).

[85] *Laws*, pp. 709 B, 905, 906; especially pp. 716 A, 897, 966 E, 967 A ("under the dominion of an intelligent will accomplishing good"), etc.

[86] *Timaeus*, pp. 41 ff.; *Philebus*, p. 30 A.

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cadence results from the temporary triumph of irrational, chaotic forces over the rational principle in some particular society. From a cosmological perspective progress is continuous; it tends to be so in a given society; and there can be no doubt of the eventual progress of all societies. The philosopher, being an agent of the world-soul, must devise means to prevent such regressions,[87] just as he must strive increasingly to order society, that is, guide it toward the ideal.[88]

The social ideal involves, with respect to individuals, the rationalizing of each soul,[89] the qualitative maximizing of experience, including social contacts,[90] and the greatest possible development of intellect;[91] and with regard to the social organism, the attainment of unity or perfect harmony, each man doing as he is able,[92] each being sensitive to the welfare of every part,[93] and the perpetuation of the conditions of human ideality,[94] including the fruition of society in the philosopher.[95]

[87] What Plato is trying to do constantly. Refer back to discussion of decadence, and notes 47–55.

[88] *Rep.*, p. 540 A ("toiling also at politics and ruling for the public good as a matter of duty"). The philosopher who has looked upon the ideal seeks constantly to bring all society into harmony with it.

[89] The harmony of the soul, which Plato frequently praises. The rational element is to be sovereign. See notes 23 and 34.

[90] This must be the process of education, so far as each one is able; mental experience as well as any other. The youth are to pass through pleasure and pain. Social contacts are to be so increased that each person feels the joys and sorrows of every other. The principle of philosophical analysis and synthesis must imply this maximizing of experience.

[91] Refer again to note 40. It is to be remembered that the intellectual ability of the population increases (eugenically).

[92] The dominating principle of Plato's thought. Every man is to be carpenter, smith, guardian, or philosopher, as he is able; but he is to be socially conscious and a participant in the social life as well; the idea being that all conduct must be rationally delimited—order, order!

[93] *Rep.*, pp. 462 C, D, E, 463 C, D, E.

[94] *Laws*, pp. 630 C, 631 A, 707 D, 770 C, D, E, 771 A, 963 A; *Pol.*, p. 293 D, E; *Rep.*, p. 592.

[95] An individual can be a smith or philosopher, as he is able. I am inclined to discount the view that the philosopher is the flower of Plato's society; every part contributes to order by approaching its ideal. The philosopher is important because he can hasten progress; he is not more an end than any other part of the social structure.

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Toward the ideal, society executes an infinite progression; since the final aim, maximum orderliness, is by its very nature impossible of attainment, so that all conceivable ideal societies can be but approximations to the ideal. The end of progress is progress; the aim is but a directing principle.[96]

Although the *Dialogues* contain no systematic discussion of, nor an explicit avowal of belief in, social progress, the evidence here collected implies the acceptance of such a notion, and may be construed to indicate the tacit formulation of a theory of progress. The material growth of society produces leisure, in which condition reason escapes from appetitive pursuits and commences the intellectual and moral progress of mankind. Reason augments the social store of music, literature, and wisdom, increases the mental ability of society by eugenic improvement, corrects the law, improves individual natures, in sum, advances society toward the ideal, each generation building upon the attained condition of its predecessor. Decadence, which interrupts this process infrequently and in restricted areas, can be explained and prevented. Human reason, being a derivative of the world-soul, orders society, even as the world-soul increasingly orders the universe, social progress being an aspect of the universal process, and as inevitable. Finally, since the social as well as the universal aim is maximum orderliness, progress must be perpetual. Such, in brief, is Plato's conception of social progress.

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[96] The idea of the good is a principle of ideation, an infinitude of ideas under the one. The world-soul, active counterpart of the idea of the good, never ceases creating order. It seems to me that, the principle of social progress being increasing order, progress must be endless, since I cannot conceive of a maximum of orderliness. If this be so, it is obvious we do not have to accept ideal states as laid down in *Rep.* and *Laws;* any one embodying order will do, but only as a point of departure.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS. By John Dewey. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. vi+224. Price, $2.50; college edition, $2.00.

"Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communion. It had its seer in Walt Whitman" (p. 184). It *had* its seer in Walt Whitman. Today it *has* its seer in John Dewey.

This book is a theory and a plea. In the book, the theory comes first and the plea afterward. But in thought, the plea is certainly first and the theory afterward. The heart of the book is its plea to save democracy, and particularly, for we are Americans, to save the democracy of America. It is a magnificent plea, calmly eloquent, moving, penetrating, compelling. The individualistic democracy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was wrong in theory and consequently wrong in practice. Its program lifted the power of government out of the hands of the public and laid it in the hands of the great industrial organizations, and at the same time blinded all eyes to what was taking place, because what was taking place was going on according to the program. In the chapters on "The Democratic State" and "The Eclipse of the Public," all this is pictured for us in a master's way. We knew it, but here it is clearer and more impending than we knew. A hundred truisms are built into form, and we stand amazed in their midst.

The last two chapters are an attempt to formulate the conditions by which a self-responsible and self-respecting democracy may be developed from the present social configuration. These conditions are "full publicity in respect to all consequences which concern" the public (p. 167), a willingness to experiment "in human concerns" as we do "in physical and technical matters" (p. 169), a development of "social knowledge" (p. 171), and a development of "face-to-face intercourse" in "local communities" (p. 211).

These conditions do not constitute a solution. There are as many concrete solutions as there are social conditions, and there is no mistake greater or more often made in social theory than the construction of a set solution. There are many ideal forms of government in the concrete. But these are the conditions by which we in our situation today can recover a democracy.

This is the plea. The theory that accompanies the plea is unfolded in the first two chapters. I cannot help feeling that the theory does not

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come up to the plea. The pivot of the theory is a definition of the state in terms of "consequences" instead of in terms of "alleged, special, original, society-making causal forces, whether instincts, fiats of will, personal, or an immanent, universal, practical reason, or an indwelling, metaphysical, social essence and nature" (p. 25). But it is somewhat characteristic of Dewey that in all of the two chapters in which this theory is being explained, I am unable to find a concise and adequate definition of the "state." On page 33 a sentence which seems to be intended for such a definition appears: "The only statement which can be made is a purely formal one," he writes, "the state is the organization of the public effected through officials for the protection of the interests shared by its members." But this statement omits something very important which is reiterated several times in the preceding pages, and that is the occasion for the creation of officials. "Recognition of evil consequences brought about a common interest which required for its maintenance certain measures and rules, together with the selection of certain persons as their guardians . . . ." (p. 17). The *recognition* by a group of certain consequences is the real crux of the matter, as I follow Dewey's analysis; not the consequences, nor the officials. The consequences might go on indefinitely, and perhaps disastrously; but if they were *unrecognized* no state would form. And agents (call them "officials," or sheep-herders, or Mussolinis) might create organizations as a matter of fact, such as would protect the interests shared by the members of the group, without the members of the group *recognizing* the fact, and so realizing a "state."

If I am right in my suspicion of the importance of recognition in Dewey's theory, three criticisms emerge: (1) Dewey's definition is actually also based on causes; not on consequences as he supposes. (2) Recognition of consequences, as apparently the ultimate defining notion, should be more carefully attended to and analyzed. (3) The "state" defined in terms of recognition of consequences is the democratic state only, and only in a condition of relatively ideal actualization. The public today is very nearly eclipsed, Dewey convincingly tells us. Our multitudes of officials are not really "officials," as Dewey describes them, any more than a sheep-herder or a collie dog are "officials" of a flock of sheep. The government of the United States is not a "government" then; nor, probably, is any government of any country in the world today a "government." Yet these governments in the world today, inadequate as they are, deserve a generic name and a science to study them. What I am saying here is that Dewey's theory of the state refers not to

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the states we do live in but to the ideal democratic state we wish we could live in, and that Dewey's theory of the state is only a normative and not a descriptive theory.

STEPHEN C. PEPPER

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

MARX AND LENIN: THE SCIENCE OF REVOLUTION. By Max Eastman. New York: Albert and Charles Boni, 1927. Pp. 267. Price, $2.00.

The distinction which this book elaborates is a very simple and a very important one: the distinction between a cosmic process that runs itself, using human intelligence often as a mirror but never as a matrix, and a social process, whether cosmic or not, that progresses through the creative media of ideas. Applied to revolution as a technique of change the former view constitutes a philosophy which, whether idealistic or materialistic, is logically allied with and historically deducible from primitive animism; the latter view constitutes a science which, assuming the efficacy of human effort, allies itself with the newer emphasis upon social engineering. The statement of functional logic with which the volume is introduced is excellent—a statement clarified by, and a logic gathering force from, the social nexus here furnished it.

The book proper is devoted to the thesis that Marx was a philosopher, Lenin a scientist, of revolution. The study is adequately documented and certainly makes out its affirmative case. The clearness of the case suffers, however, from the fact—admitted by Eastman with regard to both the characters—that each of them was both a scientist and a philosopher, in the sense above indicated. Since each was both, why fasten an exclusive label upon either? One reply is that the author's primary interest was in revolution rather than in revolutionaires—note the subtitle—and that he used the historical and biographical materials purely for illustrative purposes. So conceived, the book is a beautiful piece of work and convincing, save for an important exception displayed at the end of this review. The title and the overwhelming disproportion of space given to the biographical differentiation seem, however, to indicate this latter motif as the major intent of the author. If it be so, what justification is available for considering Marx's emphasis upon human instrumentality and Lenin's emphasis upon cosmic inevitability as being rationalizations rather than Marx's emphasis upon human instrumentality and Lenin's emphasis upon human instrumentality as the rationalizations? A humane desire to prevent a hero—or even, in logic, a villain—from flatly contradicting himself would explain an *ex parte* attribution,

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but the author affects to discover some internal logical principle that justifies just this particular attribution. It is more than probable, on the contrary, that the principle of selection—used here graciously to stigmatize Marx and eloquently to glorify Lenin—is not logical at all, but cosmic, or at least impersonally social. If events had revealed Marx, instead of Lenin, as the actual initiator of a successful revolution, then those portions of Marx's writing now read drowsily would have been taken to be the real intent of the man, as Eastman here takes Lenin's emphasis upon human control to represent the real Lenin.

As a historical study this book commits in an environment that happily makes detection possible, a fallacy that professional historians might discreetly commit with greater impunity. Since selection is inevitable in historical writing, as elsewhere, it seems the part of wisdom not merely to admit it but also to admit that the basis of selection may as well be temporal fortuity as logical compulsion. It is highly probable that such is here the case. I do not know enough to prove, and I do not prefer to believe, that Lenin's emphasis upon, and practice of, prevision and strategy did not help to make him the initiator of a successful revolution; but it is quite clear to me that Eastman himself believes as he here does otherwise than because of the evidence which he has patiently gathered and effectively displayed. And so as a study in causation, the present book seems to me to get its strength from the "Coolidge-prosperity" type of assumption.

But the book is so clearly conceived and so well sustained that I am disposed, in spite of the disproportion of space given to the historical motif, to regard it as a philosophy of revolution rather than as a biographical critique. One weakness impairs its admitted merit, even when judged from this fairer point of view. But since the weakness grows out of an assumption, I prefer first to praise the overt argument. Most penetratingly does the book reveal the weakness of animistic confidence as a method of getting things done; most happily does it reveal the great utility of men's taking their affairs into hand with conscious intent to remedy. With the smallest contribution of imagination, a reader rises from the perusal of this volume with a new respect for the scientific attitude and a new wonder that the religious and metaphysical type of mind retains the strength it does as a competitor in the market place of ideas. If revolution there is to be, then men must study its nature, invent its strategy, live in and for its success. That Lenin could do, and did do, this when the gods of war, whom he did not worship, presented him an opportunity, entitles him perhaps to the pedestal here reared for his immortality.

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But no effectiveness in manipulating means less than the best should blind us to the quest for the best possible means of reaching the best possible ends. Is revolution the best possible means to human freedom? But—objects the revolutionaire—there is no time to talk of "the best possible," when there is *only one actual*, means. This seems to be the spirit in which Eastman has approached revolution. But he is not entitled to the implicit assumption—for back of that assumption does not there lie the philosophic rather than the scientific mind? Where his guides diverge, he profits by following the better; but he does not thrust boldly through their agreement (upon at least the desirability of revolution) to see whether there stands kingly fact or some mere pitiable Polonius. If this be a treatise on the logic of revolution, as we may now charitably assume, and if revolution be not inevitable—the *fact* of which the author must be denied the right to assume even as the eventual *success* of which he has denied Marx the right to assume—then we must count in severe dispraise of this otherwise excellent study the fact that it neglects a matter of the highest relevance for the subject discussed and of the deepest moment for mankind. Means may not always get justified by ends, but they cannot be justified any other way. It seems very probable that the only large-scale method of justifying revolution as a technique of social change is to assume it inevitable; and this assumption Eastman's book makes unavailable for Eastman himself. His critique here of the logic of what he himself regards the friendly villain of the piece—Marx—damages the ethics of what Eastman's countrymen regard his villainous friend—Lenin.

T. V. SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE HEBREW FAMILY: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY. By Earle Bennett Cross. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927. Pp. xi+217. Price, $2.50.

There are available to students of primitive societies a number of fairly reliable and complete ethnographic studies of the people of the Old Testament, and there are not a few "sociologies of the Bible" based on such accounts. One has a right, therefore, to expect a new volume in this field either to synthesize the available material, to advance research in some way, to apply a new point of view or method of treatment to the data, or to popularize what has been done by others. It is difficult to determine which of these objectives the author had in mind, for the book does not clearly conform to any of these aims. It represents, however, a

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readable and sophisticated interpretation of the Hebrew family based on the Old Testament, and may be welcome as an attempt to round out the growing series of institutional monographs dealing with Hebrew life.

Such studies generally presuppose the happy combination in one person of training in biblical criticism as well as the fundamentals of social science. Professor Henry T. Fowler, in his Introduction to the volume, assures us that the author has both of these prerequisites and that the facts presented in this book may be used "with confidence by students of sociology as representing the careful and exact results of modern Old Testament scholarship." This is gratifying, in view of the fact that with the exception of four or five passing references to other authors on controversial points, this volume is devoid of mention of the great number of scholarly volumes that have preceded it in this field.

Not being trained in biblical criticism, the present reviewer must confine himself to a few comments on the sociological aspects of the volume. From this standpoint, the most obvious and persistent shortcoming of the book is the fact that Professor Cross seems to have fallen into the error of accepting the now generally discredited nineteenth-century monotypical social-evolutionary hypothesis as a fact. He says: "The pages of this book will register the fact that the development of Hebrew social life as far as the family is concerned was along lines similar to those which humanity has been found to have followed in other parts of the world and in parallel stages of history" (p. x). This leads the author into rather serious error, especially when it is recognized that the principal thesis of the book is that the Hebrew family originally was metronymic and later became patronymic, and that one of the chief arguments in favor of this thesis is that this is what generally or always happens in human society, or, as the author puts it:

> By analogy with the development of the institution of the family among other races and peoples of mankind, we are led to expect that the Hebrews passed through a stage in which kinship was reckoned through the mother rather than the father. This stage has usually preceded that form of tracing kinship with which we are more familiar, wherein the family name is that of the father [p. 1].

It is doubtful whether any considerable number of modern students of the family or of human-culture history would subscribe to this assumption.

It appears that biblical scholars are now agreed on the general chronology of the various Old Testament documents; and one is gratified to find that the temporal sequence which they have accepted does not at all correspond to the garbled, orthodox versions, which have stood in the

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way of objective interpretation until recently. The acuity of scholarship has even gone so far as to discover what passages in the Bible have suffered from the tampering of editors of various periods, and to reconstruct with some degree of plausibility the original versions. In this connection it is surprising to see to what extent the technique of students of folk lore has revitalized the sterile scholasticism which but a few years ago passed under the dubious label of "higher criticism."

The author explains the occasional appearance of metronymic practice as the misunderstanding on the part of later editors having patronymic bias, or as the survival of earlier mores. (See the case of Bethuel, p. 35.) In such a case it is possible that his evolutionary assumption will lead to erroneous interpretation of philological data, for it is not always true that metronymic forms precede patronymic forms. The author seems to overlook in such instances the possibility of the emergence of cultural disharmonies through diffusion. Ethnologists nowadays feel that neighbors may be even more influential than ancestors in shaping the pattern of a given culture.

Another consequence of the author's social evolutionary view is his assumption that the metronymic order is necessarily more primitive and of a lower form than the patronymic. It happens, for instance, that patronymic customs exist in such archaic cultures as those of the West Australians and the Fuegians of South America. In a few instances the author confuses the metronymic forms with matrilocal customs. It is one thing for children to get their names from the mother's family, and quite another for them to live with the mother's family. (See, for instance, the case of Moses, pp. 16–17.) The task of explaining the process of transition from metronymic to patronymic family life in the case of the Hebrews still remains, and must probably await the discovery of the streams of cultural diffusion from surrounding tribes to which the Hebrews were subject and to which their prophets gave articulate expression.

Although the author cautions us not to confuse the matriarchate with the metronymic group, there are occasional lapses on the part of the author himself on this point. These are probably unconscious "Freudian slips," which indicate that the author after all feels that the distinction between a metronymic and patronymic group is not quite as significant as that between the matriarchate and the patriarchal family. In the natural history of the family the Hebrew family is generally treated as the arch-type of the patriarchate. We may surmise, however, that the philological tradition in biblical criticism does not lend itself so well to the analysis of that type of phenomena. Naming is thus empha-

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sized at the expense of control. It is interesting to note in this connection that in our society we are still following metronymic customs in the case of illegitimate children, and that in our more cultured city families we get a revival of the matriarchate.

This study is probably as valuable for the questions it raises as for those which it answers. Such topics as the age of marriage, child marriages, birth-control, and adoption are not treated. It is to be regretted that in the last chapter the author finds it necessary to rise or to fall—depending upon one's point of view—in the tone of his otherwise objective volume to the level of a Sunday-school lesson. When the author, in his final conclusion, says: "The true historian should ever be alert to profit by the lessons of the past in their bearing upon the present," he is exposing himself to the criticism of a considerable section of the historical guild. History, they have learned, furnishes ample precedents and sanctions for the most contradictory social policies of today. Thus Professor Cross himself cautions the reader that "the practice of polygamy by Abraham . . . . is no warrant for polygamy in modern life" (p. 210).

It is the chief merit of this volume that it assembles in compact and readable form the most pertinent facts about the family life of the Hebrews, which would be difficult to obtain by students lacking training in biblical criticism.

LOUIS WIRTH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

HUMANIST SERMONS. Edited by Curtis W. Reese. Chicago and London: Open Court Publishing Co., 1927. Pp. 262. Price, $2.50.

In this volume a university professor and seventeen preachers of the radical wing of Unitarianism contribute their "best sermons" in the interest of a religion of humanism. While each may be said to sing his own verse, differing one from another in the number of traditional religious concepts maintained, all join in one chorus in insisting upon keeping Man alone, such as he is, at the focal point. In this sense it may rightly be termed (as one author frankly declares) an anthropocentric religion. A united stand is made against any theocentric or christocentric approach, against any theological or philosophical premise—in short, against the traditional. Cosmological theories may or may not be true—a Reality beyond may be or may not be—all this lies at the periphery, if it lies at all.

The high ethical motives and the serious interest and concern with which these contributors view the "here and now" of our contemporaries

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and the tomorrow of our children's children can hardly be questioned. The question which these sermons raise is how long may such ideals be maintained without the sustaining background of some religious-philosophical certainty? If man be the measure of all things, may not the persistent claim and the wide recognition of a Beyond-that-is-within (a testimony of Man himself) lay claim to a place very close to the focal point?

VERGILIUS FERM

COLLEGE OF WOOSTER

SPIRITUAL EXERCISES AND THEIR RESULTS: AN ESSAY IN PSYCHOLOGY AND COMPARATIVE RELIGION. By Aelfrida Tillyard. New York: Macmillan Co., 1927. Pp. viii+216.

In this book, students of mysticism and religion are informed of the practical methods employed by present-day Hindus, Buddhists, Mohammedans, and Christians in training their souls for communion with ultimate reality. The author's discussion supports the thesis that religious persons, dissatisfied with ritual or theological religion and desirous of immediate contact with the Unseen, may attain, through certain existing systems of meditation, the mystical, unitive state. The elements of spiritual exercise (the adopting of a definite posture, the regulation of the breath, the banishing of intruding thoughts, concentration, and the repeating of sacred sentences) are fully explained and evaluated. The religious and ethical prerequisites of true mysticism are emphasized; and the difference between the ordinary hypnotic state and the hypnotic consciousness, produced by spiritual practices, are clearly brought out. Valuable in the writer's treatment of the Hindu meditations are the classifications of the different Hindu sects, of the many kinds of Yoga, and the various stages of the Yogi. The progress of the Buddhist mystic through the four Jhānas and the four Aruppas to pervasive consciousness of Nirvana is interestingly described. In the examination of Mohammedan mysticism, the distinguishing characteristics of the different orders of the Sufis and the steps, which Sufis must take to achieve Truth, are fully presented. Many illustrations of the phenomenon of conversion in Mohammedanism are given. In the analysis of Christian mysticism, the methods of meditation used in the Eastern, Roman, and evangelical churches are depicted. Outlines of the formal Ignatian and Sulpician systems are set forth. In the judgment of the author, the Christian mystic is peculiarly sensitive to the duty of ethical excellency. All mysticisms, however, are discussed as involving a change in the aspirant's character, together with a frequent reception of visions, auditions, or miraculous powers. The

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spiritual exercises described in the book are practical for those who, as professional mystics, would devote themselves completely to the attainment of religious ecstasy. They have little significance for persons who would secure mystical satisfaction without a sacrifice of the secular interests of life. The work, provided with a good index, will be useful as a dictionary of many of the technical terms used in the literature of mysticism.

D. L. EVANS

OHIO WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY

SHORTER NOTICES

CURRENT CHRISTIAN THINKING. By Gerald Birney Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928. Pp. 209. Price, $2.00.

We have in this book a compact survey of contemporary theology written to attract the interest of those non-professional readers who are wondering about the present disputes and quarrels within Christian circles. New alignments, it is shown, have been set up by the introduction of the scientific and historical approach to the study of Christianity, which have cut across the old denominational lines. The antithesis between the old authoritative and dogmatic platforms of the several confessional orthodoxies and the quest for such norms as will meet the severer test of modern criticism is sharply drawn. A dogmatic theology can hardly satisfy a generation trained in scientific procedure. Current Christian thinking is in the throes of readjustment and re-valuation. The present issues are made clear by an exposition of some of the conspicuous schools of contemporary thought, e.g., Roman Catholicism, Protestant orthodoxy, modernism, fundamentalism, evolutionism, New Thought, Ritschlianism, etc. Professor Smith concludes with an excellent discussion of evangelical Christianity where modern disputants will find in the "inner spirit rather than in any particular system of doctrines" their only possible rallying point.

To intelligent lay discussion groups the book commends itself most admirably.

VERGILIUS FERM

A STUDY IN TOLERANCE: AS PRACTICED BY MUHAMMAD AND HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCESSORS. By Adolph L. Wismar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1927. Pp. xvi+108. Price, $1.50.

Students of the history of religion and ethics will find in this doctor's dissertation at Columbia an important contribution to an understanding of early Muhammadanism. Dr. Wismar has studied the Qur'an and early authorities to ascertain the tactics advocated and pursued by Muhammad and his immediate successors, with special reference to the inquiry in what measure these may be called "tolerant."

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The well-known injunction of the Qur'an "Let there be no compulsion in religion" is to be interpreted not as a principle of polity but as a theological affirmation of the complete control of Allah in matters of faith and discipleship. As such, the passage does not forbid the punishment of the rebellious, a commandment otherwise explicitly stated in the Qur'an (p. 8). The prophet regarded a difference in religion as ground for attack, yet allowed the defeated their faith provided certain prescribed tributes were forthcoming. "In this respect Muhammed was tolerant enough." If we are to judge early Islam with twentieth-century standards, let us consistently apply the same standards all around. Muhammed was as tolerant toward Jews and Christians as these were toward each other (p. 60). Furthermore, "in the early days of Islam Jews and such Christians as did not accept the imperial theology were better off under the Muslim caliph than under the Christian Emperor" (p. 105).

VERGILIUS FERM

THE WAY OF MODERNISM AND OTHER ESSAYS. By J. F. Bethune-Baker, Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. Cambridge: University Press, 1927. Pp. 150. Price, 6s. net.

We have in this collection of addresses the fearless utterances of an Anglican priest who has become an Anglican prophet. It is his conviction that "whoever else goes out of the Church of England, Modernists must not; for it is their natural home." The time is ripe for theological revision only when the fallibility of inherited infallibilites is recognized; when traditional formulas and terminologies are understood as symbols and "pictorial representations of religious realities"; and when there will be satisfaction in fewer affirmations (and perhaps less denials) and more questions left open.

Modernism "objects to the canonization of the thought of any particular epoch in the life of the race." It is not a system, but a spirit. The only approach to reconstruction, union, and harmony is through "the way" which it offers. Readers will find in this stimulating book the old familiar doctrines of historic Christianity interpreted in an arresting way.

VERGILIUS FERM

NEW REALISM AND OLD REALITY. By D. Luther Evans. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1928. Pp. x+214.

This work, as the subtitle indicates, is not a contribution to Neo-realistic doctrine but a "Critical Introduction to the Philosophy of the New Realists." As such, it should find a welcome with all those who are interested in contemporary philosophy. In the Preface, the author specifically states that his work is not meant to serve as a substitute for the original writings of Neo-realistic thinkers, but rather as a help to students with little training in philosophy. Moreover, the purpose of the book is not to attempt to picture Neo-realism as a "reflection of the culture of America," though it is "peculiarly interpretative of the American mind"; but "the aim of the book is to present a critical exposition, and not a sociological justification of new realism."

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Throughout the book, the author remains true to his intention of giving the reader a critical introduction to New Realism. The criticisms offered are, in general, from the idealist point of view and are cogent to adherents of that view. They consist mainly in showing that Neo-realism becomes involved in the very kinds of errors for which it condemns the traditional philosophies. The advanced reader may accuse the author of a somewhat hasty and superficial treatment of the Neo-realists themselves. But such an accusation would be unjust in view of the fact that the author expressly states that his book is intended as an introduction to, and not as a substitute for, the original writings. And the author has, to an admirable extent, gathered, correlated, and critically discussed a large amount of difficult and complicated material, and he has done so with such a degree of objectivity and fairness as to make the work an extremely valuable and commendable one.

GEORGE DYKHUIZEN

IRANIAN STUDIES. By Cursetji Erachji Pavry. Bombay: Captain Printing Works, 1927. Pp. xxii+239. Price, Rs. 10.00.

This volume is a translation from Gujarati, the author's native tongue, in which he has made several contributions to the knowledge of Zoroastrianism. Chapters v–ix treat of problems connected with the astronomy of the Avesta, while the rest of the eleven chapters discuss the ritualistic and ethical injunctions of the Parsi religion. The material in these studies is of special interest because worked over by one who, himself a priest, has first-hand information as to literature and ceremonial. Moreover, these researches are freely interspersed with the comments of one who is anxious for the welfare of his people and desires to purify religion and custom. We cannot underestimate the importance of forming correct notions about the original intentions and ideals of a religion which is not yet abandoned but lives still in thoughts, customs, and ceremonies of the Parsi people. The author renders a distinct service by pointing out what, in his phraseology, is "contrary to the spirit of" his religion (cf. pp. 180, 187 *et al.*), combatting "ghastly ignorance" as well as deliberate concealment of truth (p. 176). It is well in reforming a religion to begin by elevating priestly ethics (cf. e.g., pp. 25, 32, 35, 41–43, 164–65, 191). For, in a community based on ancient models, it is the priest who watches over conduct and prayers and rites of the laity.

Having a thorough knowledge of the literature and applying the text-critical method thereto, the author's contention seems justified (especially after comparing Parsi with Hindu ancient texts) that the injunctions of the original religion are concerned more with the "welfare of the living soul" (p. 192; cf. pp. 170 f., 193) than with the ubiquitous soul. In Zoroastrianism this manifests itself pre-eminently in precepts regarding sanitation (cf. pp. 36–51, 52–53, 57, 67–68, 73–74, 168, 170, 187); a good and useful life (pp. 69, 170–71, 174–75, 186); abandonment of too great reverence of the dead "at the cost of the living" (p. 51; cf. elsewhere), simplicity and economy in worship, ceremonial, care of the dead (pp. 41, 164, 173–74, 176, 180, 193); regard for

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animals (pp. 26 f., 215); elimination of nonsensical practices in connection with the atonement of the dead; personal responsibility for deeds done during life (p. 175); and, finally, improvements in ritual in respect to meaning (cf. the astronomical chs. and pp. 167, 176 and otherwise chap. xi). Though it is true that a study of the past persuades the enthusiast that at the beginning lay the golden age, and though the ethical injunctions are conditioned or, rather, reciprocal with geographic, climatic, and ethnical circumstances—the possibility that religion, thus interpreted, could be of wholesome influence in a community that still stands in need of it is not precluded thereby (cf. p. xiii of the Introduction, the biography of author by G. K. Nariman).

With reference to the astronomical material, we must withhold criticism. The author's speculations are mainly influenced by what B. G. Tilak has asserted long ago. But the relation of art and astronomy pointed out by the author (pp. 101–6, 113) is stimulating. In conclusion, it may be useful to remind the student of ethics that a knowledge of philology is indispensable when studying from literary remains the morality of a bygone people. *Iranian Studies* gives ample testimony to the fact (e.g., pp. 58, 117 ff., 155, 186, 187–88, 215–16). We may well look forward to a better insight into oriental culture if Western methods are adapted by those of the East who remained true to the "spirit of their religion," like the author who dedicates his volume to the scholars of the West as a mark of regard.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

A HISTORY OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY. By Horatio W. Dresser. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1928. Pp. xiv+471. Price, $3.00.

This volume continues the survey of philosophic thought from the point where the author's previous *History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* concludes its presentation. The work introduces the student and the general reader to the leading tendencies and systems of modern thought from the beginning of the seventeenth century until the present day. In a prefatory statement regarding the productive motives in modern philosophy, the author asserts:

> The direct line of development is not from Bacon to Voltaire, and thence to the meager results of thinkers who have given up the metaphysical enterprise: it is from Descartes and other rationalists to the critical issues raised by Locke, the idealistic analysis of Berkeley, the sceptical analysis of Hume; and thence to Kant and the post-Kantians, with frequent reminders of Leibniz; and finally to the recent polemic of realists whose discussions can hardly be understood without grasping the idealisms wherewith they contend [p. vi.].

This point of view is of special interest in a time when there is a pronounced tendency to exalt the humanistic and the positivistic above the metaphysical and rationalistic influences in the progress of philosophy. The writer is not indifferent, however, to the tremendous effect of scientific principles and procedures upon the thinking of the last three hundred years. On the other hand, he maintains that the dominant concern of modern epistemologists and metaphysicians has been to evolve a world-view, which would be a philosophy of

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science. The conservation of values must remain the philosopher's supreme ideal, but he must "relate the values which withstand criticism to the cosmos of mathematical and physical conceptions which we call the modern world" (p. viii). The book is divided into two parts: the first leading from Francis Bacon to Kant, and the second from Kant through current theory. Not only the individual thinkers but also the intellectual movements of the past three centuries are given full exposition and evaluation. In addition to their theories, the lives, works, values, and successors of the outstanding philosophers are discussed. The book is meritorious in clearly and completely presenting, in separate sections, the main notions of the leading thinkers; in providing a thorough perspective of modern philosophy by including references to lesser men and movements; in furnishing with each subject an extended bibliography of books available for introductory study; and in treating contemporary schools as important and integral aspects of the philosophical process. The book closes with the thesis that the trend of modern thought encourages the acceptance of a spiritualistic philosophy, which is personalistic and pluralistic.

D. L. EVANS

MENTAL PHASES IN A SPIRITUAL BIOGRAPHY. By George Preston Mains. New York: Harper and Bros., 1928. Pp. xiii+256. Price, $2.00.

This book, written in a reminiscent fashion, portrays the religious and philosophical environment of a man, who, for fifty-seven years, has been, as minister, editor, author, and publisher, a distinguished figure in American Methodism. The author is more concerned to examine the objective cultural setting of his career than to offer a subjective account of his own mental history. His analysis of such intellectual issues as science, morality, evolution, freedom, and God is always interesting and often inspiring, but seldom original. An individual, desirous of an increased hopefulness for Chrisianity, will find in the discussions of "God in Christ" and "Christ in History" apologetic arguments of clear and convincing character. The evils of the present age and values of Christianity for civilization are completely and compellingly presented. As Oscar L. Joseph indicates in a Foreword, the standpoint of the writer is frankly that of an evangelical Christian, who believes that fidelity to faith and fairness to fact are simultaneously possible. Friends of the author will be interested in the survey of his professional achievements, with which the work is introduced.

D. L. EVANS

THE PREWAR MIND IN BRITAIN: AN HISTORICAL REVIEW. By C. E. Playne. Large 8vo., pp. 445. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Price, 16s. net.

This is a very careful and fully documented study of the crowd and its leaders in Great Britain just before the World War. It covers newspapers, novels, and biographies, and official documents. It is very good psychological analysis, with a "moral" in the breakdown of August, 1914. Miss Playne has

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already published a valuable study of the mind prevalent in Germany and in France before the war. We have, therefore, in her work a good basis for psychological politics. It would need, however, to be corrected by an analysis of other tendencies, for example, those toward a higher standard of life and subtler civilization which happen indeed not to have been dominant in 1914. It would be quite unfair to treat the growth of war passion, or even of fear, as the only factor in British life before the war; and indeed the weakness of those who opposed the tendency toward war is no less obvious than the folly of those who promoted it. There really was no peace policy except the old-fashioned non-interference, and the "pacifists" were out of touch with the common man. A psychological study of "superior persons" would be illuminating as a guide to the understanding of the ineffectiveness of reformers.

C. D. B.

PRAYER AND POETRY. By H. Bremond, of the French Academy. Translated by Algar Thorold. 8vo., pp. 200. London, England: Burns Oates & Washbourne. Price, *7s. 6d.*

The Abbé Bremond was once a Jesuit, and he studied in England. This gives his book its serenity of argument and the width of its appeal. Poetry is treated as a mystery. That, in itself, is rather to make than to solve a problem! But the author skilfully analyzes the experience of the poets and compares it with that of religious mystics. The purification of the soul and the consequent capacity to perceive the more subtle values in things are common to poet and mystic. The attitude in the mystic's "prayer" is not unfairly indicated as an essential fact for the understanding of poetry. The book is valuable and suggestive. It is very doubtful whether the word "prayer" does not cover a distinction between "magic" and "insight" which is observed by the use of the same word in religious apologia; but with due allowance for the summary motive of the thesis, the conclusion seems valid. One suspects, however, that the word "prayer" is being transformed in meaning out of all recognition.

C. D. B.

THE EFFECTS OF THE REFORMATION ON IDEALS OF LIFE AND CONDUCT: HUSEAN PRIZE ESSAY OF CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY FOR 1925. By F. K. Chaplin. 8vo., p. 167. Cambridge, England: Heffer. Price, *5s.* net.

This is a short but very valuable study of the separation of the Church from the State, of religion from the Church, and of morality from religion. The only doubtful statements occur when prophecy is attempted. The author believes that "Rome must perish" but that "Catholicism will endure." But even here what is valuable is the application of history to a contemporary problem, and the author deserves gratitude for not having left the old controversies of Protestantism and Catholicism at the Reformation in the barren desert of documents. The issues faced at the Reformation are not yet decided: and new issues as to the relation of morality to religion were raised in the nineteenth century. These are very well summarized by Mr. Chaplin. The trouble

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is that any existing practice can be put down to the Reformation: for example, was the nineteenth-century British Sunday due to the Reformation or is the exising British Sunday "spirit" due to the Reformation? It all depends upon a theory of causation in history.

C. D. B.

SEXUAL ETHICS. By R. Michels, professor of economics at Basle University. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. Small 8vo., pp. 209. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Price, 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

This book was first published in English in 1914 and is now reissued. It is interesting chiefly because it is not dogmatic; nor does it assume that we have arrived at any final statement of the problems of sexual morality or of their solutions. The contrast between the law and the social code which is now customary in civilized society is very well stated. The study of Rome and the very different acts that cause shame in different societies is also illuminating. The evidence given by Professor Michels is interesting and varied, and his suggstions are valuable morally because he does not make them into universal rules of conduct. If there is a criticism to be made, it is that the evidence is largely from Italy and Germany, both countries in which the position of women is still somewhat primitive, in spite of advances made by some small groups in Germany. Half the evidence from such countries, however, is much more typical of the whole human race than such evidence as could be obtained in England or the United States.

C. D. B.

THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT. By William Bennet Munro. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 169. Price, $1.75.

If there be a single thread that ties the six essays of this volume together —essays earlier delivered as lectures at two universities—it is the notion that tradition, and back of tradition, geography, not only make a nation, but run its government. Other "invisible" forces that are touched upon in the essays are propaganda, stereotypes such as popular sovereignty, and the money power, which latter is here sympathetically treated. The thesis of an invisible determination of governmental policies is not, however, rigorously developed. Critical opinion can do much, is doing something, and probably will do more to direct governmental policies in America. In the opening essay the opinion is hazarded that "there is more fundamentalism in the political than in the religious thought of American people today." In the closing essay the suggestion is made that public opinion may continue to express itself more and more in regional terms until there arises between the states and the national government in America "eight or ten regional governments . . . . each with its governor-general and its own regional legislature." The book as a whole has the not unhappy incoherence, the loose flowing style, and the unrigorous stimulative power that one finds and approves in public addresses of genial personalities.

T. V. S.

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THE GOLDEN BOOK: THE STORY OF FINE BOOKS AND BOOKMAKING, PAST AND PRESENT. By Douglas C. McMurtrie. Chicago: Pascal Covici, 1927. Pp. xiv+410. Price, $6.00.

The title of this book indicates the purpose of it: to arouse ambition for, and to facilitate the accomplishment of, books that will be beautiful in workmanship. The subtitle indicates the procedure relied upon to achieve this end. The account is written from the viewpoint of the designer and the printer, the treatment is historical where this is felt to be the best approach, but the desire to improve the artistic quality of performance is never lost sight of. The author lays down in his first chapter the reassuring maxim that "sound bookmaking is not necessarily expensive bookmaking." The last fourth of the book, following the historical survey, is given over to "a discussion of the various features of bookmaking entering into the planning and production of various kinds of books," with a short program at the end looking concretely toward "an ideal within the limits of accomplishment." This book itself is a beautiful example of current book manufacture.

T. V. S.

THE SCIENCE OF RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION. By Lewis Guy Rohrbaugh. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1927. Pp. xii+291; index. Price, $3.00.

With the increasing demand for survey courses in religion in non-denominational colleges and in universities there is a parallel need for texts suitable for undergraduates trained as they are in the sciences and in the scientific approach to human problems. Professor Rohrbaugh's *Science of Religion* is an attempt to present an intricate and comprehensive subject in a way that will commend itself to such an approach. Most of his material is drawn from the findings in the field of psychology of religion. One might wish that such a closely related subject as ethics had received adequate treatment in the discussion, since the two fields are so often confused in the minds of students. The material is presented in an interesting way and well organized throughout.

VERGILIUS FERM

ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Harold Underwood Faulkner. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. xiv+301.

Constituting one of the volumes in "The World Today Bookshelf," this book sets down in untechnical language the high points in American economic development. It begins with economic problems in Colonial times and closes with social as well as economic tendencies in the post-war period. There are bibliographies at the end of each chapter, and "a working list of books for students in American Economic History" at the end.

T. V. S.

ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. ("The World Today Bookshelf.") By Willard L. Thorp. New York: Macmillan Co., 1928. Pp. 306.

Conceiving economics as "the study of the process whereby society attempts to satisfy the wants of its members," Professor Thorp raises the ques-

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tion as to why our economic life, developed without conscious planning, is not chaos. The answer is that it moves, largely unconsciously, within the limitations of social habits, which we call "institutions." The four outstanding sets of habits, hereafter designated as institutions, are "machine technique," the "price system," "private property," and "business enterprise." A section is given to each of these. The discussions are both concrete and theoretically informed. In a simple style the author succeeds admirably in making visible the structure of modern life at its economic base. The treatise as a whole, organized around an intelligible psychological analysis of the nature of institutions, comprises for all its simplicity and unpretentiousness a singularly clear and vivid presentation of the important data that make up many much larger volumes on economics. A concluding chapter in which the criticisms of each of these four institutions are studied objectively lends an ethical air to the volume.

T. V. S.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CARE OF INFANT AND CHILD. By John B. Watson, with the assistance of Rosalie Rayner Watson. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1928. Pp. 195. Price, $2.00.

Dr. Watson undertakes here to write such a useful account of the psychological care of infants as Dr. Holt, in his *The Care and Feeding of Children,* wrote of the physiological care. The usual behavioristic point of view shows itself to great advantage here by an absence of sentimentalism. The lack of sentiment regarding motherhood, and particularly regarding the home, may prejudice some, but only those who have never peeped over the moral frontier marked by blind custom. Some of the material in this book is already familiar to readers. The Johns Hopkins experiments on infants are here told again with simple illustrations of the conditioning processes. But newer clinical material is to be found here also.

The belief that all human responses of love, fear, and rage are built in by the environment, starting with very few naturally stimulative experiences, is here organized into a practical philosophy of child nurture. The aim to instruct is constantly, and very skilfully, tempered by the aim to make the instruction effective for practice. Few prejudices are allowed to stand in the way of a scientific facing of the child's problems from the point of view of his future happiness rather than the happiness of parents. The book is dedicated "to the first mother who brings up a happy child." The whole presentation is remarkably sane in its orientation. Socialization is never lost sight of, but there is a conspicuous absence of illusory sanctions for the emphasis. Instruction is very specific where experimental data are available—in regard to removing undesirable responses as well as to setting desirable responses. Where data are wanting, advice frankly gives way to confession and to hope. There is a chapter on night and daytime care, and one on sex instruction for children. Meager as experimental data still are, a page motivated by this empirical temper is worth books of previous pious hope.

T. V. S.

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INSIDE EXPERIENCE. By Joseph K. Hart. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1927. Pp. xxvi+287. Price, $2.50.

To some men is given an exuberance of insight which refuses to be impeded by the difficulties of exact formulation and statement, which must express itself, where other means lag, by italics, by metaphor, or by the triumphant piling up of synonyms. It is Professor Hart's good fortune to have such exuberance; and it is our good fortune that he is not without insight. Unfortunately, as he insists, the view he presents must be experienced to be understood. Nevertheless, he who merely reads will recognize that the doctrines outlined belong, as Professor Hart avows, to the type of philosophy developed by Professor Dewey. From the point of view of such philosophy Professor Hart furnishes an exposition of an almost complete philosophical system, discussing, among other things, nature, matter, mind, morality, science, religion, education, art, society, and the intellectual life. Though Professor Hart brings to the exposition the fruit of his own experiences, his additions to Professor Dewey are too much in the nature of detail to be indicated satisfactorily in a brief review; and Professor Dewey's views are too well-known to need repetition here. Suffice it to say that for those who find Professor Dewey's writings somewhat hard, too thorough in analysis, and a trifle too "logical," *Inside Experience* will afford a welcome substitute. Perhaps in it, pragmatic doctrines are a little blurred in outline; but this is more than counterbalanced by the heightened tempo of the exposition.

CHARNER M. PERRY

SECRET HISTORY OF PROCOPIUS. Translated by Richard Atwater. Chicago: Pascal Covici, 1927. Pp. 286.

In a new translation of a work attributed, not without dissent, to Procopius, an important historian of the sixth century, Mr. Atwater gives us the scandals of the reign of Justinian. The history purports to supplement the published histories of Procopius by revealing truths whose publication expediency forbade. Whether true or not, the accusations are interesting; Mr. Atwater has put them into graceful English; and the book makes use of an attractive new type-face designed by Mr. Douglas C. McMurtrie.

CHARNER M. PERRY

PHILOSOPHY TODAY. Collected and edited by Edward Leroy Schaub. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1928. Pp. x+609. Price, $3.75.

Containing thirty essays, by as many different men, on various aspects of philosophical thought in more than half a dozen countries, this volume defies any attempt at summary. Philosophy in English-speaking countries is dealt with at some length, as are also current philosophical movements in France and Germany. Russian, Scandinavian, and South American philosophies receive only one article each. While the volume does not give quite a complete survey of philosophy today, it does contain a wide range of information, not merely in regard to metaphysics and epistemology but in regard to ethics,

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logic, aesthetics, and the philosophy of religion as well. Moreover, most of the articles are written by men of some importance in their fields.

CHARNER M. PERRY

PRINCIPLES AND PRECEPTS. By Hastings Rashdall. New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1927. Pp. 256. Price, $2.25.

Though the ethical doctrines of the late Hastings Rashdall are adequately expressed in works previously published, this posthumous volume of sermons fills out the skeleton of theory with applications to problems of practice. Aside from some discussion of such topics as punishment, rules and principles, and determinism, these sermons contribute, not to ethical theory, but to a philosophy of life. From this point of view they are valuable reading, as well for their sympathy and tolerance as for the acuteness of mind reflected in them.

CHARNER M. PERRY

A SIDE-LIGHT ON ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1839–1858. Washington: The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History, 1927. Pp. vii+407. Price, $2.15.

Limiting their own statements to a brief introduction and conclusion, the editors of this volume present a large number of letters written by some of the men who took part in antislavery agitation in this country and England. Aside from the information they afford in regard to an important period, the letters contain valuable source material for a study of what might be called the "psychology of agitation." The letters contain very little argument against slavery but are devoted almost entirely to practical questions of steps to be taken in order to checkmate the opposition and to further the antislavery movement. Not the least interesting feature of the volume is the opportunity it gives us to see from the point of view of intent reformers novel aspects of such events as the Webster-Ashburton treaty and the annexation of Texas.

CHARNER M. PERRY

A POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: PARLIAMENTS, PARTIES, AND PRESS AS OF JANUARY 1, 1928. Edited by Malcolm W. Davis and Walter H. Mallory. Published for Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., by Harvard University and Yale University Press, 1928. Pp. 192.

Feeling the great need of an authoritative statement of facts where possible and of considered and fair opinion where facts are not available upon current governmental organization and forces, the Council on Foreign Relations has published this extremely valuable handbook on parliaments, parties, and press of all countries except the United States. The latter omission is explained as due to the use of the book primarily by Americans. The explanation is good as far as it goes; but it would be enlightening to many users of the handbook to see such a classification, for instance, of the American press as is here given for the press of other countries, in terms of its political allegiance. This is a usable and attractive volume.

T. V. S.

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NOTES

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